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STUDIA PHILOSOPHICA KANTIANA

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# STUDIA PHILOSOPHICA KANTIANA

filozofický časopis pre kriticko-rekonštrukčné uvažovanie

2/2024  
ročník 13

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Vážené čitateľky, vážení čitatelia,

s radosťou Vám predstavujem druhé číslo časopisu *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* v roku 2024. Ide o špeciálne číslo, ktorého prvú časť tvorí šesť monotematických príspevkov na tému „Rethinking Perpetual Peace“, venujúcich sa aktuálnej problematike opätovného premýšľania o Kantovej koncepcii večného mieru.

Hostujúcou editorkou tejto časti je Michaela Fišerová, ktorá túto aktuálnu tému otvára svojou štúdiou „Perpetual Peace Today: Ethics and Politics of Sustainability“. Jej článok sa zameriava na súčasné filozofické revízie koncepcie večného mieru Immanuela Kanta z hľadiska udržateľnosti mieru, ktoré autorka prepája s jednotlivými témami príspevkov v tomto špeciálnom čísle. Svojou úvodnou štúdiou formuluje východiská a prístupy autorov (David Peroutka, Martin Šimsa, Jan Šmíd, Michaela Fišerová a Krzysztof Skonieczny), ktorí sa snažia premýšľať o problémoch mieru v súčasnosti, aby zároveň uvažovala aj o nových smerovaniach etickej a politickej diskusie o udržateľnosti mieru v dnešnej dobe.

Ďalšiu časť časopisu tvoria tri vedecké štúdie. Adrián Kvokačka vo svojom článku „Estetika každodennosti a Kant?“ inovatívne predstavuje možnosti, ktoré ponúka Kantova estetika formulovaná v *Kritike súdnosti* pre súčasný diskurz estetiky každodennosti. Štúdia poukazuje na to, že Kantova estetická teória ponúka vhodný základ pre estetické hodnotenie každodenných predmetov a že mierny posun v tom, ako sa tradične interpretuje *Kritiku súdnosti*, stačí na to, aby bolo možné vidieť jej aplikovateľnosť na oblasť estetiky každodennosti.

Príspevok Eugena Andreanskeho „Kant, mimozemšťania, evolúcia a rasová teória“ sa venuje kontextu, charakteru a dôsledkom Kantových úvah o ľudských rasách. Autor poukazuje na rozpor medzi Kantovými myšlienkami o hierarchii ľudských rás podľa ich vlastností a schopností

na jednej strane a Kantovou etickou teóriou, univerzalizmom a kozmopolitizmom na strane druhej a poukazuje aj na to, že dôsledkom Kantovho nazerania na prírodu je uplatnenie hierarchickej schémy a prvkov environmentalistického uvažovania aj na mimozemské bytosti.

Andrea Miškocová sa v štúdiu „Moral Formation in Kant's Philosophy” venuje téme mravného zdokonaľovania u Kanta v kontexte jeho teórie mravného rozvoja ako aj v súvislosti s kategorickým imperatívom a Kantovou analýzou cností.

Súčasťou čísla je aj preklad prvej časti filozofickej eseje „O povahe napodobňovania, ktoré sa uskutočňuje v napodobňujúcich umeniach“ Adama Smitha, ktorého Kant označoval za svojho obľúbenca, vážil si ho a bol ním inšpirovaný.

Záverečným príspevkom je recenzia knihy *Kant and the Problem of Morality: Rethinking the Contemporary World* (Eds.: Luigi Caranti a Alessandro Pinzani), ktorú pripravila Monika Homulková.

Prajem Vám príjemné čítanie!

Sandra Zákutná  
december 2024

Dear readers,

I am pleased to present the second issue of *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* in 2024. This is a special issue, the first part of which consists of six monothematic papers devoted to the idea of “Rethinking Perpetual Peace”.

The guest editor of this part is Michaela Fišerová, who opens the topical theme with her article “Perpetual Peace Today: Ethics and Politics of Sustainability”. Her paper focuses on contemporary philosophical revisions of Immanuel Kant’s concept of perpetual peace from the perspective of the sustainability of peace, which she links to the topics of individual papers in this special issue. In her introductory study, she presents the backgrounds and approaches of authors (David Peroutka, Martin Šimsa, Jan Šmíd, Michaela Fišerová, and Krzysztof Skonieczny) who seek to reflect on the problems of peace in the present, in order to also consider new directions for the ethical and political debate on the sustainability of peace in our times.

The next part of the journal consists of three articles. Adrián Kvokačka in his text “Everyday Aesthetics and Kant?” innovatively presents the possibilities offered by Kant’s aesthetics as formulated in the *Critique of Judgement* for the contemporary discourse of the everyday aesthetics. The paper shows that Kant’s aesthetic theory offers a suitable basis for the aesthetic evaluation of everyday objects and that a slight shift in how the *Critique of Judgement* has traditionally been interpreted is enough to see its applicability to the field of the everyday aesthetics.

Eugen Andreansky’s paper “Kant, Extraterrestrials, Evolution and Racial Theory” discusses the context, character, and implications of Kant’s reflections on the human races. The author shows the contradiction between Kant’s ideas about the hierarchy of human races according to their characteristics and abilities on the one hand and Kant’s ethical theory, universalism and cosmopolitanism on the other hand. He also

points out that a consequence of Kant's view of nature is the application of the hierarchical scheme and elements of environmentalist reasoning to extraterrestrial beings as well.

Andrea Miškocová in her article "Moral Formation in Kant's Philosophy" deals with the topic of moral formation in Kant in the context of his theory of moral development as well as in connection with the categorical imperative and Kant's analysis of virtues.

The issue also includes a Slovak translation of the first part of the philosophical essay *Of the Nature of that Imitation which Takes Place in What Are Called the Imitative Arts* by Adam Smith, whom Kant referred to as his favourite, respected and was inspired by.

The final contribution is a review of the book *Kant and the Problem of Morality: Rethinking the Contemporary World* (Eds.: Luigi Caranti and Alessandro Pinzani) by Monika Homulková.

I wish you a pleasant reading!

Sandra Zákuťná  
december 2024



Michaela  
Fišerová

University of Jan  
Evangelista Purkyně

## Perpetual Peace Today: Ethics and Politics of Sustainability

**Abstract:** The article focuses on contemporary philosophical revisions of Immanuel Kant's concept of perpetual peace in the perspective of sustainability of peace, fundamentally threatened by our construction of inner and outer enemies. Its goal is to rethink this concept in relation to Gregg Lambert's theory of conceptual figures, understood as one of its relevant revisions, and to link them to the topic of individual papers collected in this special issue. As I argue, the papers creatively rethink the mentioned figures of political thinking to illustrate the ethical and political ways how to philosophically think about the problems of peace today. Finally, by questioning the role of our construction of alterity in our relation to identity, leading to our invention of inner and outer enemies, the article opens new directions in ethical and political discussion on the sustainability of peace today.

**Keywords:** Enemy, Gregg Lambert, Immanuel Kant, Peace, Sustainability, War

### I. Introduction: Rethinking Kant Today

By introducing the concept of perpetual peace in his 1795 essay *Toward Perpetual Peace*,<sup>1</sup> Kant formulates the idea of universal hospitality and security as a moral maxim for human behavior. I propose to join contemporary philosophers<sup>2</sup> in their efforts to rethink the ethical and po-

<sup>1</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. In: Kant, I. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on. Politics, Peace, and History*, trans. David L. Colclasure. New Haven: Yale University, pp. 67 – 109.

<sup>2</sup> Similar philosophical initiatives have been recently undertaken in legal, political, and ethical philosophy in Dörflinger, B., 2016. *Právne a etické aspekty Kantovej idey mieru*. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 5(1), pp. 3 – 17; Šajda, P., 2024. *Working for Peace in Situations of Conflict: On Schmitt's Reception of Kant*. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 13(1), pp. 28 – 44; Kupš, T., 2024. *Kant's Project of Perpetual Peace Today*. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 13(1), pp. 9 – 27.

litical problems related to this concept. The idea Kant's essay came with is still challenging. Contemporary world evolves into violent situations that force people to migrate. Some of them find themselves in the middle of a war zone. From one day to another, they discover they are seen as enemies. And they get bombed, wounded, killed. Sometimes in their sleep, sometimes in the streets, looking for safety. Those who are quicker and luckier leave their homes immediately. Trying to save bare lives, they leave all behind. Suddenly, they lose their homes, houses, apartments. By leaving their country, they become emigrants, outsiders in relation to other countries. Without the possibility to return, they lose trust and sense of security. In war, they lose peace.

More than two hundred years ago, Kant suggested it would be possible to avoid this situation. He even wrote a list of measures to prevent future wars, but none of his anti-war conditions were implemented and fulfilled. Why? Is there an answer to this question? Are there more than one?

In my view, one of the possible answers could be that global peace cannot exist constantly, perpetually. It can be only declared and signed, as a promise, as a word that must be kept. But to last, it needs more than that. It must be recalled, reexperienced, renewed over time. Even this consistent performative effort, however, does not guarantee that the vow of peace would not be broken. If this promise is broken, Kant's ethical-political duty of human hospitality and security remains unfulfilled. Old friends turn into new enemies. This means that enemies are not simply declared. They are progressively constructed, created, invented and re-invented.

In his essay *Inventing the Enemy*<sup>3</sup> Umberto Eco observes that friends may unite in shared hate for common enemy. To illustrate this problem, he recalls that some years ago in New York he found himself in conversation with a Pakistani taxi driver, who asked him where he came from. When Eco replied "Italy", the taxi driver asked how many of them there were and was surprised they were so few and that their language wasn't English. Then the driver asked Eco who our enemies were. He even explained that he wanted to know who were the people against whom we have fought through the centuries over land claims, ethnic rivalry, border incursions, and so forth. Surprised, Eco told him Italians are not at war with anyone. The driver insisted that he wanted to know who were

<sup>3</sup> Eco, U., 2012. *Inventing the Enemy and Other Occasional Writings*, trans. Richard Dixon. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

our historical enemies, those who kill them and whom they kill. Eco repeated that we don't have any, that we fought our last war more than half a century ago—starting, moreover, with one enemy and ending with another. The taxi driver wasn't satisfied with this answer. How can a country have no enemies? Thinking further about the conversation, Eco has come to the conclusion that “Italians have no outside enemies, or rather they are unable to agree on who they are, because they are continually at war with *each other*—Pisa against Lucca, Guelphs against Ghibellines, north against south, Fascists against Partisans, mafia against state, Berlusconi's government against the judiciary”.<sup>4</sup> He finds he could have explained to the taxi driver that “one of Italy's misfortunes over the past sixty years has been the absence of real enemies”.<sup>5</sup> Eco further argues that having a common external enemy is an important factor in building internal friendship, which is a practice that shall be explained by thinking in binary oppositions. To build and maintain an identity, we are involved in the process of creating and demonizing an alterity. As he puts it, “Having an enemy is important not only to define our identity but also to provide us with an obstacle against which to measure our system of values and, in seeking to overcome it, to demonstrate our own worth. So when there is no enemy, we have to invent one”.<sup>6</sup> In other words, Eco notes that it is the fear of enemy that unites us. By constructing an outer enemy, we construct inner unity. If there is no outer enemy, we keep ourselves busy with searching for inner enemies.

From another angle, the same problem is poetically described in Franz Kafka's story “The Burrow”<sup>7</sup> where he comments on his search for safety because of inner and outer threats. The figure of the narrator is an animal-like being who builds a vast hole or tunnel dug into the ground, connected to a network of subterranean passages. As the burrow is constructed for refuge or flight, the burrowing way of life is motivated mostly by fear of being vulnerable and unprotected from the outside world. It provides a form of shelter against predation and exposure to danger. In some interpretations, it is not only this fictional character, it is Kafka himself who burrows into language and constructs a subterranean shelter for refuge and safety from external predators.<sup>8</sup> But the struggles of

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Kafka, F., 1995. Burrow. In: *The Complete Stories*. New York: Schocken Books, p. 323 – 359.

<sup>8</sup> As Lambert puts it, Kafka “found refuge in this system from how he was determined as an individual by family and society; in the stories and tales, he escaped from the condition of

Kafka's animal character do not end here; the external threat is not his only nightmare. He realizes that he has to invent the outer enemy. Without doing so, he would start wars with his inner enemy, which would be much worse and would destroy his identity from the inside.

Is our identity, as Eco claims, destined to protect us from a threat coming from the outside? Is it, as Kafka claims, based on our fear that a bigger threat, the threat of disintegration, might come from the inside? In other words, do we construct outer enemies to help us unite? In the domain of philosophy, such a construction of enmity can be elaborated through conceptual work. To review this problem and answer the previously formulated questions, I propose to have a closer look at several new ways the traditional concepts of friend, enemy, war, and peace can be philosophically reinvented, recognized, and rethought today.

## II. Rethinking Peace Today: Who is the Enemy?

One of the possible new ways of rethinking this old topic was recently opened by Gregg Lambert in his book *Philosophy after Friendship*.<sup>9</sup> Although Lambert realizes that some of Kant's claims might sound as a philosopher's sweet dream, or an idea fit only for the academy, he recalls Kant's assertion that the idea of perpetual peace should be affirmed as a reality. Even if this reality cannot be empirically proven or disproven, it can still function as an *a priori* idea of reason for any future political philosophy. Lambert proposes to substitute this philosophy with his concept of "post-war philosophy".<sup>10</sup>

To elaborate on his post-war philosophy, Lambert returns to Deleuze and Guattari's book *What is Philosophy?* where they explain the figure of a philosopher. In their view, philosopher is not a wise man himself, but rather a "friend of wisdom".<sup>11</sup> Analogically, enemies of wisdom are not stupid themselves, they befriend stupidity. Being a creative friend of wisdom, Deleuze's and Guattari's philosopher creates concepts to or-

being human; in the novels, he escaped and found temporary refuge in hallways and passages between each chamber or conjoining room. *The Castle* is actually described as a giant burrow of passages in which there is no outside. This is one reason why K. cannot get to the Castle by walking across the surface of the earth in a single straight line; he must take tunnel or enter through the labyrinth." Lambert, G., 2012. *In Search of a New Image of Thought. Gilles Deleuze and Philosophical Expressionism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 71.

<sup>9</sup> Lambert, G., 2012. *Philosophy after Friendship*, pp. 3 – 4.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>11</sup> Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., 1994. *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University.

ganize chaos. To do so, he needs an imaginary “friend” who entertains a dialogue of wisdom with him. They have to create the wisdom, it does not preexist anywhere and cannot be simple uncovered or discovered. Deleuze’s *conceptual personae* are figures that in the form of a concept help the philosopher think – it is an imaginary person created by the philosopher to accompany his thoughts and to help them unfold.

At this point we must turn to another distinction that Deleuze and Guattari make immediately after discussing the difference between aesthetic figures and conceptual personae, which is the distinction between psychosocial types. Following their comments, Lambert attempts to reconstruct a genealogy of the different political situations and social personae to which this final statement might refer in order to arrive at “a moment of recollection where perhaps the essential meaning of philosophy might be interrogated anew, especially in relation to Deleuze’s assertion that the democratic ideal of friendship has become corrupted”.<sup>12</sup> Consequently, following Deleuze and Guattari’s views, Lambert proposes to question a very commonplace and patently metaphorical equivalence between the ideas of friendship and the democratic form of politics. Lambert conceives a philosophy after this friendship with wisdom... there are other conceptual figures than friends created by philosophers. He emphasizes the need for clarification of various philosophic figures of socio-political insiders and outsiders, such as friend, enemy, foreigner, stranger, deportee, and revolutionary people.

Lambert’s first conceptual person is the friend, the one I can trust. I feel safe in his presence because I believe he won’t betray me, he won’t attack me. As Lambert reminds us, however, this concept of “friend” should be distinguished from the Greek idea of friendship as containing the intensive states of competition, rivalry, and conflict between citizens in the form of a “generalized athleticism”<sup>13</sup> where the virtue of friendship would also be judged in ethical and aesthetic terms. The contemporary term “friend” refers to this original “conceptual persona” invented by the Greeks, but its meaning is now difficult to discern, since many of its social ritual significations have become lost.

The second figure is the enemy. This conceptual person is defined by more than just not sharing of common sense – it is also a threat, a sign of danger coming from disrespect. Enemy makes one feel unsafe,

<sup>12</sup> Lambert, G., 2012. *Philosophy after Friendship*, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

vigilant, ready for defense. According to Lambert, however, enemy may be also seen as the one who is excluded from friendship, defined as a social experience of the negation of the self. The enemy would then have “a social existence reduced to its barest abstraction, bereft of all other social relations, as well as all forms of dependency and for this reason, either condemned to death, to nothingness, or to wandering outside the limits of community”.<sup>14</sup> If friends ally to produce common experience, it is against the existence of such an isolated, purely solipsistic self.

Lambert’s third conceptual person is the foreigner. Following Benveniste’s etymological work, Lambert sees the stranger is the one who comes from beyond the limits of a state or community. Consequently, foreigner is not any ‘stranger’. He is seen as a foreigner in case of recognition of his cultural difference. Foreigner is a citizen of another country entering the territory from behind its external boundary. He comes inside from behind the frontier, marking the distinction between the inside and outside. He is a traveler, a tourist, a migrant who originates from a distinct state. As a temporary hosts, foreigners must respect local laws. Otherwise, the locals would not feel safe in their presence and their behavior would be rightfully corrected by a coercive power.

Lambert’s following figure is the stranger. To challenge the common “xenophobia” against people transgressing the inner limits of a law, he raises the question concerning the group’s right to determine the very identity of the stranger as if from the inside. At this point Lambert asks what would be the origin of stranger’s right to acceptance, tolerance, and hospitality? In his view, it is only in a limit-situation that the full meaning of the obligation of hospitality appears, according to which the “stranger-guest”<sup>15</sup> is bound to the same observance of community already enjoyed by the natural citizen but by means of a special pact that is premised on the sign of recognition of absolute dependency on the host.

Lambert’s fifth conceptual person is the deportee. This figure designates a refugee, an immigrant who has no right to stay. Lambert comes to three figures that represent the broken circle of friendship: first, contemporary strangers who appear today in the very center of the polis; second, refugees, those survivors who have passed through an experience of war; and finally, global poor. This last figure is becoming the

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 92.

wellspring of terrorism and thus regarded with renewed fear and suspicion. Lambert argues that “today there is no possibility for any political philosophy, much less any new concept of the political”<sup>16</sup> that does not address at its beginning these three figures as the new conceptual personae who will determine the future compass and the extreme limit of our common species.

Lambert’s last figure is the revolutionary people. At this point he turns to Deleuze and Guattari who distinguish two species of violence. The first one is the bureaucratic state violence that can be found in the state apparatus: it either applies disciplinary violence against its own citizens (its police forces, its judges, its bureaucrats); or it acquires an army. The second one is the primitive violence of “pólemos” that is exterior to state power. In their view, this “war machine” was invented by the nomads, since the terror that it causes is not only transgressive, but also lawless, random, undisciplined, and nondialectical. Lambert argues that in the context of today’s war on terror requires the same vigilance as the nomadic “tyrannical state of lawlessness”,<sup>17</sup> which corresponds to the Kantian state of nature that existed in the era before constituted nations, in wastelands and deserts.

This problematic was further developed in Gregg Lambert’s international *Perpetual Peace Project*. Its opening page recalls one major political event that invites us to rethink what peace means to us: “On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014. With the current wars in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and well over twenty major conflicts globally today, we can no longer continue to see the state of peace as merely the temporary absence of war, since perpetual war now appears as the horizon of our world”.<sup>18</sup> In relation to this approach of contemporary international political situation, Lambert investigates universities as institutional spaces best equipped to forge new practices of peace, especially in addressing current geopolitical conditions that would make peace impossible. The goal of his initiative is not simply another academic discussion, but an engaged and active effort to redesign the concept of peace itself—from new course offerings, international collaborations, and new trans-disciplinary knowledges that may be useful for re-designing a sustainable planetary peace.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>18</sup> <https://perpetualpeaceproject2022.org/>

### III. Re-Designing Perpetual Peace in Ethical and Political Thinking

As a correlate to Lambert's *Perpetual Peace Project*, this special issue focuses on the possibility to rethink and re-design the concept of peace today. Articles collected in this special issue, however, do not copy Lambert's conceptual persons of ethically and politically justified "non-friends". In some ways, they touch the topic directly related to these figures, in some others, they build an autonomous space and open new theoretical directions. By pointing to previously untouched or unsolved problems, the articles written by Michaela Fišerová, David Peroutka, Krzysztof Skonieczny, Martin Šimsa, and Jan Šmíd introduce five innovative lines of reflection in contemporary ethical and political thinking of peace.

The main goal of this special issue is to reevaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Kant's idea of perpetual peace and to examine its reception in contemporary ethical and political philosophy with a focus on issues of national and international law. To critically evaluate acute and current issues of the present global justice, international declarations and institutions, migration, right to asylum, cosmopolitan education, environmental rights and obligations, war and military interventions, this special issue sets two partial aims. First, to find out what is Kant's idea of perpetual peace in comparison with related ethical and political concepts of contemporary philosophy (forgiveness, hospitality, democracy, sovereignty, defense, human nature). Second, to examine the possible applications of Kant's concept of perpetual peace in relation to contemporary political situation in the world and its historical-political background (Shoah, Chart77, War in Ukraine).

The conceptual figure of enemy as threat appears in Peroutka's article discussing the ethic-political problem of defense. This first line of thinking aims to show that Kant's theory invites us to a certain degree of pacifism. According to Peroutka, Kantian practical reason as a source of morality excludes the right to war. Federalism seems to involve only the international law of peace, whereas the state of nature has no real international law, and thus no right to war. To declare a particular war "just" would presuppose a competent "judicial decision", which, however, does not exist. Therefore, neither of the two parties is entitled to declare the other side an unjust enemy. Everyone is prepared to declare his enemy unjust, but that does not constitute any meaningful justification for anything. If, in the international state of nature, "each state is judge in



its own case”, then such judgments are of little validity. Peroutka, finally, finds such validity in the principle that warfare can only be considered permissible if it is defensive war in the strict sense of the word (which does not include pre-emptive war).

Šimsa’s article partially joins Peroutka’s views on “just war” by proposing to rethink the topic of migrant fleeing the violent political conditions of totalitarianism. This second line of revising Kant’s perpetual peace examines Jaspers’, Arendt’s, Habermas’, and Rawls’ interpretations of Kant’s project of perpetual peace, as well as their influence on Czechoslovakian democratic thought. To restore the broken circle of friendship, Šimsa explains the way Patočka used Kantian framework to justify human rights in Charter 77. In his own reading, however, Kant oscillates between sweet dreams of philosophy, ironic comments and concrete proposals for advancing civil, international and world law to move closer to the end of all wars and eternal peace. To challenge Kant’s theory, Šimsa’s article inspects Russian aggression against Ukraine through the lens of Kant’s conditions. In contrast with Kant’s preference for a republican setting of the peace, democratic Europe would not hesitate to intervene and get embroiled in a war. While one democratic state had to defend itself, other democratic states had to help the refugees from this defensive, unsolicited war.

Šmíd’s article pays attention to the topic of foreigner’s political relation to state sovereignty. Following Kant’s theory of perpetual peace, foreigner is seen as a temporary guest who respects sovereignty of the state he visits during his travels between the inside and the outside. This third line of rethinking peace today presents Kant’s theory of perpetual peace with regard to its political applicability in the present day. It traces Kant’s assumptions of perpetual peace – primarily a republican form of government and secondarily a federal community of states. In Šmíd’s reading, Kant rejects the state of nations or the world republic. If he prefers a federated union of states that arrive at a republican polity, which he considers to be a matter of luck, then the resulting union will, depending on luck, consist of random combinations of states that luckily happen to have a republican polity. However, since the republican form of government is not firmly fixed, then the stability of this union cannot be guaranteed, and states can join it, but then also leave it. The composition of the union would be subject to the choice of each state after it fulfills the conditions of accession. Subsequent withdrawal would be a matter of choice (with a republic) or necessity (if the state ceased

to have a republican form of government). A federal union would most likely have no coercive power, not even in international relations, and certainly not within states. It could therefore not influence either the internal conditions of individual members or their external behavior. Foreigners would remain a permanent threat.

The topic of stranger as a weird insider, as an alterity that absolutely depends on tolerance and hospitality of the host, appears in Fišerová's article bringing an ethical focus on our struggles with hospitality. This forth line of rethinking peace today elaborates on Derrida's revision of Kant's concept of perpetual peace as the opposite of war. Its goal is to introduce the way deconstruction subversively bridges binary oppositions. When deconstructed, Kantian duty obliges all people to peace, hospitality, and friendship but, simultaneously, contains and displaces traces of past wars, hostility and enmity. Fišerová proposes to follow Derrida's work to interconnect these binary oppositions by the promise of ongoing forgiveness. Because of the individual and uncertain healing process, forgiveness is deferred and never fully accomplished. It can only be approached partially, by little steps. As Derrida puts it, for the invited guest as much as for the visitor, crossing the threshold remains a transgressive step. In every new step of hospitality, we are transgressing our limits in forgiveness, we are overcoming these interminable thresholds. In the perspective of deconstruction, therefore, it is not the peace that is to be considered perpetual, it is the poetic performative work on forgiveness that is.

Finally, the figure of revolutionary people as lawless and unpredictable warriors is challenged in Skonieczny's article focusing on the ethical problem of human nature. This fifth line of thinking uses a discussion of the relationships between war, peace and "human nature" in the First Supplement of Kant's *Perpetual Peace* essay to make a wider observation about the interplay of the three concepts. Pointing to more contemporary attempts to frame the term "human nature" present in biological discourses, Skonieczny's article sketches a possible alternative to the argument that human nature is "evil", but only through it can we foster conditions of perpetual peace-to-come. He questions Kant's view of nature by referring to evolutionary theory that uncovers a set of complex mechanisms that depend on the interplay of genetic and environmental factors. Such a transgressive understanding of human nature, in the context of war, leads to considering each instance of peace and war is a singular interplay of factors. In with Fišerová's views on difficulties with

maintaining the state of “peace”, Skonieczny’s article finally suggests that thinking the conditions for perpetual peace relies on perpetual vigilance to the singular interplay of humans and their political environment.

#### IV. Conclusion: Toward Sustainability of Peace

By studying and interpreting Immanuel Kant’s major works and short writings, this special issue rethinks his philosophy with a focus on the issue of perpetual peace. Kantian peace is a duty of improvement of human coexistence in universal respect to otherness. As a moral maxim, it cannot be totally present in human behavior or simply implemented in the real world. Any declaration of total presence of peace on Earth would be totalitarian as it would abandon the promise to improve human sense of hospitality. By systematically construing an inner our outer “enemy” related to the particular imposed version of peace, it would head towards a totalitarian “nightmare”. Any attempt to design peace should, therefore, providently include a reflection of this risk.

The contemporary ethical and political forum of thinkers gathered in this special issue challenges this risk incorporated in promises of perpetual peace – of projecting an “enemy”. In addition to the historic-philosophical analysis of Kant’s theory of perpetual peace, they focus on its comparison with contemporary philosophy discussing problem areas of today’s social, political and cultural reality. These acute issues require philosophical analysis and bring new global challenges such as war crimes and global justice, forgiveness and hospitality, right to defense and asylum, human nature and non-human nature.

There are various possible answers to the question why none of Kant’s anti-war conditions were ever implemented and fulfilled. The first line of possible answers is politically oriented. Peroutka argues that there is no right to war except the right to armed defence against an actual war of aggression. In other words, the traditional notion of “just war” must be clearly restricted to that of defensive war in the strictest sense. For this purpose, the article goes beyond the limited sphere of Kantian interpretive efforts and presents arguments concerning our present, i.e. the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Similarly, Šimsa finds Kant’s universally normative moral, legal, and political reasoning inspiring, but challenging to implement. Although his moral disapproval of war and unethical politics is valuable, it can be hard to enforce in the contemporary political reality of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Another approach to Kant’s essay *Toward*

*Perpetual Peace* is proposed and elaborated in Šmíd's legal view, which analyzes Kant's idea of republican form of government as incomplete and in tension with Kant's conception of sovereignty, which grants supreme power to the head of state. Moreover, Šmíd finds that the global union of states could not enforce uniform action against the foreign states outside the federal union, with whom war is possible and probable. Another approach, this time ethically oriented, is proposed by Fišerová and Skonieczny. According to Fišerová, in Derrida's view, we need to focus on possible performativity of the Kantian "leap over the abyss", even if it remains an ongoing, unfinished work. What permanently defers war and maintains peaceful relations is their constant renewal by iterable ethical ornament of peace by performing ongoing rituals of mourning and forgiveness. Finally, Skonieczny situates Kant's *Perpetual Peace* essay in a polemical context proposing a mechanism through which nature sets this inherently evil tendency to work against itself, thus producing conditions for perpetual peace.

People become enemies in the process of constructing enemies, which can lead to aggressive warfare. To minimize this risk, friendships shall be consistently performatively constructed. The thinkers publishing in this special issue meet in a challenging perspective of thinking, which indicates that peace is never declared and guaranteed once and for all. Precisely because of its expected potential presence, it is necessary opting for peace, tending to it, searching for it, defending it. Paradoxically, sometimes even by means of entering a "just" war.

Let us return, finally, to the Eco's essay and to the Kafka's story. Our questioning of the construction of identity through the construction of alterity may open new directions of discussion on the sustainability of peace today. Eco and Kafka remind us that, besides the outer threat, there is another xenophobic trouble coming from a seemingly opposite direction. Seemingly, because those who invent and hate inner enemies, fear and fight alterity inside themselves.<sup>19</sup> Haters try to cover this fear by arrogance. Unable to overcome their xenophobic worries, these "warriors" make war against those who do to make war. They keep on constructing prejudices against the most vulnerable "strangers" such as immigrants, women, racially different or queer people. Through their judgmental ter-

<sup>19</sup> As Josef Fulka explains, in such a situation, "the alterity coming from outside starts to resonate with the alterity inside us, with the violence of primary conflicts, on the basis of which what we are began to form." Fulka, J., 2015. *Násilí, subjekt, politika*. In: Mahler, M. – Telerovský, R., eds. *Strach z cizího. Antisemitismus, xenofobie a zkušenost "uncanny"*. Praha: Česká psychoanalytická společnost, p. 204. Personal translation.

ror and bullying they persistently participate on destruction of peace.

This path of reflection suggests that we may need an effective ethical and political regulation that would nourish friendships across various social environments. Such a regulation would avoid construction of identity on the basis of prejudices and hate that would occasionally “unite” us. In this perspective, acceptance of alterity would not destroy identity of democratic states, it would complete and strengthen it. To sustain the peace today would mean to cultivate new ethically and politically justified set of communication skills imposing respect for vulnerable people. To not “befriend stupidity” by constructing new inner and outer “enemies” would mean to redirect common admiration from the seemingly strong, “resilient” value of arrogance toward peacefully powerful values of thoroughness, curiosity, and vulnerability. Sustainable ethics and politics of planetary peace would focus on constructing safe spaces where one feels free to invent friends instead of enemies.

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## The Defensive Nature of Just War. A Kantian Inspiration

**Abstract:** The article aims to show that Kant's theory invites us to a certain degree of pacifism. Kantian thought inspires us to accept the principle that warfare can only be considered permissible if it is defensive war in the strict sense of the word (which does not include pre-emptive war). I argue that there is no right to war except the right to armed defence against an actual war of aggression. In other words, the traditional notion of "just war" (*bellum iustum*) must be clearly restricted to that of *defensive war* in the strictest sense. For this purpose, the article goes beyond the limited sphere of Kantian interpretive efforts and presents arguments concerning our present, i.e. the 21st century.

**Keywords:** Aggression, Defensive War, Immanuel Kant, Just War, Pacifism

### Introduction

In what follows, we will not look at Kant's work primarily as an object of interpretation, but rather as a source of inspiration.<sup>1</sup> My aim is to show that Kant's theory invites us to a certain degree of pacifism. Indeed, Kantian thought inspires us to accept the principle that warfare can only be considered permissible if it is defensive war in the strict sense of the word (which does not include pre-emptive war).

Although our questions go beyond mere interpretive issues, it is of course necessary to be faithful to Kant's texts and to base ourselves sufficiently on the results of Kantian studies. In the first part of the present article, we will therefore recall what Immanuel Kant says about war. We

<sup>1</sup> We thus take a similar position to that expressed by H. Williams in the "Conclusion" of his book on Kant's view of just war theory: "I did not wish to suggest that I have discovered the 'true Kant' or the 'authentic Kant', but rather I believe I have outlined the most cogent account of war that can be drawn from Kant's philosophy." Williams, H., 2012. *Kant and the End of War – A Critique of Just War Theory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 168.

will do this in order to subsequently, in the second part, base our orientation in current international issues on Kantian theoretical principles.

## 1. Immanuel the Pacifist

As far as Kant's theory is concerned, the question of whether war is permissible is divided into two distinct areas. The first is the "state of nature" at the level of states (countries), an anarchic, lawless situation at the field of international relations. The second is a "pacific federation" of states. Unlike the "state of nature", this "free federalism" entails the existence of "international right".<sup>2</sup> The "pacific federation" or "state of nations" is a "lasting and continually expanding federation that prevents war". Once the federation is extended to all nations of the world, it will become a "world republic" that will guarantee perpetual world peace.<sup>3</sup>

There is no doubt that within the second of the two areas no war attack is permitted. The international law associated with such a state of humanity contains no right to war, for it is by its nature a law of peace.<sup>4</sup> I will try to show that even under the "state of nature", according to Kant, war attacks are (morally) forbidden to states. All the more so (*a fortiori*) it is therefore forbidden to the participants in a "peaceful federation".

But let us first consider the question whether, according to Kant, there really is no "right (to wage) war" within the "state of nature". What does his treatise *Toward Perpetual Peace* have to say about this? Federalism seems to involve only the international law of peace, whereas the state of nature has no real international law, and thus no "right to war". Kant explicitly denies the existence of a "right to war", *jus ad bellum*. "One cannot conceive of international right as a right to war", he says.<sup>5</sup> To declare a particular war "just" would presuppose a competent "judicial decision", which, however, does not exist. Therefore, "neither of the two parties" is entitled to declare the other side "an unjust enemy".<sup>6</sup>

To do so would not even make sense. A "just enemy", Kant explains,

<sup>2</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* [8:356]. In: Kant, I. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, transl. David L. Colclasure. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 80.

<sup>3</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace* [8:357], *ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>4</sup> "While Grotius [...] recognised a right to war [...], Kant established a radically new international law. International law of peace takes the place of international law of war." Höffe, O., 2024. *Völkerbund oder Weltrepublik?* In: Höffe, O., ed. *Immanuel Kant: Zum ewigen Frieden*. Berlin, Boston: Walter de Gruyter, p. 81.

<sup>5</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace* [8:356], *ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* [8:346], pp. 70 – 71.



“would be one that I would be doing wrong by resisting; but then he would also not be my enemy.”<sup>7</sup> So, if we identify someone as our “enemy”, then labelling him as “unjust” provides no further serious information. Everyone is, of course, prepared to declare his enemy unjust, but that does not constitute any meaningful justification for anything.<sup>8</sup> If (in the international “state of nature”) “each state is judge in its own case”,<sup>9</sup> then such judgments are of little validity.

Kantian “practical reason” as a source of morality excludes the right to war. In the “Conclusion” of Kant’s “The Doctrine of Right” (the first part of his *Metaphysics of Morals*) we read that “morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto: There is to be no war”.<sup>10</sup> When Kant considers the just war theory as represented by “Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel”, he rejects any “justification” (*Rechtfertigung*) for an offensive war.<sup>11</sup>

But now let us take good note of Kant’s (just mentioned) term “offensive war” or “war attack” (*Kriegsangriff*), which should be a guideline for us. Kant’s moderate pacifism says that no political entity has the right to wage a *war of attack*. It certainly does not mean that offensive actions are forbidden in a defensive war, but it does mean that war efforts are morally permissible only in a defensive war.

This reading of Kant is in line with the opinion of competent Kant interpreters. For example, Otfried Höffe notes that Kant “categorically denies any power – whether small or large – the right to wage war, with the exception of defence (*die Verteidigung ausgenommen*)”.<sup>12</sup> Thomas Mertens takes a similar view: “For Kant, self-defence is the only legitimate ground for using force against another state.” Kant’s “rejection of the just war tradition”, with the sole exception of defensive war, also applies “in

<sup>7</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals* [350, § 60], transl. Mary Gregor. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, p. 156.

<sup>8</sup> “[I]n the international state of nature [...] states indeed define their ‘rights’ solely on the basis of their own interpretations and estimations. [...] Inevitably, then, every state is able to claim that the resort to war is justified. It is ‘easy’ for a state to ‘pay homage’ to the concept of ‘right’. By declaring its cause ‘justified’, it simultaneously makes the claim that its opponent is an unjust enemy. Affirming the opposite, namely fighting against a just enemy, would be a contradiction”. Mertens, T., 2012. Kant and the Just War Tradition. In: Justenhoven, H. J. – Barberini, W. A. Jr, eds. *From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics*. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 244 – 245.

<sup>9</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals* [349, § 60], *ibid.*, p. 155.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* [354, Conclusion], p. 160.

<sup>11</sup> Kant, I., 2006. Toward Perpetual Peace [8:355], *ibid.*, p. 79; Kant, I., 1992. Zum ewigen Frieden – Ein philosophischer Entwurf [355, B 33]. In: *Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis; Zum ewigen Frieden*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, p. 66.

<sup>12</sup> Höffe, O., 2024. Völkerbund oder Weltrepublik?, *ibid.*, p. 87.

the absence of a federation of states". The claim that "the only justification for war is self-defence" is thus quite general.<sup>13</sup>

Scholars advocating a different interpretation caution against too much focus on the text of *Toward Perpetual Peace*.<sup>14</sup> And it is true that the passages on just war from *The Metaphysics of Morals* seem to contrast strikingly with the intellectual climate of *Toward Perpetual Peace*: "In the state of nature, the right to make war (i.e., to enter into hostilities) is the permitted means by which one state prosecutes its rights against another state, namely by its own *force*, when it believes it has been wronged by the other state [...]"<sup>15</sup>

However, when we read Kant's formulations apparently conforming to the standard theories of the time, we should be alert and not draw hasty conclusions on this basis. When Kant speaks of the right to wage war in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, he may be accurately describing the common conception of international relations rather than proposing a normative ideal. In this sense it does not seem necessary to contrast the text with the views expressed in *Toward Perpetual Peace*. The "principle of charitable interpretation", which requires us not to attribute contradictions to an author unless necessary, can strengthen our motivation to favour the conciliatory viewpoint.

In Kant's case, this harmonization may not be certain, but neither does it commit violence to his texts. In fact, Kant, in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, is able to reflect on the justifications for war, but also to question them afterwards. He says, for example, that there are "no limits to the rights of a state against an unjust enemy", only to subsequently (at the end of the same paragraph) call into question the meaningfulness of the concept of the "unjust enemy".<sup>16</sup>

Therefore, we can adopt the interpretative strategy outlined by Howard Williams, who advises "to subordinate the judgements on war in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (which seem to indicate a modified acceptance of just war doctrine) to those of *Perpetual Peace* which indicate no such

<sup>13</sup> Mertens, T., 2012. Kant and the Just War Tradition, *ibid.*, pp. 240 – 241.

<sup>14</sup> "Kant has a just war theory. In fact, an argument will be made that the weight of the textual evidence points clearly in favour of a pro-just war reading of Kant, and that any view to the contrary can only be sustained by a partial and selective reading of the relevant texts. The common tendency to read only *Perpetual Peace* [...] is, in particular, a prime source of this confusion". Orend, B., 2000. *War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, p. 43.

<sup>15</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals* [346, § 56], *ibid.*, p. 152.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* [349–350, § 60], pp. 155 – 156.

reconciliation”.<sup>17</sup> The notion of “prevention” (or *ius praeventionis*), used by Kant in the *Metaphysics of Morals*,<sup>18</sup> should also be viewed from this perspective. As Williams notes, the idolum of “pre-emptive” (anticipatory) war here, like other versions of “just war”, is more of a “caricature showing what the position was under the law of nations in Kant’s day (and to a large extent even now)”.<sup>19</sup>

The reference to our present time in the parenthesis of the last quotation will now serve us a stimulus for further, more up-to-date reflections (without abandoning the Kantian perspective we have achieved). We shall attempt to further justify and clarify the belief held by Kant that the only permissible war effort is defensive war.

## 2. Defence and what it is not

I will argue for the thesis that that there is no right to war except the right to armed defence against an actual war of aggression. In other words, the traditional notion of “just war” (*bellum iustum*) must be clearly restricted to that of *defensive war* in the strictest sense. In the rest of the present study, I will go beyond the limited sphere of Kantian interpretive efforts and present arguments concerning our present, i.e. the 21st century.

Traditional just war doctrines allowed for two other reasons for war besides defence: *rectification* and *punishment*. It seems that, in addition to defensive, corrective and punitive warfare, pre-emptive warfare is nowadays regarded as permissible military action. I think that even before any deeper discussion of the different (named) types of war we are able to suspect that the permissibility of war must be narrowed to defence. For *only defensive war* includes in its justification also a sufficient limitation of military activities. It is easier to objectively assess what is useful in order to defeat an ongoing aggression than to objectively determine whether and to what extent a particular state entity should be punished, rectified, or preventively intervened against.

Let us begin with the concept of punitive war, which is explicitly a target of Kant’s scepticism. The punisher, according to Kant, assumes that he is in some sense “superior” to the punished, which is an unjustified attitude.<sup>20</sup> Punishment, unlike defence, is directed *at the agent himself* (rather

<sup>17</sup> Williams, H., 2012. *Kant and the End of War*, *ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>18</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals* [346, § 56], *ibid.*, pp. 152 – 153.

<sup>19</sup> Williams, H., 2012. *Kant and the End of War*, *ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>20</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace* [8:347], *ibid.*, p. 71. In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant explains: “For punishment occurs only in the relation of a superior (*imperatoris*) to those

than *at his action*) and presupposes the agent's guilt. But who decides the degree and nature of guilt and the measure of its punishability when, as Kant points out, there is "no court of justice" in the international or interstate sphere?<sup>21</sup>

Contemporary war attacks—think of Iraq 2003, Libya 2011 or Ukraine today—escape this criticism because they are justified as *corrective* or *preventive* rather than *punitive*. However, western military action against Iraq and Libya was certainly not defensive in the true sense of the word because neither Iraq nor Libya attacked the Western countries. Of course, the current Russian war (in Ukraine) is not defensive either. The attack on Iraq was "justified" as *pre-emptive*, in view of Iraq's imaginary nuclear armament. The attacks against the regimes in Libya and Ukraine were "justified" by the need to *rectify* the situation in those countries (in the case of the Russian war, its "justification" also includes the idea of *prevention* against NATO's advance).

As can be seen, our present time confronts us with the question of whether the just cause for war can lie in *prevention* against anticipated adversary intentions or in *rectification* of a current situation. My objection is similar to that in the case of *punishment*. Prevention and rectification also differ significantly from defence. In the case of defence against a concrete ongoing attack, military experts are able to consider what steps will be useful to foil the invasion. But who decides, and based on what criteria, when warfare *prevention* or *rectification* is appropriate and what scope it should have? Wouldn't there be an opening for political arbitrariness?

Military experts are able to anticipate an adversary's military activities if the war is already underway, but not the adversary's intent to break the peace and start a war. This is a political question, not a purely military one. A pre-emptive attack is therefore a political choice, and, as Kant would say, being a judge in one's own cause is not a safe path to justice.

Can it be argued that pre-emptive armed action sometimes constitutes a form of defence? Political thinker Roger Scruton, an expert on Kant, confirms (despite his pro-war views) that Kant would not consider prevention a form of defence: "pre-emptive attack is not defence".<sup>22</sup> Thomist moral philosopher Joseph Boyle argues that "the preventive actions are not narrowly defensive; the aggressive action is anticipated, not actual. It

subject to him (*subditum*), and states do not stand in that relation to each other". Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals* [347, § 57], *ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>21</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace* [8:346], *ibid.*, pp. 70 – 71.

<sup>22</sup> Scruton, R., 2004. *Immanuel Kant and the Iraq war* [Accessed: 2024-10-10]. Available at: [opendemocracy.net/en/article\\_1749jsp/](https://opendemocracy.net/en/article_1749jsp/)

is not there yet to be resisted”. And Boyle continues by arguing that the military *prevention* is much more akin to a *war of conquest*:

While [the destruction of assets in preventive war] is not exactly seeking the subjugation of another nation [...], it is more like that than like defense in the strict sense; for it reduces the assets of a polity, and that seems to involve the failure to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that polity. [...] Defensive warfare cannot begin until aggressive hostilities are under way.<sup>23</sup>

Roger Scruton has argued, however, that if Kant were assessing the Iraqi situation in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, he would have approved of pre-emptive military intervention:

Kant indeed believed that war can be legitimately embarked on only as a defensive measure, and that pre-emptive attack is not defence. However, circumstances have changed, and I can see good Kantian reasons for the view that the civilised world, faced with the dangers that now confront it, should take pre-emptive measures when dealing with rogue states like Saddam's Iraq. [...] Such states are intrinsically illegitimate, which means that their disappearance is good in itself, and the aim and desire of all rational beings.<sup>24</sup>

Scruton further argues that such a “rogue state” is not a republic in Kant's sense and does not belong in a peaceful union of states. Therefore, it is permissible to take pre-emptive action against it:

[T]he recourse to international law [...] presupposes that members of the League of Nations are republics. If they are not republics, but regard themselves as in a state of nature vis-à-vis other states, then it may be necessary to confront them with violence, in order to prevent them from imposing their will.<sup>25</sup>

Such an argumentation is also conceivable for Susan Shell, whose article was written at the time of continued US military action in Iraq:

Kant's thinking on international right opens up a space, on which recent US administrations have seized, allowing for a (new) distinction between states that do and those that do not count as full-fledged members of the commu-

<sup>23</sup> Boyle, J., 2011. Waging defensive war: The idea and its normative importance. *Journal of Military Ethics* 10(3), p. 157.

<sup>24</sup> Scruton, R., 2004. Immanuel Kant and the Iraq war, *ibid*.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*.

nity of nations. The latter ('failed' and 'rogue') states do not deserve and need not receive the normal prerogatives of sovereignty to which members 'in good standing' of the community of nations (as we are accustomed to saying) are generally entitled.<sup>26</sup>

Personally, I find this type of reasoning unfortunate. Recall that even states which are in a mutual "state of nature" are, according to Kant's ethics, forbidden to attack each other. If we also take into account Kant's emphasis on non-interference, we can subscribe to the answer given to Shell by Georg Cavallar: "No doubt Saddam is a mass murderer. However, Kant is the wrong author if we want to justify 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' (the Gulf war of 2003). He defends the principle of non-intervention [...]"<sup>27</sup> Kant's idea of non-interference forms the context of his moderate pacifism. Kant believes that a forcible "intervention of external powers" is not allowed, because it would "render the autonomy of all states insecure".<sup>28</sup>

### 3. Reasoning from experience and from authority

The idea of non-interference can also be supported by empirical reasoning. I think it is worth asking what recent history, specifically the acts of war waged by Russia, the United States and NATO, can tell us, especially if we take into account their real results. Although the reasoning from empirics cannot be "mathematically" conclusive, it nevertheless carries some weight and cogency.

What experience do we have with current preventive or corrective military actions carried out by the Western powers and Russia? Iraq war waged between 2003 and 2011 is an example of pre-emptive and corrective war. About half a year before the war, the White House issued a document speaking of a "war against global terrorism" and warning "regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism".<sup>29</sup> These threats were directed at Iraq, which was also suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the Iraqi people as part of his 2003 State of the Union speech, George W. Bush declared: "I have a message for the brave and

<sup>26</sup> Shell, S. M., 2005. Kant on Just War and 'Unjust Enemies' – Reflections on a 'Pleonasm'. *Kantian Review* 10(1), p. 103.

<sup>27</sup> Cavallar, G., 2006. Commentary on Susan Meld Shell's 'Kant on Just War and Unjust Enemies' – Reflections on a Pleonasm. *Kantian Review* 11(1), p. 121.

<sup>28</sup> Kant, I., 2006. Toward Perpetual Peace [8:346], *ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>29</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, part III, 2002. George W. Bush's Administration [Accessed: 2024-10-10]. Available at: [georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/](http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/)

oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country—your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation”.<sup>30</sup>

The US and its allies insisted on the demand of justice to wage war, as Cian O’Driscoll notes in his book:

[W]hen Bush and Blair sought to justify the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 [...] they variously sought to justify the war as a means of promoting a more just world order and exporting democracy and human rights to Iraq and the Middle East while still relating their case to the language of the just war tradition.<sup>31</sup>

Another example of a corrective war can be seen in Libya in 2011. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization considers itself a defence alliance, it intervened against the Libyan regime, which did not attack any NATO member. NATO forces carried out a bombing campaign in Libya in support of rebels against the Gaddafi government. The aim was to remedy the situation in Libya.

In 2012, US intelligence began arming and training rebels against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It was the Operation Timbre Sycamore, subsidized by more than a billion dollars. Federico Manfredi Firmian evaluates it as follows:

Timbre Sycamore [...] caused untold misery to the Syrian people. A three-year study funded by the European Union and the German government later established that efforts by the United States and its allies to arm Syrian rebels ‘significantly augmented the quantity and quality of weapons’ of the Islamic State.<sup>32</sup>

The so-called Islamic State, one of the worst evils of our era, has subsequently made territorial gains in Syria, Iraq and Libya, countries where local dictatorships have been destroyed or weakened by Western military interventions, whether direct or (as in the case of Syria) indirect. In fact, dictatorial regimes in Muslim countries have been a force that regards Islamist terrorists (who are non-state actors) as its enemies. Such regimes

<sup>30</sup> I quote from: O’Driscoll, C., 2008. *The Renegotiation of the Just War Tradition and the Right to War in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 70.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>32</sup> Firmian, F. M., 2022. After a Decade of Incoherent Strategy in Syria, a Way Forward. *The Modern War Institute at West Point* [Accessed: 2024-10-10]. Available at: [mwi.westpoint.edu/after-a-decade-of-incoherent-strategy-in-syria-a-way-forward/](https://mwi.westpoint.edu/after-a-decade-of-incoherent-strategy-in-syria-a-way-forward/).

formed a functional barrier against non-state Islamist organisations in the Muslim world. The destruction or weakening of these regimes was followed by general disruption and an immense suffering. Millions of people have lost their homes and livelihoods. Is it really a sign of wisdom on the part of the West, especially the US, to trust again and again that military intervention will lead to some greater good?

The leader of contemporary Russia also had corrective and pre-emptive reasons in mind when he decided to invade Ukraine. The Russian side tried to substantiate the absurd accusations of “Nazism” against the Ukrainian political leadership, for example, by Ukraine’s abolition of Russian-language schools (after 2017). Above all, however, Russia intended to prevent Ukraine from its planned accession to NATO (approved at the 2008 NATO Summit<sup>33</sup>). At the turn of 2021 /2022, the Russian president repeatedly demanded “guarantees” that Ukraine would not be admitted to NATO. He undoubtedly knew that he would not get any, he was merely preparing the political ground for the aggression.

In any case, however, we observe that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is bringing above all a terrifying destruction, an ocean of suffering, and a moral and political tragedy for Russia itself. All the moral credit Russia has enjoyed since the World War II has finally become obsolete. NATO is growing as a result of what is happening (Finland and Sweden are the newest members), and the anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine is understandably increasing as well. Does a war attack seem like an intelligent strategy?

The reduction of just war to defensive war can be further supported by some arguments “from authority”. The 1945 *United Nations Charter* begins with these words:

We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war [...], to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure [...] that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest [...], have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims (Preamble). All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state [...] (Article 2).<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO”. *Bucharest Summit Declaration* (NATO), 23, 2008. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest. [Accessed: 2024-10-10]. Available at: [nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8443.htm](https://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm)

<sup>34</sup> Shapiro, I. – Lampert, J., eds., 2014. *Charter of the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 14 – 5.



The only exception to the obligation to refrain from armed violence is defence: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations [...]” (Article 51).<sup>35</sup>

Similarly, in the Constitution of the Second Vatican Council *Gaudium et Spes* (1965), in the section “The Avoidance of War”, we are told of only one exception: “[G]overnments cannot be denied the right to legitimate defence once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted”. It is possible “to undertake military action for the sake of the just defence of the people [...]” (*Gaudium et Spes*, § 79).<sup>36</sup>

Of course, neither the empirical argument nor the argument from authority is conclusive. Such considerations have at most only a motivational or heuristic function. It will, however, fulfil this role with profit if it encourages us to be more philosophically cautious about the notion of a just war. With reference to Kant, we can then think as follows: A “just” enemy would be one whom I would oppose unjustly, and thus should not be considered an enemy.<sup>37</sup> However, if the notion of a “just enemy” is a type of oxymoron, then declaring one’s enemy unjust is an uninformative statement. But if we cannot be judges in our own cause and declare our adversary unjust,<sup>38</sup> neither are we authorized to designate our attack against him as just. In other words, “just (offensive) war” is too arbitrary and abusable a concept to be used by attackers to legitimise their war effort.

Perhaps the only compelling factual motivation for justifying a corrective military attack is the urgent need for so-called “humanitarian intervention”. Examples include India’s decision (1971) to intervene on behalf of the Bengalis massacred in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), or Vietnam’s removal of the horrific Khmer Rouge regime<sup>39</sup> in Cambodia (1979).<sup>40</sup> The question arises whether humanitarian intervention is not an example of a *non-defensive* yet *just* war action.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>36</sup> *Gaudium et Spes*, 1965. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World promulgated by his Holiness, pope Paul VI [Accessed: 2024-10-10]. Available at: [www.vatican.va/archive/hist\\_councils/ii\\_vatican\\_council/documents/vatii\\_const\\_19651207\\_gaudium-et-spes\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html)

<sup>37</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals* [350, § 60], *ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>38</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace* [8:346], *ibid.*, pp. 70 – 71.

<sup>39</sup> An estimated two and a half million people, including Cambodian Vietnamese, fell victim to Pol Pot’s tyranny.

<sup>40</sup> These Asian events are given as examples of “humanitarian intervention” by Jim Whitman in Whitman, J., 1994. A cautionary note on humanitarian intervention. *GeoJournal* 34(2), p. 169.

Consider, however, that although some of the sources cited above speak of “self-defensive” war, the key term in our discussion is simply “defensive war”. Humanitarian intervention, although not self-defence, can be seen as defence. Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, in their reflections on humanitarian intervention, point out that defending an innocent victim may be a morally higher goal than mere self-defence.<sup>41</sup> They advocate the “moral superiority of defense of another over self-defence”.<sup>42</sup> To the measure that genocide is analogous to war,<sup>43</sup> it is therefore reasonable to consider extending the concept of “defensive war” to cases of urgent humanitarian intervention against ongoing aggression. (Such an intervention must, of course, be strictly subject to *ius in bello*.)

## Conclusion

Although, from a purely interpretive point of view, it is not certain that Kant considered only defensive warfare to be morally permissible, strong arguments for this thesis can be drawn from his work. Immanuel Kant shows that the offensive intervention of one state in the territory of another substantially calls into question the autonomy of states as such.

Moreover, such a decision ventures into the realm of political arbitrariness. If a political entity authorizes itself to wage aggressive war (see Russia in 2022), it makes itself inappropriately “a judge in its own case”. The experience in Libya in 2011 (and subsequent developments) teach us that even invoking a UN Security Council resolution is no guarantee of a greater good (I am alluding to the Resolution No. 1973). Numerous bitter experiences teach us that neither prevention nor rectification must figure as a justification for war. The only permissible reason for armed struggle is to defend against an actual attack.

When it comes to defence in the face of current military aggression, the

<sup>41</sup> Fixdal, M., Smith, D., 1998. Humanitarian Intervention and Just War. *Mershon International Studies Review* 42(2), p. 296.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 306. The authors explain: “[O]ne important conclusion to be drawn from applying the Just War framework to the debate on humanitarian intervention is that it is unwarranted to view self-defence as the only possible just cause for the use of force. [...] Overvaluing justifications based on self-defence leads many authors into the trap of justifying intervention through intellectually questionable interpretations of events (e.g., as evident threats to regional security when they are only arguably so) and of the international system”. Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Martin Shaw, in comparing genocide to war, notes that “the logic of destruction is the same: the dismantling, through violence and its threat, of what constitutes the power of the enemy, both in general and specifically that which sustain its capacity for resistance”. Shaw, M., 2007. The general hybridity of war and genocide. *Journal of Genocide Research* 9(3), p. 464.

question of what to do and how to do it is a matter of pragmatic military consideration. However, when it comes to mere prevention, it is a matter of anticipating the intentions and ambitions of the enemy political entity. Such reasoning is, of course, political and influenced by political motivations. This can hardly be considered the basis of war justice.

A legitimate defensive war can therefore only be launched when the adversary's intention to wage an attack is a matter of empirical fact (whether evidenced by observation or at least by an intelligence report of an explicit timed plan). After all, building a defensive position and waiting for an attack can be a good strategy (as the importance of the Battle of Kursk in 1943 shows, for example). On the contrary, pre-emptive war is not a just war and by its very nature calls into question all foundations of peace in the world. Our quest for lasting world peace must include the demand that in future neither preventive nor corrective wars should ever again be justified.

When Kant, as a philosopher, does everything in his power in favour of perpetual peace, he is clearly aware that he is pursuing [*einen*] *süßen Traum*, a “sweet dream”.<sup>44</sup> “Nonetheless,” he solemnly declares, “from the throne of the highest moral legislative authority, reason looks down on and condemns war as a means of pursuing one's rights, and makes peace an immediate duty.”<sup>45</sup> The assumption that universal and lasting peace is unlikely to be achieved does not relieve politicians of the moral obligation to make it their aim<sup>46</sup> and strive for it. Kant insists that “the perpetual peace [...] is not an empty idea, but rather a task which, carried out gradually, steadily moves toward its goal”.<sup>47</sup> Our guide should be the maxim that “the state of peace must be established”.<sup>48</sup> According to Immanuel Kant, this is what we should take to heart.

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<sup>44</sup> Kant, I., 1992. Zum ewigen Frieden [343], *ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>45</sup> Kant, I., 2006. Toward Perpetual Peace [8:356], *ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>46</sup> “Thus, the leaders of nations are called to work on a continual approximation to perpetual peace as a *terminus ad quem* and to take concrete steps in this direction.” Šajda, P., 2024. Working for Peace in Situations of Conflict: On Schmitt's Reception of Kant. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 13(1), p. 32.

<sup>47</sup> Kant, I., 2006. Toward Perpetual Peace [8:386], *ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* [8:349], p. 73.

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# Perpetual Democratic Peace: A Sweet Dream of Philosophers or Viable Peace Treaty?

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**Abstract:** The article examines Jaspers', Arendt's, Habermas', and Rawls' interpretations of Kant's project of perpetual peace, as well as the influence of this Kant's concept on Czechoslovakian political and philosophical thought. It explains the way Patočka used the Kantian framework to justify human rights in Charter 77. Finally, the article inspects Russian aggression against Ukraine through the lens of Kant's conditions. In conclusion, the author evaluates viability of this Kant's project in democratic societies.  
**Key words:** Perpetual Peace, Democratic Peace, Immanuel Kant, Tomáš G. Masaryk, Jan Patočka, Russian Aggression

## Introductory research questions

Is Kant's concept of perpetual peace a serious proposal for a treaty of peace (a league of peace) or is it merely a dream, a naive illusion, an utopia, an ill-conceived notion, or even a potentially dangerous idea that could lead to the opposite outcome? Are we getting closer to or drifting away from Kant's perpetual peace?

Did Kant intend to achieve practical outcomes with his philosophical project, or was it simply a theoretical exercise, as it is often the case with philosophers? Emanuel Rádl would inquire of Kant whether his project was aimed at reforming the world or just an intellectual game.<sup>1</sup>

In the aftermath of World War II, the Nurnberg Tribunal labelled war as a crime, and the democratic peace theory emerged, positing that democratic states do not engage in warfare with each other.<sup>2</sup> The theory

<sup>1</sup> Rádl, E., 1998. *Dějiny filosofie I*. Praha: Votobia, p. 5. Rádl saw the task of philosophy in being the program for the reform of the world. Only in Czech.

<sup>2</sup> Doyle, M., 1983. Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12(3 – 4). pp.323–353. Russett, B., 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Delahunty, R. J., Yoo, J., 2010. Kant, Habermas and Democratic Peace. *Chicago Journal of International Law* 10(2). pp. 1 –37

explicitly mentions Kant, although Kant conditioned the idea of perpetual peace by republicanism, not by democracy. So we should elucidate Kant's interpretation of republicanism and democracy and clarify our understanding of these terms. Conversely, the reality is that wars have not ceased since Kant's time; rather, the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw the two most destructive world wars in human history. Wars have been waged more frequently between non-democratic countries, or between democratic and non-democratic ones; therefore, the outbreak of war does not necessarily signify the breakdown of peace between democratic states; quite the opposite, they have often collaborated as allies. What role did Kant's project play in promoting democratic peace?

What developments have occurred with Kant's philosophical project in the 20<sup>th</sup> century? Kant's smaller publication, seemingly insignificant compared to his great critics, had a groundbreaking influence on the political philosophy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The works of Karl Jaspers, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, all major political philosophers of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, undoubtably reflect Kant's influence. It acted also in shaping Czechoslovak democracy and philosophy, especially in works of Masaryk, Rádl and Patočka.

Today, it would be fascinating to hear Kant face to face the current call for peace in light of Russian aggression against Ukraine. However, the main agenda of those advocating for peace today appears to be cutting off military aid to Ukraine rather than striving for peace by ending all hostilities and reaching a fair peace treaty. Would Kant ever endorse an unjust peace or surrendering unilaterally to a stronger aggressor? Does Kant see peace as an absolute value even if it means compromising morality and a fair republican system of government? When considering our stance on war, peace, and fair democracy, should we rely on Kant's teachings or reject them as a dead end, as Pavel Kouba argued?<sup>3</sup>

Despite Kant's conditions for perpetual peace and the belief held by democratic theorists like Masaryk and Habermas that democratic states do not wage war against each other, wars have shown no sign of ceasing. Would it be wise to abandon this project as it seems to be unsuccessful, pointless or illusory? Are we not drifting away from it as wars persist and even escalate in regions where they used to be dormant or seemingly frozen? (Ukraine, Israel).

<sup>3</sup> Kouba, P., 1999. Konečný mír. *Reflexe* 20, Praha: Oikoymenth. Article 6. pp. 1 – 11. Only in Czech.

## Kant's peace project

Kant's political philosophy can be best understood by first delving into the Critique of Practical Reason, as it states the prerequisite of practical reason: freedom and autonomy of the will. In this instance, Kant's primary concern is ethics, even though ethics and/or morality are not presented as a condition of politics until Kant's late concept. An alternative starting point for our reflections could be the question: What is the Enlightenment? Here, Kant very clearly outlines the conditions of not only the Enlightenment but also human freedom and hence republican, world-citizen (democratic) politics. Enlightenment is characterised as the freedom to "to make *public use* of one's reason in all matters".<sup>4</sup> Freedom is a basic condition for the public use of reason. That being said, we will centre our discussion on Kant's political-philosophical project of eternal peace.

According to Kant, heads of state "who can never get enough of war"<sup>5</sup> Kant maintains that rulers are drawn to war because it offers them excitement and entertainment without requiring any personal sacrifices or risks.<sup>6</sup> They also wage wars for territory and to extend their power.

The state of peace among people is not a natural occurrence compared to the state of war, posing a constant threat to peace. Achieving a state of peace requires negotiations. It is achievable only within a lawful state. In a civil-legal state, I cannot take hostile actions against anyone unless they harm me. The absence of lawfulness is damaging. Kant suggests that I can force my neighbour to either enter into a socially lawful state with me or leave my neighbourhood, a principle that is perhaps more feasible for individuals than states. Everyone should belong to a civil constitution. There are three options based on: 1. civil law for one people (*ius civitatis*), 2. international law for mutual relations between states (*ius gentium*), 3. universal civil law for people and states that interact with each other (*ius cosmopoliticum*).<sup>7</sup>

Kant's Articles of Perpetual Peace: 1. A peace settlement with a secret

<sup>4</sup> Kant, I., 2006. An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment. In: Kant, I. *Toward Perpetual Peace and other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, transl. by David L. Colclasure. Yale University Press, p. 18.

<sup>5</sup> Kant, I., 2006. Toward Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch. In: *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, transl. by David L. Colclasure. Yale University Press, p. 67.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 73.



condition is deemed invalid. 2. It is unacceptable for any state to annex another state, as a state is a community of individuals, a moral entity that should not be treated as a tool or a commodity. 3. Standing armies are eventually to be abolished. 4. States ought to refrain from accumulating debts. 5. States cannot use force to intervene in the constitution and government of another state. 6. In times of war with another State, no state should engage in acts of hostility that would hinder mutual trust to achieve peace in the future. Kant believes that war is a sad measure to be taken in an emergency to secure one's rights in the natural state of men driven by violence. In the natural state, whose side is right is only determined by the outcome of war (like God's judgment). Kant bans criminal war and deems the war of extermination as unacceptable.<sup>8</sup>

Article 3 is unrealistic because not all states are democratic and peaceful, and it seems unlikely that they will become so any time soon. On the other hand, what seems morally significant is Kant's argument that people are recruited into the army to kill or face death, being treated as mere machines and tools in the hands of others, a fact irreconcilable with individual human rights. Considering how the global economy is currently operating, Article 4 also seems unrealistic, whereas the remaining articles are relevant contributions to international law.

Kant's dream of perpetual peace ceased to be just a dream once he converted it into a philosophical treatise and even a proposal for a peace treaty, which he coined as a league of peace (*foedus pacificum*). He did not push for this proposition to be accepted but rather urged practical politicians to listen to or read it. He highlighted the need to consider the content with an open mind rather than arrogantly or pompously. Still, it is not just about practical politicians; citizens should also listen to or read the proposal and ponder it.

Kant starts by making a clear distinction between peace and truce. He views peace as the end of all hostilities between warring countries or states. Peace hinges on the republican constitution, which argues that citizens would bear the burden of costs if they were to declare war. The republican constitution is the only form of government that, according to Kant, derives from the idea of the original compact. It is established 1. by principles of freedom of the members of society, 2. by principles of everyone's dependence on a single common system of law, and 3. by the law of their equality as citizens. To maintain perpetual peace, the republican constitution requires the approval of the state's citizens before

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 70 – 71.

starting any war. This is because the citizens will hesitate to indulge in evil actions, as they would ultimately bear the brunt of war. They would have to “themselves fighting, paying the costs of the war from their own possessions, meagerly repairing the ravages that war leaves behind, and, finally, on top of all such malady, assuming a burden of debt that embitters the peace and will never be repaid [due to imminent, constantly impending wars])”<sup>9</sup> In a non-republican political system, declaring a war game is the easiest thing in the world, as the rulers can keep enjoying their banquets, hunts, summer castles, and court festivities without any sacrifices. A trivial cause is enough to stir things up as if it were some exciting entertainment; the ruler can casually leave it to his ever-ready diplomatic corps to come up with a “justification”.<sup>10</sup>

Kant did not view democracy as an effective political system for protecting individual freedom; he favoured a republic, and ultimately even a republic of world citizens, or rather republics of world citizens. According to Kant, the republican polity is not democratic. He distinguishes three forms of sovereignty. The sovereign power is held by one person (autocracy – prince), a group of people (aristocracy – nobility), or all who constitute society (democracy – people’s rule). The second form of classification is that of forms of government, either republican or despotic. Republicanism separates the executive from the legislative power. Democracy is believed to be a form of despotism because it establishes an executive power in which all settle things for each individual, potentially going against their will. Kant posits that a republican form of government is viable only in a representative system, but not in a democracy. The most bearable form of despotism is that practised by a single ruler.<sup>11</sup> Kant’s concept of democracy clearly refers to a direct democratic system where the executive and legislative powers are not separated, similar to ancient or Rousseauian democracy. On the other hand, the traits he attributes to the republican polity are typical of the current democratic system. Contemporary democracies are representative systems that align with Kant’s concept of republican governments. Not only do they divide executive, legislative and judicial powers but they also enshrine human and civil rights in their constitutions, which goes well beyond what Kant envisaged and demanded, though he was heading in that direction.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

According to Kant, international law should rest on the federalism of free states, which should not only sign peace treaties with each other but also create a league of peace (*foedus pacificum*) that would not end just one but all wars. Peace treaties and peace leagues arise from reason, which “from the throne of the highest moral legislative authority, reason looks down on and condemns war as a means of pursuing one’s rights, and makes peace an immediate duty”.<sup>12</sup> Kant claims that international law precludes the existence of a right to war. This would imply that “that it is perfectly just that people who are so disposed annihilate each other and thereby find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence together with their perpetrators”.<sup>13</sup>

The novelty of Kant’s treatise on peace is the law of world citizenship (*ius cosmopoliticum*), referring to the right to visit, i.e. be hospitable without treating visiting foreigners as enemies as long as they conduct themselves peacefully. Another crucial and truly cosmopolitan principle is

all human beings have a claim, to present oneself to society by virtue of the right of common possession of the surface of the earth. Since it is the surface of a sphere, they cannot scatter themselves on it without limit, but they must rather ultimately tolerate one another as neighbors, and originally no one has more of a right to be at a given place on earth than anyone else.<sup>14</sup>

Applying this principle without exception would equate to the eradication of private property, in line with Rousseau’s philosophy. At the same time, it showcases Kant’s pragmatism, emphasizing tolerance based on the awareness that the Earth is both spherical and finite. Kant’s most significant contribution to the cosmopolitan, universal right of mankind is arguably: “the violation of right at any *one* place on the earth is felt in *all* places”. Kant identified this principle as essential for attaining eternal peace.<sup>15</sup> This sentence was often cited by the signatories of Charter 77 from 1977 through 1989.

According to Kant, perpetual peace is ensured by Nature, described as a “great artist,” who dispersed people to populate all corners of the earth through war”. He argues that it “seems to be grafted on human nature,” and “even counts as something noble”. A warlike spirit is highly es-

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 84.

teemed by both American and European savages in the age of chivalry. It is even given an “inner dignity,” and even some philosophers have glorified it while disregarding the Greek saying “War is an evil because it creates more wicked men than it kills”. Kant asserts that a republican state can fully protect human rights, though many argue that it would only work in a nation of angels. He is convinced, however, that if the state is organised well, “men’s powers are arranged pairwise so that the ruinous effect of one power is reduced or cancelled by its opposite number.” He claims that a state can be established even for a “of nation of devils”.<sup>16</sup> Nature’s influence on international law is evident in how the diversity of languages and religions separates nations, leading to mutual animosity and war. Gradually it leads to greater harmony in their principles and understanding as opposed to despotism, which is “the graveyard of freedom”. According to Kant, the spirit of trade and the power of money can also play a role in fostering peace.<sup>17</sup>

Regarding the relationship between philosophy and the state, Kant is satisfied as long as states allow philosophers to speak freely and publicly about the maxims of waging war and negotiating peace. He does not require the state to follow them; all he wants is to be heard. He does not expect kings to philosophise or philosophers to become kings, nor does he long for it, because “holding power unavoidably corrupts the free judgment of reason”.<sup>18</sup> This conveys a sense of scepticism about both the concept of power and the moral integrity of philosophers.

Kant prioritizes morality grounded in freedom over politics centred on “cleverness like snakes”. Kant is not deluded because he knows that the proposition “Honesty is the best policy” often contradicts practice, whilst “Honesty is better than any policy” is beyond refutation and is the indispensable condition of policy.<sup>19</sup> Kant’s sense of political reality is revealed by the sentence: “Once a ruler gets power in his hands, he won’t allow the people to prescribe laws for him”.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, he dares to declare the sentence *fiat iustitia, pereat mundus* and translate it as: “Let justice reign even if it may cause all the rogues in the world to perish”<sup>21</sup> and ironically add “The world will certainly not come to an

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 85 – 90.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 93 – 94.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 102.

end by there being fewer evil people”.<sup>22</sup> Kant compares the moral politician “who interprets the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can coexist with morality” and the political moralist “who fashions himself a morality in such a way that it works to the benefit of the statesman”.<sup>23</sup> Interestingly, he believes that despotic moralists are led against their nature to a better path, while moralizing politicians “with the excuse that human nature is *incapable* of good in the way that the idea of reason dictates it, and the only effect that they have is to make progress *impossible* and to perpetuate the violation of right”.<sup>24</sup>

Kant originally conceived his project as a sweet dream of a philosopher; however, he presented it as a fictitious peace treaty, or more precisely a peace league. Although it did not develop into a peace league encompassing all nations, Kant should be acknowledged and studied further for his exploration of political philosophy, the concept of human rights and modern democratic theory.

### Czechoslovak Democratic and Philosophical Footprint

The focus here is on the Czechoslovak philosophical and democratic legacy, as democracy was often associated with Czechoslovakia in the works of Masaryk, Rádl, Komárková and Patočka. Hejdánek and Kohák are no different: even though they had firsthand experience with a divided Czech and Slovak democracy, their philosophical contemplation frequently circled back to Czechoslovak democracy and its philosophical reflection. We will explore the Czechoslovak topic in two parts: we will first look at the concept of democracy in the First Republic as perceived by Masaryk and Rádl; second, we will examine the assumptions of democracy in the human rights philosophy of Charter 77, and how it set the stage for the democratic revolution.

Masaryk proposed the concept of a democratic republic during the war, as he believed it to be linked to the progress of democracy in Europe and around the world.<sup>25</sup> Masaryk had already written about democracy before the war, emphasising its opposition to violence. By tying it to the idea of humanity, particularly fraternal humanity represented

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>25</sup> Masaryk, T. G., 2005. *Světová revoluce: Za války a ve válce 1914 – 1918*. Praha: Masarykův ústav AV ČR.; Masaryk, T. G., 2009. *The Making of a State – Memories and Observations 1914 – 1918*. New York: Ishi Press.

by Chelčický and Comenius, the ultimate goal was to achieve peace in Europe and worldwide.<sup>26</sup> Masaryk's conception of democracy, and that of a democratic republic, was not only pacifist. He initially dismissed revolution because he viewed it, much like the war, as centred on killing and romanticised aristocracy. However, in his work *Russia and Europe*<sup>27</sup> published before the war, he agreed to it as long as it was a legitimate and democratic revolution. At last, amid the war, he took charge of it as the head of the foreign Czechoslovak committee and the Czechoslovak legions to carry out a revolution against Austria-Hungary, to form a new Czechoslovak state, a democratic republic. In his view, the First World War was a contest between democracy and theocracy, in which democracy triumphed, paving the way for an era of democratic peace in Europe and globally.

Initially, Masaryk criticized – Kant's transcendental thought for not overcoming Hume's scepticism.<sup>28</sup> However, he eventually agreed with Kant's critical thinking, noting its absence in Russia, where Western philosophy and culture were well received but not critically evaluated. He often cites Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative that we must treat a person or a group of people as an end in itself, not merely as a means of our thinking and acting.

Rádl carried forward Masaryk's concept of a democratic republic within contemporary Western philosophy while pointing out its shortcomings for not being sufficiently thorough and critical, given its roots in Czechoslovak, Central European, and originally German romantic nationalism. In Rádl's view, nationalism was not a philosophy of peace but rather a philosophy of war, exemplified by the war between Czechs and Germans, as well as the disputes between Czechs and Slovaks. Rádl cautioned that democracies built on nationalism would lack fairness and stability, advocating instead for their transformation and reconstruction on a contractual basis. Rádl also criticizes Masaryk's concept of humanity democracy, arguing that the concept of humanity is not sufficient to ensure that the democratic state will be fair even towards minorities,

<sup>26</sup> Masaryk, T. G., 1990. *Ideály humanitní*. Praha: Melantrich. Masaryk, T. G., 1991. *O demokracii*. Praha: Melantrich. Only in Czech.

<sup>27</sup> Masaryk, T. G., 1995 – 1996. *Rusko a Evropa I-III*. Praha: Masarykův ústav AV ČR. Masaryk, T. G., 1918. *The Spirit of Russia*, Vol. 1, Vol 2. Transl. by Cedar Paul. London: George Allen & Unwin.

<sup>28</sup> Masaryk, T. G., 2000. *Moderní člověk a náboženství*. Praha: Masarykův ústav AV ČR. Masaryk, T. G., 1938. *Modern man and Religion*. Transl. by Bibza, A., Bene, V. London: George Allen & Unwin.

especially national ones. He proposes the concept of human rights as a safer criterion.<sup>29</sup>

*History of Philosophy II* by Rádl underlines Kant's advocacy for perpetual peace and great faith in reason as characteristics that position him closer to Western philosophy than other German idealist and romantic philosophers. For Rádl, almost all of them can be classified as anti-Western, and in this sense, Kant was a philosopher who fulfilled his task by presenting a programme for the reformation of the world.<sup>30</sup>

After the war, Komárková believed that democracies founded on the concept of human rights could bring about a free life. Despite writing her work "The Origin and Significance of Human Rights" in 1948,<sup>31</sup> she did not submit it due to the communist coup and the subsequent changes at the university and in society. It spread through samizdat, especially following the announcement of Charter 77, and was not officially published until 1990. The topic of human rights in our country was brought up back in 1928 by Rádl, who saw them as a decisive criterion for evaluating fairness and democracy within every democratic society. She regards Kant as one of the Anglo-Saxon thinkers, i.e. Milton, Locke and Mill, who laid the foundations of democracy on human rights.

### Existential interpretation

Karl Jaspers' 1957 commentary on Kant's *Toward Perpetual Peace*<sup>32</sup> showcased his Kantian leanings, which were already present in his earlier work, notably the post-war *Question of Guilt* (1945).<sup>33</sup> Here he sought to reconcile German guilt and responsibility for the war by considering not only criminal and political guilt but also moral and metaphysical guilt. In doing so, he proved to be a true disciple of Kant in updating Kant's philosophy to the post-war era and the post-war German society. He openly acknowledged Kant as the greatest German philosopher and pointed out the infringement of article number six by Hitler's Nazi

<sup>29</sup> Rádl, E., 1993. *Válka Čechů s Němci*. Praha: Melantrich. Rádl, E., 2017. *Der Kampf zwischen Tschechen und Deutschen*. Kulmbach: Verlagsbuchhandlung Sabat.

<sup>30</sup> Rádl, E., 1999. *Dějiny filosofie II*. Praha: Votobia, p. 287. Only in Czech.

<sup>31</sup> Komárková, B., 1990. *Původ a význam lidských práv*. Praha: SPN. Only in Czech.

<sup>32</sup> Jaspers, K., 1957. Kants „Zum ewigen Frieden“. In: Ziegler, K., ed. *Wesen und Wirklichkeit des Menschen. Festschrift für Helmuth Plessner*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 131 – 152.

<sup>33</sup> Jaspers, K., 2001. *The Question of German Guilt*. Transl. by Ashton, E. B. New York: Fordham University Press.

Germany. In the study *Kant's writing Toward Perpetual Peace*, he delved deeper into Kant's project. He dealt with the political situation in Germany, Europe and the world as early as 1931 in *The Spiritual Situation of the Time* (1931),<sup>34</sup> and after the war, he published *The Atomic Bomb and the Future of Humanity: Political Consciousness in Our Time* (1956).<sup>35</sup>

Jaspers's interpretation follows Kant's radically moral view of politics. He comments on the first preamble of Kant's peace project as follows: "He who wants peace must not lie. The lie is the principle of war and of all politics determined by possible war. Therefore, truth is a powerful weapon of peace. One must call things by their true names, and thus not pass off a truce for peace".<sup>36</sup> He notes that Kant's interpretation is modest and open-ended while emphasising that in contrast to Hegel's "confusion of a total interpretation of the world with scientific knowledge," it is only a hypothesis, only a hope.<sup>37</sup> He interprets Kant's secret article on the relationship between philosophy and politics as follows:

Only philosophy, but only as a force in all men as rational beings, can bring about eternal peace. For truth to apply, it must become apparent in public debate. [...] Kant did not give up the Platonic idea of philosopher-kings, but changed its form. Philosophy, that is reason, is supposed to rule, but this reason can rule only when it is carried out through men. Not individual philosopher kings or supermen, but the truth revealed publicly in mutual discourse and spiritual struggle can effectively lead.<sup>38</sup>

He remarked on Kant's specific humour and irony.

### Reconstruction of Kant's Political Philosophy

Arendt expanded on Jaspers' ideas by delving deeply into the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin in *The Origin of Totalitarianism*,<sup>39</sup> as well as in various other works. She interpreted Kant's *Critique of Judgment* through a philosophical lens, uncovering the origins of political philosophy triggered by the French Revolution as evidenced in Kant's writings. She elucidated Kant's political philosophy by interpreting *Toward*

<sup>34</sup> Jaspers, K., 1998. *Die geistige Situation der Zeit*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

<sup>35</sup> Jaspers, K., 1958. *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen*. München: Verlag R. Piper.

<sup>36</sup> Jaspers, K., 1957. Kants „Zum ewigen Frieden“, *ibid.* 5.1 – 2.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.14.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.19.

<sup>39</sup> Arendt, H., 1962. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: The World Publishing Company.



*Perpetual Peace* in her lectures in 1970.<sup>40</sup> However, Arendt also wondered if Kant was joking just like Plato, Aristotle or Pascal when they wrote about politics. Kant's irony, black humour, and sarcasm are prevalent throughout *Toward Perpetual Peace*.

Kant's sketch on perpetual peace is the most extensive treatise in the arena of his political philosophy. Arendt's reputable reconstruction shows that Kant opens his political philosophy with the *Critique of Judgment*, while Arendt begins hers with the theory of judgment, a topic she hinted at but did not finish. She draws her political philosophy from that of Kant. In her Kantian lectures, she interprets judgment as speaking, criticising and communicating with others and between others. An important role in her interpretation is played by the viewer and the actor. While actors are constrained by their actions and have a one-sided perspective, they surpass the passivity of the spectators and observers. The viewers can see things from multiple perspectives, but mere spectatorship leads to arrogance and conceit, as illustrated by the Pythagorean fragment about competitors being hunters of fame, merchants being hunters of wealth, and philosophers, mere spectators, being hunters of truth. Arendt's critics highlight that Kant's political philosophy could have drawn more from the *Critique of Practical Reason* in establishing the concept of freedom. They contend that it is curious why Arendt chose to overlook or outright dismiss this concept, given that Kant's ethics and politics are founded on it.<sup>41</sup> While I concur with Arendt's critics, I also acknowledge that her interpretation of the role of judgment and the relationship between the viewer and the actor in political philosophy marks a significant political step in Kant's interpretation.

## Wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and Charter 77

Patočka's sixth essay, "20<sup>th</sup> Century Wars and the 20<sup>th</sup> Century as War,"<sup>42</sup> can be read as a direct contradiction to Kant's concept of perpetual peace. Patočka supported his argument by pinpointing that 19<sup>th</sup>-centu-

<sup>40</sup> Arendt, H., 1982. *Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

<sup>41</sup> Beiner, R., 1992. *Hannah Arendt on Judging*. In: Arendt, H.: *Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 89 – 156.

<sup>42</sup> Patočka, J., 1996. Wars of the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War. In: Dodd, J. ed. *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*. Transl. By Erazim Kohák, E., Chicago: Carus Publishing Company, pp. 119 – 137.

ry scholars as well as Masaryk interpret human history only in terms of the day, life and peace, overlooking its dark and war aspects. Patočka tries to interpret them from both perspectives, following the footsteps of not only Heraclitus, Nietzsche and Heidegger but also Teilhard de Chardin's mystical war experience and Ernst Jünger's accumulation of energy; nevertheless, the dark, war side dominates. Patočka argues that the only glimmer of hope in the war-torn 20<sup>th</sup> century lies in the "solidarity of the shaken," which will stand united in opposition to war measures. He continues this line of thought by conducting a critical analysis of Masaryk, drawing comparison between Masaryk and Nietzsche. He mentions that while Masaryk was a philosopher of the First World War as a conflict between democracy and theocracy and believed it was the culmination and overcoming of the world crisis, Nietzsche is the philosopher of all wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>43</sup>

In his defence of Charter 77 and human rights, Patočka uses Kant's arguments, emphasising morality as the foundation of any society. Morality is not to make society work, but simply to make people human.

No society, no matter how well-equipped it may be technologically, can function without a moral foundation, without convictions that do not depend on convenience, circumstances, or expected advantage. Yet the point of morality is to assure not the functioning of a society but the humanity of humans. Humans do not invent morality arbitrarily, to suit their needs, wishes, inclination, and aspiration. Quite the contrary, it is morality that defines what being human means. [...] The idea of human rights is nothing other than the conviction that even states, even society as a whole, are subject to the sovereignty of moral sentiment: that they recognize something unconditional that is higher than they are, something that is binding even on them, sacred, inviolable, and that in their power to establish and maintain a rule of law they seek to express this recognition. This conviction is present in individuals as well, as the ground for living up to their obligations in private life, at work, and in public. The only genuine guarantee that humans will act not only out of greed or fear but freely, willingly, responsibly, lies in this conviction.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Patočka, J., 1981. An Attempt at a Czech National Philosophy and its Failure. In: Čapek, M. – Hrubý, K. – Arbor, A., eds. *T. G. Masaryk in Perspective. Comments and Criticism*, Transl. By Mark Suino, SVU, pp. 1 – 22.

<sup>44</sup> Patočka, J., 1989. What Charter 77 Is and What It Is Not. In: Kohák, E., ed. *Jan Patočka. Philosophy and Selected Writing*. Transl. by E. Kohák. Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 343 – 347.

Patočka referred to Kant when discussing the duty to resist injustice, even if it is inflicted on oneself. Patočka's political-philosophical perspective was significantly shaped not just by Kant, but also by Arendt, whose influence was paramount in his final complete work, *the Heretical Essays*.

What seems significant is Patočka's critique of Masaryk's "safe optimism".<sup>45</sup> Patočka held Masaryk in high esteem for establishing a new, democratic state. His appreciation was in a sense Platonic in that he called Masaryk the only philosopher who managed to fulfil Plato's dream. Patočka's praise of Masaryk for establishing a democratic republic is connected with a philosophical critique. He questions Masaryk's unexplained contradiction between positivism and moral philosophy and his preaching of safe optimism between the wars, when the unresolved domestic and global crises were not leading to increased democracy in Europe and the world, but rather towards another world war. Patočka's students and critics (Hejdánek, Kohák) pointed out an interesting inconsistency: Patočka's critiques of Masaryk and Rádl were severe, yet he concurred with them in their condemnation of nationalism, and his efforts as a spokesperson for Charter 77 to promote human and civil rights reflected the non-political politics of Masaryk and Rádl.<sup>46</sup> Scruton believed that Masaryk's and Patočka's actions embodied the spirit of Kant's practical reason and moral approach to politics. This moral and political-philosophical contribution to the philosophy of human rights was politically manifested and confirmed in the democratic revolution in 1989, signifying a unique domestic tradition of democratic and human rights thought.<sup>47</sup>

### Habermas' Critique and Communicative Action

In his study for the bicentenary of *Toward Perpetual Peace*, Habermas's examination, commentary and interpretation that was Kantian in nature but also drew from the critiques of Kant, Marx, and Peirce. More specifically, he sees criticism as an act of clarifying concepts, exploring

<sup>45</sup> Patočka, J., 2006. Vzpomínka a zamyšlení o Rádlovi a Masarykovi. In: *Češi II*. Praha: Oikymen, pp. 325 – 338. Only in Czech.

<sup>46</sup> Hejdánek, L., 2010. Patočkovо kritické vidění Masaryka. In: *Setkání a odstup*. Praha: Oikymen, pp. 274 – 290. Only in Czech. Kohák, E., 2010. Zdar a nezdar „národní“ filosofie: Patočka, Masaryk. In: *Kopí Dona Quijota*. Praha: Ježek, pp. 26 – 44. Only in Czech.

<sup>47</sup> Scruton, R., 1990. Masaryk, Kant and the Czech Experience. In: Winters, S. B. ed. *T. G. Masaryk (1850-1937) Vol. 1. Thinker and Politician*. London: MacMillan, pp. 44 – 59

the possibilities and limitations of our interpretation, social criticism of ideologies of all kinds, including those in the scientific and technological domains, and embracing criticism as a pragmatic philosophy of speech.<sup>48</sup> Reflecting Kantian principles, the theory of communicative action regards the other not as a tool or a strategic object, but as a partner or opponent in the process of ethical, social and political communication.<sup>49</sup>

For Kant, “Perpetual peace” is an ideal that is meant to raise the challenge and illustrative power to the state of world citizenship. Kant in Habermas interpretation opens a third dimension to legal theory: in addition to the state law and the law of nations, he introduces the law of world citizens (*ius cosmopoliticum*).<sup>50</sup> Kant advocates for legal pacifism. He asserts it is based on the law of reason as well as the experiential boundaries of his era. This sets us apart from him.<sup>51</sup> The evils of war are caused by the princes of Europe and their mercenary armies. The major atrocities of war are not the loss of lives, but the plundering and impoverishing of the country; the true costs of war manifest in subjugation, loss of freedom, foreign rule and moral decay. Habermas situates Kant’s treatise within the context of limited warfare following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which was only a truce rather than the end of all wars.<sup>52</sup> According to Habermas, Kant considered normal locally limited conflicts between individual states and alliances, cabinets and states, i.e. technically limited wars that distinguished between fighting armies and civilian populations. The goals of these wars were politically circumscribed, differing from the objectives of world wars, civil wars, guerilla warfare, and terrorism through bombings. They were not motivated by ideologies seeking to exterminate populations.<sup>53</sup> For Kant, the war crimes did not yet exist.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Habermas, J., 1988. *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*. Transl. by Weber Nicholson, S., Stark, J. A. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

<sup>49</sup> Habermas, J., 1981. *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns I-II*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Habermas, J., 1984. *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Transl. by McCarthy, T. A. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J., 1987. *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. Two: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*. Transl. by McCarthy, T. A. Boston: Beacon Press.

<sup>50</sup> Habermas, J., 1997. Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: With the Benefit of 200 Years’ Hindsight. In: Bohman, J. – Lutz-Bachmann, M., eds. *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 113 – 153.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 114 – 115.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., pp. 115 – 116.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

He interpreted perpetual peace as legal pacifism, a subfield of cosmopolitan law and world citizen republicanism. Habermas demonstrated how post-Kantian European and global history failed to achieve peace and instead witnessed world wars, genocide, and other atrocities surpassing the conflicts known during Kant's era. He contrasts Kant with Carl Schmitt, who advocated for legal bellicism and considered enmity as a fundamental aspect of politics. Because Kant argued that the removal of hostile actions was essential for wars to stop, Schmitt raised doubts about whether Kant's universalism was promoting war.<sup>55</sup> By contrast, Habermas believed that the primary concern in the advancement of post-war Western democracy was human rights. Within the theory of deliberative democracy, human rights are pivotal in providing a normative counterbalance to the democratic principle, the principle of elections. He interprets human rights as having a dual face, deriving from morality and having universal, boundless applicability. They are integrated into the constitutional and legal system while being subject to territorial constraints within the state where they were adopted. He accentuates the detective work required to uncover human rights violations, instead of applying them selectively to specific countries. Kant's contribution in this area is undeniable.

## Rawls' Just Contract Theory and Perpetual Peace 2.0

Rawls' project *The Law of Peoples* stands out for its thorough reevaluation of the potential and boundaries of Kant's "cosmopolitan" law or "cosmopolitan" peace. He actively seeks to apply Kant's thoughts to the modern era, particularly at the cusp of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, reflecting on the circumstances under which this "law of peoples" could be applied and recognized. He formulates his project around the concept of justice as fairness, which rests on two maxims. They are both founded on a hypothetical contract made behind the "veil of ignorance," which is then extended to the concept of political liberalism and overlapping consensus at the international, global and cosmopolitan levels.<sup>56</sup> Rawls calls his concept a realistic utopia. Rawls's and Kant's final projects share the common trait of being less extensive than their major works *Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism*, and *Critiques*.

<sup>55</sup> This reading is questioned in Šajda, P., 2024. Working for Peace in Situations of Conflict: On Schmitt's Reception of Kant. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 13(1), pp. 28 – 44.

<sup>56</sup> Rawls, J., 1999. *A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition*. Boston: Harvard University Press.; Rawls, J., 1995. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

The law of peoples was motivated by two ideas. “One is that the great evils of human history—unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass murder—follow from political injustice, with its own cruelties and callousness”. The second idea “lies in asserting that these great evils will disappear as soon as the most serious forms of political injustice are removed”.<sup>57</sup> He describes the law of peoples as a realistic utopia because he not only envisions just peace among well-organized liberal democracies but also suggests that the law of peoples could be embraced by non-liberal nations and states. For this reason, he divides nations into five groups: 1. reasonable liberal nations, 2. decent peoples (he classifies them as decent consultative hierarchies), 3. outlaw states, 4. societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, 5. benevolent absolutism.<sup>58</sup> The first two types are addressed through ideal theory, whereas non-ideal theory addresses the other types. We won’t delve into every aspect of Rawls’s project. According to him, peace between liberal democratic states consists in the fact that “The crucial fact of peace among democracies rests on the *internal* structure of democratic societies, which are not tempted to go to war except in selfdefense or in grave cases of intervention in unjust societies to protect human rights”.<sup>59</sup> This is proven by high levels of satisfaction, happiness and self-esteem found in democratic societies, which significantly reduces the likelihood of these states resorting to war.<sup>60</sup>

According to Rawls, democratic states have not engaged in warfare with each other since 1800. For instance, according to Rawls’s classification, the American confederation in the Civil War or Bismarck’s Germany were not democratic states as they failed to meet the necessary criteria. Slavery was present in the South and Bismarck’s Germany led expansive wars for territory, indicating a lack of commitment to the principles of a decent, organised and democratic state.<sup>61</sup> He brings attention to questionable actions carried out by democratic states, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the bombing of Dresden at the war’s end, which he deems as a failure of statecraft.<sup>62</sup> He criticizes that

<sup>57</sup> Rawls, J., 1999. *The Law of Peoples*. Boston: Harvard University Press, p. 7.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., pp. 73 – 77.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., pp. 145 – 158.

the United States overturned the democracies of Allende in Chile, Arbenz in Guatemala, Mossadegh in Iran, and, some would add, the Sandanistas in Nicaragua. Whatever the merits of these regimes, covert operations against them were carried out by a government prompted by monopolistic and oligarchic interests without the knowledge or criticism of the public.<sup>63</sup>

## **Russian Aggression Against Ukraine through the Lens of Kant's Conditions**

In light of Russian aggression, what would be Kant's stance on the present appeals for peace? Would he align with those in favour of peace at all costs or a temporary truce, or would he stand firm on enforcing the conditions that the Russian aggressor continues to breach? Speculating on Kant's stance on Russian aggression may be presumptuous, but we can evaluate Kant's principles to see which are attainable and which are not.

Firstly, given the current level of hostility between Russia and Ukraine, discussing peace in the Kantian sense is not feasible; a ceasefire appears to be the only viable solution. Moreover, in this war instigated by Russia's unilateral aggression, numerous other principles of Kant's "peace treaty" for attaining eternal peace are being violated. For now, there is no point in discussing the first article, as there is no peace settlement under consideration or negotiations, hence secret reservations are out of the question. All other articles are violated. The defining feature of Putin's regime is then "the relentless quest for power using any means necessary".

In his second article, Kant refutes the notion that an independent state can legitimately acquire another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift. The main argument is that the state is a community of people that cannot be controlled and managed by anyone other than the state itself. The current state of affairs in Ukraine, exacerbated by Russian aggression, goes beyond Kant's expectations. Instead of using direct military aggression, Putin's strategy for taking over Ukraine involves occupying conquered territories, abducting and indoctrinating children and brutally subjugating the population of the occupied territories.

The third article, that standing armies are to be abolished in time, appears ludicrous in our current context, as these armies have been con-

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

stantly waging war against each other. This article inspired many pacifists between the wars, with Přemysl Pitter being the most prominent among them.

The fourth article on national debts is grounded on the premise that the debt system and easy access to borrowing can contribute to the outbreak of wars. Nevertheless, application is unrealistic since the economies of all existing states, including the largest ones, operate on the basis of the debt system. Kant might remark: “No wonder that there is so much war”. The fifth article, which prohibits states from forcibly interfering in the constitution and government of another state, is being, despite its general recognition throughout the civilized world, brutally violated by Russia.

The sixth article is consistently flouted by Russia through its engagement in hostile acts during war that could undermine trust for future peace. Russia’s crimes in Bucha, Irpina and other occupied parts of Ukraine, such as the systematic abduction of children, targeted bombing of civilian areas, power plants and energy facilities, are not likely to restore mutual trust in the foreseeable future. It is undeniable that Ukraine also breaches Kant’s principles in certain instances by trying to assassinate Russian officials or bomb Russian refineries. Yet this should not overshadow the crimes committed by the Russian aggressor, who unquestionably holds responsibility for the war.

The points listed suggest that it is premature to talk about peace and a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. The peace rhetoric coming from populist and extremist political leaders is really a request for Ukraine to concede to Russian aggression and discontinue the military aid that empowers Ukraine to fend off Russian aggression. It is worth mentioning here that Putin’s Russia violates all the conditions of Kant’s eternal peace.

## Final Answers and Open Questions

Kant’s project is a significant political-philosophical act, which was newly evaluated in the 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy. Paradoxically, the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw much more warfare and atrocities compared to Kant’s era. Kant oscillates between sweet dreams of philosophy, ironic comments and concrete proposals for advancing civil, international and world law to move closer to the end of all wars and eternal peace. Through his comments, criticisms and suggestions framed as hypotheses, he envisions a world where people live as moral beings tolerating each other in their states, international environment and the Earth. He writes his treatise from the perspective of



a moral philosopher, ready to provide advice and recommendations to politicians and heads of state who are willing to listen to him. Kant's moral, legal, and political reasoning, which is universally normative, continues to be inspiring, even though it can be challenging to implement. Although his moral disapproval of war and unethical politics is valuable, it can be hard to enforce and is somewhat on the fringes of contemporary political reality.

We examined Kant's work from the perspective of his dual influence on democracy and philosophy. Kant's impact is noticeable in the works of our philosophers. The dilemma of how philosophers should approach war was fleshed out by Masaryk, Rádl, Komárková and Patočka. Masaryk incorporated Kant's ethics into his works. Before the First World War and during his presidency thereafter, he advocated for a peaceful, democratic solution in his reform philosophy and politics; during the war, on the other hand, he took on a revolutionary role, standing with democratic allies against theocratic regimes in the fight for democracy against theocracy, i.e. on one side of the conflict. Masaryk upheld our democracy, yet his vision for a lasting democratic peace never came to fruition. Rádl interpreted Czechoslovak interwar nationalism as a form of national war and pleaded for a contractual democratic peace. Despite being unheard and misunderstood in his lifetime, he was acknowledged posthumously by his indirect pupils, Patočka and Hejdránek. Rádl, Komárková, Patočka and Hejdránek championed human rights as a guarantee of democratic peace. Patočka's justification of human rights was rooted in Kant philosophy, a stance that seems to conflict with his war hermeneutics in the 6<sup>th</sup> heretical essay.

Jaspers was inspired by Kant when morally acknowledging Germany's guilt for the war, morally condemning the war and transforming philosophy into a free and responsible quest for truth. Arendt built on Jaspers' ideas by describing, analysing and criticising totalitarianism as well as reconstructing Kant's political philosophy. She somewhat problematically and debatably drew on the critique of justice, which served as the foundation of her own political philosophy. From my perspective, it would be more logical to establish Kant's political philosophy on his interpretation of morality derived from practical reason.

Both Habermas and Rawls' political philosophy represent a unique continuation of Kant's political-philosophical project. Habermas adopted Kant's ideas on criticism and communicative action, as well as his views on human rights within the framework of deliberative democracy. Rawls even ventured into creating his unique take on Kant's perpetual peace. He strived to conceive it as a realistic utopia, i.e. not as a solely moral project

but as something applicable to contemporary politics. It can be argued that neither Habermas nor Rawls stopped the war through their philosophical-political projects, yet their philosophical contribution to the democratic peace is noteworthy.

Wars are usually not caused by democratic states. But democratic states have to defend themselves. If they seem at ease and show no desire to engage in conflict, they might catch the dictator-aggressor's eye. Putin most likely assumed that Ukraine's defense capabilities were weak and that democratic Europe would hesitate to intervene to avoid getting embroiled in a war. Russian aggression against Ukraine was examined using the framework of six articles of Kant's preamble. Kant's articles are still relevant, albeit not entirely. This reflection aimed to examine the issues of peace through the lens of Kant's philosophy and 20<sup>th</sup> century political thought. I leave it to the reader to think about and continue the reflections and questions that have been raised.

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## On the Real Possibility of Establishing Perpetual Peace from Today's Perspective

**Abstract:** The text presents Kant's theory of perpetual peace, which it seeks to analyze, especially with regard to its applicability in the present day. In particular, it traces Kant's basic assumptions of perpetual peace – primarily a republican form of government and secondarily a federal community of states. Kant's idea of a republican form of government is analyzed as vague, and incomplete, and in tension with Kant's conception of sovereignty, which grants supreme power not to the people but to the head of state. Moreover, the conception of sovereignty put forward is at odds with modern conceptions of democratically understood sovereignty. The problems with the first condition of perpetual peace – a republican form of government – are consequently reflected in the possible practicability of the second condition of perpetual peace – a federation of free states. The text concludes, along with Kant, that the realization of both conditions is difficult, but is further complicated by the inconsistency of Kant's theory.

**Keywords:** Immanuel Kant, Peace, Sovereignty, Democracy, Republic

### Introduction

Although Immanuel Kant was not primarily a political philosopher, his work *Toward Perpetual Peace* is also one of his major works that greatly influenced thinking about international relations. As Pierre Hassner puts it, Kant's contribution lies primarily in placing his reflections (even when building on his predecessors) within a broader and deeper philosophical framework.<sup>1</sup>

Kant's idea can be simplistically characterized as “peace through law”. From the natural state between states, which was a state of war, to a legal

<sup>1</sup> Hassner, P., 1987. Immanuel Kant. In: Strauss, L., Cropsey, J., eds.. *History of Political Philosophy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 581-621.

state (relationship),<sup>2</sup> i.e. peace, even “perpetual peace”.

Kant was a proponent of linking domestic and foreign policy, and the internal organization of the state was a condition for peaceful coexistence. The importance he attaches to this is already evident from the fact that the very first definitive article, “The civil system in every state is to be republican,” refers to it. In its popular version, the saying “democracies do not war with each other” is common, but the situation is more complicated.

However, some authors express that “foreign policy openly takes precedence over domestic: Particular civil constitutions must fail to bring peace internally while external threats to peace persist.”<sup>3</sup> The aim of this article is to show the opposite approach of Kant, and also to examine the conditions of perpetual peace, their realism and adequacy, especially in the light of the political trends of the 21st century.

### Conditions of Perpetual Peace

Immanuel Kant lists two definite articles, the fulfillment of which is necessary for perpetual peace. The first article is the *republican system*, and the second is the *federalism of free states*.

The two articles build upon each other, and the functionality of the second is conditional upon the first. But both steps are conditional on their successful establishment, which in reality is extremely difficult in practice. This, of course, complicates Kant's construction, and the deficiencies in the (separate) steps complicate the success of the outcome.

### The Internal Political Condition of Perpetual Peace

Kant distinguishes between forms of ruling (*forma imperii*) and forms of government (*forma regiminis*), thus introducing his typology.

The forms of ruling depend on who rules (has the ruling power), and here Kant distinguishes autocracy, aristocracy and democracy. He thus essentially copies the classical scheme. (However, it should be noted at the outset that this copying of the classical scheme has its limits for Kant, since he probably means primarily executive power, as I will try to explain later.)

The forms of government depend on the way power is exercised and

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 581 – 621.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 581 – 621.

there are only two: republican and despotic. Despotism is the principle where the state implements the laws it has given itself. The republican form of government is characterized by the separation of the executive from the legislature. Furthermore republic is defined on three principles: “first on principles of the *freedom* of the members of a society (as individuals), second on principles of the dependence of all upon a single legislation (as subjects), and third on the law of their *equality* (*as citizens of a state*)”<sup>4</sup>

The republican form of government is thus defined in three ways:

- separation of powers
- the status of the citizen (which includes the freedom of members of society, subordination to a single legislature, and equality of citizens)
- the scope of citizenship.

The question that arises is whether these are cumulative conditions, i.e., they must all be fulfilled at once, or whether any one of the conditions, however privileged, and its fulfilment is already sufficient for declaring the form of government republican, and further whether partial fulfilment of at least some of the conditions is sufficient, i.e., whether it is a question of degree and only relative fulfilment is sufficient.

While the division into monarchy, aristocracy and democracy/politheia (i.e. according to the criterion of who rules) has been a classical division since antiquity, Kant’s division into despotic and republican systems represents a modern element in his typology.

So is there such a thing as a Kantian table of good and bad forms of government? That is to say, an analogy to Aristotle’s table of good and bad forms of government, except that while the criterion of the form of government, i.e. who rules, remains the same, the other criterion differs – namely not good and bad government, but the form of government, i.e. whether it is a division into despotic or republican.

The division of forms of government into despotic and republican represents an element that is influenced by modern theories of the separation of powers, beginning with John Locke and especially Ch. L. de Montesquieu, from whom the road to the American Constitution of 1787 leads. Typical of the US Constitution is the strict separation of powers. And herein lies one of the pitfalls of Kant’s conception, namely the division into forms of government according to whether or not there

<sup>4</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. In: Kleingeld, P., ed. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. New Haven: Yale University, p. 74.

is a separation of legislative from executive power. It is a well-known fact that such a separation of powers, which in effect implies a separation of the two, has not been subsequently applied nearly as strictly as it has been in the U.S. presidential system. Thus, although the separation of the executive and the legislature represents a new element in Kant's work, it is also an element that has become obsolete with the evolution of political practice. The evolution has not gone in the direction of the model familiar from the US becoming widespread and becoming a typical feature of stable democracies, but quite the opposite – the presidential model that has worked for over two hundred years in the US has rather failed elsewhere, and most established and stable democracies have either a semi-presidential or parliamentary system. In both cases, however, it is a model in which the two powers coexist and usually work together. It can even be said that the executive, especially in parliamentary systems, is constituted by the legislature and must act in accordance with it, being a kind of delegate (representative) rather than an independent actor. Hayek even points to the interconnection of powers, where the so-called legislators cooperate with the government in which they are either directly or indirectly involved, which is therefore also their government (the government of their party or coalition). The details vary from country to country, but a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this text.

Kant's position could be interpreted in two ways. Either as a separation in the sense that the two powers are not identical, even though they influence and cooperate with each other. In that case, modern democracies would satisfy this condition of republicanism, indeed they are considered mixed forms of government, not pure democracies.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the exercise of power by an elite is not considered contrary to the democratic choice of legislation. However, if Kant insisted on a real separation, as would be suggested not only by the then prevailing theory of Ch. L. de Montesquieu, but also the first significant application of these theoretical principles in practice one decade before the writing of the treatise, and moreover the author himself expresses himself in this way, then one can speak of the first reason for the practical impracticability of the first definitive article today, and probably also within a certain horizon in the future.

<sup>5</sup> Novák, M., 2024. Proč jsou podle Aristotela demokracie a oligarchie nejdůležitější „ústavy“ a v čem se zásadně liší? *Sociologický časopis / Czech Sociological Review* 60(2), pp. 187 – 211. Only in Czech. This opinion, according to Novák, is also shared by Carl Schmitt and Bernard Manin.



## The Relationship of the Republican Form of Government to Democracy

Kant talks about the fact that the republican system gives the best hope for perpetual peace because the citizens decide about war and peace.<sup>6</sup>

The question is, of course, who Kant includes among the citizens, i.e. who constitutes for him the political nation. In *Toward Perpetual Peace*, Kant talks about the fact that in an establishment that is not republican the subject is not a citizen of the state.<sup>7</sup> Thus, in a republic, a subject is a citizen of the state, one might conclude. A republic could therefore be democratic in the sense that it would grant citizens civil rights, including participation in political power. One might consider that Kant is linking the republic to the democratic principle here, since he communicates the crucial information a little above that in a republican setup, citizens (i.e., freed subjects) have the right to express approval or disapproval of war. This would not be an option in a monarchical or aristocratic regime in the sense of monarchical despotism or aristocratic despotism.

Kant is not a fan of radical (direct) democracy, which is a well-known fact.<sup>8</sup> However, this type of democracy is not even relevant today, as there are only representative forms of democracy (with some elements of direct democracy mixed in, depending on the country, but this does not change the representative character of modern democracies).

The extent to which a republic could be democratic depends, in turn, on the definition of a citizen, i.e. who all is a citizen. And then on resolving the question of whether all citizens should have the right to participate in political power. (And even more consequential is the question of how far that right extends.)

On the question of who all is a citizen, it is possible to move between two limits, where on the one hand there is an establishment that is still aristocratic (oligarchic) and thus political power is held by a relatively narrow group of the population, and on the other hand a system with an inclusive citizenship, where all adult self-governing citizens are citizens with a stake in political power. The system of aristocracy fulfils Kant's condition that a narrow group rules (holds executive power), and this model is one of the two systems (the other is monarchy) that have

<sup>6</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace*, *ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>8</sup> Caranti, L., 2023. Why does Kant Think that Democracy is Necessarily Despotic? *Kantian Review* 28(2), pp. 167 – 183.

the potential to achieve a republican model, while “the democratic mode of government does not allow this” – it is therefore always despotic. But when does a model become democratic, i.e. necessarily despotic? While the line between monarchy and aristocracy is clear, at least in theory, there is a continuum between aristocracy (or oligarchy)<sup>9</sup> and democracy in the radical sense of inclusive citizenship. There may be a percentage of aristocrats, but there may also be, say, 10 % – but that is already more than the proportion of citizens in Athenian democracy.

A thorough reflection in this direction is carried out by M. Novák, in the context of Aristotle's concept of democracy and the relationship between democracy and oligarchy.<sup>10</sup> In this comparison, Aristotle's rather subtle distinction stands out, allowing us to scale the different variations and combinations of the two forms of government (in Aristotle's terminology, in Kant's we could speak of forms of the state). In the case of democracy alone, Aristotle distinguishes four types (in fact, probably five):

- the people consist of peasants and middle-class citizens who are so busy with work that they have no time for politics.
- the People composed of citizens of good birth.
- a society in which everyone lives freely
- a society in which all the free (as in the previous type) have a share in political power.

And Novak, in agreement with some other authors, finds a fifth type (fifth definition):

- all have an equal share in the government of the state.<sup>11</sup>

With the exception of radical democracy (which is quite explicitly rejected), a combination of oligarchic and democratic principles is quite common to Aristotle's reasoning and is also more practically feasible and, above all, more stable. Kant does not elaborate the democratic form of state in any detail, nor does he define the republican form of government in any clear way. This, however, significantly complicates the understanding of his work.

In terms of the scope of citizenship, it may seem in *Toward Perpetual*

<sup>9</sup> The difference between aristocracy and oligarchy is another topic. Kant uses the term of “aristocracy”, by which he means the government of a group – a definition that corresponds also to oligarchy because what Kant deals with is not a quality of governance, but the amount of persons in power.

<sup>10</sup> Novák, M., 2024. Proč jsou podle Aristotela demokracie a oligarchie nejdůležitější „ústavy“ a v čem se zásadně liší?, *ibid.*, pp. 187 – 211. Only in Czech.

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle, 1998. *Politics*. Transl. C. D. C. Reeve. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 109 – 110.

*Peace* that Kant's ideal is that all subjects become citizens. Since all citizens, not only the privileged classes were subjects, one might also consider the interpretation that all subjects would become citizens. Kant does not make any more precise definition in the present essay. However, he does make it in his earlier essay *Über ein Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis*, 1793. Kant makes a distinction between those who are unable to exercise the right of giving public laws (but are nevertheless under their protection); those who have this right are citizens (*citoyen*), which is a distinction from the bourgeois:

The one who has the right to vote in this legislation is known as the *citizen* (*citoyen*, that is, *citizen of the state*, not citizen of the city, *bourgeois*). The only quality required for this, beside the *natural* one (that it is neither woman nor child) is: that one is *one's own master* (*sui iuris*), and thus that one has some *property* (which also includes any skill, trade, fine art, or science) that provides for one. That is to say that in those cases where he must earn his livelihood from others, he earns it only by *selling* what is *his*, not by means of granting others the right to make use of his powers, thus that he not *serve* anyone, in the true sense of the word, but the commonwealth.<sup>12</sup>

Also later in *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*, he distinguishes between active and passive citizens, counting “journeymen, servants, minors, women” among the passive citizens.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, if Kant uses a similar definition of who is a citizen in works written approximately two years before and after *Toward Perpetual Peace*, it can be assumed that at the time of his writing, between the two works mentioned above, he held the same principles, even if he does not explicitly state them, which greatly facilitates the interpretation of the scope of citizenship according to his ideas. If we exclude those persons who are merely co-participants in the protection they enjoy along with citizens, but who have the right to participate in rule-making,<sup>14</sup> we find that the

<sup>12</sup> Kant, I., 2006. On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Hold in Practice. In: Kleingeld, P., ed. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. New Haven: Yale University, pp. 44 – 66.

<sup>13</sup> Chotaš J., 2022. Immanuel Kant. Idea věčného míru. In: Kučera, R. – Chotaš, J., eds. *Dějiny politického myšlení, Svazek III/2, Politické směry a myslitelé 19. století*. Praha: Oikoyemenh, pp. 108 – 130. Only in Czech.

<sup>14</sup> In this context, it is also appropriate to point out the interpretation that human dignity depends on the ability to participate in the creation of public laws. See Muránsky, M., 2023. Republikánska tradícia a ľudské práva: K Lohmannovej kritickej reflexii Immanuela Kanta a Karla Marxa. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 12(2), pp. 94 – 115.

range of citizens with a stake in power is very far from today's notions of democracy and inclusive citizenship (a judgment we can make even in the absence of accurate statistical data from Kant's time).

At the same time, however, we can hope that the range of participation in political power (lawmaking) is broad enough to be held by persons who will view war as a disadvantageous enterprise and will not approve of it. This problem could therefore be concluded by stating that, once a certain degree of extension of political rights has been achieved, Kant's assumption will no longer realistically hold, and that there is therefore no need to extend political rights with today's scale.

### **How Much Democracy for the Republic?**

At the same time, it is worth noting that today's scope of political rights is probably not inconsistent with Kant's theory of Perpetual Peace. Kant would probably not have seen a problem in extending political rights to other social classes, in terms of the sustainability of a restrained attitude towards war, or even precisely because, rather, he could not imagine it in the reality of the time.

Indeed, the breadth of fundamental political rights is not in itself a problem if it were to be limited to legislation. In fact, Kant distinguishes between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy according to who holds executive power. If the same subject is also the holder of legislative power, it is no longer a form of state, but a form of despotic government (in the sense of the division of forms of government despotic versus republican). The division between despotism and republic, then, is whether a legislative power has been created in addition to the executive power.

In fact, the republican model of government is one that has not let the executive power out of its hands, but has allowed the people (the political nation) to legislate. In a democratic system, this division cannot be made; the people have earned the legislative power and also the executive power. In connotation to Aristotle's table of good and bad forms of government, the following classification could be attempted:

- Monarchy: despotic x republican
- Aristocracy: despotic x republican
- Democracy: despotic x despotic.

Aristotle's distinction between good and bad forms of government has persisted, as the criterion of governing for the good of society ver-

sus governing for one's own good still appears to be workable (albeit in light of the fact that concepts such as the "common good" have been subjected to radical criticism).

In contrast, Kant's conception may appear to be a contemporary answer to a then-vivid question, but one that has become exhausted over time. This is probably a consequence of the historical setting of the argument. This, however, reduces its value for today.

Kant may be conflating two topics that he (seemingly) discusses in one. These are the question of the separation of legislative and executive power, i.e. the question of institutions, and secondly the question of the exercise of the (general) political will and its binding by legislation or laws. Here it is a different, more complicated issue. It is also, in fact, a return to a more traditional concept, namely the question of the binding of government by law (not government in the narrower sense as the executive, but in the broader sense as the governing power of the state). However, while Aristotle points to the problem of democracy as an establishment where citizens do not want to obey the law, and democracy puts itself above the law, for Kant it is a different problem, namely the problem of the enforcement of laws by those who enact them. This is not possible, according to him, if it is not to be a despotism. In a despotism, the ruler also enacts the laws. In a democracy, those who pass laws also rule – which is the same problem, only mirrored, and therefore democracy so conceived is only one variant of despotism. The difference that the autocrat is one and the people are all has no impact on the despotic nature of such a government.

The question is whether the principle of the rule of those who make laws at the same time can be applied in the same way to individuals as to the people, and with the same consequences.

In his typology, Aristotle proceeds towards the best realistically possible form of government, and concludes that it is a mixed government, combining the good elements of monarchy and aristocracy with the democratic principle (one cannot speak directly of democracy, since Aristotle used the word democracy to refer to one of the bad forms of government).

Kant's reasoning is somewhat different – his principle is to separate the will of the people, which is objectified in laws, from the exercise of power. The question is whether this is a different distinction, or whether it is an adoption, with a slight simplification, of the classical conception of Aristotle.

It would seem that Kant is about the same thing – the people decide the laws, but they do not rule directly, another group rules, Kant even

prefers it as narrow as possible, so that the formation of political will and its exercise overlap as little as possible. In his eyes, an aristocratic government is closer to a republic, and an autocratic one even closer. In a slightly later work, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*, he openly disbelieves in the ability of democracy in general to form a republican form of government,<sup>15</sup> since “the reform of the state and its change into a republic is to be effected, according to Kant, by way of reforms from above”.<sup>16</sup> In autocracy and aristocracy, it is possible that they will accept the principle of representation, since the smaller the number of rulers, the greater the representation, and therefore even in autocracy he assumes an easier implementation than in aristocracy.<sup>17</sup>

### Who is the Sovereign?

Kant's pessimism about democracy, and his optimism about the rule of elites, however, contradicts the modern notion of popular sovereignty, which Kant mentions essentially in the connection with Rousseau. The first important difference, however, is that Rousseau was led by his concept of the general will to reject the institution of representation.<sup>18</sup> And this in any form, including the democratic one. Belling points out that, according to Hobbes, democracy is not necessary for representation; one can represent/articulate the will of the people in a way independent of a democratic form of government, whereas for Rousseau, representation (any form, even a democratic one) is “incompatible with the idea of the sovereignty of the people”.<sup>19</sup> Rousseau is very clear in *On the Social Contract* that “sovereign power can never be alienated because it is only the exercise of the general will, and that the sovereign, who is only a collective being, can only be represented by himself”.<sup>20</sup> Consequences of sovereign power<sup>21</sup> is not only its inalienability, but also its indivisibility.<sup>22</sup> The con-

<sup>15</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right*. In: Kleingeld, P., ed. *Toward Perpetual Peace and other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. New Haven: Yale University, pp. 110 – 149.

<sup>16</sup> Chotaš J., 2022. Immanuel Kant. Idea věčného míru, *ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>17</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace*, *ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>18</sup> Kant, I., 1988. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*. Ak. VI. Berlin: H. Kleiner, p. 321.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 128.

<sup>20</sup> Rousseau, J.-J., 1987. *On the Social Contract*. In: Rousseau, J.-J. *Basic Political Writings*. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 153 – 154.

<sup>21</sup> Belling states that he prefers to translate “souveraineté” as “sovereignty” rather than “supreme power”. See Belling, V., 2014. *Zrození suveréna: pojem suverenity a jeho kritika v moderní politické a právní filosofii*. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, p. 128. Only in Czech.

<sup>22</sup> Rousseau, J.-J., 1987. *On the Social Contract*, *ibid.*, pp. 154 – 155.

temporary opposite is the theory of Montesquieu and the division of power into legislative and executive (including the judiciary).<sup>23</sup> It is also worth noting that Rousseau “regards representation as fundamentally hostile to sovereignty and the state itself”.<sup>24</sup>

An important idea of Rousseau, which Kant probably does not develop, is the limitlessness of the sovereign’s will – if only the general will (which is identified with the sovereign) can be the source of laws,<sup>25</sup> then it is also true that “the sovereign may violate any law he has imposed”.<sup>26</sup> This could include the application of laws to individual cases, including the decision not to apply them or to apply them differently, which is considered by Kant to be a sign of despotism and therefore rejected.

In his work *Toward Perpetual Peace*, Kant follows Rousseau in certain aspects. He conceives of democracy primarily as a plebiscitary form of government, resulting in a critique of democracy, which he thus classifies as a despotism characterized by ignorance of the principle of the separation of powers between the legislative and executive.<sup>27</sup> This does not exclude the possibility of democracies with an established system of representation, as stated in Appendix I of *Toward Perpetual Peace*.<sup>28</sup>

It is important to note that Kant’s conception of democracy and the sovereign underwent some development, and his conception in *Toward Perpetual Peace* and *Metaphysics of Morals* is different. In terms of our topic, however, the conception presented in *Toward Perpetual Peace* is relevant, since Kant’s conception of democracy and sovereignty is here combined with other components of his conception of *Perpetual Peace* into a single body of thought. It even forms its fundamental part – the first definitive article: “The civil constitution in every state shall be republican”.<sup>29</sup> It is worth noting here that while the view of democracy and the conception of the sovereign varied, Kant is consistent in his emphasis on the republican system, indeed, in his *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*, two years later, he seems to emphasize it again and even more.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Montesquieu, Ch., 1949. *The Spirit of the Laws*. New York: Hafner Publishing Company, pp. 151 – 152.

<sup>24</sup> Belling, V., 2014. *Zrození suveréna*, *ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>25</sup> Bartoš, J., 2017. *Suverenita panovníka, lidu a státu v moderní politické filosofii*. Ústí nad Labem: Filozofická fakulta UJEP, p. 52 – 74. Only in Czech.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>27</sup> Belling, V., 2014. *Zrození suveréna*, *ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>28</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace*, *ibid.*, pp. 101 – 102.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72 – 73.

<sup>30</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right*, *ibid.*, p. 340 – 341.

Kant completely diverges with Rousseau not only on the question of the possibility of representation, but also on the question of the sovereignty of the people. Although Kant operates with terms such as “general will”, a closer analysis shows rather a great caution to entrust the people with supreme power. Kant’s text repeatedly addresses this question, and we find views that certainly do not grant supreme power to the people. For example, the people cannot “claim to themselves the right of power over the head of state,” who has “supreme power which cannot be resisted”.<sup>31</sup> This is, of course, an admission of sovereignty to the sovereign (head of state) and such statements certainly cannot be considered as an adherence to the principle of the sovereignty of the people, but the sovereign is perceived here rather according to the Hobbesian model. In contrast, Kant states that in a republican form of government, “the consent of the citizens of the state is required whether there is to be war or not”.<sup>32</sup>

The above two ideas can hardly stand side by side. How, according to Kant, would the dispute between the sovereign (who would be more war-like in principle) and the people, who in Kant’s theory represent the brake on such tendencies, be resolved? On the one hand, the people have the “task” of preventing the war into which the high-ranking elites are rushing, but on the other hand, they must not oppose these elites (the head of state).

One may consider that this is an example of the immaturity of the theory put forward, which on the one hand works with Rousseauian motifs, on the other hand adopting a certain legacy of absolutism. The result, however, is an unworkable whole whose problems can hardly be bridged if we are to stay on Kant’s theories.

## Democracy and Sovereignty

In interpretations of Kant’s theory, many authors are convinced that Kant does not condemn democracy in all its forms, but only direct democracy. Kant’s republic could then, according to some, be interpreted as a liberal democracy of the modern type.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, Byrd and Hrushka argue that representative democracy is Kant’s ideal political system.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace*, *ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>33</sup> Hoffe, O., 2006. *Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>34</sup> Byrd, S. B., Hrushka, J., 2010. *Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 167.



However, Caranti, for example, thinks of Kant as „his criticism, properly reconstructed, (a) does not rest on any institutional peculiarity of direct democracies and (b) applies to representative democracies too, including the ones we live in“.<sup>35</sup> This view must be taken seriously if it is based on a relevant argument, as then the possibility of modern democracies to come closer to the realization of a peaceful order could be called into question. It is not certain whether Kant was also referring to representative democracy; it is more likely that he was not, but the question is whether the same arguments could not be applied to it. This would mean that the complications Kant saw in the theory presented in *Toward Perpetual Peace* would still apply today, in the application of a different conception of democracy. Caranti believes that “Kant evidently calls ‘democracy’ the whole political system of a state that adopts the democratic form of sovereignty”.<sup>36</sup>

Basically, it is about the fact that discussions regarding the acceptability and unacceptability of a certain concept of democracy are secondary, if Kant does not grant sovereignty to the people, which is considered one of the basic features of the modern form of democracy - a democratic legal state. Kant can therefore, by today’s standards, be considered an opponent of democracy of today’s type, which greatly complicates the possible contribution of his theory to the present.

### **Egoism of the People as a Guarantee of Peace**

Although Kant is skeptical of democracy, and even more of the principle of the sovereignty of the people, at the same time, for him, the republican form of government presupposes the strongest aversion to war, and is therefore an internal political guarantee of perpetual peace, because he assumes that resistance to the hardships of war comes from the people. In Kant’s view, the people are egoistic, and Kant hopes that this egoism leads them to create a state of law and peace, since war would expose them to hardships they do not want to undergo.

There are two questions that Kant does not ask:

1) What if other, more egoistic motives prevail? Kant does not assume such (im)rationality of citizens that would lead them to prefer war. However, both theoretically and practically, it is possible to imag-

<sup>35</sup> Caranti, L., 2023. Why does Kant Think that Democracy is Necessarily Despotic?, *ibid.*, p. 167 – 183.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 167 – 183.

ine or empirically find situations that reduce the mentioned optimism. Throughout history, there have been entire tribes or nations whose egoism led them to aggression.

2) If egoism would lead to the creation of government and rules domestically (the continuity with Hobbes' motives for concluding a social contract is obvious), how can it be concluded that the same egoism does not necessarily lead to a preference for good decisions in international relations? After eliminating the war of all against all, which immediately threatens all, and establishing the state, the egoistic motive of self-preservation and hedonism can be fulfilled. Foreign aggression does not have to threaten (even if only hypothetically) the lives or the pleasures of the group that decides on war and peace, or it may even appear to be advantageous. Kant limits citizens to a relatively narrow group of persons in the state, which can lead to speculation as to how much they will be fundamentally affected by the state of war. His preferred principle of representation, which Kant requires in a very disproportionate variant, where he prefers as few representatives as possible (i.e. autocracy over aristocracy), as a principle leading to the right results, can also significantly distort the will of the people in favor of the elites, who may not be so severely affected by the war.

3) At the same time, it is necessary to take into account a fundamentally different task, which is deciding on war and peace. Kant actually demands that the citizenry (political nation) change its role in the given situation - from a legislator (creator of the general will) to a co-creator of the state's policy, the author of a very specific political decision. That is exactly what he criticizes in principle elsewhere.

## International Order

The second definitive article talks about the arrangement of relations on the international scene: International law must be based on the *federalism* of free states. Kant introduces an analogy between a social contract between people, which establishes an establishment in which everyone can be assured of his right. Subsequently, states should conclude a similar social contract, it would be a union of nations (*Volkerbund*). However, in a twist, Kant adds that it should not be a state of nations, since the state is above the nation, and if it were to rule over several nations that would form one people there, which is not the subject of consideration.

The goal is a *peace union* (*foedus pacificum*), which would end all

wars forever.<sup>37</sup> However, states cannot be considered the same as citizens, says Kant, namely that “they are supposed to emerge from this state”.<sup>38</sup> “Nevertheless, reason from the throne of the highest moral legislative power utterly condemns war as a legal procedure, and makes a state of peace, on the contrary, an immediate obligation, and this state cannot be negotiated and secured without a treaty between nations”.<sup>39</sup>

The condition for the creation of a peace union is the establishment of the first of the republics, to which other states (republics) will be able to join. The problem here is that, according to Kant, he has to wish it luck – he repeatedly expresses how difficult it is to establish a republican polity, even relying on the establishment by the ruler from above when he comes to this realization. However, this only begins to reveal the complexity of the problem, because regarding the republican establishment Kant states that “however, it is extremely difficult to establish it, and even more difficult to preserve it”.<sup>40</sup>

At the same time, Kant offers a solution there, he even writes that this problem “must be solvable”. The question is why it has not yet been resolved when Kant describes a practically determining mechanism in which “reason can therefore use as a means the natural mechanism of the egoistic inclinations, which in a natural way, in order to make room for its own purpose: namely, the legal regulation, and thereby also support and ensured internal as well as external peace...”.<sup>41</sup>

The peace union is not supposed to have any state power, but to guarantee freedom to individual states without having to submit to a higher authority. At the same time, states should submit to public coercive laws – but without coercive authority. Kant rejects the idea of a world state. According to him, it is firstly undesirable and secondly unrealizable. It is undesirable because “the laws lose more and more of their emphasis as the extent of government increases, and that soulless despotism, having exterminated the germs of good, sinks at last into anarchy”.<sup>42</sup>

Instead of the positive idea of a world republic, only its negative substitute is realistic – namely, a union preventing war. However, this union would operate under the constant threat of an outbreak of hostilities.

<sup>37</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace*, *ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 90 – 91.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 90 – 91.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

## Conclusion. The Possibility of Establishing Perpetual Peace

It must be remembered that, according to Kant, the very germ of a peaceful arrangement, namely the republican arrangement of things, is fortune. Subsequently, a union of associated states can be created to the original one. Kant believes in feasibility, but subsequently contradicts himself. First, he considers the emergence of the republican establishment to be the result of luck. This greatly relativizes feasibility.

Kant further rejects the state of nations or the world republic. If, of course, he prefers a federated union of states that arrive at a republican polity, which he considers to be a matter of luck, then the resulting union will, depending on luck, consist of random combinations of states that luckily happen to have a republican polity. However, since the republican form of government is not firmly fixed, then the stability of this union cannot be guaranteed, and states can join it, but then also leave it. The composition of the union would be subject to the choice of each state after it fulfills the conditions of accession. Subsequent withdrawal would be a matter of choice (with a republic) or necessity (if the state ceased to have a republican form of government).

A federal union would most likely have no coercive power, not even in international relations, and certainly not within states, not even in a situation where internal conditions are the *sine qua non* of establishing a peace union. It could therefore not influence either the internal conditions of individual members or their external behavior. Moreover, the union could not enforce uniform action against the states outside the federal union, which are in a state of nature vis-à-vis its members, and with whom war is therefore possible and easy, and therefore most probably very probable.

Kant's concept of Perpetual Peace therefore opens up a number of topics, but also questions. It appears to be practically unrealizable and, moreover, difficult to grasp thanks to its internal ambiguities. Moreover, due to the present, it is outdated and unacceptable in certain areas.

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**Abstract:** The article focuses on Derrida's revision of Kant's concept of perpetual peace with intention is to elaborate on the way deconstruction subversively bridges binary oppositions. When deconstructed, Kantian duty obliges all people to peace, hospitality and friendship but, simultaneously, contains and displaces traces of past wars, hostility and enmity. I propose to follow Derrida's work to reframe and interconnect these binary oppositions by the promise of forgiveness. I argue that, in the ethics deconstruction, it is not the universal moral maxim, but the ongoing effort to forgive the unforgettable wrongdoings of the past that should be considered "perpetual". I conclude by demonstrating that it is the ongoing performing of rituals of hospitality and forgiveness that defers war and maintains peaceful relations.

**Keywords:** Forgiveness, Hospitality, Immanuel Kant, Jacques Derrida, Ornament, Peace

## I. Introduction: Two Ornaments of Peace

Kant's concept of perpetual peace formulates the transcendently conditioned moral maxim of human behavior. His vision of peace, which introduces the rule of hospitality in the cosmopolite world, is based on the universal duty to forgive the injustices committed in the past. But, can such a duty be fulfilled? Is human behavior capable to fulfill this duty of forgiveness?

I propose to answer these questions through my revision<sup>1</sup> of Jacques Derrida's works dedicated to Kant's conception of perpetual peace as

<sup>1</sup> As Peter Kyslan briefly notes, Derrida operates a shift from Kant's account of peace because he finds Kant's hospitality „unhospitable“. While Kyslan does not explain Derrida's reasons, my present work continues this investigation with intention to bring a more detailed insight in the given topic. See Kyslan, P., 2022. *Od kultúry I. Kanta ku kultúram J. G. Herdera*. Bratislava: SFZ pri SAV, p. 199. Personal translation.

the opposite of war. While Kant's concept of peace is justified as a universal right and *duty* of humanity, Derrida suggests reconsidering this concept in terms of a precarious *promise*. To explain this shift in the bias of his ethical thinking, I will elaborate on the way deconstruction subversively bridges binary oppositions. When deconstructed, Kantian duty obliges all people to peace, hospitality and friendship but, simultaneously, contains and displaces traces of past wars, hostility and enmity. In Derrida's view, Kantian peace is an imaginary peace-to-come, a promise of a possible improvement of human coexistence in universal openness to otherness. As a promise, peace does not actually exist anywhere and cannot be simply implemented in the real world. As a moral maxim, it cannot be totally present in human behavior. However, precisely because of its expected potential presence, it is necessary opting for peace, tending to it, searching for it. Any declaration of total presence of peace on Earth would be totalitarian as it would abandon the promise to improve human sense of hospitality.

I will follow Derrida's work to interconnect these binary oppositions by the promise of forgiveness, which defers war and maintains peaceful relations by their constant renewal. I argue that, in ethics inspired by deconstruction, it is not the universal moral maxim that should be considered "perpetual", it is the ongoing effort to forgive the unforgettable wrongdoings of the past that should be considered.

To elaborate on this problem, I suggest to grasp the repetitive practices encouraging a specific arrangement of ritual behaviour by the concept of *ornament*. More specifically, I propose to name *ethical ornament of peace* a specific peace-making ritual behaviour framed by an ethically justified order of repetition. The ethical ornament of perpetual peace, inspired by Kant, is framed by the moral duty to repeat peace-making acts of forgiveness and hospitality according to the rational morality of law. By contrast, the ethical ornament of ongoing peace, inspired by Derrida, is framed by a "quasi-ethical"<sup>2</sup> promise to iterate peace-making performative acts of forgiveness and hospitality, while accepting their eventually failing, uncertain outcomes.

The goal of my reflexion is to explain and justify Derrida's move from Kant's transcendental order of peace to his deconstructive order

<sup>2</sup> Derrida explains the ethical position of deconstruction as quasi-ethical in the sense of an "ethics beyond ethics" that invites to accept the different without condition, without law, without economy, and without calculation. See Derrida, J., 2000 *Le siècle et le pardon*. Entretien avec Michel Wieviorka. In: Derrida, J. *Voit et savoir*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, pp. 110 – 111. Personal translation.



of peace. In both cases, the ethical ornament of peace is framed by an ethico-political conceptual bias. Comparison of their different philosophical framings of ethical ornaments of peace will reveal the difference in Kant's and in Derrida's theoretical goals. And yet, as I aim to demonstrate, they partially intertwine.

## II. Kant's Duty of Peace

In his essay *Toward Perpetual Peace*,<sup>3</sup> Immanuel Kant designs the “perpetual peace” as an ideal state of possible cosmopolitan cohabitation of human beings on Earth. Justified by the emancipation of human reason that comes to maturity in the era of the Enlightenment,<sup>4</sup> Kant's moral conception of humanity obliges all people living on Earth to offer and share their hospitality and friendship. This moral understanding of human identity allows Kant to see every human being as a rightful citizen of the globe. As Sandra Zákutná puts it, “Kant considered the state of mind of a man, who is aware of being citizen of a nation and member of a society of global citizens, to be the most noble idea that a man can have as a goal; a goal that will direct humanity toward the state of perpetual peace and just society”.<sup>5</sup> In Kant's view, this moral vow is broken in a state of war. As a politically imposed situation of hostility and enmity, war divides humanity. It introduces an unbridgeable opposition between two sets of human beings – the “friends” and the “enemies”.

To avoid such a breaking of the cosmopolitan vow of peaceful human existence, Kant formulates several anti-war conditions for maintaining the situation of perpetual peace. In his third preliminary article, he indicates that, to make the perpetual peace possible, “Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall gradually be abolished entirely”.<sup>6</sup> And, in the sixth preliminary article, he add that

<sup>3</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. In: Kant, I. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, trans. David L. Colclasure. New Haven: Yale University, pp. 67 – 109.

<sup>4</sup> As Kant puts it, “Enlightenment is the human being's emancipation from its self-incurred immaturity.” Kant, I., 2006. *An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?*. In: Kant, I. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, trans. David L. Colclasure. New Haven: Yale University, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Zákutná, S., 2020. Na úvod. Reflexie Kanta v 20. storočí. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 9(2), p. 11. Personal translation.

<sup>6</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, *ibid.*, p. 69.

No state shall allow itself such hostilities in wartime as would make mutual trust in a future period of peace impossible. Such acts would include the employment of assassins (*percussores*), poisoners (*venefici*), breach of surrender, incitement of treason (*perduellio*) within the enemy state, etc.<sup>7</sup>

Both of these conditions of perpetual peace presuppose universal human trust based on universal human forgiveness of atrocities and crimes committed in previous wars. Kant rightfully supposes that humanity cannot be at peace while holding grudges from the past. It is therefore necessary to forgive all the previous injustices, sufferings, and wounds. Based on this cosmopolitan moral *duty* to forgive past wrongdoings, Kant's forgiveness is presented as an inevitable condition for "perpetual peace".

At the same time, however, Kant delimits his universal appeal for human trust and hospitality by sovereignty of the local rules of hospitality. While every citizen of the globe has the right to visit other states and benefit from his hosts' hospitality, this hospitality is limited in time because it means a right to visit, not a right to stay. Kant's hospitality is also conditioned by its conventional reciprocity, by foreigner's willingness to return the service. And, finally, it can be calculated by the proportionate amount of respect the foreigner shows to the local laws. A rude, unrespectful foreigner may be denied access or expelled. To be welcomed peacefully, one must attempt a friendly interaction "with the old inhabitants".<sup>8</sup> Kant's right of universal hospitality means a right of foreign arrivals, which are, according to local laws, not seen as arrivals of enemies.

Michel Rosenfeld notes that

Kant's own moral theory internalizes the Enlightenment's commitment to freedom and equality for all and prescribes its realization at the highest levels of abstraction, thus setting a counterfactual ideal rather than providing moral principles susceptible of implementation through law and politics. Specifically, Kant proposes universally applicable moral norms that are self-imposed.<sup>9</sup>

By commenting on Kant's moral theory, Rosenfeld proposes to move from the Kantian ethical perspective of identity to the Derridean ethical perspective of difference. I propose to follow Rosenfeld's path. What

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>9</sup> Rosenfeld, M., 2008. Derrida's Ethical Turn: The Case of Terrorism. In: Goodrich, P. – Hoffmann, F. – Rosenfeld, M. – Vismann, C., eds. *Derrida and Legal Philosophy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 86.

Derrida's reading of Kant shows is that, just like peace, compassion for otherness can be neither perpetually nor universally imposed. It is not a law that could be enforced. One cannot forgive on command, one can only promise to try. Therefore, as Rosenfeld claims, "a deconstructive ethics of difference cannot yield an unequivocal and categorical condemnation of global terrorism".<sup>10</sup> If it cannot categorically condemn human terror and war, it is because of the radical singularity that precludes establishing a common intersubjective criterion to assess conflicting claims issuing from different perspectives and from the uncertain willingness to forgive. Contrary to Rosenfeld, however, I would not say that Derrida's deconstruction abandons the transcendental idea of perpetual peace. I argue that Derrida's thinking opens a new ethical path toward it.

### III. Derrida's Promise of Peace

Since the beginning of the 1990s, recurrent inquiries of deconstruction have revolved around phenomena or concepts such as promise, testimony, responsibility, gift, justice, hospitality, and friendship. In his essay *Force of Law*,<sup>11</sup> Derrida operated on an ethical transition from the undecidability to the undeconstructibility. From now on, he defines justice not in terms of right, but in terms of promise, which conditions the ethical possibility of thinking the law. As Petra Gehring puts it, ethics finally becomes a topic for deconstruction,

*Force de loi* is surprising for the vehemence with which deconstruction takes hold of law. The text has a tone of distinct identification. It seems that whereas on the one hand Derrida 'deconstructs' legal discourse, that is, decodes the law with respect to what remains unthought, he simultaneously affirms the model of law; it may even be that he adopts it as a certain broken form of the justice of law, as a paradigm of deconstruction itself.<sup>12</sup>

What Gehring emphasizes is that, in *Force of Law*,<sup>13</sup> Derrida defines deconstruction as an aporetic domain of thinking, which is situated in the *interval* between law and justice. For Derrida, the law is an estab-

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>11</sup> Derrida, J., 1992. *Force of Law*. In: Cornell, D. – Rosenfeld, M. – Gray Carlson, D., eds. *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*. New York: Routledge.

<sup>12</sup> Gehring, P., 2008. The Jurisprudence of the "Force of Law". In: Goodrich, P. – Hoffmann, F. – Rosenfeld, M. – Vismann, C., eds. *Derrida and Legal Philosophy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 56.

<sup>13</sup> Derrida, J., 1992. *Force of Law*, *ibid.*, p. 16.

lished set of norms that can be performatively enforced: every time that something comes to pass or turns out well, every time that we placidly apply a good rule to a particular case, to a correctly subsumed example, according to a determinant judgement, we can be sure that the law may find itself accounted for. Nevertheless, as he writes,

Law (*droit*) is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule.<sup>14</sup>

Such a *justice-to-come*, as Derrida puts it, justice promised and awaited, opens a messianic perspective of hope. Justice, which is in a state of perpetual arriving, is neither present nor absent. It is awaited and hoped for, but never fully present in human behaviour. While human behaviour is always calculated according to the fully present law, which can be enforced, it is impossible to calculate or negotiate with justice. Contrary to the law, justice remains ungraspable, unrepresentable, sublime. It can't be enforced: "justice as the experience of absolute alterity is unrepresentable."<sup>15</sup> Any fight in the name of justice finishes when the fight is won. Such a victory transforms the sublime call for justice into a new law, which legalizes new norms that will be enforced. As such, Derridian *justice-to-come* is a phantom coming to haunt the present law by pointing to its limits. Derrida himself defines the justice as an aporia of the undecidable, which

is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two tensions; it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged – it is of obligation that we must speak – to give itself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules.<sup>16</sup>

I argue that, in the perspective of Derrida's deconstruction, the same goes for peace. Just like justice, peace is perpetually deferred and haunted. In his ethics of difference, peace can only be present as an expectation of its future arrival, as an *arrivant* promising a universal improvement of

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

the human senses of solidarity and hospitality. Derrida turns Kant's human right to perpetual peace into a perpetually deferred promise giving us hope for forgiveness, for what may be called a *peace-to-come*. As a promise, this *peace-to-come* is not totally presentable in human behaviour, it cannot be universally imposed and enforced.<sup>17</sup> Any calculable declaration of actual "perpetual peace" replaces the incalculable promise of perpetuity by a temporary and particular political agreement. No declaration of peace can be universal, because it omits the inevitable collective memory with its conflicting interests related to past wars, such as unhealed collective wounds and resentment for previous injustice, oppression or humiliation. All of these triggers may call for a new justice, mourning or revenge that would defer the supposed presence of universal peace. Deadly enemies from past wars can hardly become innocent friends, especially on command.

The suggested difference between the Kantian and the Derridian ethical ornaments of peace can be better understood if we follow Derrida's shift from the bias of duty toward the bias of promise. His deconstructive way of reframing concepts reveals that meanings of so-called binary oppositions are not necessarily opposed because the frame that would reframe these concepts may be seen as porous.

#### IV. Shifted Bias, Reframed Concepts

What is a frame? Does it delimit and emphasize? Does it divide and eliminate? Kant and Derrida give us different understandings of this concept and suggest its different uses for philosophical goals. In the *Critique of Judgement* Kant describes the frame as a *parergon*, which means a supplement of the work, the *ergon*. He writes that the work ought to allow itself to be well – centred and framed, to have its ground delimited with a frame, against a general background. His aesthetic judgment bears upon the intrinsic beauty of the core of the work, not its mere surrounding decoration or ornamentation, *parerga*.<sup>18</sup> Derrida notices that

<sup>17</sup> As Richard Beardsworth puts it, "For Derrida, the specific enforcement of universal cosmopolitan law, through the executive sovereign, undercuts the very universality it is enforcing as it enforces it. As soon as there is a legislative will, sovereignty, there is enforcement. As soon as there is enforcement, there is executive sovereignty." Beardsworth, R., 2007. *The Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics*. In: Fagan – M. Glorieux, L. – Hasimbegovic, I. – Suet-sugu, M., eds. *Derrida. Negotiating the Legacy*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 55.

<sup>18</sup> Kant writes that "Even what is called *ornamentation (parerga)*, i.e. what is only an adjunct, and not an intrinsic constituent in the complete representation of the object, in augmenting the

although Kant himself claims that the role of the parergon is to separate the inside of the work from its outside, in Kant's own description of the artistic work, the parergon remains on an uncertain margin between the supposed core of the work and its surroundings. As Derrida puts it,

Hence one must know what is framed and know what one is excluding as frame and outside-the-frame. We are thus already at the unlocatable center of the problem. And then Kant replies to our question 'What is a frame?' by saying: it's a parergon, a hybrid of outside and inside, but a hybrid which is not a mixture or a half-measure, an outside which is called to the inside of the inside in order to constitute it as an inside.<sup>19</sup>

In Derrida's view, this parergon's instability, characterized by its movable disposition, unclear limits, and possible excess, has two contradictory consequences. On the one hand, because it lacks the ability to make a clear division between the "inside" and the "outside", it cannot produce any clear-cut division resulting in binary opposition. Derrida defines it as a porous frame, which is introduced between two binaries, two conceptual oppositions, to separate them. Its porosity sets the relation between these opposed concepts as an interval, not as an opposition. While in Kant, *parergon* does not belong to the complete representation of the object internally as elements, but only externally as frames, in Derrida's *logic of parergonality*,<sup>20</sup> *parergon* is aporetic. As Derrida emphasizes, the logic of parergonality is characterized by the inadequation of the frame to the framed, of framing at all.<sup>21</sup> In Derrida, the frame remains unstable, porous, permeable.

Following Derrida's logic of parergonality, I suggest reframing the

delight of taste does so only by means of its form. Thus it is with the frames of pictures or the drapery on statues, or the colonnades of palaces. But if the ornamentation does not itself enter into the composition of the beautiful form — if it is introduced like a gold frame merely to win approval for the picture by means of its charm—it is then called *finery* and takes away from the genuine beauty" Kant, I., 2007. *Critique of Judgement*, trans. James C. Meredith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 57.

<sup>19</sup> Derrida, J., 1987. *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington, Ian McLeod. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 63.

<sup>20</sup> According to Irene E. Harvey, Derrida's claims perform the 'satire of the abyss.' As she puts it, "The abyss is the distance between Kant and Derrida, it is the difference between a critique and a deconstruction, between metaphysics and non-metaphysics, between metaphysics and the rhetoric of metaphysics, between the *parergon* in Kant's sense and the same in Derrida's sense." Harvey, I. E., 2004. Derrida, Kant, and the Performance of Parergonality. In: Silverman, H. J., ed. *Continental Philosophy II. Derrida and Deconstruction*. London: Routledge, p. 68.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 67.

supposedly opposed concepts of peace and war. In his attempt to re-frame the given concepts, Derrida suggests overcoming their understanding as binary oppositions, trying to see the supposed “inside” as the actual “outside” and *vice versa*. Such a deconstructed concept of peace is no longer strictly opposed to the concept of war. In the interval built by the logic of parergonality, under specific circumstances, an enemy may be imagined as a friend and *vice versa*. Thanks to its permeability, the logic of parergonality introduces the interval of forgiveness between these binary oppositions. Without forgiveness, human beings could not reunite in their peaceful moral imagination. To be at peace, they need to heal the moral traumas caused by the already experienced overwhelming horrors of human wars. In situations of war, moreover, Kant’s moral maxim is declaratively abandoned. Human friends turn into human enemies, their supposed hospitality collapses into hostility. Who is more reliable in such a situation – a declared friend or a declared enemy?

Derrida’s answer to this question is that “The two concepts (friend/enemy) consequently intersect and ceaselessly change places. They intertwine, as though they loved each other, all along a spiralled hyperbole: the *declared* enemy, the true enemy, is a better friend than the friend.”<sup>22</sup> A living enemy remains present in the simulacrum of the unfaithful friend who is, in a sense, worse than a faithful enemy. The declared enemy is, paradoxically, my best friend. If I can predict my enemy’s behaviour, I rely on him, I trust him. Derrida even speaks about his enemy’s fidelity – he can rely on his enemy’s hatred. Much worse is the sudden unreliability of a trusted friend – if I trust him, I cannot predict his betrayal. These binaries haunt each other – my friend (*amicus*) can be my enemy (*hostis*). One concept bears the phantom of the other: “I can be hostile towards my friend, I can be hostile towards him publicly, and conversely I can, in privacy, love my enemy.”<sup>23</sup>

Derrida therefore suggests seeing the frame separating these opposed concepts as porous, permeable. I propose to follow Derrida’s logic of parergonality to deconstruct these binaries by reading his comments on Kant’s conception of perpetual peace. This will be done in two steps – firstly, by reframing the binary oppositions of hospitality and hostility, secondly by reframing the binary oppositions of friendship and enmity. In both cases, the logic of parergonality will blur the distinction between

<sup>22</sup> Derrida, J., 2020. *Politics of Friendship*, trans. Gabriel Motzkin, Michael Syrotinski, Thomas Keenan. London: Verso, p. 89.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

inclusion and exclusion. Let us start by the parergonal reframing of hospitality and hostility from the perspective of visitation.

#### IV.I. Parergonality in Hospitality and Hostility

In his book *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*<sup>24</sup> Derrida points to a parergon in Kant's thought on hospitality. On the one hand, Kant extends the cosmopolitan law to include universal hospitality without limit. Such is the condition of perpetual peace between all human beings. He expressly determines it as a natural law that would be both imprescriptible and inalienable. In his view, the Earth belongs to human beings. All human creatures, all finite beings endowed with reason, have received, in equal proportion, common possession of the surface of the Earth. On the other hand, however, if Kant specifies that this common place covers the surface of the Earth, he also expels from it what is erected, constructed, or what sets itself up above the soil: habitat, culture, institution, State etc. Therefore, not all of this, only the soil upon which it lies, must not be unconditionally accessible to all comers.

According to Derrida, Kant deduces two consequences from this condition, which introduces the institution of limit as a border, nation, State, public or political space. At first, Kant limits hospitality to the right of visitation. He excluded hospitality as a right of residence, which must be the object of a particular treaty between states. But also, by defining hospitality as a right, Kant makes it dependent on state sovereignty, which is of great consequence for the "violations of hospitality". Kant's hospitality is dependent on and controlled by the law and the state police. For Derrida, therefore,

It is a question of knowing if an improvement of law is possible within a historical space which takes place *between* the Law of unconditional hospitality, offered *a priori* to every other, to all newcomers, *whoever they may be*, and the conditional laws of a right to hospitality, without which *The* unconditional Law of hospitality would be in danger of even being perverted at any moment.<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, as Thomson notes, in the Derridean reading, Kant's laws of hospitality enact exclusion of species: "Even if hospitality were to be of-

<sup>24</sup> Derrida, J., 2005. *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, trans. Mark Dooley, Michael Hughes. London: Routledge, pp. 20 – 21.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 21.



ferred universally to any other human, it would still be a limited hospitality – and perhaps the very definition of a humanism. (Can hospitality be offered to the non-human other: whether animal, vegetable or mineral?)<sup>26</sup> Thanks to the logic of parergonality, Derrida's ethics of difference goes beyond this specieism, beyond Kant's frame of hospitality as an exclusive bond between human beings. Contrary to Kant's binary framing of concepts, Derrida's deconstruction allows for ethically including hospitality into human moral thinking. By the same token, it allows for reframing the concepts of friendship and enmity and to define them as not opposed, but bridged, as we will see in the following section.

#### IV.II. Parergonality in Friendship and Enmity

In *Politics of Friendship*, Derrida claims that, in Kant, what unites mankind must be able to happen. And the condition of the possibility of this human unity must be universal. Kant supposes the possibility of the *friend of man* who loves the whole human race, and he loves it because of his duty. He rejoices with other men when something good happens and will never disturb this joy without profound regret. This very regret is the sign of his solidarity with the whole human race. Kant's *friend of man* concept corresponds to an infinite rational rigour, the Idea. This is what distinguishes the friend of man from the "philanthropist" who is content with merely loving mankind, without being guided by this Idea. In Derrida's words, "Kant establishes this Idea: it is not only an intellectual representation, a representation of *equality* among men, but *consideration* for this representation of equality, a '*just consideration*' for such a representation. Equality *is necessary*. There is no equality, but there must be"<sup>27</sup>.

Kant's equality of men is a just obligation, demanded by human justice. Equality is not only a calculable measure, a statistical objectivity; it bears within itself a feeling of obligation, hence the gift and its sensibility of debt, gratitude. This duty is inscribed in sensibility's relation to the purely rational Idea of equality. This is the condition for the existence of something called the friend of man, the friend of the whole race.

Derrida notes that Kant's cosmopolitanism, universal democracy, and perpetual peace would not have the slightest chance of being

<sup>26</sup> Thomson, A. J. P., 2005. *Deconstruction and Democracy. Derrida's Politics of Friendship*. Continuum: London, p. 90.

<sup>27</sup> Derrida, J., 2020. *Politics of Friendship*, *ibid.*, p. 227.

promised without the presupposition of such a friend. It is precisely this promise, which makes it necessary to perpetually opt for peace. And Derrida's ethics of difference goes even further, it questions Kant's cosmopolitanism as a global friendship. As Thomson puts it, Derrida's understanding of friendship is by definition exclusively individual. It cannot be based on a universal duty:

The paradigmatic experience of friendship, Derrida suggests, can be seen to be determined by what he calls 'the question of number': as both the necessity of enumerating or counting friends, and as an implicit limit to the number of friends I can have. Since friendship is always defined by the act of loving, being loved is not enough to qualify as friendship. Conversely there must be a limit to the number of people I can (actively) love.<sup>28</sup>

In Derrida's view, Kant's cosmopolitan peace is at once pure and impure. Kant's peace retains a trace of what threatens it. Temporary peace is framed by weapons – threatening arms separate the state of peace from the state of war. Contrary to an armed peace, which is simply a suspension of war, Kant insists that the perpetual peace must be unarmed. Derrida deconstructs the seeming purity of this conception of peace by pointing to two impure traces in his thought that undermine it by dividing human compassion. Firstly, Derrida questions Kant's formulation of exclusion of unhuman beings from perpetual hospitality. Derrida's subversive trace introduces a hint of freedom in Kant's cosmopolitan duty by suggesting to offer hospitality to other than human beings too. As a promise, suggested by Derrida, Kant's perpetual peace should be re-framed. Secondly, Derrida questions Kant's formulation of human duty to befriend every human being. In his view, we can not necessarily become friends with every human being, but we can forgive them their hostility and enmity. Derrida's subversive trace introduces the freedom of choice in friendship. Because forgiveness cannot be done on command, one cannot be imperatively obliged to regain trust and live unarmed. One shall decide freely to forgive his enemy, to heal the wounds left by past enmities. Such a healing process could be rather expressed in terms of hope than in terms of duty. Let us have a closer look at the performative side of this Derridian ethical ornament of peace framed by promise and practiced by iteration.

<sup>28</sup> Thomson, A. J. P., 2004. *Deconstruction and Democracy*, *ibid.*, p. 15.

## V. Performing Peace: Inclusion as a Poematic Gift

As we have seen, Derrida deconstructs Kant's description of a frame as a limit reliably separating the inside from the outside, the meaningful from the meaningless part of a work. I argue that Derrida's subversive framing of concepts allows to question Kant's understanding of a frame as a limit strictly dividing inside from outside, good from evil, peace from war. Derrida's deconstruction of Kant's binary framing of concepts helps to rethink the Kantian moral duty of peace, hospitality and friendship as necessarily interconnected with incorporated traces of war, hostility and enmity. His focus on interval between binary oppositions reframes Kant's duty of peace as a promise of hospitality and forgiveness of past traumas.

Derrida reminds us that there is a paradox in Kant's conception of perpetual peace: universal human hospitality is restricted and governed by state sovereignty. In this Kantian perspective, hospitality appears as a "conditional hospitality":<sup>29</sup> ritual practices of peace-making have to be repeated after the rules set by local laws, not by the universal moral duty of humanity. Kantian particular law of the state is above the moral unity of humanity – local law makes us repeat ritual gestures and rightfully punishes any transgression. This means that, in a situation of peace, Kantian foreigners are only allowed to visit, not to stay. Kantian host treats the one he shelters according to right, along with the relation that links him to murderers or the police or judges. From the perspective of Kant's right, the guest, even when he is well received, is a foreigner and remains a foreigner. Derrida explains this contradiction by emphasizing that Kant opposed war to "perpetual peace" as an ultimate, unchanging state of peace. Such a "pure" concept of peace requires abolishing everything that might disturb or threaten it. As Derrida puts it,

for Kant, the promise of perpetual peace promised a peace that was no longer even threatened with war. It was not a matter of simply distinguishing peace from armistice, of distinguishing peace from the end of the war. It was a matter of distinguishing peace from any potential war. A mere threat

<sup>29</sup> As Michael Naas puts it, "Kant gives us the *best example* of what Derrida will go on to call somewhat critically a "conditional hospitality." While Kant's hospitality will aim for a certain universality, it will nonetheless be limited, conditioned, and, as such, it will begin to "ruin" the kind of hospitality that Derrida will call unconditional, the only hospitality truly worthy of the name." Naas, M., 2024. *Threshold Phenomena. Derrida and the Question of Hospitality*. New York: Fordham University Press, pp. 104 – 105.

of war, any mere threat, even if it be symbolic or unconscious, interrupts peace.<sup>30</sup>

Contrary to Kant, Derrida speaks not about a perpetual duty, but rather about an ongoing *promise* to not threaten the peace. He also reminds us that the concepts of threat and promise are binary oppositions: while I can only promise good intentions, I can only threaten with bad intentions.<sup>31</sup> Derrida emphasizes, however, that every performative may fail. By commenting on Austin's performatives and Searle's speech acts,<sup>32</sup> Derrida introduces the problem of iteration and demonstrates how rituals idealize repetition to the point that they tend to unsee the performative possibility of their failure. As de Ville puts it, in spite of recognising that infelicity happens in all *conventional* acts, which have the general character of ritual, Austin regards the possibility of failure as a mere accident which does not tell us anything of the structure of the utterances that are analysed. By contrast, Derrida points out that the performative–constative distinction of speech-acts, “is typical of the idealisation involved in the metaphysics of presence”.<sup>33</sup>

This idealization produces an aporia in the rituals of mourning,<sup>34</sup> an aporia that may be deconstructed. On the one hand, Derrida understands the moral rule of forgiveness. On the other hand, from Derrida's view, friendship with the enemy is not something that should be taken for granted. It may fail at any point. Paradoxically, one must forgive his enemy's lack of compassion to be compassionate with his enemy's suffering. In other words, one must forgive the unforgivable to turn old enmity into new friendship. Understood in this sense, forgiveness is no duty, but a hope for peace. It is an uncalculable, unexpected gift. In other words, if practices of performing peace are iterable, they are not

<sup>30</sup> Derrida, J., 2024. *Hospitality II*, trans. Peggy Kamuf. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 175.

<sup>31</sup> In Derrida's view, “for classic speech act theorists, a promise always promises something good. You don't promise something bad. You promise a present, a gift; I don't promise to do you harm. That's a threat. If I promise harm, it's a threat; it's not a promise. I cannot say, “I promise to kill you,” in principle; that should not be said”. Ibid., p. 176.

<sup>32</sup> See Derrida, J., 1972. *La dissémination*. Paris: Seuil, and Derrida, J., 1977. *Limited Inc*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. This problematic is further developed in Moati, R., 2009. *Derrida/Searle. Déconstruction et langage ordinaire*. Paris: PUF, and in Fišerová, M., 2022. *Event of Signature. Jacques Derrida and Repeating of the Unrepeatable*. New York: SUNY Press.

<sup>33</sup> de Ville, J., 2011. *Jacques Derrida. Law as Absolute Hospitality*. London: Routledge, p. 52.

<sup>34</sup> These rituals of mourning are extensively described from the Derridean perspective in Thwaites, T., Seaboye, J., 2013. *Re-reading Derrida. Perspectives on Mourning and Its Hospitalities*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.

received as a law, but as a gift, which is a poetic act of pure hospitality. In Derrida's view, such an activity of *poēsis* is not only creative, but also *poematic*: "the experience of pure hospitality is that of the signature and the making that erases itself, of the host becoming erased in the poem, in the poematic, which I will always prefer to the poetic".<sup>35</sup> Derrida explains this "poematic" aspect of the gift on the relation between foreigner's respect and inclusion. Kant requires foreigner's consideration for his host's sovereignty as host: to receive there whomever I like, I have to be master in my home. In other words, the host has the power to choose his invitees, visitors, or guests, those to whom he decides to grant asylum or right to visit. Host's sovereignty, therefore, "can be exercised only by filtering, choosing, hence, by excluding and doing violence. This collusion between the violence of power or the force of law, *Gewalt*, on the one hand, and hospitality, on the other, has to do, in an absolutely radical way, with the inscription of hospitality in right".<sup>36</sup>

Without such a thoughtfulness, a welcomed guest may easily turn into a "parasite",<sup>37</sup> an undesirable foreigner, virtually an enemy undeserving any hospitality. Every arrivant is not received as guest. Wherever the "at-home" is violated, one can expect an ethnocentric, nationalistic, xenophobic reaction directed against the foreign language, religion, or nation that threatens the traditional conditions of hospitality. Derrida sees that Kant's rule of selection of hosts contains virtual traces of xenophobic perversion. In Derrida's words, "The perversion, the pervertibility of this law (which is also a law of hospitality) is that one can become virtually xenophobic in order to protect or claim to protect one's own hospitality, one's own at-home which makes possible one's own hospitality".<sup>38</sup> By his conceptual work with reframed binaires, Derrida seeks to shift the ethico-political bias from perpetual duty to ongoing promise. This shift allows him to reflect on inclusive potential of ritual performatives in the peace-making process.

Let us have a closer look at his ability of performatives to construct the "ethical ornament of peace", as I propose to call the peace-making process. Inspired by Derrida's work on iterability of performatives, Ju-

<sup>35</sup> Derrida, J., 2023. *Hospitality I*, trans. E. S. Burt. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 157.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>37</sup> Derrida distinguishes between a guest and a parasite by defining the parasite as an intrusive and abusive, illegitimate, clandestine guest, one liable to expulsion or arrest. As he puts it, "to constitute the space of an inhabitable house and a home, one also needs an opening, a door and windows, that is to say one must open a passage to the foreigner." Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 93.

dith Butler reminds us that common representations of historical events via commemorating rituals and narrations is shaped both politically and aesthetically. In her book *Frames of War*,<sup>39</sup> she focuses on censorship of photographic reportage of war events to reveal the way we collectively frame common mourning and compassion with war “enemies” by eliminating the testimonies of their suffering. The ethical ornament of war is constructed via performative iteration of selected pictures, which constructs the “enemy” both aesthetically and politically. Similarly, Gregg Lambert rethinks this performative construction of *sensus communis* by naming it the “practice of friendship”. In his view, this practice is based on sharing of “mutual affirmation of the same tastes, the same opinions, the same culture”; on “creating a homonymy of taste, leading to the specific production of a sphere of culture that defines the association between friends”.<sup>40</sup> Both of these thinkers relate to Derrida’s views on the inclusive potential of shared ritual performatives of friendship in the peace-making process. And yet, following Derrida, they take into consideration the inevitably failing potential of performatives. Derrida himself sees performatives as iterable, which means disseminable and reusable, but not exactly repeatable. “Facing this repetition that never repeats itself”,<sup>41</sup> Derrida finds that performatives return the meaning in an event that happens “once”, which makes each of its returns singular and elliptical, curved, unidentical. However necessary, the planned and performed “forgiveness of the unforgivable” may never totally happen.

Finally, let us distinguish the two ways of performing forgiveness as an ethical ornament of peace. There is Kant’s ethical ornament, which conceives universal duty of forgiveness as a condition for perpetual peace of humanity. And there is Derrida’s ethical ornament, which is framed by the aporetic forgiveness of the unforgivable. He understands peace as a peace-to-come, which does not exist yet and needs to be performed in a time that is not yet. While Kant’s ornament of perpetual peace, framed by the rule of local legal duty, treats foreigners as moral insiders and political outsiders, Derrida’s ornament of ongoing peace puts emphasis on the messianic promise. By doing so, it allows to host foreigners as ethico-political quasi-insiders. Derrida explains his “quasi-ethical”<sup>42</sup> philosophical position as an undecidable interval introduced

<sup>39</sup> Butler, J., 2009. *Frames of War. When Life is Grievable*. London: Verso.

<sup>40</sup> Lambert, G., 2017. *Philosophy after Friendship. Deleuze’s Conceptual Personae*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 63.

<sup>41</sup> Derrida, J., 2003. *Voyous. Deux essais sur la raison*. Paris: Galilée, p. 19. Personal translation.

<sup>42</sup> Simon Critchley explains the aporetic position of Derrida’s ethics in the following way:

between the traditional conceptual binaries. It erases the strict opposition between binary concepts of forgivable and unforgivable, friend and enemy, hostility and hospitality. He exposes his reasons for blurring of these conceptual oppositions in detail in *Le siècle et le pardon*<sup>43</sup> where he comments on the quasi-unforgivable nature of the crimes against humanity that consists in absence of any sufficient punishment. Derrida sees this disproportional trauma as the very reason for change of ethical bias of historical narration and ritualization of mourning. After Shoah, Kant's idea of humanity remains meaningful only if it allows to forgive the unforgivable. Such a "hyperbolic ethics"<sup>44</sup> would mark this particular forgiveness as an unforgettable historical exception. This exceptional forgiveness, framed as a permanent recollection of disproportionate injustice, would introduce the dimension of collective mourning into the performativity of historical narration.

In *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*<sup>45</sup> Derrida comments once more on the dilemma of forgiveness as reconciliation with major historical wrongdoings such as exterminations, genocides and massacres of human beings. In his view, however, "Forgiveness is not, it *should not be*, normal, normative, normalising. It *should* remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality".<sup>46</sup> To discourage returns of the phantom of bad faith by *forgiving* the committed injustice, Derrida suggests cultivating collective remembrances and mourning of the unbearable, disproportional injustice. As Derrida puts it, "forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable. One cannot, or should not, forgive; there is only forgiveness, if there is any, where there is the unforgivable. That is to say that forgiveness must announce itself as impossibility itself. It can only be possible in doing the impossible".<sup>47</sup> If the broken vow of perpetual

"Ethics, properly speaking, is restricted to imperatives that are categorical; and for Derrida, the ethical moment is the interruption of the general context of conditioned hypothetical imperatives by an unconditional categorical imperative. *Ethics arises in and as the undecidable yet determinate articulation of these two orders.* As Derrida writes, this moment of unconditional appeal is revealed in the link that connects deconstruction to the 'Yes', the moment of affirmation that one finds repeatedly in Derrida's writings." Critchley, S., 2014. *The Ethics of Deconstruction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 40.

<sup>43</sup> Derrida, J., 2000. *Le siècle et le pardon*, *ibid.*, p. 101 – 133.

<sup>44</sup> Smreková, D., 2017. *Filozofický príbeh odpustenia. Odpustenie a neodpustiteľné u V. Jankelévicha, J. Derridu a P. Ricoeura*. Bratislava: Iris, p. 81. Personal translation.

<sup>45</sup> Derrida, J., 2005. *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, *ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32 – 33.

peace can ever be repaired, it is thanks to this aporetic, seemingly impossible promise to forgive the unforgivable.

## VI. Conclusion: “We are going...”

In their ethico-political revisions of peace, the Kantian and Derridean perspectives lead to partially different solutions. While Kant sees the ultimate goal of Enlightenment in the rational emancipation of man, Derrida observes the historical failure of this Enlightenment goal in the 20th century. Based on the historico-political trauma of Shoah, that Europeans experienced more than a century after Kant's death, Derrida reevaluates the totalitarian violence structurally built in the Western metaphysical thinking. He even sees this violence as partially built in the construction of collective memory via iterable, ornamental representations of past events.

In *Archive Fever*,<sup>48</sup> Derrida conceives deconstruction as a philosophical tactic capable of revealing metaphysical violence of the “selecting” work of all memories and archives. Each memory is born from selection, each archive is born from censorship – both start with the decision about what will be forgotten. According to Derrida, the notion of archive seems at first to point toward the past, to refer to the signs of consigned memory. However, before recalling faithfulness to tradition,

the archive should *call into question* the coming of the future. And if we still lack a viable, unified, given concept of the archive, it is undoubtedly not a purely conceptual, theoretical, epistemological insufficiency on the level of multiple and specific disciplines; it is perhaps not for lack of sufficient elucidation in certain circumscribed domains: archaeology, documentography, bibliography, philology, historiography.<sup>49</sup>

In other words, Derrida suggests a psychoanalytical explanation of historical memory: erasing guilt through a new form of narration systematically avoids it and, thus, makes us forget it. Just like our hospitality for foreigners, our forgiveness must remain a promise, not a right. Because no one has the right to be forgiven, it is up to our hosts to decide if they forgive or not. Because hosts can select their visitors, just like they can select what they remember and what they forgive from the past, there is

<sup>48</sup> Derrida, J., 1998. *Archive Fever. A Freudian Impression*, trans. Eric Prenowitz, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33 – 34.



no universal and perpetually present justice we shall refer to.

Similarly, in *Force of Law*,<sup>50</sup> Derrida defines deconstruction as a tactic operating in the interval between deconstructibility of law and undeconstructibility of justice. The force that enforces the law cannot be applied to justice because it is, in Derrida's view, a *justice-to-come*. Derridian justice is a mere promise to punish the guilt. Its arrival is perpetually deferred. Every fight "in the name" of justice ends when the fight is won: such a "victory" turns the call for justice into a new law that will be enforced. Justice is a promise to punish the guilty – it is the condition of possibility of the law. It is, however, impossible to fulfill this promise in legal practice. Derrida emphasizes this uncertainty in reaching universal justice or forgiveness. He sees the Kantian perpetual peace as perpetually deferred. One cannot be morally obliged to forgive the unforgivable. Forgiveness is no duty, but an ongoing process of healing from previous traumas caused by enmity. In this sense, Derrida's quasi-ethical promise precedes Kant's moral duty.

And yet, to a certain degree, these two ethical ornaments of peace pervade. In Derrida's view, Kant leaves a gap between two orders – the order of global ethics and local politics. Kant's pure practical reason is distinguished from pure theoretical reason by the lack of intermediary schemas between ideas, concepts, and sensibility that "would procure for us the best mediations between the ethics or holiness, if you like, of messianic hospitality and the political 'peace process'".<sup>51</sup> This hiatus marks a discontinuity between two orders, between the order of messianic promise and the order of determination of a political right. It introduces an indecision into the basis of which a decision must be determined. Therefore, his moral maxim is a "messiah" whose arrival is foretold and awaited, but never totally experienced. Derrida even finds that this Kant's "leap over the abyss"<sup>52</sup> between the two orders is a guarantee against totalitarian decisions in ethics, politics, and jurisdiction.

The ongoing performativity of this "leap over the abyss" is, in Derrida's view, an unfinished work of forgiveness and hospitality. Because of the uncertain healing process, forgiveness is never fully accomplished. It can only be approached partially, by little steps – "No hospitality, step of

<sup>50</sup> Derrida, J., 1992. *Force of Law*, *ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>51</sup> Derrida, J., 2024. *Hospitality II*, *ibid.*, p. 197.

<sup>52</sup> As Derrida puts it, "If there were not this leap over the abyss, we would merely have to unfold knowledge in a program of action. And there would be nothing more irresponsibilizing and more totalitarian." *Ibid.*, p. 198.

hospitality. We are going”<sup>53</sup> As Derrida puts it, for the invited guest as much as for the visitor, crossing the threshold remains a transgressive step.

It is as though hospitality were the impossible: as though the law of hospitality defined this very impossibility, as if it were only possible to transgress it, as though *the* law of absolute, unconditional, hyperbolic hospitality, as though the categorical imperative of hospitality commanded that we transgress all the laws (in the plural) of hospitality, namely, the conditions, the norms, the rights and the duties that are imposed on hosts and hostesses, on the men or women who give a welcome as well as the men or women who receive it. And vice versa, it is as though the laws (plural) of hospitality, in marking limits, powers, rights, and duties, consisted in challenging and transgressing *the* law of hospitality, the one that would command that the “new arrival” be offered an unconditional welcome.<sup>54</sup>

In every new step of hospitality, we are transgressing our limits in forgiveness, we are overcoming “these interminable, uncrossable thresholds, these parergons”<sup>55</sup> In the perspective of Derrida’s deconstruction, it is not the peace that is to be considered perpetual, it is the poematic work on forgiveness that is. What maintains peaceful relations is their ongoing renewal by performative rituals of hospitality and forgiveness.

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<sup>53</sup> Derrida, J., 2005. *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, *ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>54</sup> Derrida, J., 2000. *Of Hospitality*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 75.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

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**Abstract:** This article uses a discussion of the relationships between war, peace and “human nature” in the First Supplement of Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* essay to make a wider observation about the interplay of the three concepts. It starts by outlining the argument concerning the inevitability of war and the evil of human nature in the *Perpetual Peace* essay, and then reconstructs the reasoning of the First Supplement to show the role which nature — and human nature in particular — plays with it, underlining its two crucial flaws: a pragmatic one and a theoretical one. It then widens the scope of the analysis to show that these fundamental flaws represent general problem in our understanding of the reasons of war. Finally, pointing to more contemporary attempts to frame the term “human nature” present in biological discourses, it sketches a possible alternative to the Kantian argument that although human nature is “evil,” it is only through it that we can foster conditions of perpetual peace to come.

**Keywords:** Human Nature, Nature, Perpetual Peace, Peace, War

## Introduction

Kant’s argument concerning the historical possibility of the conditions of perpetual peace, laid out in the famous First Supplement to the *Perpetual Peace* essay, rests on a specific understanding of human nature — one that, as I show in this text, is untenable today. Importantly, this untenability is not only based on some biological or empirical understanding of nature (human or otherwise) that Kant might not have had given the biological knowledge of his time. Rather, it rests on a fundamental change that has happened in our scientific (but not necessarily political and philosophical) understanding of what *kind* of thing we refer to when we talk about human nature. As I show in the paper, this profound change not only puts into question the Kantian argument itself, but also requires a change in

our understanding of the relationships between war, peace and human nature — and, *a fortiori*, between the natural and the political — providing an avenue into transcending an important limit to political imagination.

I proceed by first outlining the argument concerning the inevitability of war, which is shared by thinkers against whom the *Perpetual Peace* essay is written — and, in some of its elements, also by Kant himself. This helps to situate Kant’s essay in context and show the stakes of the reasoning laid out in the supplement. Next, I reconstruct the reasoning of the supplement to show the role which nature — and human nature in particular — plays with it; I argue that even the most benevolent reading of the fragment does not remove the fundamental flaw on which this argument is based. In the next section, I widen the scope of the analysis to show that this fundamental flaw is not restricted to Kant or his time, but rather a more general problem in our understanding of the reasons of war. Finally, pointing to more contemporary attempts to frame the term “human nature,” I show a possible alternative to Kant’s reasoning.

## Inevitable War

There is a number of possible arguments that say why perpetual peace is impossible. A resource argument would say that both resource scarcity and abundance will, in the right circumstances, lead to conflict.<sup>1</sup> “Clash of civilizations” arguments would suggest that irreconcilable differences between cultures, or indeed the proclivity of some cultures to value warrior behavior highly, inevitably lead to wars.<sup>2</sup> But the strongest possible argument — or the strongest argument in a secular world — would insist that permanent or even perpetual peace is impossible, because war is somehow natural or, even worse, embedded in human nature itself.

By calling this argument “strongest” I do not mean that it is necessarily true, nor that it is necessarily the most convincing; in fact, I leave these matters on the side for most of this article. What I mean is that *if it were true*, it would mean the strongest possible sense in which war is inevitable — while we may imagine a world in which the distribution of resources is “just right” (whatever that would mean in practice), and we may imagine a better cultural alignment or understanding, if war is something embedded in nature itself, a world without war would cease to

<sup>1</sup> Vesco P., Dasgupta S., De Cian E., Carraro C., 2020. Natural resources and conflict: a meta-analysis of the empirical literature, *Ecological Economics* 172. doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106633.

<sup>2</sup> Huntington S. P., 1993. The Clash of Civilizations?, *Foreign Affairs* 72(3). doi: 10.2307/20045621.

be a natural world. Or, at least, if war is something embedded in *human* nature, then for a world without war, humanity would need to undergo a change undreamed of by anyone except perhaps the most adventurous posthumanists.

The belief in the naturalness of war is shared by cynics who make a point of assuming that man is in essence evil, and of idealists whose dreams are shattered each time another war inevitably breaks out. Hobbes' "war of every man against every man,"<sup>3</sup> as a natural state of human existence is often mentioned in this context; this may be problematic because of two factors that remain important for this text as well. Firstly, it is highly debatable if Hobbes even believed that such a state ever existed — it is rather posited as a hypothetical benchmark as to what would happen if we did not give up some of our freedom to a sovereign power. Secondly, and more importantly in this context, it is even more debatable if a free-for-all sticks-and-stones brawl can be called a war.

How does Kant's *Perpetual Peace* figure in this context? There are several ways in which we can situate Kant essay historically, for example acknowledging earlier similar texts, especially the *Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe* (Project for Bringing about Perpetual Peace in Europe), by Abbé de Saint-Pierre first published in 1712 and then widely circulating in abridged versions.<sup>4</sup> We can also note that its chronological closeness to the French Revolution, an event to which the Königsberg philosopher had a generally positive attitude (even though he dismissed violence as a way to bring about political change), which could suggest that the essay was a way for Kant to involve himself in a more public way in the discussion of current political events.<sup>5</sup> This suggestion is corroborated by the lighter style of the piece — at least if we measure it by other works of Kant. As W.B. Gallie says: "It is unique among Kant's writings in that it was written for a wide public, and that its publication can be regarded as a political act"<sup>6</sup>

However, for the problem at hand, it is more important to situate Kant's essay through highlighting its polemical edge — in other words,

<sup>3</sup> Hobbes T., 1998. *Leviathan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 85.

<sup>4</sup> Scheid, D. E., 2011. Perpetual Peace: Abbé de Saint-Pierre. In: Chatterjee, D. K., ed. *Encyclopedia of Global Justice*. Dordrecht: Springer.

<sup>5</sup> This "publicist" understanding of Kant's essay, focussing on the topicality of the subject in the late 18th century, is underscored, e.g., in Kupś, T., 2024. Kant's Project of Perpetual Peace Today. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 13(1).

<sup>6</sup> Gallie, W. B., 1978. *Philosophers on Peace and War, Kant, Clausewitz, Marx Engels and Tolstoy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 8.

given that it is, in fact, a political act, understanding what *kind* of political act it is and against whom or what kinds of ideas it is situated. Kant himself puts it quite clearly in another text from the period, “A Renewed attempt to answer the question ‘Is the human race constantly improving?’”, in which he summarizes the stance on human nature taken by the “clever statesmen” of his time:

One must take men as they are, they [=our politicians] tell us, and not as the world’s uninformed pedants or good-natured dreamers fancy that they ought to be. But ‘as they are’ ought to read ‘as we have made them by unjust coercion, by treacherous designs which the government is in a good position to carry out.’ For that is why they are intransigent and inclined to rebellion, and why regrettable consequences ensue if discipline is relaxed in the slightest.<sup>7</sup>

Kant, therefore, situates himself against the supposedly “cynical” argument, according to which men are by nature evil and we must treat them “as they are” and accept that the occasional outbursts of malevolence will happen, and the only way to make them rarer is to put them under strict surveillance and discipline them as intensely as possible. As Howard Williams puts it, giving names to philosophers who represent this way of thinking: “We can surmise that Kant believed that Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel were taking for granted the presence of war in international society (as evidence of our inherent evil) rather than questioning it and asking how it might be removed”.<sup>8</sup> As Williams adds, “The ‘sorry comforters’ of just war theory pride themselves on their acquaintance with the way of the world and contrast it with the presumed naivety of those who seek security without war”.<sup>9</sup> The name itself, “sorry comforters” is derived from the book of Job, and refers to Job’s friends, who made it their life’s mission to make sure that their understanding of God’s justice is not spoiled by their friend’s hardships.

However, while Kant opposes the cynics who believe that there is nothing to be done about the evil or malicious side of human nature, he seemingly agrees with them on one point — namely that such a malicious or evil side exists. As he admits in the *Perpetual Peace* essay, “A state of Peace among men who live side by side with each other, is not the natural state.

<sup>7</sup> Kant I., 1991. Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose. In: Reiss H.S., ed. *Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 178.

<sup>8</sup> Williams H., 2012. *Kant and the End of War. A Critique of Just War Theory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 63.

<sup>9</sup> Williams, H., 2012. *Kant and the End of War*, *ibid.*, p. 64.



The state of Nature is rather a state of War.”<sup>10</sup> At another point, he claims that an “inclination” to war “seems to be implanted in human nature.”<sup>11</sup> Whether we call it the “radical evil” of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, or the “unsocial sociability” of the “Renewed attempt,” Kant recognizes in the human an evil based on egoism, the tendency to care only for one’s own interest at the cost of everyone else’s.

The main difference between the reasoning of Kant and that of his opponents does not lie, then, in a more optimistic view of human nature as it is; it lies, rather, in the conclusions he draws from how this influences human behavior and human history. This is presented most clearly in the famous “Guarantee” in the “First supplement” to the *Perpetual Peace* essay.

### **(Human) Nature<sup>12</sup> and the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace**

Full of awe for nature, Kants “guarantee” may seem, for the contemporary reader, like a page from a creationist handbook:

in the cold, icy wastes around the Arctic Ocean there grows the moss which the reindeer scrapes forth from beneath the snow in order that it may itself become food, or that it may be yoked to the sledge of the Ostiak or the Samojan. And in like manner, the wildernesses of sand, barren though they be, do yet contain the camel which appears to have been created for traveling through them, in order that they might not be left unutilized.<sup>13</sup>

In fragments such as these, one can clearly distinguish a providential view of nature, something whose key function is to serve man and the goals of humanity.

More importantly, it is this same providential nature — through a seeming ruse of reason — that made men go to war in the first place. How to go from this place of war to the place of peace, especially when Kant says that “War [...] requires no special motive for its explanation; it appears to be ingrafted on human nature and is even regarded as noble

<sup>10</sup> Kant, I., 2010. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795). Edited by Lambert G. Syracuse and Philadelphia: Slought Foundation and the Syracuse University Humanities Center, p. 12.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Focussed as it is on the *Perpetual Peace* essay, this article presents only a partial appraisal of the chronologically varied understandings of human nature that can be found in Kant’s philosophy. For a more thorough analysis of how the philosopher’s views on anthropological matters changed throughout his career, see e.g., Bosáková, K., 2024. Moving Around the Question of the Human. Was Kant an Anthropological Philosopher?, *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 13(1).

<sup>13</sup> Kant, I., 2010. *Perpetual Peace*, ibid., p. 26.

in itself, man being stimulated to it by the love of glory without regard to selfish interests.”<sup>14</sup>

The answer, for Kant — much as this might seem as unnatural a means as there may be — is money. Thanks to the establishing of states, men stopped being at so-called war with each-other, and decided to constrain themselves to be good citizens. In the same vein, states will someday understand that a peaceful federation is more profitable for all involved than war. As Kant concludes,

Among all the means of power subordinate to the regulation of the State, the power of money is the most reliable, and thus the States find themselves driven to further the noble interest of peace, although not directly from motives of morality. Hence wherever war threatens to break out in the world, the States have an interest to avert it by mediations, just as if they stood in a constant league with each other for this purpose. Thus great combinations with a view to war can but very rarely occur from the very nature of things, and still more rarely can they succeed.<sup>15</sup>

This, of course, is not the guarantee of peace itself, but rather a guarantee that there are “conditions of Perpetual Peace by the mechanism involved in our human inclinations themselves; and although this is not realized with a guarantee that is sufficient to enable us to prophesy the future theoretically, yet the security involved is sufficient for all practical relations.”<sup>16</sup>

There have been debates as to the status of this explanation “from nature,” with Kant’s own theories in particular providing some possible guidelines. Are we supposed to understand the providential nature of nature at face value, i.e. as a force akin to the aforementioned ruse of Reason, which, having its own plan and will, overcomes the seemingly “natural” tendency of man to go to war? Are we supposed to understand it — again, in a literal reading of Kant’s text — as the fulfillment of the “final purpose of human nature”, i.e., a reason-based, peaceful society? While both of these interpretations can find textual support, it is clear that they are untenable from the point of view of today’s understanding of nature because of their naively providential character.

But there are two more benign ways to read Kant’s claim about nature’s role in the bringing about of peace. One of them, perhaps a bit more subtle, would point to the understanding of the purposefulness of nature

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

that is present in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*<sup>17</sup> — in short, while a scientific analysis of nature needs to understand it as a causal system, we cannot help to see it *as if* it had a purpose. In this sense, although we understand it is thoroughly unscientific to say that nature gave us roses so that we can express love, it is perfectly normal to look at a rose and see a flower that was created for this very purpose.

This type of reading would make Kant's guarantee of perpetual peace resemble the vision of nature present in James Lovelock's Gaia theory.<sup>18</sup> In Lovelock's interactive understanding of living processes it is key that they are not only shaped by their environment, but also actively shape it so that the living Earth starts behaving like an organism, i.e., is capable of maintaining conditions that are key for life, e.g., a high enough level of oxygen in the air. Similarly, the egoistic human nature in Kant, although in itself not meaning to produce conditions of peace, does produce them, since they are what best serves the needs of human nature itself.

A somewhat simpler kind of reading — but equally useful for the purpose of aligning Kant with a more contemporary and Darwinian view of nature — is represented, for example, by Luigi Caranti.<sup>19</sup> Caranti suggests that Kant's text, far from being a simplistic teleological exercise, is in fact focused on how seemingly natural processes and rational actions of governments that do not necessarily have perpetual peace as their goal, nevertheless foster conditions of peace. In other words, while Kant's awe of nature may be overly exaggerated, his analysis of the causes and effects of human political behaviors is very much down-to-earth. Caranti's argument is that many of processes we see today in fact confirm many of Kant's intuitions — he focusses mainly on the peace- and democracy-promoting nature of trade and commercial relations in general. However, the “today” that he is writing his book in — the year on the cover is 2017, but some chapters appeared as early as 2011 — is very different from ours, with one of his primary examples being the supposed democratization of China that followed its decision to be more open in trade relations with the rest of the world and to allow for a more capitalist-oriented economy. Today's China, lead by who some call “Mao with money”,<sup>20</sup> is very far from

<sup>17</sup> Kant, I., 2000. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 68 – 73.

<sup>18</sup> Lovelock, J. E., 2016. *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>19</sup> Caranti, L., 2017. *Kant's Political Legacy*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Kindle Edition.

<sup>20</sup> E.g., in a quotation from a “longtime observer” of Chinese issues in Osnos, E., 2023. China's Age of Malaise. *The New Yorker*, October 23 [Accessed 2024-08-10]. Available at: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/30/chinas-age-of-malaise>.

the optimistic projections of the 1990s and early 2000s that Caranti seems to echo. More recently, Russia’s full-blown aggression on Ukraine directly points to the fiasco of the idea that economic exchange in itself brings nations together and fosters peace.

Regardless, however, of the rightness or wrongness of these predictions, the very fact that such a reading — as well as the Gaia reading — is possible and plausible, show that Kant’s misgivings and naiveties about nature, fundamental as they are, are not the main problem we should currently have with the understanding of nature present in his texts.

This main problem is visible in Caranti’s reading. As said above, he explicitly rejects any intentionality of nature; however, he keeps another key aspect of the Kantian view, namely “the mechanism of unsocial sociability with its consequences for the evolution of human institutions, at the domestic and international level”.<sup>21</sup>

Unsocial sociability, a somewhat paradoxical mechanism that Caranti alludes to, is explained by Kant in his “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” as a twofold tendency in human nature. Man is, on the one hand, a social creature who seeks out companionship and community — this is one of the roots of political life as such. On the other hand, an opposite tendency is also present in the human, an “unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance to his own ideas”.<sup>22</sup> The discord and ambition that lead from the second characteristic are also the mechanism behind the human conquering of nature described in the “First Supplement” to the *Perpetual Peace* essay. And the sociable instinct, in itself, leads to the creation of just, modal institutions, which in turn leads to a better society: “The justice of institutions gradually permeates individuals’ souls, and they in turn adhere more authentically and steadily to the principles on which their government is based, thereby generating further institutional progress”.<sup>23</sup>

However, the mechanism of “unsocial sociability” — and a similar thing can be said about the “radical evil” of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, — is in itself a problematic concept, and not because of any directly empirical evidence that can be brought against it; it is, in fact, questionable, if such a conception of human nature can be overturned thanks to empirical evidence (I come back to this problem towards the

<sup>21</sup> Caranti, L., 2017. *Kant’s Political Legacy*, *ibid.*, Chapter 7. (As references are made to an unpaginated Kindle edition, only chapter numbers are given)

<sup>22</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *Idea for a Universal History*, *ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>23</sup> Caranti, L., 2017. *Kant’s Political Legacy*, *ibid.*, Chapter 6.

end of the article). This conception is problematic because it defines human nature as something universal and wholesale, singular to humans but belonging to each human in the same way. As Dipesh Chakrabarty notices with regards to what he calls the “standard account of the modern subject in European political thought” that in these discourses “[h]uman nature [...] was as universal as the biological human body”.<sup>24</sup>

While Chakrabarty makes this claim with explicit reference to Smith and Hume, the same is true about Kant, it is also a part of the pattern of explaining human nature and its relationship to war (and peace) that can be found in the work of a number of thinkers — the “sorry comforters” not withstanding — and is also present today. I explain this pattern more thoroughly in the next part of the text.

### Natural War, Future Peace

While a detailed and exhaustive assessment of the characteristic pattern of explaining human nature and its relationship to war and peace — focusing on a supposed “dark side” of human nature and a remedy that is linked to various elements of “progress” — is well beyond the scope of this text (as well as my ability), it might be a good approximation for the needs of the problem at hand to focus on a few examples by well-known authors.

One such example is the classic 1932 exchange between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud on the reasons for the existence of war. Einstein, after considering a few other options and analyzing the means through which people can be incited to go to war, either by their own states or by arms-producing lobbies who profit from conflict, in the end lands on a familiar trope as to why men are indeed so ready to take part in the fighting: “Because man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction. In normal times this passion exists in a latent state, it emerges only in unusual circumstances; but it is a comparatively easy task to call it into play and raise it to the power of a collective psychosis”.<sup>25</sup>

An important addition to this argument is added in the conclusion of the piece, where Einstein notes that he is “well aware well aware that the aggressive instinct operates under other forms and in other circumstances”<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Chakrabarty, D., 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 129.

<sup>25</sup> Einstein A., Freud S., 1964. Why War? In: Strachey J. – Freud A. – Strachey A. – Tyson A. – Richards A., eds. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XXI, p. 201.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 201.

(such as civil wars or racist persecution). Einstein’s notion is, then, that regardless of the cultural and political factors driving the existence or even promotion of war, the ease of this promotion must hinge upon a basic instinct which allows for these promotions to sink in — pretty much in the same way as fast food commercials would have been useless if we were not drawn to food containing a lot of fats and simple carbohydrates in the first place. Moreover, much as in Kant it is the same “unsocial sociability” instinct that makes us look at each-other with far-reaching cautiousness and go to war with each-other, for Einstein it is the same instinct that drives aggression towards one-another and all-out war. The only solution to this problem lies not only in the “superficial” (as Einstein puts it) action on the political level, but also a deep change in human psychology, or indeed human nature, itself.

Einstein must have known enough of Freud’s writings to understand that Freud will agree on this point. Indeed, Freud’s answer points not only to the existence of such an instinct of destruction, but situates the instinct theory of psychoanalysis in a double, mythical and biological context, which further strengthens the thesis of the fundamental nature of what drives us to war. Moreover, thanks to the ins and outs of psychoanalytic theory — especially the notion that instincts or drives can manifest in ways not consciously understood by those in whom they manifest themselves, Freud can also explain why going to war is often and rightly understood as a positive, idealist or noble thing:

When we read of the atrocities of the past, it sometimes seems as though the idealistic motives served only as an excuse for the destructive appetites; and sometimes – in the case, for instance, of the cruelties of the Inquisition – it seems as though the idealistic motives had pushed themselves forwards in consciousness, while the destructive ones lent them an unconscious reinforcement.<sup>27</sup>

And again, when trying to propose a solution to the problem of war, he points to a way to master the instinctive evil of human nature through cultural means. In Freud’s understanding, the work of civilization is to change the goal of the instinct of destruction from the original one to one that is more sublime.

As an aside, it is also worth remembering that in psychoanalytic theory, given its “hydraulic” conception of the psychological apparatus, there are

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

limits to the sublimation or at least to the suppression of instincts that is beneficial for civilization. While quite a few psychoanalysts and thinkers taking psychoanalysis seriously underscored this problem after Freud especially in the 1960s (with Herbert Marcuse and Wilhelm Reich being perhaps the most known), one can still happen on that view in more recent discourse. For example, here is a fragment worth considering in this context taken from the French psychoanalyst Elizabeth Roudinesco's talks with Jacques Derrida:

"I am always worried that we are moving toward the construction of a sanitized society, without passions, without conflicts, without insults or verbal violence, without any risk of death, without cruelty. When one claims to be eradicating something on one side, there is the risk of its resurgence where it isn't expected".<sup>28</sup>

In other words, too much suppression leads to an outburst, too much culture, too quickly, and the evils of nature will show themselves. We cannot remove the aggressive instincts altogether, or even remove the outlets of those instincts too quickly, because a resurgence will happen somewhere else.

One might argue that at least in the case of Freud the structural similarities between his and Kant's theory — a belief in some kind of "evil" in human nature and an argument that somehow other forces present in human nature may overcome this evil — are simply caused by the fact that Freud is appropriating a Kantian argument. There is a fragment in his text that might suggest that, using even the notion of "perpetual peace" (even if it has not been translated thusly in the Standard Edition): "Paradoxical as it may sound, it must be admitted that war might be a far from inappropriate means of establishing the eagerly desired reign of 'everlasting' peace ('ewigen' *Friedens*) since it is in a position to create the large units within which a powerful central government makes further wars impossible".<sup>29</sup> (The next sentence, invoking another Kantian motif, claims that this is untrue in practice while theoretically plausible).

While it may well be possible that Freud had been inspired by Kant, it does not explain why he would choose to follow his thinking in the first place had he not been convinced that this is indeed the right pattern for explaining the prevalence of war. More importantly, this pattern of explanation can be found in other sources, in whose case the Kantian inspira-

<sup>28</sup> Derrida J., Roudinesco E., 2004. Violence Against Animals. In: *For What Tomorrow: a Dialogue*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 75.

<sup>29</sup> Einstein, A., Freud, S., 1964. *Why War?*, *ibid.*, p. 207.

tion is much less plausible. For example — and the importance of referring to this particular group is made clearer below — in texts and statements of prominent neodarwinists. E.O. Wilson cites research according to which “Territorial expansion and defense by tribes and their modern equivalents the nation states is a cultural universal. The contribution to survival and future reproductive potential, especially of tribal leaders, is overwhelming, and so is the warlike imperative of tribal defense”.<sup>30</sup> Richard Dawkins, when explaining the ethical stakes of the selfish gene theory, makes the following statement: “Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. Let us understand what our own selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least have the chance to upset their designs, something that no other species has ever aspired to”.<sup>31</sup> This means that even if we are selfish (or even “nasty”, as he says in his documentary, *The Fifth Ape*) by biology, we can remain less so by culture.

While this evidence is not and cannot be exhaustive, it seems that a very cautious thesis can be put forward about the structure of understanding war and peace with reference to human nature again, namely that this structure rests on several fundamental points:

1. There exists a key part of human nature which we can identify as aggressive, greedy or outright evil;
2. Is firmly embedded in human nature on its most fundamental level;
3. It is holistic — it is a single mechanism that determines all “bad” behaviors from interhuman aggression to all-out war and its presence makes it easier for bad-willing political actors to incite people into war;
4. It is opposed in a binary way to something “cultural” — either Reason or another kind of instinct;
5. The only way to peace is to use culture to counter the evil part of human nature;
6. The only way to achieve success is to work slowly, so that gradual acceptance of “cultural” influences roots itself deeply in humans, thusly changing their nature or at least underscoring its “better angels”.

Stylistically, these explanations often contain a touch of the poetic or even mythical — it is no surprise that Kant alludes to the book of Job and his “sorry comforters”, nor that psychoanalysts talk about Greek gods, Eros and

<sup>30</sup> Wilson, E. O., 1999. *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*. New York: Vintage Books, p. 185.

<sup>31</sup> Dawkins, R., 2006. *The Selfish Gene. Thirtieth Anniversary Edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3.



Thanatos. It might well be that one of the reasons of the popularity or plausibility of these kinds of explanations is that they take us deep into the historical roots of our Western self-understanding, tap into our Western cultural habits of translating history into metaphysics.

However, they also make peace into a dream of the future, a distant possibility that will present itself so long as we keep on the current course and — curiously — not move forward too quickly, lest a resurgence happens where we least expect it. The promise that peace will come in the future, that sometime it will be possible to have perpetual peace is, in fact, producing conditions of the perpetual *postponing* of peace. Since the virtuous circle is turning, this philosophical posture invites complacency. It is also suspect from the point of view of equality — those countries or nations who are at war can easily be cast as backwards or underdeveloped when it comes to the progress of human nature. This vision, thus, seems suspicious from a pragmatic point of view.

But much more importantly, there are also grounds to critique it from a theoretical, not just pragmatic standpoint. This critique, I believe, should start with what I called the “holistic” aspect of so-called “human nature”.

### Complicating Human Nature

The term “human nature” is, of course, problematic in itself. As Michel Foucault noted in his debate with Noam Chomsky, which I use to exemplify two important understandings of the term: “In the history of knowledge, the notion of human nature seems to me mainly to have played the role of an epistemological indicator to designate certain types of discourse in relation to or in opposition to theology or biology or history. I would find it difficult to see in this a scientific concept”<sup>32</sup>

In other words, Foucault suggests that if we use the term “human nature” or espouse a certain view of human nature, we are rather always already taking a side, signaling that we are subscribing to a certain type of discourse, maybe even playing a certain language game. This is, perhaps, not far from the truth, since today’s discussion about using the term “human nature” can be — simplifying only slightly — summed up as a zero-sum fight between the “Tim Ingolds”, who claim that there is no “human nature”<sup>33</sup> and the

<sup>32</sup> Chomsky N., Foucault M., 2006. *The Chomsky-Foucault Debate on Human Nature*. New York: The New Press, pp. 5 – 6.

<sup>33</sup> See Ingold, T., 2006. Against Human Nature. In: Gontier, N. – Van Bendegem, J. P. – Aerts, D., eds. *Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture*. Dordrecht: Springer. doi: [https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3395-8\\_12](https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3395-8_12).

“Steven Pinkers” who claim the exact opposite<sup>34</sup>. More importantly, while the two camps both use the term “human nature,” they are, in fact, speaking about two very different things. We can see this difference already in the discussion between Foucault and Chomsky, when the latter gives his understanding of human nature as a: “collection, this mass of schematisms, innate organizing principles, which guides our social and intellectual and individual behavior”.<sup>35</sup>

Chomsky of course has in mind the schematisms of language, but anthropologists, psychologists and biologists who are still keen on using the term “human nature” have painted a much more complex picture of the matter, with Richard Dawkins’ idea behind the term *The Selfish Gene* being perhaps the most extreme example of this tendency of radical atomisation. E.O. Wilson, another hero of sociobiology, puts it thusly: “[Human nature] is the epigenetic rules, the hereditary regularities of mental development that bias cultural evolution in one direction as opposed to another, and thus connect the genes to culture”.<sup>36</sup> Or, as Stephen Peter Rosen puts it, human nature is “the aspects of human cognition that are affected by biological inheritance, as those inherited factors are shaped by human interaction with the environment”.<sup>37</sup> This means that in this understanding human nature is formed of a number of general, genetic rules that make humans react in a certain way to certain environmental factors — it is not strict genetic determinism, but rather epigenetics: to understand human nature, as understood by the sociobiologists, one must understand the connections between the genes and the environment, including the cultural environment people create for themselves. Incidentally, if understood correctly, this *kind* of concept of human nature does not necessarily need to be anthropocentric, as was often the case with traditional ideas behind human nature. Or, at least, it does not actively seek to be anthropocentric.

This is not meant as a defense of sociobiology — I will not rehash the many deserved critiques this movement has received, also from the side of some geneticists; we have already seen that in the case of war, at least some sociobiologists still cling to the old “man is evil” explanation. I am rather trying to point to the fact that this kind of understanding of what used to be called “human nature” can be productively used to complicate

<sup>34</sup> See Pinker, S., 2016. *The Blank Slate*. New York: Viking.

<sup>35</sup> Chomsky, N., Foucault, M., 2006. *Debate on Human Nature*, *ibid.*, pp. 4 – 5.

<sup>36</sup> Wilson, E. O., 1999. *Consilience*, *ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>37</sup> Rosen, S. P., 2005. *War and Human Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 3.

philosophical understandings of war and peace, which in turn could undermine the general, simplified story I have been diagnosing in discourses from Kant (and even Grotius) to Freud and beyond.

Some of this work is already being done. A short glance at the research of the problem of war in evolutionary anthropology, neuropsychology and other domains shows the multitude of ways in which the problem is posed and the multitude of candidates for mechanisms which are responsible for war. Such mechanisms may include the already mentioned territorial expansion;<sup>38</sup> cultural rewards for participating in warfare<sup>39</sup> or outright self-sacrifice;<sup>40</sup> “Emotion, stress, and hormones”,<sup>41</sup> which influence the mindsets of state leaders and other decision-makers. Also, since war – especially modern war, which makes it clearly distinct from the Hobbesian supposedly natural “war of all against all” – is a highly cooperative activity, the research on the biological underpinnings of war needs to take cooperation into account as well; in this regard, we are very different from other primates;<sup>42</sup> also, the relative rarity of intergroup conflict in humans makes some researchers suggest that it makes sense to study the evolution of peace rather than war.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, biologists considering Neo-Darwinian explanations – which generally focus on inheritable traits and mechanisms – too simplistic, raise the “need to think [war and peace] in terms of human systems and niches, not specific adaptations”,<sup>44</sup> complicating matters even further.

While these examples can be multiplied, the point is clear enough – the classic argument that there is something in “our nature” that leads us to war is of little value, not because we are not, as a species, aggressive – there is aggression in many species, so why not ours – or that we do not have something “evil” within us, but rather because it is impossible to soundly pinpoint this “something evil”; and, *a fortiori*, it is impossible

<sup>38</sup> Wilson, E. O., 1999. *Consilience*, *ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>39</sup> Glowacki, L., Wrangham, R. W., 2013. The Role of Rewards in Motivating Participation in Simple Warfare. *Human Nature* 24. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X22002862.

<sup>40</sup> Wrangham R. W., Glowacki L., 2012. Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and War in Nomadic Hunter-Gatherers. *Human Nature* 23. doi: 10.1007/s12110-012-9132-1.

<sup>41</sup> Rosen, S. P., 2005. *War and Human Nature*, *ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> Tomasello, M., 2011. Human Culture in Evolutionary Perspective. In: Gelfand, M. J. – Chiu, C. – Hong, Y., eds. *Advances in Culture and Psychology: Volume 1, Advances in Culture and Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380392.003.0001.

<sup>43</sup> Glowacki L., 2024. The evolution of peace. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 47. doi:10.1017/S0140525X22002862.

<sup>44</sup> Fuentes, A., 2013. Cooperation, Conflict, and Niche Construction in the Genus Homo. In: Fry, D. P., ed. *War, Peace, and Human Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 91.

to link a behavior as complex as war to a single psychological or genetic factor, or even to a finite and stable set of factors – or, indeed, as the need for cooperation and the double-edged nature of some of the mechanisms responsible for war<sup>45</sup> make clear, to a set of traits that we could unequivocally classify as “evil” or even “bad”. Such an argument does not mean that such factors should not be researched by scientists, but rather that philosophical explanations of war should take the complexity of those possible factors — and thus both the complexity of war and the complexity of “human nature” — into account.

## Conclusions

I started this text by situating Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* essay in its polemical context. In doing that, I showed that while it is purportedly opposed to theorists who propose an inherent evil in human nature which needs to be controlled in order to preserve peace — and that even these control measures will not be enough to achieve it — it does share with them the belief in this inherent evil. Kant’s original stance with regards to these thinkers lies in proposing a mechanism through which nature sets this inherently evil tendency to work against itself, thus producing conditions for perpetual peace. However, Kant’s view of nature is problematic — not so much because he proposes a providential and teleological view of nature (as this can be reconciled with our current understanding of evolutionary processes), but rather because of two other ideas: (1) that even though we can engage in working towards perpetual peace, the natural process that brings about its possibility is necessarily long-term; (2) that human nature is understood as a single (and singular) factor which causes all evil, from individual acts of aggression to multinational war. Importantly, this general pattern of explanation is present not only in Kantian philosophy, but also in many discourses, including psychoanalysis and contemporary evolutionary theory. However, a serious engagement with evolutionary theory shows that it also proposes another possible understanding of human nature — as a set of complex mechanisms that depend on the interplay of genetic and environmental factors.

Such an understanding of human nature, in the context of war, opens up several avenues that could lead to meaningful further research: (1) Even if they are (somewhat understandably) striving for general reason-

<sup>45</sup> Sapolsky, R. M., 2018. Doubled-Edged Swords in the Biology of Conflict. *Frontiers in Psychology* 9(26 – 25). <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02625>.

ing, philosophers should not treat war as something that is unified and especially explainable by a single factor coming from “human nature”; (2) Disconnected from such an understanding of human nature, war cannot be understood as a perennial struggle to which we are doomed — rather, each instance of war is a singular interplay of factors; (3) Conversely, it would perhaps be useful to think of peace in the same way — as a singular interplay of factors that can be brought about in the given situation; (4) Finally, to think conditions for perpetual peace, one should not rely on discovering a historical process which will end in a changed humanity, nor should one point to simple solve-all mechanisms like mutual trade. Rather, thinking the conditions for perpetual peace relies on the perpetual vigilance to the singular interplay of humans and their (political) environment.

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## Estetika každodennosti a Kant?

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### Everyday Aesthetics and Kant?

**Abstract:** The main aim of the paper is to present the possibilities offered by Kant's aesthetics formulated in the *Critique of Judgement* for the contemporary discourse of the everyday aesthetics. In this paper, I argue that a new and more attentive reading of the *Critique of Judgment* is sufficient to support its applicability to the field of the aesthetics of everyday life without having to modify its positions as Tom Leddy suggests. Pointing out the inadequacy of the requirement to assert the notion of disinterestedness for the everyday aesthetics and to privilege the notion of agreeable for this field was only one response to the objections that accompany such attempts to apply Kant's aesthetics today. Furthermore, I suggest that instead of accommodating Kant's notions of pure judgments of taste or adherent beauty in the everyday aesthetics, we should emphasize the material aesthetic judgments associated with the agreeable. This shift allows for a clearer assessment of the aesthetic qualities of everyday objects. Rather than relying on the concept of beautiful art, I propose to turn to Kant's ideas of mechanical art and agreeable aesthetic art or remunerative art, which offer more appropriate conceptual tools for reflecting on the quotidian.

**Keywords:** Aesthetics, Agreeable, Art, Everydayness, Kant

**Abstrakt:** Cieľom predkladanej štúdie je predstaviť možnosti, ktoré ponúka Kantova estetika formulovaná v *Kritike súdnosti* pre súčasný diskurz estetiky každodennosti. V práci tvrdím, že stačí nové a pozornejšie čítanie *Kritiky súdnosti*, aby sme podporili jej aplikovateľnosť na oblasť estetiky každodennosti bez toho, aby sme museli jej stanoviská meniť ako to navrhuje Tom Leddy. Poukázanie na neadekvátnosť požiadavky presadzovania pojmu nezainteresovanosti pre estetiku každodennosti a uprednostnenie pojmu príjemného pre túto oblasť bolo len jednou z odpovedí na výhrady, ktoré takéto pokusy o uplatnenie Kantovej estetiky dnes sprevádzajú. Okrem toho navrhujem, aby sme namiesto prispôsobovania Kantových pojmov čistých súdov vkusu alebo viazanej krá-



sy v estetike každodennosti, kládli dôraz na materiálne estetické súdy spojené s príjemným. Tento posun umožňuje jasnejšie posúdiť estetické kvality každodenných predmetov. Namiesto spoliehania sa na koncept krásneho umenia navrhujem obrátiť sa ku Kantovým myšlienkam mechanického umenia a príjemného umenia či remesla, ktoré ponúkajú vhodnejšie konceptuálne nástroje na reflexiu každodennosti.

**Kľúčové slová:** estetika, Kant, každodennosť, príjemné, umenie

Na úvod by som rád uviedol, že som si plne vedomý toho, že téma estetiky každodennosti určite nie je dôvod, pre ktorý sa dnes *Kritika súdnosti* číta a ani nie je v súčasnom diskurze o Kantovej estetike alebo filozofii dominantná, a už vôbec nie je s nimi bezprostredne spájaná. Na druhej strane sa domnievam, že ide o tému, pri ktorej má zmysel čítať Kanta znovu. Toto nové čítanie *Kritiky súdnosti* môže reagovať na nesúhlasné pozície, ktoré možno nájsť okrem iného v textoch Arnolda Berleanta<sup>1</sup>, Yuriko Saito<sup>2</sup> a Katyi Mandoki<sup>3</sup>. Títo autori tvrdili, že by sme sa mali vzdať akéhokoľvek pokusu o nájdenie kantovského rámca pre estetiku každodennosti. Tento skeptický postoj je podľa môjho názoru do značnej miery neopodstatnený, pretože vychádza zo selektívneho čítania *Kritiky súdnosti*, v ktorom dominujú otázky krásy, vznešeného, nezainteresovanosti a pod., ale nie téma každodenného života a jeho estetiky. Komplexnejší prístup k interpretácii Kantovej estetiky ale ukazuje, že tento text je paradoxne bohatým zdrojom podnetov pre skúmanie estetiky každodennosti v súčasnej estetike.

Príspevok v prvej časti ponúkne krátky úvod do estetiky každodennosti. Druhá časť prinesie príklady tých miest z *Kritiky súdnosti*, ktoré ostávajú ako by prehliadané pri jej čítaní a zameriam sa na potrebu modifikácie Kantovej estetiky pre účely estetiky každodennosti, o ktorej hovorí Tom Leddy. Potom sa dotknem najznámejších problémov, ktoré boli uvádzané ako prekážky aplikácie Kantovej estetiky v oblasti estetiky každodennosti: konkrétne problému nezainteresovanosti, aplikácie alebo rozšírenia koncepcie krásneho umenia na každodennosť a koncepcie príjemného.

<sup>1</sup> Porovnaj Berleant, A., 1991. *Art and engagement*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Berleant, A., 1994. Beyond Disinterestedness. *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 34(3), s. 242 – 254. doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/34.3.242; Berleant, A., 1999. Re-thinking Aesthetics. *Filozofski vestnik* 20(2). Dostupné na: <https://ojs.zrc-sazu.si/filozofski-vestnik/article/view/4063>.

<sup>2</sup> Pozri napr. Saito, Y., 2007. *Everyday aesthetics*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press a Saito, Y., 2017. *Aesthetics of the familiar: everyday life and world-making*. First edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Pozri Mandoki, K., 2007. *Everyday aesthetics: prosaics, the play of culture and social identities*. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

## 1. Estetika každodennosti včera a dnes

Nie je žiadnym prekvapením, že filozofi dlho prehliadali každodenný život a považovali ho za nepozoruhodný. Súčasnosť je voči našej každodennosti viac žiživá a minimálne estetika ju dnes rozpoznáva ako bohatý a dynamický zdroj estetických myšlienok, koncepcií a problémov. Takáto orientácia zahŕňa takmer každý aspekt našej každodennej rutiny, od úžitkových predmetov a sociálnych interakcií až po domáce práce a bežné činnosti, ako je stravovanie, varenie, obliekanie, upratovanie, dochádzanie do práce alebo odpočinok. Nemali by sme ale opomenúť ani výnimočné momenty, ako sú svadby, cestovanie, večierky, rituály a športové podujatia, ktoré dočasne narúšajú každodennú rutinu a v kontraste k nej je pre nás zviditeľňujú. Napriek rozdielom v identite, sociálnom postavení alebo kultúrnom zázemí tvoria tieto postupy a predmety podstatnú súčasť každodenného života každého človeka.

Vychádzajúc z Deweyho pragmatizmu a Berleantovho angažovaného estetického prístupu sa od začiatku 21. storočia vytvorila celá nová filozofická vetva výskumu, ktorého hlavným cieľom je esteticképrehodnocovanie každodenného života. Estetika každodennosti, rozvíjaná pôvodne v angloamerickom prostredí, predstavuje reakciu na tradičné západné chápanie estetiky ako filozofie umenia, ktoré dominovalo vo vedeckej diskusii až do polovice 20. storočia. Dôležitým krokom vpred v rozvoji tejto oblasti bolo vydanie zborníka *Aesthetics of Everyday Life*<sup>4</sup>, do ktorého prispeli viaceré známe osobnosti súčasnej diskusie, ako napríklad Thomas Leddy, Yuri-ko Saito, Arnold Berleant, Arto Haapala, Emily Brady a Wolfgang Welsch a ďalší. Zborník po prvýkrát ukázal pluralitu otázok, ktoré možno analyzovať z perspektívy estetiky každodennosti, a navrhol aj niektoré kľúčové pojmy pre jej konceptuálny rozvoj. O dva roky neskôr, v roku 2007, vyšli publikácie *Everyday Aesthetics. Prosaics, the Play of Culture and Social Identities*<sup>5</sup> a *Everyday Aesthetics*<sup>6</sup>, ktoré akoby oficiálne ustanovili zrod estetiky každodennosti ako samostatnej subdisciplíny súčasnej estetiky.

V súvislosti s procesom reimaginácie každodenného života, jeho povahy, charakteru a významu, sú estetické otázky nevyhnutné na vyzdvihnutie hodnotových aspektov každodennosti.<sup>7</sup> V podstate ide o presvedčenie,

<sup>4</sup> Light, A. – Smith, J. M., eds., 2005. *The Aesthetics of Everyday Life*. New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>5</sup> Mandoki, K., 2007. *Everyday aesthetics: prosaics, the play of culture and social identities*, ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Saito, Y., 2007. *Everyday aesthetics*, ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Highmore, B., 2004. Homework: Routine, social aesthetics and the ambiguity of everyday life. *Cultural Studies* 18(2 – 3), s. 311 – 312. doi:10.1080/0950238042000201536.

že každodennosť môže byť „vykúpená“ len prostredníctvom jej estetickej transfigurácie. Súčasné prístupy k estetike každodenného života sa zameriavajú na zachytenie estetickej hodnoty našej každodennosti, vyzývajú nás k návratu k nej a chcú poukázať, ako sú estetické kvality už zakotvené v bežnej štruktúre každodenného života. Každodenný život sa potom neukazuje ako šedé a neprehľadné pozadie filozofickej, politickej a umeleckej činnosti, ale stáva sa predmetom estetického skúmania sám o sebe.

Záujem o každodenný život je v súčasnej estetike všadeprítomný. To nás môže podnietiť k tomu, aby sme uvažovali v súčasnej estetike o vzniku tzv. „každodenného obratu“<sup>8</sup>, ktorý je rozpoznateľný v prekvapujúcom náraste počtu prác na túto tému. Niektorí autori sa pri tomto posune zameriavajú na vyzdvihnutie estetických kvalít obsiahnutých v rôznych aspektoch každodenného života, ktoré často zostávajú nepovšimnuté a vyžadujú si zámernú pozornosť, aby boli docenené. Zvyčajne tieto prvky prehliadame a predpokladáme, že v našich každodenných skúsenostiach je len malý estetický význam. Z tohto pohľadu sa estetika každodennosti snaží odhaliť tieto skryté estetické hodnoty a upriamiť na ne filozofickú pozornosť. Pre iných však tento obrat ku každodennosti predstavuje prehodnotenie jej estetickej hodnoty – spôsob, ako prekročiť jej všednosť a vyvrátiť jej zdanlivú obyčajnosť. Obrat ku každodennosti je v podstate motivovaný predovšetkým praktickým záujmom: uvedomením si, že estetika môže byť účinným prostriedkom spoločenskej a politickej zmeny, ktorá spochybňuje dominantné kultúrne naratívy a hodnoty. Na druhej strane však tento obrat odhaľuje aj viac teoretický záujem o nové vymedzenie disciplinárneho rozsahu a metodológie estetiky s ohľadom na tzv. tradičné formy estetického skúmania založené na umení. V tejto súvislosti niektorí predstavitelia tvrdia, že prosté udalosti, úkony a činnosti, ktoré tvoria náš každodenný život, sú spojené s formami estetických zážitkov, ktoré charakterizujú umeleckú produkciu a recepciu. Iní sa naopak prikláňajú k tomu, aby sa estetike každodenného života priznala väčšia autonómia vo vzťahu k sfére filozofie umenia<sup>9</sup>. Môžeme sa však pýtať: kde je tu Kantovo miesto a aký je, ak vôbec, jeho náhľad na túto oblasť estetiky?

<sup>8</sup> Giombini, L., Kvokačka, A., 2023. Introduction: Rethinking roots, imagining futures. In: *Applying Aesthetics to Everyday Life: Methodologies, History and New Directions*. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, s. 2 – 3.

<sup>9</sup> Giombini, L., Kvokačka, A., 2021. Aesthetics and the Everyday. Une Liaison Dangereuse. In: Giombini, L. – Kvokačka, A., eds., *Everydayness. Contemporary Aesthetic Approaches*. Roma & Prešov: Roma Tre Press & University of Prešov, Faculty of Arts, s. 16 – 20. Dostupné na: <https://www.pulib.sk/web/kniznica/elpub/dokument/Kvokačka4>.

## 2. Prehliadaný obsah Kantovej estetiky v *Kritike súdnosti*

Namiesto prísnej a strohej teórie začnime príkladom, ktorý tvorí akoby appendix Analytiky krásna v Kantovej *Kritike súdnosti* a ostáva pre mnohých čitateľov prakticky neviditeľný v ich čitateľskej optike tak silne ovplyvnenej všeobecným poznaním o obsahu tejto knihy. Kant po expozícii teórie voľnej krásy a zabezpečení možnosti o nej vypovedať prostredníctvom čistých súdov vkusu vysvetlením jeho nutných modalít totiž napíše:

Ještě je třeba rozlišit krásné předměty od krásných pohledů na předměty (které často pro jejich vzdálenost už nemůžeme jasně rozeznat). V druhém případě se vkus pravděpodobně ani tolik nepojí s tím, co obrazotvornost *pojímá* v tomto poli, jako spíše s tím, co jí dává podnět k *básnění*, t.j. s vlastními fantaziemi, jimiž se mysl baví, zatímco je nepřetržitě probouzena rozmanitostí, na niž pohled naráží, jako snad při pohledu na proměnlivé tvary ohně v krbu nebo bublající potok; ani to, ani ono není krása, ale přesto mají pro obrazotvornost určitý půvab, protože udržují její svobodnou hru.<sup>10</sup>

V tomto príklade, ktorý možno ľahko spojiť aj so súčasnou tzv. atmosférou prostredia v zmysle Germota Böhma<sup>11</sup>, Kant explicitne poukazuje na spôsob, akým vnímame predmety každodenného života. Jeho umiestnenie na konci Analytiky krásna, ktoré predchádza práve skúmaniu vznešeného, nemôže byť náhodné. Kant totiž po predstavení svojej teórie krásy považuje za dôležité ukázať, že sme neustále obklopení estetickými podnetmi. Estetika sa tak stáva súčasťou nášho každodenného života a zďaleka nepredstavuje len výlučné stretnutie s krásou či vznešenosťou prírody alebo umenia. Kant víta sklon predstavivosti k vymýšľaniu fantázií na základe vnímania predmetov, pretože krásne pohľady na predmety podporujú slobodnú hru predstavivosti. V kombinácii s tým, čo Kant poznamenáva v tom istom odseku – „to, s čím si obrazotvornosť môže hrať nenucené a účelne, je pre nás vždy nové a pohľad na to nás neomrzí“<sup>12</sup> – nám tento príklad poskytuje dôkaz o úlohe, ktorú v Kantovej estetikej teórii zohrávajú predmety každodenného života. Ukazuje tiež, že na to, aby sme ocenili estetickú hodnotu takýchto predmetov – ako je napríklad vlniaci sa potok, meniace sa tvary ohňa alebo ozdoby –, nie je potrebné uchýľovať sa k nezainteresovanosti alebo s nimi zaobchádzať ako s umením. Argumenty pre toto tvrdenie ešte rozvediem v tretej časti. Namiesto toho je potrebné pristupovať k nim s myslou

<sup>10</sup> Kant, I., 2015. *Kritika soudnosti*. Prel. V. Špalek a W. Hansel. Praha: OIKOYMENH, s. 82.

<sup>11</sup> Böhme, G., 1995. *Atmosphäre: Essays zur neuen Ästhetik*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

<sup>12</sup> Kant, I., 2015. *Kritika soudnosti*, ibid., s. 81.

oslobodenou od obmedzení vyplývajúcich z čistých estetických súdov.

Kantova estetická teória teda má, podľa môjho názoru, potenciál, aby bola aj dnes považovaná za možný teoretický nástroj na pochopenie sféry každodennosti. Avšak aj u tých, ktorí uznávajú jej prínos pre rozvoj estetiky každodennosti, sa objavujú určité obmedzenia, ktoré robia jej aplikáciu problematickou. Zdá sa, že Kantova teória si vyžaduje revíziu, aby bola dnes skutočne užitočná. Explicitne to tvrdí napr. Leddy vo svojom článku *The Nature of Everyday Aesthetics. A Kantian Attempt to Define Everyday Aesthetics*, keď napíše „Kantovo dielo je stále prínosné keď sa modifikuje“<sup>13</sup>. Ale je to naozaj tak? Prvotný problém, ktorý si podľa Leddyho vyžaduje pozornosť, sa týka Kantovho rozlišovania príjemných a krásnych estetických zážitkov, ktoré sa odlišujú vzhľadom k podmienke nezainteresovanosti. Príjemné je pre estetiku každodennosti základný pojem, z ktorého je potrebné vychádzať pri skúmaní estetickej stránky každodenného života. Napriek tomu sa Kant po načrtnutí jeho miesta v štruktúre Kritiky súdnosti zmieňuje o príjemnom v texte len epizodicky a jeho definíciu podáva veľmi schematicky. Leddy sa preto domnieva, že Kantov opis príjemného je len sčasti presvedčivý. Odporúča modifikovať Kantovu teóriu aspoň v jednom ústrednom bode, a to v bode týkajúcom sa charakteru estetickej skúsenosti, keď napíše: „Odporúčam zachovať zásadný rozdiel medzi príjemným a krásnym. Príjemné je predovšetkým záležitosťou hry zmyslov a obrazotvornosti. Krásne je predovšetkým vecou hry obrazotvornosti a rozvažovania“<sup>14</sup>. Rozdiel medzi príjemným a krásnym privádza Leddyho ku kľúčovej otázke, kedy potrebujeme stanoviť za akých podmienok je zážitok estetický a kedy nie. Keďže zmyslové a imaginatívne vnímanie je aspektom estetickej skúsenosti na úrovni príjemného aj na úrovni krásneho, „na odlišenie estetického pôžitku od neestetického je potrebná určitá forma komplexnosti, bohatosti alebo hĺbky“<sup>15</sup>. Leddy sa v tomto zmysle odvoláva na úlohu, ktorú zohráva „aura zosilneného významu [...], ktorá je zároveň nevyhnutná a postačujúca na to, aby niečo bolo estetické“<sup>16</sup>. Aura je „fenomenologická charakteristika predmetu, na ktorej sa podieľa pocit páčenia sa alebo určitá kombinácia strasti a pocitu páčenia sa“<sup>17</sup> buď v kontexte

<sup>13</sup> Leddy, Th., 2005. *The Nature of Everyday Aesthetics*. In: Light, A. – Smith, J. M., ed. *The aesthetics of everyday life*. New York: Columbia University Press, s. 7.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., s. 7.

<sup>15</sup> Leddy, Th., 2012a. *Defending Everyday Aesthetics and the Concept of "Pretty"*. *Contemporary Aesthetics* 10. Dostupné na: <https://contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=654&searchstr=leddy>.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Leddy, Th., 2012b. *The extraordinary in the ordinary: the aesthetics of everyday life*. Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, s. 128.

bezprostredných skúseností, alebo v kontexte skúseností, ktoré sú výsledkom kontemplácie. Hoci by sme v týchto slovách mohli vidieť opis pocitu krásy alebo vznešeného, Leddy skôr tvrdí, že „keď má niečo auru, zdá sa, že to presahuje samo seba alebo je väčšie ako ono samo“<sup>18</sup>. Táto definícia je paradoxne natolko všeobecná, že zahŕňa prakticky všetko, k čomu môžeme esteticky pristupovať, zároveň však sťažuje možnosť rozlišovať medzi tým, čo je príjemné, a tým, čo je krásne v kantovskom zmysle. Na druhej strane Leddy nachádza dôvody na tvrdenie, že „v Kritike súdnosti sú miesta, kde Kant necháva priestor pragmatickému prístupu“<sup>19</sup>. Tento apel na pragmatizmus je v angloamerickej línii uvažovania o estetike každodennosti dominantný, aj keď v nedávnych publikáciách sa zdôrazňujú európske korene estetiky každodennosti. Hoci Leddy uzatvára, že „by sme nemali byť v pokušení jednoducho subsumovať estetiku každodennosti pod príjemné alebo pod závislú krásu, nemali by sme ju tiež jednoducho subsumovať pod príjemné umenia“<sup>20</sup>, Kantov prístup považuje pre účely estetiky každodennosti za prínosný.

Na rozdiel od Leddyho sa nedomnievam, že Kantova teória potrebuje nejaké špeciálne úpravy alebo doplnenia, aby sa dala platne aplikovať na estetiku každodennosti. Domnievam sa však, že je potrebné iné čítanie Kantovho textu, ak chceme zdôrazniť relevantnosť jeho prístupu pre súčasné diskusie o estetike každodennosti. Je zrejme, že Kantova estetika je zložitá a nie je ľahko pochopiteľná. Rôzne interpretácie často závisia od toho, na ktorú časť Kantovej teórie sa každý komentátor rozhodne zamerať, pretože pri uprednostňovaní jednej časti môže zanedbať alebo podceňovať iné časti systému. V ďalšej časti sa preto budem venovať nesprávnemu chápaniu Kantovej estetickej teórie, ktoré robí jej aplikáciu na estetiku každodennosti problematickou.

### 3. Estetika každodennosti v *Kritike súdnosti*

Prvým a azda najviac kritizovaným mechanizmom, ktorý akoby znemožňoval aplikovateľnosť Kantovej estetiky pre súčasný svet je jeho požiadavka nezainteresovanosti. Zbežné čítanie Kantovej *Kritiky súdnosti* viedlo mnohých k tvrdeniu, že Kantov nezainteresovaný subjekt je pasívny subjekt, subjekt zbavený akéhokoľvek záujmu. To však zďaleka nie je to, čo Kant zamýšľal, keď koncipoval túto podmienku. Podľa Kanta „vkus je schopnosť posudzovať niejaký predmet alebo spôsob predstavy prostredníctvom záľibení alebo neli-

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., s. 133.

<sup>19</sup> Leddy, Th., 2020. Kant and Everyday Aesthetics. In: Marino, S. – Terzi, P., eds. *Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" in the 20th Century: a Companion to Its Main Interpretations*. Boston: de Gruyter, s. 339.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., s. 355.

bosti *bez veškerého zájmu*<sup>21</sup> na reálnej existencii predmetu, pretože ten by bol spojený s príjemným alebo dobrým, a teda spojený so záujmom. Ako poznamenáva Milan Sobotka: „Nezainteresovanosť estetického páčenia sa vôbec neznamená, že objekt nás nezaujíma – potom by umelecké dielo nemalo pre vnímateľa žiadny zmysel –, ale len to, že sme voči nemu v zvláštnom vzťahu neviazanosti, ktorý je produktívny v inom zmysle, než ako chápeme produktivitu v praktickej, resp. i mravnej oblasti“<sup>22</sup>. Nezainteresované páčenie sa, ktoré je predpokladom čistého posúdenia vkusu, smeruje u Kanta k tomu, čo môžeme nazvať čisto estetickou atraktivitou objektu pre subjekt, a to aj na úrovni predstavy tohto objektu. Táto estetická príťažlivosť smeruje mimo štandardného úsilia subjektu, ktoré Kant analyzoval v predchádzajúcich Kritikách a ktoré spája subjekt s objektom buď na základe záujmu o poznanie objektu, alebo na základe nejakého účelu, pričom v oboch prípadoch zahŕňa predstavu objektu. Naproti tomu úsudok vkusu má len kontemplatívny charakter sebareflexie, ktorá sa vzťahuje na to, že subjekt je zasiahnutý ideou. Preto Kant píše, „chceme jen vědět, zda je pouhá představa předmětu ve mně provázena zalíbením, ať už jsem vzhledem k existenci předmětu této představy sebelhostejnější“<sup>23</sup>. Estetická príťažlivosť predmetu nezávisí na pojme o predmete, ale závisí skôr na reflexii o predmete. Táto reflexia vedie Kanta k identifikácii toho, čo nazýva empirickou príjemnosťou zmyslového. Tá súvisí so záujmom, ktorý máme o predmet, a má skôr podobu empirického súdu než čistého súdu vkusu. Empirické sudy nemajú nárok na všeobecnú platnosť, pretože niečo sa páči alebo príjemné len tomu, kto to posudzuje, na rozdiel od toho, čo sa deje v prípade čistého vkusového súdu, napríklad pri súdoch o krásnom. Je to analogické Kantovej úvahe o pojme dobra, ktoré sa páči „prostřednictvím rozumu skrze pouhý pojem“<sup>24</sup>. Predmet sa nám páči, alebo ako hovorí Kant, predmet si ceníme, na základe jeho schopnosti plniť predpokladaný účel, ktorý je predpísaný zákonom rozumu. Každý náš záujem buď o príjemné, alebo o dobré predpokladá potrebu, ktorá nás robí „neslobodnými“ a viaže nás k forme, povahe a užitočnosti predmetu. Naproti tomu čisto estetické zaujatie predmetom, zbavené iných záujmov, nám ponecháva slobodu vzťahovať sa na predstavu, ktorú o predmete máme. Harmonická voľná hra medzi poznávacími schopnosťami subjektu – obrazotvornosťou a rozvažovaním v prípade krásy a rozumom v prípade vznešeného – je slobodná práve vďaka tejto forme nezainteresovanosti. O úroveň nižšie sa ale

<sup>21</sup> Kant, I., 2015. *Kritika soudnosti*, ibid., s. 52.

<sup>22</sup> Sobotka, M., 1975. Úvodom ke Kritice soudnosti. In: Kant, I. *Kritika soudnosti*. Praha: Odeon, s. 9.

<sup>23</sup> Kant, I., 2015. *Kritika soudnosti*, ibid., s. 47.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., s. 49.



dennodenne odohrávajú estetické posúdenia vecí, situácií a javov, ktoré nás obklopujú a ktoré posudzujeme ako príjemné pre nás práve vďaka ich atraktivite a takpovediac službyschopnosti uspokojovať naše prívratne estetické potreby. Namietat, že v takýchto situáciách nezaujímame dištančné nezainteresované stanoviská je pri možnosti Kantom regulérne založenej empirickej príjemnosti zmyslového skutočne neadekvátne.

Ďalší problém pre kantovskú líniu myslenia uplatňovanú v estetike každodennosti predstavuje rozšírený názor, podľa ktorého by sme mali postupovať tak, že Kantovu koncepciu krásneho umenia aplikujeme na objekty každodennosti. Kritici ako Dowling<sup>25</sup> alebo Saito<sup>26</sup> chybné aplikujú Kantov výklad krásneho umenia na oblasť každodennosti v snahe prekročiť obmedzenia stanovené kantovským pojmom voľnej krásy. Nakoľko Kantova voľná krása len málo konvenuje pre predmety nášho každodenného života (vytvárané s predstavou účelu a tak aj používané) neostáva zdanlivo nič iné, než prijať do oblasti estetiky každodennosti kantovskú účelom viazanú krásu. Keďže túto Kant analyzuje pri vysvetľovaní povahy krásneho umenia, zdá sa, že je vhodné, ako to napríklad navrhuje Dowling<sup>27</sup>, práve rozšíriť jej pôsobnosť na estetiku všedných každodenných vecí. Teória viazanej krásy však podľa môjho názoru nemôže úspešne pokryť širokú škálu predmetov, ktoré sú súčasťou našej každodennosti, pretože väčšina týchto predmetov nie je krásna, ani sa nepodobá umeniu. V ktorej inej časti *Kritiky súdnosti* by sme mohli nájsť vhodnejší základ pre hodnotenie estetických kvalít predmetov každodenného života? Paradoxne, niektoré zaujímavé indície môžeme objaviť práve v tých pasážach, kde Kant tematizuje princípy krásneho umenia<sup>28</sup>. Na tomto mieste textu, aj keď tu pochopiteľne kategória krásneho umenia naďalej zostáva Kantovým najvýraznejším zameraním, sa zavádzajú dva pojmy: *mechanické umenie* a *príjemné estetické umenie*, ktoré sa zdajú byť oveľa viac v súlade so sférou každodennosti. Kant tu dokonca spomína aj úžitkové umenie, ktoré spája s *remeslom*<sup>29</sup>. Pri bližšom skúmaní zistíme, že pre Kanta *mechanické umenie* je také umenie, ktoré je

přiměřené *poznání* nějakého možného předmětu, vykonává činnosti potřebné jen k tomu, aby tento předmět skutečně vytvořilo [...] Je-li však jeho bezprostředním záměrem pocit libosti, nazývá se uměním *estetickým*. Toto estetické

<sup>25</sup> Dowling, Ch., 2010. The Aesthetics of Daily Life. *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 50(3), s. 225–242. doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayq021.

<sup>26</sup> Saito, Y., 2007. *Everyday aesthetics*, ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Dowling, Ch., 2010. The Aesthetics of Daily Life, ibid., s. 241.

<sup>28</sup> Kant, I., 2015. *Kritika soudnosti*, ibid., § 44 – 46.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., s. 139.



umění je buď *příjemné*, nebo *krásné*. Příjemné je tehdy, je-li jeho účelem, aby libost doprovázela představy jako pouhé *počítky*, krásné je potom tehdy, je-li jeho účelem, aby libost doprovázela představy jako *druhy poznatků*.<sup>30</sup>

Keďže Kant pri tvorbe príjemného mechanického umenia nepostuluje potrebu nezainteresovaného súdu, ako to robí v prípade krásneho umenia, je záhadou, prečo estetici opomenuli jeho potenciálny význam pre estetiku každodennosti. Produkcia takéhoto umenia, neviazaná na požiadavky, ktoré si vyžaduje tvorba krásneho umenia, nám poskytuje zaujímavý konceptuálny nástroj na uvažovanie o predmetoch každodenného života. Na rozdiel od krásneho umenia sa takéto umenie nesnaží vyjadrovať estetické idey, ale slúži len na potešenie, čo ho približuje ku každodenným predmetom a nástrojom. Napokon, samotné remeslo vytvára remeselné výrobky, ktoré sú alebo môžu byť vnímané, ako súčasť nášho každodenného života.

Ešte raz sa chcem vrátiť k pojmu príjemného, ktorý je, ako to už bolo konštatované neobvykle stručne predstavený. Navyše Kant používa len veľmi málo príkladov na ilustráciu toho, aké predmety v nás tento pocit vyvolávajú a namiesto toho sa rozhodol zamerať na reakciu vnímajúceho a súdiaceho subjektu. To však ale neznamená, že možné aplikácie pojmu príjemného sú obmedzené. Existuje mnoho každodenných predmetov, ktoré mu zjavne zodpovedajú. Kant skutočne explicitne hovorí: „Půvabné a příjemné pro něj může být mnohé, o to se nikdo nestará.“<sup>31</sup> Uvádzaná mnohosť je v skutočnosti derivovaná ako protiklad ku *sensus communis* krásneho, je privátna, individuálna a pominuteľná. Nik sa o tieto pocity príjemného u iných nestará, nerozporuje ich ako v prípade (ne)krásneho, o súdy o ktorom sa vášnivo zasadujeme. Na druhej strane tieto zážitky príjemného Kant nezavrhuje ako nepodstatné či nedôležité v porovnaní s krásnym a vznešeným, naopak po spojení príjemnosti s potešením a pôžitkom, ktorý je jadrom páčenia sa napíše: „Příjemnost je požitek. Jde-li však o něj, bylo by hloupé být úzkostlivý vzhledem k prostředkům, které nám jej opatřují, ať už je dosažen trpně štědrostí přírody nebo vlastním přičiněním a naším působením“<sup>32</sup>. Na základe tohto chápania príjemného dostávame všetko, čo potrebujeme na zdôvodnenie našej estetickej skúsenosti s predmetmi každodenného života. V našich každodenných skúsenostiach totiž nevyhľadávame nepretržite krásu okolo nás (a ešte menej vznešenosť), a napriek tomu považujeme za samozrejmé, že na nás predmety každodenného života môžu esteticky pôsobiť. To znamená, že ak chceme mať estetický

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., s. 140.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., s. 54.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., s. 50.

zážitok, nemusíme sa vždy usilovať o nezainterosovanosť, ktorá sa vyžaduje v prípade krásy. Namiesto toho je legitímne prežívať každodenné predmety „zainterosovane“, a pritom mať pre ne zodpovedajúci pojem príjemného, ktorý zabezpečuje komunikáciu o našom estetickom stave.

#### 4. Záver

V tomto príspevku som sa snažil dokázať, že Kantova estetická teória ponúka jasnejší základ pre estetické hodnotenie každodenných predmetov, než by sa dalo očakávať na základe zvyčajného dôrazu, ktorý v jej rámci kladíme najmä na prírodnú a umeleckú krásu. Mierny posun v tom, ako tradične interpretujeme *Kritiku súdnosti*, stačí na to, aby sme podporili jej aplikovateľnosť na oblasť estetiky každodennosti bez toho, aby sme museli jej stanoviská meniť. *Kritika súdnosti* obsahuje dostatok indícií, ktoré by takúto aplikáciu usmernili. Poukázanie na neadekvátnosť požiadavky presadzovania pojmu nezainterosovanosti pre estetiku každodennosti a uprednostnenie pojmu príjemného pre túto oblasť bolo len jednou z odpovedí na výhrady, ktoré takéto pokusy o uplatnenie Kantovej estetiky dnes sprevádzajú. Okrem toho som tvrdil, že namiesto prispôbovania Kantových pojmov čistých súdov vkusu alebo viazanej krásy v estetike každodennosti, by sme mali klásť dôraz na materiálne estetické súdy spojené s príjemným. Tento posun umožňuje jasnejšie posúdiť estetické kvality každodenných predmetov. Namiesto spoliehania sa na koncept krásneho umenia som navrhol obrátiť sa ku Kantovým myšlienkam mechanického umenia a príjemného umenia či remesla, ktoré ponúkajú vhodnejšie konceptuálne nástroje na reflexiu každodennosti.

Hoci netvrdím, že rozpracovanie Kantovej teórie je jedinou cestou vpred pre estetiku každodennosti, dúfam, že som ukázal, že jej aplikácia na tento diskurz nie je nemožná, ale naopak je životaschopná a produktívna.

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Štúdiá vznikla vďaka podpore a ako súčasť riešenia projektu VEGA č.1/0725/22 *Kantova praktická filozofia – potenciál a perspektívy*.

## Kant, Extraterrestrials, Evolution and Racial Theory

**Abstract:** The paper is focused on the context, character and consequences of Kant's reflections on human races. The text deals with the sources of Kant's theory of races in the science and philosophy of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and seeks an answer to the question whether Kant's understanding of biological species can be considered a forerunner of Darwinian evolutionary theory. A closer examination of Kant's philosophy points to a contradiction between his ideas about the hierarchy of human races according to their qualities and abilities on the one hand and Kant's ethical theory, universalism and cosmopolitanism on the other. An interesting consequence of Kant's view of nature is the application of a hierarchical scheme and elements of environmentalist reasoning to extraterrestrial beings.

**Keywords:** Evolution, Hierarchy, Kant, Racial theory

**Abstrakt:** Príspevok je zameraný na kontext, charakter a dôsledky Kantových úvah o ľudských rasách. Text sa zaoberá zdrojmi Kantovej teórie rás vo vede a filozofii 18. storočia a hľadá odpoveď na otázku, či Kantovo chápanie biologických druhov môže byť považované za predzvesť darwinovskej evolučnej teórie. Bližšie skúmanie Kantovej filozofie poukazuje na rozpor medzi jeho myšlienkami o hierarchii ľudských rás podľa ich vlastností a schopností na jednej strane a Kantovou etikou teóriou, univerzalizmom a kozmopolitizmom na strane druhej. Zaujímavým dôsledkom Kantovho nazerania na prírodu je uplatnenie hierarchickej schémy a prvkov environmentalistického uvažovania aj na mimozemské bytosti.

**Kľúčové slová:** hierarchia, evolúcia, hierarchia, Kant, rasová teória

Pri čítaní tretej kapitoly Kantových *Všeobecných dejín prírody a teórie nebies* môže čitateľa prekvapiť, ba možno aj trochu pobaviť, akým spôsobom Kant uvažuje o fyzikálnych a mentálnych vlastnostiach mimozemských obyvateľov planét Slnčnej sústavy. A hoci sa Kant neskôr od tejto kapitoly (ako aj od niektorých pasáží z iných častí knihy) viac-menej dištancoval a nepovažoval ju za dobre zdôvodnenú, predsa len je v nej obsiahnutá istá črta Kantovho uvažovania, ktorá si zaslúži pozornosť. Nejde tu totiž o svojvoľnú fabuláciu – Kantova špekulácia o rozmanitom výzore, stavbe tela, ale aj o nerovnakých poznávacích schopnostiach mimozemských bytostí, a to v závislosti od podmienok, ktoré panujú na jednotlivých planétach, dobre zapadá do kontextu skúmania v oblasti filozofie prírody, antropológie, sociálno-politickej filozofie či etiky. Kantovskí mimozemšťania navodzujú mnoho otázok a tém, ktoré Kant v rôznej miere a v rôznych obdobiach svojej tvorby rozpracoval. Z nich spomeňme problém plurality a rozmanitosti v prírode, myšlienku vývoja živej a neživej prírody, koncepciu odlišnosti ľudských rás ako aj rás mimozemských racionálnych bytostí, ideu vzťahu rovnakosti a inakosti, v neposlednom rade tiež previazanosť materiálnej (fyzikálnej, geografickej, biologickej) a kultúrnej sféry. To všetko sa pretavilo do Kantovho nazerania na rôzne ľudské aj mimoludské rasy. Ukazuje sa tiež, že v prípade úvah o ľudských rasách nebol ani Kant – napriek vysokému stupňu svojej intelektuálnej autonómnosti – imúnny voči dobovým stereotypom a myšlienkovým konvenciám. Zámerom tohto článku je ukázať, ako sa Kantovo filozofické a prírodovedné pozadie prepájalo a konkretizovalo v otázke ľudskej (prípadne aj mimozemskej) rasy a aké dôsledky z toho vyplývajú.

## I.

Kantov príspevok k skúmaniu vesmíru, ale aj pozemských prírodných dejov a špeciálne človeka ako druhu, nadväzoval na výsledky, ktoré dosiahla veda na prelome 17. a 18. storočia. Prirodzene, tou najvýraznejšou a originálnou Kantovou stopou v dejinách vedy je jeho dielo *Všeobecné dejiny prírody a teória nebies*. Aj keď Kantove úvahy o mimozemskom živote a mimozemskej inteligencii ani zďaleka nepatria medzi najcitovanejšie a najužívanejšie pasáže jeho *Všeobecných dejín*, predsa len prinášajú so sebou ďalekosiahlejšie témy, ktoré presahujú rovinu konkrétnej špekulácie.

Kant pri opise fyzických aj mentálnych odlišností medzi obyvateľmi rôznych planét Slnčnej sústavy vychádzal zo základného kritéria, ktorým bola vzdialenosť danej planéty od Slnka. Menej dokonalým a menej súmerným

telom disponujú obyvatelia planét bližších k Slnku, naopak elastickejšou a symetrickejšou telesnou schránkou oplývajú obyvatelia vzdialenejších planét. To isté platí pre rozumové schopnosti, preto v konečnom dôsledku Kant uvádza celú hierarchiu kozmických bytostí: najmenej dokonalí, najmenej rozumní a najmenej duševne aktívni sú obyvatelia Merkúru a Venuše, naopak telesne najdokonalejší a zároveň najrozumnejší sú obyvatelia Saturnu. Pozemšťania zaujímajú stredovú pozíciu medzi oboma krajnosťami.<sup>1</sup>

Kant pri rozlišovaní povahy obyvateľov rôznych planét zobral okrem vzdialenosti od Slnka do úvahy aj špeciálne časové hľadisko, ktoré je dané dobou rotácie danej planéty (s čím súvisí aj dĺžka slnečného dňa). Fakt, že Jupiter a Saturn obehnú okolo svojej osi viac ako o polovicu rýchlejšie ako Zem a mnohonásobne rýchlejšie ako Merkúr či Venuša, má za následok, že obyvatelia Jupitera a Saturnu sa vyznačujú väčšou akcieschopnosťou, ľahkosťou vo vykonávaní činnosti a pracovnou efektivitou.<sup>2</sup> Na Kantových úvahách je dôležité to, že pracoval s faktorom vonkajšieho prostredia, s hierarchickým usporiadaním fyzikálnych aj mentálnych schopností a v neposlednom rade aj s myšlienkou vývoja. Možnosť výskytu mimozemských inteligentných bytostí úzko súvisí s vývojom danej planéty, ktorý smeruje k vytvoreniu vhodných podmienok pre vznik a rozvoj rozumných bytostí. V tomto smere nie je výnimkou ani ľudský druh, čo nás privádza späť na Zem.

Kant vo svojich prírodovedných spisoch, presnejšie vo svojich názoroch na povahu a históriu prírodných druhov, čerpal z diela významného vedca G. Buffona.<sup>3</sup> Buffonovo skúmanie bolo zamerané na systematický výklad dejín prírody a podrobnú klasifikáciu druhov, ktorá vysvetľovala ich variabilitu. Dôležité a pre Kanta obzvlášť inšpiratívne bolo Buffonovo zvýraznenie vplyvu prostredia na utváranie druhov, napr. prevládajúce podnebie môže zapríčiniť rozdiely v rámci jednotlivých živočíšnych druhov, vrátane človeka. Kant si osvojil výsledky Buffonovho empirického prírodovedného výskumu, ale mal výhrady k jeho definícii druhov a odmietal názor, že rôzne rasy predstavujú rôzne druhy. Pre Kanta ľudstvo je ako druh jednotné, čo je dané spoločným pôvodom všetkých ľudí, ale ľudia sa medzi sebou môžu líšiť v dôsledku vplyvov prostredia, v ktorom žijú. Túto myšlienku

<sup>1</sup> Kant, I., 1909. *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*. In: Buek, O., ed. *Immanuel Kants kleinere Schriften zur Naturphilosophie*. Leipzig: Dürr'sche Buchhandlung, s. 175–177.

<sup>2</sup> Bednarczyk, A., 1995. Z dziejów idei życia we wszechświecie: Epoka oświecenia (Fontenelle, Huygens, Kant) w trzzechsetną rocznicę śmierci Christiaana Huygensa (1629-1695). *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki* 40(3), s. 36.

<sup>3</sup> Bližšie pozri: Sloan, P. R., 1979. Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species. *The British Journal for the History of Science* 12(2), s. 109 – 153.

Kant zakomponoval do svojej teórie ľudských rás.

Kant bol inšpirovaný Buffonom v tom, ako vysvetľoval rozmanitosť ľudských rás na celej zemeguli a ako prepájal odlišnosti vo farbe pleti, postave, povahe a ďalších daností s podmienkami, ktoré vytvára prostredie. Podnebie, ale aj charakter stravy a celkový spôsob života môže zmeniť fyzické aj duševné vlastnosti v dlhodobej perspektíve a tvarovať konkrétnu rasu. V tomto sa Kant s Buffonom výrazne zhodoval a na základe toho formuloval svoju rasovú teóriu. Rasa je podľa Kanta určená dedičnými znakmi, ktoré sa nemenia po celé generácie a k odchýlke od spoločného pôvodu došlo pod vplyvom klimatických podmienok, ktorým sa skupiny ľudí museli prispôbovať. Považoval tieto vlastnosti za vrodené a konštantné v rámci jednotlivých rás, čo bol významný odklon od Buffonovho flexibilnejšieho pohľadu na adaptáciu v prostredí. Buffon argumentoval, že druhy môžu aj degenerovať od svojej pôvodnej podoby vplyvom prostredia, čo sa môže prejavíť na ich podobe a správaní. Tieto zmeny však nemusia byť nezvratné a môže dôjsť k opätovnému progresu druhov v závislosti od prostredia. Na rozdiel od toho bol Kantov prístup rigidnejší. Podľa neho niektoré vlastnosti rás pretrvávajú aj napriek zmenám v prostredí. Rasové rozdiely sú podľa Kanta určené už v zárodku každej rasy a aj keď sú do istej miery ovplyvniteľné prostredím, nie sú úplne flexibilné.

Jadro Kantových názorov o ľudských rasách z jeho kritického obdobia sa nachádza v spisoch *O rozdielnych rasách ľudí* (1775),<sup>4</sup> *Definícia pojmu ľudskej rasy* (1785)<sup>5</sup> a *O využití teleologických princípov vo filozofii* (1785).<sup>6</sup> V týchto prácach nadväzuje na svoje názory z predkritického obdobia (zaznamenané napríklad v prednáškach s názvom *Fyzická geografia*) a skúma v nich pojem rasy, klasifikáciu ľudských rás na základe biologických, geografických a kultúrnych charakteristík ako aj aplikovateľnosť pojmu účelnosti v rámci skúmanej prírodovednej problematiky.

Kant sa nazdával, že ľudia – aj keď rasovo odlišní – patria k jednému biologickému druhu, pretože môžu mať navzájom plodné potomstvo. Rozdiely medzi rasami sú podľa neho výsledkom dlhodobého pôsobenia geografických a klimatických podmienok. Kant vymedzoval pojem rasy na základe dedičných vlastností, ktoré sú prenášané z generácie na

<sup>4</sup> Kant, I., 1912. Von den verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen. In: Kant, I. *Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften. Sämtliche Werke*. Zweiter Band. Leipzig: Insel Verlag, s. 579 – 597.

<sup>5</sup> Kant, I., 1912. Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrasse. In: Kant, I. *Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften. Sämtliche Werke*. Zweiter Band. Leipzig: Insel Verlag, s. 599 – 618.

<sup>6</sup> Kant, I., 1873. Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie. In: Kant, I. *Vermischte Schriften und Briefwechsel*. Berlin: Heimann's Verlag, s. 143 – 175.



generáciu. Rasy v tomto ponímaní sú stabilnými skupinami ľudí, ktoré sa navzájom odlišujú fyzickými a mentálnymi vlastnosťami. Kant uvádzal rôzne kritériá, podľa ktorých možno identifikovať rasu, vrátane farby pleti, tvaru tela a ďalších fyzických znakov. Hovoril o štyroch hlavných ľudských rasách: bielej, čiernej, mongolskej (hunskej alebo kalmyckej) a hinduistickej. O každej z nich platí, že má svoje špecifické fyzické a mentálne vlastnosti, ktoré sú v zásade dedičné, ale aj ovplyvnené prostredím. Kant popisoval, ako klimatické a geografické faktory vplyvajú na fyzické a mentálne vlastnosti ľudí v konkrétnych oblastiach Zeme. Tvrdil napríklad, že teplé podnebie má za následok lenivosť ľudí, zatiaľ čo chladná klíma naopak podporuje ich pracovitosť. Treba poznamenať, že podľa Kanta nie všetky rozdiely medzi ľuďmi sú dostatočne významné na to, aby smerovali k sformovaniu osobitnej rasy. Kant si okrem toho všimal, ako sa dedičné vlastnosti medzigeneračne prenášajú a ako sa menia v závislosti od prostredia. Rasové rozdiely medzi ľuďmi neostávajú čisto v rovine ich biologického bytia, ale ovplyvňujú tiež sociálnu stratifikáciu a kultúru spoločnosti. Niektoré rasy sú podľa Kanta prirodzene predurčené na určité úlohy a postavenie v spoločnosti, medzi rasami existuje hierarchia – niektoré rasy sú na základe svojich vlastností nadradené iným. V tom sa javí aj teleologický moment Kantovho uvažovania. Rozmanitosť mapoval Kant na úrovni prirodzených vlôh, ale následne aj v oblasti kultúry.<sup>7</sup>

Pre Kanta bolo dôležité pracovať s pojmom účelnosti. Obhajoval použitie teleologických princípov v prírodných vedách. Zdôvodňoval, že aj keď sú sily prírody nepochopiteľné, je legitímne používať princíp účelnosti ako heuristický nástroj pri skúmaní prírody. Kant navyše zdôrazňoval, že teleologické princípy nie sú dôležité iba vo filozofickej reflexii prírodných vied, ale aj v morálke a filozofii. Tvrdil, že účelnosť je nevyhnutná pre pochopenie prírody a ľudského správania. Rozlišoval medzi prirodzenou teleológiou (prírodoveda), teleológiou slobody (morálka) a teleológiou prírody vzhľadom na konečný účel slobody (transcendentalná filozofia). Úvahy o účelnosti napokon rozvinul vo svojej *Kritike súdnosti*, v ktorej podrobnejšie rozpracoval jednotlivé formy účelnosti. V neposlednom rade Kant uplatnil teleologizujúci prístup vo svojej filozofii dejín.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Kyslan, P., 2017. Kantovo svetoobčianstvo ako výzva pre súčasnosť. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 6(1), s. 29.

<sup>8</sup> Hüning, D., 2015. Kant a téza o doux commerce. O vzťahu obchodného ducha, práva a mieru v Kantovej filozofii dejín. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 4(1), s. 27 – 29.

## II.

Pri hľadaní zdroja rozmanitosti biologických druhov (platí to aj pre ľudské rasy) Kant pracoval s myšlienkou vývoja organizmov a vo všeobecnosti akcentoval časové hľadisko. Napokon, temporalita hrala dôležitú úlohu už v jeho *Všeobecných dejinách prírody a teórii nebies*. Týkalo sa to ako rozvoja anorganických (vesmír, Slnčná sústava, Zem), tak aj organických súcien (živá príroda, zvieratá človek). Kľúčovou otázkou však je, čo je motorom vývoja organizmov. V tomto nebol Kant ani mechanicismom, ale na druhej strane ho ani vonkoncom nemožno považovať za priameho predchodcu Darwinovej myšlienky evolúcie biologických druhov prirodzeným výberom. Kant naopak uvažoval v kategóriách teleologického vysvetlenia vývoja druhov, i keď myšlienku účelnosti v kritickom období, hlavne v *Kritike súdnosti*, výrazne modifikoval v porovnaní s predkritickými spismi. Vývoj podľa Kanta nemôže byť slepý, podriadený náhode. V tom, ako sa príroda vyvíja, sa zračí účel a naplnenie určitých dispozícií. Kant však nehovorí, že je účel v prírode hmatateľne prítomný, zdôvodňuje skôr názor, že teleologické uvažovanie je regulatívnym vo vzťahu k tomu, ako chápeme prírodu, resp. ako ju vôbec môžeme či musíme chápať.

Vývoj a účelnosť sú u Kanta dve strany jednej mince. Kant sa pokúšal vysvetľovať javy s ohľadom na ich účelnosť a konečný cieľ, avšak bez toho, aby spravil krok späť k aristotelovskému pojmu účelovej príčiny. Jeho uvažovanie vykazovalo prvky teleologického rámca, keďže v *Kritike súdnosti* okrem iného skúmal usporiadanie živých bytostí, pričom zastával názor, že prírodné súcna obsahujú účel, ktorý usmerňuje ich rozvoj a podmieňuje ich samotnú existenciu. Nič v organizme nie je bezúčelné, všetko je účelne, organicky prepojené. Je potrebné pripomenúť, že jednotu organizmov „chápe Kant teleologicky. Procesy a štruktúry v organizmoch zo svojej podstaty vyžadujú odkaz na cieľ alebo účel, ktorý sa prostredníctvom nich dosahuje. Týmto cieľom je celý organizmus, ktorý je buď reprodukováný, produkováný alebo udržiavaný štruktúrou alebo procesom“.<sup>9</sup> V tejto súvislosti sa ponúka otázka, ako sa ku kantovskému teleologickému vysvetleniu stavia evolučná biológia, vychádzajúca z učenia Lamarcka a Darwina. Pre prívržencov Kantovej filozofie je výzvou zladíť myšlienku náhodných mutácií v evolučnom procese prirodzeného výberu biologického druhov s pojmom vnútorných účelov.

E. Mayr pripomína, že hoci Kant je niekedy považovaný za predchodcu Darwina, nie je to obhájitelné stanovisko. Kantovi bránila rozvinúť

<sup>9</sup> Kolb, D., 1992. Kant, Teleology, and Evolution. *Synthese* 91(1 – 2), s. 12.

evolučnú teóriu skutočnosť, že podobne ako väčšina bádateľov 18. storočia chápal biologické druhy esencalisticky, rozvoj druhov podľa neho súvisel skôr s rozvinutím ich vrozených schopností. Nebol preto pripravený akceptovať prirodzený výber ako podstatný faktor. Kant sa prikláňal k názoru, že druhy sú od seba jasne ohraničené a nie je možné sa dostať od jedného druhu k druhému ničím takým, ako je evolúcia. Všeobecne povedané Kant „nevyriešil konflikt medzi diskontinuitou druhov a kontinuitou vo vesmíre, ktorý vyjadril vo svojej kozmológii a vo svojom príklone k Veľkej reťazi bytia. Zdanlivý konflikt medzi čisto mechanickými zákonmi fyziky a chémie a dokonalou adaptáciou všetkých organizmov, ktorá si zrejme vyžadovala stvoriteľský akt ad hoc, predstavovali pre Kanta dilemu, ktorú nedokázal vyriešiť“.<sup>10</sup> Napriek tomu Kant svoju mierou prispel k formovaniu intelektuálneho prostredia, ktoré napomohlo vzniku a rozvoju evolučnej teórie v 19. storočí, prinajmenšom v tom zmysle, že si kládol dobré otázky a kriticky prekonával staršie názory na usporiadanie a vývoj prírodných organizmov.

Jedným z prvých, kto podrobne preskúmal otázku, či môžeme Kanta považovať za predchodcu darwinovskej evolučnej teórie, bol A. O. Lovejoy. Dôkladne analyzoval tie pasáže Kantových spisov z kritického obdobia, ktoré rôzni interpretátori a historici považovali za potvrdenie Kantovho evolucionistického uvažovania (recenzia Moscatiho práce o vzpriamenom postoji človeka (1771), dvojica textov venovaných rasevej koncepcii (1775, 1785), recenzia Herderových *Ideí* (1785), *Domnelý začiatok ľudských dejín* (1786), *O využití teleologických princípov vo filozofii* (1788), *Kritika súdnosti* (1790), *Antropológia z pragmatického hľadiska* (1798)). Výsledok Lovejoyovho skúmania bol však jednoznačne negatívny – hoci mal Kant veľmi blízko k uvažovaniu o prírodných druhov z pohľadu ich vývoja, neprejavil záujem podporiť hypotézu transformácie druhov, ktorá je pre evolučnú koncepciu kľúčová.<sup>11</sup> Lovejoy dokonca hovoril o rezíduách scholastického uvažovania u Kanta, ktoré mu bránili akceptovať obraz meniacej sa, zmiešanej, spleťtej, neusporiadanej prírody, v ktorej sústavy organizmov vo vopred neurčenej miere môžu stratiť jeden súbor znakov a naopak získať iný. Podľa Lovejoya sa Kant neodpútal od túžby mať prírodu jednoznačne kategorizovanú, klasifikovanú, zorganizovanú, usporiadanú do ostro vymedzených častí, preto

<sup>10</sup> Mayr, E., 1982. *The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, s. 339.

<sup>11</sup> Lovejoy, A. O., 1968. Kant and Evolution. In: Glass, B., ed. *Forerunners of Darwin, 1745 – 1859*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, s. 205 – 206.

aj keď sa z novších vedeckých tendencií svojej doby naučil, že veda sa zaoberá procesmi a predovšetkým genetickými procesmi, táto scholastická stránka jeho mysle mu bránila v tom, aby tento princíp dôkladne uplatnil v biológii. Bol pripravený zísť ďaleko po ceste evolucionizmu, ale pripustiť, že organizmy [...] boli natolko plastické, že samotné archetypálne črty druhov by sa, v rámci hry bežných environmentálnych agentúr, mohli v minulosti meniť – to už bolo priveľa!<sup>12</sup>

Veľmi zaujímavý text, ktorý si Lovejoy pre svoje analýzy vyberá, sa nachádza v Kantovej *Antropológii z pragmatického hľadiska*. Malo údajne ísť o pozoruhodné potvrdenie Kantovho evolučného prístupu k vývoju druhov, v ktorom dokonca naznačuje možnosť druhovej transformácie. Ide o poznámku z poslednej podkapitoly práce, v ktorej Kant odvíja svoje úvahy od otázky, aký „účel by mohla mať príroda v tom, že umožňuje dieťaťu prísť na svet s hlasným plačom, ktorý je v surovom stave prírody pre dieťa a matku mimoriadne nebezpečný?“<sup>13</sup> Plač by totiž mohol privolať ľudskému životu nebezpečných predátorov. Na rozdiel od človeka v súčasnom vývojovom štádiu však žiadne zvieracie mláďa neohlasuje svoj príchod na svet plačom, a to sa zdá byť prospešné pre zachovanie druhu, napĺňa to svoj účel. Kant však uvažuje, či by prvotné štádium divokosti (absencie kultúry) nemohlo byť aj u zvierat, podobne ako to bolo pri ľuďoch, nahradené druhým štádiom, v ktorom obaja rodičia dosiahli kultúru umožňujúcu život v domácnosti. Lenže v skutočnosti nevieme, akým spôsobom alebo prostredníctvom akých príčin príroda prispela k takému vývoju. Kant pokračuje ešte ďalej k myšlienke „či by po tej istej druhej epoche vo veľkých prirodzených revolúciách nemohla nasledovať tretia, v ktorej orangutan alebo šimpanz vyvinuli orgány, ktoré slúžia na chôdzu, dotýkanie sa predmetov a rozprávanie do štruktúry ľudských foriem, v ktorých vnútri sídli orgán na používanie mysle a ktoré sa postupne rozvíjajú prostredníctvom sociálnej kultúry“.<sup>14</sup> Do akej miery sa tu otvára možnosť druhovej transformácie od ľudoopov k ľuďom súčasného typu? Je potrebné poznamenať, že v citovanej pasáži sa netvrdí, že ľudský druh sa vyvinul z orangutanov alebo šimpanzov. Kant naznačuje iba možnosť, že dôjde k postupnej premene a antropoidné zvieratá následne získajú orgány či schopnosti, ktorými disponuje človek. Nehovorí sa tu o minulosti vývoja druhov, ale o možnej budúcnosti. Zdá sa, že Kant naráža na dobové teologicko-metafyzické koncepcie vývoja druhov (napr. u Ch. Bonneta),

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., s. 185.

<sup>13</sup> Kant, I., 2000. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, s. 265.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

ktorý je vtesnaný do určitých etáp, pričom na otázku, ako prebieha prechod od jednej etapy k druhej, Kant odpoveď nemá. Inak povedané, Kantove úvahy nie sú dostatočné pre to, aby sme mu mohli pripísať evolučné stanovisko. Zaujímavé však je, že sa nad možnosťou orgánovej premeny vôbec zamyslel, ako aj to, že zvažoval úlohu spoločenských a kultúrnych aspektov vo vývine druhov.

To, čo spája Kanta s modernými biológmi, je ako odmietnutie vitalizmu, tak aj nesúhlas s chápaním živých organizmov ako strojov, ktorých procesy, funkcie a činnosti by boli vysvetliteľné čisto fyzikálno-chemickými prostriedkami. Kant a neskôr aj evoluční biológovia sa odklonili od mechanistického chápania živej prírody, to však neznamená, že v nej postulovali záhadné, neprirodzené či nadprirodzené sily. Ak odhliadneme od terminologických rozdielov a od stupňa rozvoja biológie ako vedy, moderní biológovia podobným spôsobom ako Kant „zdôrazňujú skutočnosť, že organizmy disponujú mnohými vlastnosťami, ktoré nemajú vo svete neživých predmetov obdoby. Explanačná výbava fyzikálnych vied je nedostatočná na vysvetlenie zložitých živých systémov a najmä súhry medzi historicky získanými informáciami a reakciami týchto genetických programov na fyzický svet“.<sup>15</sup> Súvisí to aj s riešením dôležitého metodologického problému redukcionizmu – biológia nie je redukovateľná na fyziku či chémiu a aj keď je s nimi plne kompatibilná, v systéme vied zaujíma autonómne postavenie. Nefyzikalistickým pohľadom sa Kant díval aj na problematiku ľudských rás.

### III.

Z dnešného uhla pohľadu boli mnohé Kantove poznámky, týkajúce sa rôznorodosti rás, vyslovene rasistické, a teda vysoko problematické. Treba však tiež brať do úvahy to, že aj iní myslitelia 18. storočia – osvietenských filozofov nevynímajúc – vyjadrovali podobné názory ako Kant. Myšlienka vrodenej odlišnosti medzi ľudskými rasami, ktorá na vrchol hierarchie kládla (bielu) európsku rasu, nebola v dobovom kontexte vôbec výnimočná, a to ani u popredných vzdelancov. Kant nebol v žiadnom prípade jediný, kto považoval domorodých obyvateľov Afriky, Ázie či Ameriky za menej schopných rozvíjať sa v intelektuálnom aj mravnom zmysle. Prirodzene, u Kanta sa prejavuje disproporcía medzi jeho názormi na ľudské rasy a jeho etikou, ktorá je

<sup>15</sup> Mayr, E., 1982. *The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance*, ibid., s. 52.

kompatibilná s myšlienkou dôstojnosti každej (rozumnej) ľudskej bytosti a je v prvom rade postavená na univerzálnej platnosti mravného zákonodarstva, bez akýchkoľvek relativizujúcich vymedzení. Týka sa to spleťtého vzťahu medzi Kantom ako prírodovedcom, geografom, učiteľom, príslušníkom určitej spoločenskej triedy či empirickým pozorovateľom sveta na jednej strane a Kantom ako kritickým filozofom a etikom na strane druhej. Kant však postupom času, hlavne v súvislosti s precizovaním etickej koncepcie, svoje rasistické názory potláčal do úzadia, hoci sa ich celkom nezbavil. Otázkou ostáva, do akej miery a v akom smere sa menili Kantove názory na hierarchiu medzi ľudskými rasami. O. Eberl prišiel k záveru, že Kantov chápanie rasy prešlo viacerými transformáciami:

Začína sa klimaticko-teoretickou kategorizáciou extrémov a hierarchiou pôvodu rôznych rás, prechádza k nehierarchickému konceptu rasy a napokon dospieva k pojmu, ktorý teleologicky identifikuje aktivitu ako charakteristiku a používa ju na potvrdenie mocenských vzťahov a odlišností v politickom svete. Akokoľvek problematická môže byť tretia a posledná verzia, neznamená to potvrdenie týchto vzťahov.<sup>16</sup>

Interpretátori Kantovho vedeckého a filozofického diela sa líšia v otázke, do akej miery je výrazný rozpor medzi Kantovým rasizmom a jeho etickým a politickým učením, resp. ako a či je vôbec možné tento rozpor odstrániť. Do akej miery sa Kant v poslednej fáze svojej tvorby dokázal odpútať od svojich rasistických konceptov v prospech myšlienky univerzalizmu a kozmopolitizmu, v ktorom sa rasové rozdiely stierajú? P. Kleingeld prízvukuje, že v poslednej dekáde svojej tvorby Kant, pokiaľ sa vôbec o celej veci vyjadroval, upustil od hierarchického usporiadania ľudských rás a diskusiu o rasách pripúšťal výhradne v rámci fyziologických úvah, bez ďalších rasistických dôsledkov v mravnom či politickom zmysle.<sup>17</sup>

Na rozdiel od P. Kleingeld patrí medzi najväčších skeptikov R. Bernasconi, ktorý na základe analýzy mnohých tvrdení v Kantových autorských textoch ako aj v zápisoch z Kantových prednášok prichádza k záveru, že Kantovo rasistické uvažovanie pretrvávalo počas všetkých období jeho tvorby aj napriek univerzalistickej povahe Kantovej etiky.

<sup>16</sup> Eberl, O., 2019. Kant on Race and Barbarism: Towards a More Complex View on Racism and Anti-Colonialism in Kant. *Kantian Review* 24(3), s. 407.

<sup>17</sup> Bližšie pozri: Kleingeld, P., 2007. Kant's Second Thoughts on Race. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 57(229), s. 573 – 592.

Na to, aby bolo možné jednoznačne tvrdiť, že Kant na sklonku života svoje rasistické postoje zmiernil alebo dokonca odstránil, neexistujú presvedčivé dôkazy. Podľa Bernasconiho nemá koncepcia rasovej hierarchie v Kantovej antropológii iba akési okrajové postavenie, preto je iluzórne hovoriť o jej neskoršej revízii. O to vypuklejším sa javí rozpor, medzi Kantovým rasizmom a jeho eticko-politickou teóriou, ktorá zdôrazňuje dôstojnosť a rozumnosť všetkých ľudských bytostí. Nemá zmysel tento zjavný rozpor ignorovať a umelo oddeľovať Kantovu antropológiu od jeho etiky. Takisto je trúfalé predpokladať, že si Kant protirečenie vo svojom diele uvedomil a ak áno, že ho odstránil dištancovaním sa od idey rasovej hierarchie. V skutočnosti Kant nikdy explicitne neodmietol rasovú teóriu ako celok, mal však kritické výhrady k niektorým parciálnym historicko-spoločenským prejavom útlaku, akými boli kolonializmus a otroctvo, resp. obchod s otrokmi. Ani v tomto prípade to preň neznamenalo priame popretie myšlienky nadradenosti európskej rasy. Ide len o to, že „Kantov osobitý druh kozmopolitizmu mal vplyv na to, ako sa díval na otroctvo, ale neznamená to radikálnu premenu v jeho pohľade na rasu ako takú“.<sup>18</sup> Nemožno teda hovoriť o Kantovom uvedomení si povahy a sily protirečenia v jeho diele (ak ho vnímame ako celok), ktoré by napokon viedlo k popretiu vedeckého charakteru skúmania samotných rás a špeciálne hierarchie rás.

Problém významu rasovej teórie pre celok Kantovej filozofie prináša so sebou interpretačné výzvy. Je potrebné sa kriticky vyrovnávať s rôznymi stratégiami, ktoré sú odpoveďou na rozpor medzi Kantovou rasovou hierarchiou a jeho univerzalizmom. Od bagatelizácie problému, cez snahu nejako zladíť či syntetizovať kontradiktórické názory, prioritizovať Kantovo etické učenie nad ostatnými koncepciami, ktoré sa nachádzajú v jeho spisoch a od ktorých sa explicitne nedištancoval až po prehodnotenie Kanta ako filozofickej autority v mravnom zmysle slova z dôvodu neriešiteľnosti uvedeného sporu a Kantovho ultimatívneho zlyhania v nazeraní na človeka. Najmenej presvedčivé je chápať Kantove práce v oblasti filozofie prírodných vied (kozmológie, biológie, antropológie...) a v oblasti filozofie morálky (poznania, politiky...) ako dve na sebe nezávislé línie, ktoré nepripúšťajú prienik. Pred týmito tendenciami vystriha Ch. Mills, ktorý dokonca spochybňuje zaužívané spôsoby výkladu dejín filozofie, keďže problém otvoreného rasizmu sa týka aj iných významných filozofov, a to nielen novovekých. Kantov prípad je o to

<sup>18</sup> Bernasconi, R., 2011. Kant's Third Thoughts on Race. In: Elden, S. – Mendieta, E., eds. *Reading Kant's Geography*. Albany, NY: SANY Press, s. 292.



chúlостivejší v tom, že Kant je jednou z popredných tvárí osvietenstva, no ak sa preukáže, že rasistické myšlienky boli „ústredným bodom jeho myslenia, potom to zjavne znamená radikálne prehodnotenie našich zvyčajných naratívov o histórii a obsahu západnej filozofie“.<sup>19</sup> To prirodzene naráža na odpor a smeruje k rôznym riešeniam, aby nedošlo k úplnému narušeniu prevládajúceho obrazu vývoja filozofie.

L. Allais zdôrazňuje, že namiesto márných pokusov o zosúladienie Kantovho rasizmu s jeho všeobecnou morálnou teóriou by sme si mali z celého prípadu zobrať ponaučenie. Výsledkom skúmania by malo byť prehĺbenie nášho poznania zdrojov, charakteru a vplyvu rasizmu ako takého, nielen v jeho kantovskej podobe. Pozoruhodné je, aký všadeprítomný môže byť rasizmus

v systéme presvědčení člověka a aký odolný může být voči důkazům a to až po možnost, že si člověk nevšimne zjevné rozpory vo svojom myslení. Táto možnosť je obzvlášť dramatická [...], ak nejde o hocikáku osobu, ale v skutočnosti o priekopníkeho a brilantného filozofa, ktorý explicitne uvádza morálnu teóriu o dôstojnosti všetkých ľudí, ale ktorý má zároveň taký odludštený pohľad na niektoré osoby, že si nevšimne takýto zjavný problém vo svojom myslení. A príklad rasizmu ilustruje fenomén, ktorý má širšie uplatnenie – aké ľahké je pre ľudí dehumanizovať ostatných, negatívne poznačených vecami, ktoré chceme robiť.<sup>20</sup>

Kantova filozofia by teda mohla slúžiť ako prípadová štúdia určitého mravného poklesku, ktorý je opísateľný prostriedkami jeho vlastného chápania rozumu, morálky a politiky.

Nejde len o samotného Kanta. G. M. Fredrickson poukázal na dvojakú povahu osvietenského racionalizmu, na jeho „paralelné odmietanie hierarchie postavenej na náboženstve, poverách a predsudkoch a zároveň pokúšenie vytvoriť hierarchiu novú, ktorá mala byť založená na rozume vede a histórii“.<sup>21</sup> Dobrým príkladom tejto osvietenskej obojakosti bol Voltaire, ktorý na jednej strane vyjadroval jednoznačné rasistické a antisemitské postoje, na strane druhej s rovnakou vehemenciou obhajoval myšlienku náboženskej tolerancie, občianskych slobôd a zrušenia otroctva. K jednej aj druhej názorovej platforme ho viedli skúsenostné, rozumové a ateistické dôvody. Podobné myšlienky za-

<sup>19</sup> Mills, Ch. W., 2005. Kant's Untermenschen. In: Valls, A., ed. *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, s. 169.

<sup>20</sup> Allais, L., 2016. Kant's Racism. *Philosophical Papers* 45(1 – 2), s. 20.

<sup>21</sup> Fredrickson, G. M., 2003. *Rasismus. Stručná historie*. Praha: BB art., s. 56 – 57.



znievajú aj v Kantovej filozofii, zvlášť v neskoršom období jeho tvorby. Na rozdiel od Kanta sa však Voltaire prikláňal k polygenetickej teórii vzniku jednotlivých rás ako osobitných druhov, ktoré majú odlišný pôvod a panuje medzi nimi trvalá nerovnosť, v tomto zmysle bol Voltairov rasizmus silnejší oproti Kantovmu chápaniu. V každom prípade príklad Voltaira ukazuje, že napätie medzi rasistickou a univerzalistickou tendenciou sa nenachádzalo iba u Kanta, ale bolo všeobecnejšie rozšírené v prostredí osvietenskej filozofie. Paradoxne tak z osvietenstva mohli vychádzať modernejšie rasové koncepcie, ale aj opačné prúdy, či už v podobe politicky motivovaného abolicionizmu, eticky podmieneného antidiskriminacionizmu alebo koncepcií univerzálneho, antirasistického humanizmu.

### Osvietenský naturalizmus

zdanlivo poskytol vedecké vysvetlenie rasizmu založeného na farbe pleti a položil tak základy pre biologický determinizmus devätnásteho storočia. Zároveň však prišiel s myšlienkou rovnosti už v tomto svete a nielen iba v kráľovstve nebeskom či pred Bohom, vďaka čomu bolo možné spochybňovať spravodlivosť a racionalitu čierneho otroctva a židovskej ghettoizácie. Osvietenstvo tak dalo chápaniu rasy nový význam a silu, zároveň však umožnilo vznik pochybností, či je spravodlivé a rozumné zakladať na nej spoločenské usporiadanie a privilégia.<sup>22</sup>

Viaceri osvietenci tomto vzdialene pripomínali starých Grékov, ktorí účasť na verejnom živote v rámci *polis* priznávali iba slobodným občanom, ale nie otrokom. Tak, ako grécka demokracia nebola určená všetkým obyvateľom gréckych mestských štátov, tak z pohľadu osvietencov môže existovať prirodzená prekážka, ktorá príslušníkom vývojovo „nižších“ ľudských rás znemožňuje ich plnú participáciu na ideáli slobody a rovnosti. Osvietenci boli presvedčení, že rovnosť medzi ľuďmi je daná tým, že sú to mysliace bytosti a sú schopné autonómne používať svoj rozum. Čo však v prípade, ak sa preukáže, že niektoré bytosti alebo skupiny bytostí či celé ľudské rasy nedisponujú rozumovou schopnosťou? Obrat k rozumu chtiac-nechtiac dal do pohybu nielen redefiníciu ľudskej rozumovej schopnosti, ale aj bližšie vymedzenie pojmu ľudskej rasy.

Osvietenci sa programovo dištancovali od tradičných argumentov k viere alebo k náboženstvu, ktoré vychádzali z rovnosti všetkých ľudí pred Bohom (chápaných ako napr. bratov v Kristovi a pod.). Etnické,

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., s. 57.

kultúrne, spoločenské a politické ukotvenie však osvietencom (vrátane Kanta) bránilo priznať iným, „nebielym“ rasám plný štatút racionality a pripísať im schopnosť osobnostne sa rozvíjať v zmysle rozumových zásad. Odvolávali sa pritom na poznatky vtedajšej vedy, ktoré nadšene akceptovali a filozoficky interpretovali. M. Hrabovský tento prístup charakterizoval nasledovne:

Obhajcovia univerzálnej rovnosti preniesli záujem z religióznych argumentov na „prírodné“ argumenty, čo otvorilo cestu k skupinovým kategóriám. Výsledkom bolo, že osvietenský univerzalizmus sa „obohatil“ závažným rozporom: na jednej strane hlásal, že *každá* osoba zasluhuje rovnakú úctu, slobodu a rovnosť, ale na druhej strane podmienil závislosť nároku od tejto rovnosti istými *skupinovými* „vnútornými“ (mentálnymi) predpokladmi.<sup>23</sup>

Stupňovateľnosť schopností otvára priestor pre stupňovateľnosť práv, či už je reč o ľudských alebo dokonca o mimoludských racionálnych bytostiach.

\* \* \*

V interpretáciách Kantovej filozofie nie je bežne prítomná extrapolácia Kantovej rasovej teórie do jeho chápania mimozemských bytostí. Ponúkajú sa tu však výrazné analógie medzi Kantovým učením o ľudských rasách a hierarchizáciou obyvateľov planét Slnecnej sústavy (s možným rozšírením aj na obyvateľov mimo Slnecnej sústavy). Nejde o náhodnú analógiu, ale o prítomnosť spoločného vzorca uvažovania u Kanta, ktorého výsledkom je filozofia prírody ako v pozemskom, tak aj mimozemskom priestore. Kantove úvahy o obyvateľoch iných planét možno chápať ako tvorivé rozšírenie jeho predstáv o rozvoji duševných schopností a morálky v rôznych prostrediach.

Kantova filozofia prírody zahŕňa nielen klasifikáciu a hierarchizáciu ľudských rás, ale aj širšie chápanie rozumných bytostí v celom vesmíre. Vlastnosti príslušníkov bielej rasy (v racionálnom a mravnom zmysle) mu poslúžili ako meradlo nielen vo vzťahu k „nebielym“ rasám, ale aj k rozumným bytostiam mimozemského pôvodu. Kant predpokladal, že tieto bytosti by mohli byť hodnotené na základe podobných kritérií, čo vedie k vytvoreniu hierarchie, ktorá je pomerne komplexná a zahŕňa rôzne úrovne rozumnosti a morálnosti.

<sup>23</sup> Hrabovský, M., 2018. *Rasa. Rasová klasifikácia ľudí*. Bratislava: VEDA, vydavateľstvo SAV, s. 152.

Hierarchia, ktorá na základe toho vzniká, je pomerne komplexná. Antropológia sa v tomto ohľade spája s trans-antropológiou, kde sa skúmajú nielen ľudské rasy, ale aj potenciálne rasy mimozemských bytostí. Kantova filozofia tak vytvára rámec pre porozumenie nielen našej vlastnej planéty, ale aj širšieho vesmíru, kde sa vlastnosti a schopnosti jednotlivých bytostí stávajú základom pre ich hodnotenie a zaradenie do kozmickej hierarchie.

Tento prístup otvára nové perspektívy pre skúmanie Kantovej filozofie, kde sa antropologické princípy aplikujú na širší kozmický kontext. Kantova práca tak môže byť vnímaná nielen ako príspevok k filozofii ľudstva, ale aj k filozofii vesmíru, kde sa ľudské a mimozemské bytosti hodnotia na základe spoločných kritérií rozumnosti a morálnosti. Tento trans-antropologický prístup umožňuje hlbšie pochopenie Kantovej filozofie prírody a jej aplikácie na rôzne formy života v celom vesmíre.

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**Abstract:** The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of using Kant's theory of moral formation in the context of virtue education, as it aims to highlight its practical implications through an analysis of his works *Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765-1766*, *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), *Lectures on Pedagogy* (1803), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), *On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice* (1783), with an emphasis on his theory of moral development and its rational basis, and the analysis of virtues.

**Key words:** Kant, Morality, Bildung, Cosmopolitanism, Virtue

## Introduction

Moral thinking today is often associated only with the level of rational reasoning (cognition), which can often cause it to be structurally separated from other theories (faculties of reason) of understanding the world. According to Kant, we have not yet reached the moral stage in the philosophy of history, but we are moving towards it and see various emerging initiatives to develop moral teaching<sup>1</sup>, critical thinking, or character education as possible gradual initiatives to fulfil his ideas. When we speak about moral theory connected to Kant, we can trace it in various of his works, such as *The Critique of the Practical Reason*, *The*

<sup>1</sup> For more information look at: Paul, R. W., Elde, L., 2013. *The Thinker's Guide to Ethical Reasoning*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, *The Jubilee Centre Framework for Character Education in Schools*, 2024. University of Birmingham: The Jubilee Centre for Characters & Virtues. [Accessed: 2024-11-3]. Available at: <https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/The-Jubilee-Centre-Framework-for-Character-Education-in-Schools-April-2024.pdf>; Gardner, H., 2006. *Five Minds for the Future*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press; Friedman, M., 2000. Educating for World Citizenship. *Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy* 110(3), pp. 586 – 601. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1086/233325>.

*Metaphysics of Morals*, *The Critique of Judgment*, etc. This idea is connected not only with practical application of one's will but also with the formation of his thinking or enhancing virtues. As Ziche (2023) writes, the virtues must be flexible and open-ended because they are characterized by being universally applicable without knowing in advance what situation we may encounter, which creates a paradox in the formation of one's own virtues through education, for example: it is a problem to develop clearly structured and controlled educational programmes to train fully autonomous, creative citizens (scientists, artists, etc.) when they do not have a uniform structure. In his paper, Giesinger (2012) suggests that the possibility of moral education is challenged in Kant by the existence of two selves (noumenal and phenomenal self). "If the free self is non-empirical, i.e. not embedded in the temporal and causal order of the natural world, then it is not clear how it can develop and how its development can be influenced by education."<sup>2</sup>

### Virtuous formation

The last stage of Kant's notion of education, the process of moralization, is where the idea of world citizenship is anchored, to be carried across generations and thus reached its ultimate purpose. The virtuous action of the individual, laid down in his moral thought by a categorical imperative, is the instrument of providence that causes the growth of humanity. Morality is not a mere theoretical base but a place from which practical virtuous action begins. It is not enough to speak of the individual acting morally only for himself. The consequences of his actions are cosmopolitan, manifesting themselves at the level of society, which I will try to indicate by an analysis in the following lines. Theory in Kant's writings does not merely remain a written word for his readers, but he uses it to spur man to its realization, which is in no small measure manifested in his connection of theory with practice, e.g. in the text *On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice* (1793), where he writes: "Everyone in his capacity as a human being, a being subjected by his own reason to certain duties, is accordingly a *man of affairs*."<sup>3</sup> He points here to the direct relation between theory and practice,

<sup>2</sup> Giesinger, J., 2012. Kant's Account of Moral Education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 44(7), p. 775. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2011.00754.x.

<sup>3</sup> Kant, I., 1793. *On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice*. In: *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 289.

adding at the same time that the striving for the improvement of the human race and its advance towards virtuous action is its ultimate purpose:

I shall therefore be allowed to assume that, since the human race is constantly advancing with respect to culture (as its natural end) it is also to be conceived as progressing toward what is better with respect to the moral end of its existence, and that this will indeed be interrupted from time to time but will never be broken of [...]. For I rest my case on my innate duty, the duty of every member in the series of generations - to which I (as a human being in general) belong and am yet not so good in the moral character" required of me as I ought to be and hence could be - so to influence posterity that it becomes always better (the possibility of this must, accordingly, also be assumed), and to do it in such a way that this duty may be legitimately handed down from one member [in the series of] generations to another.<sup>4</sup>

Kant's ideas connected to pedagogy are explicitly related to his philosophy of history, which suggests their permanent process of being shaped, and includes the various meanings of education, as Friedrich Theodor Rink, Kant's disciple and relative, writes about them in the introduction to *Lectures on Pedagogy* (1931 / 1803), published after Kant's death. Here he speaks of the phenomenon of education in connection with care (*Wartung*), tending, nourishment (*Verpflegung*, *Unterweisung*), discipline (*Disziplin*, *Zucht*), teaching (*Unterweisung*), and moral education / formation (*Bildung*). From these meanings of education, then, a scheme of education can be constructed as a succession of linear stages through which man is disciplined, cultivated, civilized, and moralized. By disciplining, man frees himself from savagery by the control of his own reason. By cultivating, one builds a new nature (culture), which is concretely manifested in the building of intellectual and technical skills. In the third phase of education, man socializes, builds society, civilizes himself. These are external manifestations of culture, such as politeness or adaptation to social conditions.<sup>5</sup> The last culminating phase of human and social development is moralizing, i.e. "a person [...] has to acquire such a mindset that he chooses only good goals. Good ends are those which are necessarily approved of by everyone and which also at

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 306.

<sup>5</sup> Kyslan, P., 2015. Multikultúrna výchova verus Kantova výchova k svetoobčianstvu. In: Belás, E. – Zelizňaková, E., eds. *12. kantovský vedecký zborník*. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta PU v Prešove, p. 58. Available at: <https://www.pulib.sk/web/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/web/kniznica/elpub/dokument/Belas2/subor/9788055514536.pdf>.

the same time can be the ends of everyone.”<sup>6</sup> The practical application of the theory of world citizenship is thus the education of the individual to a moral stage, which thus tends towards his ultimate purpose, and thus builds a world-civic society. Education is the fulfilment of cosmopolitanism, which thus moves from generation to generation to its ultimate purpose: “the design for a plan of education must be made in a cosmopolitan manner.”<sup>7</sup>

In Kant's system of morality, we are bound with the idea of categorical imperative forming his ethics. This imperative is a maxim, but not a subjective one. The categorical imperative is a maxim, which is categorical because, if it is to be necessary, it cannot depend on the will of the contingent conditions of the subject. In men, then, the moral law is a categorically imperative because the law is unconditioned; such a will is in a relation of dependence to that law called binding, which implies a compulsion to act, even if only by pure reason and its objective law:

In the first case [case of human beings, author's note], however, the law has a form of an *imperative*, [...] that commands categorically, because the law is unconditioned; the relation of such a will to this law is *dependence* under the name of obligation, which signifies a *necessitation*, though only by reason and its objective law, to an action which is called *duty*, because a choice that is pathologically affected (though not thereby determined, hence still free), brings with it a wish arising from *subjective* causes, because of which it can often be opposed to the pure objective determining ground and thus needs a resistance of practical reason which, as moral necessitation, may be called an internal but intellectual constraint.<sup>8</sup>

It is the duty of mankind to gradually approach eternal peace through morally-minded individuals who improve their virtue through practice. But what is virtue itself in Kant's thought? In his book *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in the section *The Doctrine of Virtue*, Kant defines virtue not as the capacity and long-standing habit of morally good actions, but as the strength of will of the human maxim in the fulfilment of its duty<sup>9</sup>, which is acquired by man overcoming his natural inclinations that come into conflict with moral discernment:

<sup>6</sup> Kant, I., 1931. *O výchově*. Praha: Dědictví Komenského, pp. 42 – 43.

<sup>7</sup> Kant, I., 1803. Lectures on Pedagogy. In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 442.

<sup>8</sup> Kant, I., 1793. Critique of Practical Reason. In: *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 165 – 166.

<sup>9</sup> Kant, I., 1797. The Doctrine of Virtue. In: *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 189.



*Virtue* is the strength of man's maxims in fulfilling his duty. Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which can come into conflict with man's moral resolution; and since it is man *himself* who puts these obstacles in the way of his maxims, virtue is not merely a self-constraint (for then one natural inclination could strive to overcome another), but also a self-constraint in accordance with a principle of inner freedom, and so through the mere representation of one's duty in accordance with its formal law.<sup>10</sup>

It is an intrinsic limitation in accordance with the prescriptions of intrinsic freedom and with the pure representation of human duty according to its formal law with which he relates his idea of the categorical imperative. The attainment of virtue is not merely a possibility for man, but his inner duty, for it exists in man not only as a prerequisite of his freedom, but as a power which is acquired by the contemplation of the dignity of the rational law and the practice of virtue:

It is also correct to say that man is under obligation to [acquire] *virtue* (as moral strength). For while the capacity (*facultas*) to overcome all opposing sensible impulses can and must be simply *presupposed* in man on account of his freedom, yet this capacity as *strength* (*robur*) is something he must acquire; and the way to acquire it is to enhance the moral *incentive* (the thought of the law), both by contemplating the dignity of the pure rational law in us (*contemplatione*) and by *practicing* virtue (*exercitio*).<sup>11</sup>

And according to Kant, "the utmost that finite practical reason can effect is to make sure of this unending progress of one's maxims toward this model and of their constancy in continual progress, that is, virtue..."<sup>12</sup> The prerequisite for the practice of virtue is his encounters with vices, which he must combat through the will. The will adopts the rule, and thus gives to desire a universal law:

Virtue is, therefore, the moral strength of a *man's* will in fulfilling his *duty*, a moral *constraint* through his own lawgiving reason, insofar as this constitutes itself an authority *executing* the law. Virtue itself, or possession of it, is not a duty (for then one would have to be put under obligation to [have] duties); rather, it commands and accompanies its command with a moral

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 197.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 200.

<sup>12</sup> Kant, I., 1793. Critique of Practical Reason. In: *Practical Philosophy*: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 166.

constraint (a constraint possible in accordance with laws of inner freedom). But because this constraint is to be irresistible, strength is required, in a degree we can assess only by the magnitude of the obstacles that man himself furnishes through his inclinations. The vices, the brood of dispositions opposing the law, are the monsters he has to fight.<sup>13</sup>

What are the conditions of virtue? Kant speaks of mastery in the repression of affects and in the control of one's passions. Affect is merely a lack of virtue, whereas passion is a rational desire which became a permanent inclination (it is already hatred). Virtuous action here, then, consists in the subjection of human faculties and inclinations to the commands of reason, to the rational government of the self: "Affects and passions are essentially different from each other. Affects belong to feeling insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this impossible or more difficult. Hence an affect is called *precipitate* or *rash* (*animus praeceps*), and reason says, through the concept of virtue, that one should *get hold of oneself*."<sup>14</sup>

An interesting observation, which can be found in the note to the 16<sup>th</sup> article of this dossier, is its gradual acquisition and always new beginning of formation. Virtue is an ideal to which we can only approach, and it always begins anew, for each man struggles with his own nature and inclinations:

Virtue is always in *progress* and yet always starts *from the beginning*. It is always in progress because, considered *objectively*, it is an ideal and unattainable, while yet constant approximation to it is a duty. That it always starts from the beginning has a *subjective* basis in human nature, which is affected by inclinations because of which virtue can never settle down in peace and quiet with its maxims adopted once and for all but, if it is not rising, is unavoidably sinking.<sup>15</sup>

In the gradual line of pedagogy which Kant suggests, moral sense must be in the last part of education, because it is to be laid on principles, maxims, not on habit. If we want to develop moral thinking we cannot use punishments, since "[m]orality is something so holy and sublime that one must not degrade it and place it on the same level with discipline."<sup>16</sup> The first task in the development of the moral mind is the devel-

<sup>13</sup> Kant, I., 1797. The Doctrine of Virtue. In: *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991, p. 206.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 208.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 209 – 210.

<sup>16</sup> Kant, I., 1803. Lectures on Pedagogy. In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. The Cam-

opment of character, which, according to Kant, resides in the capacity to act according to maxims, which are the subjective laws of the individual. This task is to be secured in the making of a definite plan of certain laws which they must observe, such as the setting of times for sleep, work, etc.: “If one wishes to form a character in children, it is very important to draw their attention to a certain plan in all things, certain laws, known to them, which they must follow exactly. Thus, for example, one sets for them a time for sleep, for work, for amusement, and these one must then not extend or shorten.”<sup>17</sup> The second task consists in truthfulness, the third in the creation of sociability.<sup>18</sup>

In the writings analysed so far, Kant comes up with a certain draft to be followed in order to create character in the individual. It manifests itself in the learning of duties towards oneself (preservation of dignity, truthfulness, etc.) and towards others (reverence, respect, sincerity).<sup>19</sup> Moral education culminates in the young individual who is able to enter into marriage, is aware of the differences between social classes and is conscious of his cosmopolitan disposition: “The young man should learn early to foster a decent respect for the other sex, to earn its respect through activity which is free from vice, and thus to strive after the high prize of a happy marriage [...] One must stress to him philanthropy towards others and then also cosmopolitan dispositions.”<sup>20</sup>

### How to *teach* a character?

The possible problem I hinted in the introduction to this paper is expressed by Giesinger’s idea. He asks how we can educate, that is, encourage the development of a self that is embedded in a noumenal world without causality. The categorical imperative, however, presupposes the existence of moral maxims that the individual finds in himself by his reason, which Kant suggests in his lectures: “Maxims must originate

bridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 468.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 469.

<sup>18</sup> Kant, I., 1931. *O výchově*. Praha: Dědictví Komenského, p. 81.

<sup>19</sup> Zákutná deals with Kant’s view on the question of moral formation, which is supported by cosmopolitan education of individuals who become self-conscious people who are able to think independently and at the same time make decisions for the good of the commonwealth. Zákutná, S., 2023. Sebaporozumenie v Kantovej teórii svetoobčianstva. *Filozofia* 78(6), 462 – 473. doi: <https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2023.78.6.4>.

<sup>20</sup> Kant, I., 1803. Lectures on Pedagogy. In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 484 – 485.

from the human being himself.”<sup>21</sup> The fact that the moral law is necessarily presupposed by every human individual does not at the same time imply that the individual must be aware of these presuppositions, so that there is naturally room for the development of these presuppositions. In the *Lectures on Pedagogy* (1803), Kant also gives an example of a method by which to arrive at moralization, and that is *the Socratic method* used in the case of teaching universal religion<sup>22</sup> (*geoffenbarte Religion / allgemeine Religion*). Education here, then, consists in the evocation of those rational presuppositions which were already primordially present in the individual. To promote the realization (*Bestimmung*) of one's vocation thus means to enable the pupil to understand and accept what he necessarily presupposes: to see himself as a noumenal self that can determine his will in accordance with the moral law.<sup>23</sup> Here Giesinger refers to other point mentioned in the *Lectures*: “Maxims too are laws, but subjective ones; they originate from the human being's own understanding.”<sup>24</sup>

Other Kantian scholars stress the method called *zetetic*<sup>25</sup> which Kant also mentions, for example in his text *Announcement of the Programme of Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765—1766*. In this text, Kant emphasizes that the method of the teacher should orient towards understanding the difference between thoughts and thinking because “it is not *thoughts* but *thinking* which the understanding ought to learn. It ought to be *led*, if you wish, but not *carried*, so that in the future it will be capable of *walking* on its own, and doing so without stumbling.”<sup>26</sup> Kant's zetetic method is particularly mentioned afterwards: “The method of instruction, peculiar to philosophy, is zetetic, as some of the philosophers of antiquity expressed it. [...] In other words, the method of

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 468.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 466.

<sup>23</sup> Giesinger, J., 2012. Kant's Account of Moral Education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 44(7), p. 785. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2011.00754.x.

<sup>24</sup> Kant, I., 1803. Lectures on pedagogy. In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 469.

<sup>25</sup> To read more about zetetic method in Kant, see: Kubok, D., 2022. Kant and Zetetic Scepticism. *Ruch Filozoficzny* 78(3), pp. 7 – 25. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/RF.2022.020>; Belás, L. – Zákutná, S., 2016. Kant's method of teaching philosophy. *Studia Kantiana* 14(21), pp. 27 – 36. doi: <https://doi.org/10.5380/sk.v14i21.89153>.

<sup>26</sup> Kant, I., 1765/1766. Immanuel Kant's Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765-1766. In: *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 292.

philosophy is the method of *enquiry*.<sup>27</sup> In this very text, he mentions a phenomenon that can still be seen at some point in our educational methods, which are oriented towards learning facts rather than learning to think, which Kant corresponds to with a difference between learning philosophy and learning to philosophise. The emphasis on autonomy is very present here:

The philosophical writer, for example, upon whom one bases one's instruction, is not to be regarded as the paradigm of judgment. He ought rather to be taken as the occasion for forming one's own judgment about him, and even, indeed, for passing judgement against him. What the pupil is really looking for is proficiency in the method of reflecting and drawing inferences for himself.<sup>28</sup>

Švihura also mentions Kant's call for autonomous thinking while transforming current teaching of philosophy at higher secondary education with a specific reference to Kant's aforementioned note about the difference between thoughts and thinking. He also emphasizes the moral sensitivity that should be developed in current teaching of philosophy and its wide impact on life in connection with its affective goals:

[...] knowledge from philosophy in the environment of higher secondary education cannot even be assumed as a starting point for the formation of desirable "civic", moral, or value attitudes of students, because such a method of imparting knowledge (in addition, dominantly historical-philosophical) does not participate in their sensitization, which is apparently an essential prerequisite for acquiring desirable values – for example, respect for otherness.<sup>29</sup>

Ziche (2023) mentions Schelling's lectures *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, in which Schelling describes Kant as an instinctive philosopher whose core is based on creativity – on the imperative of the creativity of the philosopher himself, as well as the creativity with which his readers adopt and transform Kant's ideas. The main idea here is that the author himself cannot have full control over what is done with

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 293.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Švihura, L., A., 2024. Affective Goals in Teaching Philosophy in Higher Secondary Education: Reality, Criticism, Perspectives. *Ruch Filozoficzny* 85(1), p. 102. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/RF.2024.007>.

his work in the future (that is the reference to hermeneutics).<sup>30</sup> Education for moralization, that is, for the last stage of education with the horizon of the cosmopolitan goal, can therefore take on new forms and shapes with the help of the teacher who does enhance autonomous philosophizing in his students connected to his character thorough challenging his reflective thinking as well as his consequent actions.

## Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to outline the inspiration of Kant's moral thought by analysing the categorical imperative and virtue, the development of which affects both the individual and society (so it also contains a cosmopolitan aim in itself). Although the categorical imperative is based on the maxim of reason, it does not remain a simple theorem; it constitutes a constant reflexive basis for man's practical action. Moralization is the last stage in Kant's outline of pedagogy (after discipline, cultivation, and civilization) and is related to virtue, which is understood as the willpower of the maxim in the fulfilment of human duty by overcoming inclinations in conflict with moral discernment. The attainment of virtue is not merely a possibility for man, but his inner duty, for it exists in man not only as a prerequisite of his freedom, but as a power which is acquired by the contemplation of the dignity of the rational law and the practice of virtue. Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning. The task of developing a character has three stages: first, the establishment of a plan which people must follow, e.g. setting a time for sleeping. Secondly, the man should be truthful and thirdly, he must be sociable. Giesinger's note creates a space for developing moral character through the Socratic method, and other Kantians speak of the zetetic method, both of which can represent a space for developing moral character through autonomous reflective thinking and working on virtues. Since Kant does not have full control over his text, the fulfilment of the cosmopolitan aim can take different forms.

<sup>30</sup> Ziche, P., 2023. Creativity and genius as epistemic virtues: Kant and early post-Kantians on the teachability of epistemic virtue. *Metaphilosophy* 54(2–3), p. 274. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12612>.

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Adam Smith

## O povahe napodobňovania, ktoré sa uskutočňuje v napodobňujúcich umeniach (1. časť)<sup>1</sup>

Je zjavné, že najdokonalejšie napodobnenie ľubovoľného objektu je zakaždým iným objektom toho istého druhu, ktorý je vytvorený čo najvernejšie svojmu modelu. Aká by bola, napríklad, najdokonalejšia napodobnenina koberca, ktorý teraz leží predou mnou? Bol by to, samozrejme, ďalší koberec utkaný čo najpresnejšie podľa predloženého vzoru. Nech by už bola kvalita alebo krása tohto druhého koberca akákoľvek, nepredpokladalo by sa, že je vyrobený napodobňovaním prvého. Skutočnosť, že nejde o originál, ale o kópiu, by sa považovala za určité, či už väčšie alebo menšie, zníženie kvality v závislosti od toho, či by si objekt nárokoval na väčší alebo menší stupeň obdivu. Hodnota bežného koberca by sa veľmi neznížila, pretože pri veciach, ktoré si, prinajlepšom, nenárokujú na veľkú krásu alebo kvalitu, originalita nie vždy stojí za zmienku. Významne by sa však znížila hodnota koberca so znamenitým vypracovaním. Pri ešte významnejších objektoch by sa táto presná, alebo, nazvime ju, servilná napodobnenina, považovala za najneodpustiteľnejšiu chybu. Postaviť ďalšiu Baziliku svätého Petra alebo Katedrálu svätého Pavla s rovnakými rozmermi, proporciami i ornamentami, aké majú tieto stavby v Ríme alebo Londýne by znamenalo prezentovať úbohú neplodnosť génia a invencie, ktorá by zneuctila veľkoleposť týchto diel.

Úplná podobnosť náprotivných častí toho istého objektu sa často považuje za krásu a jej nedostatok za deformitu, rovnako ako je to v prípade náprotivných častí ľudského tela, náprotivných krídel tej istej budovy, stromov tej istej aleje, častí toho istého kusu koberca alebo kvetinovej záhrady, či stoličiek alebo stolov, ktoré stoja v náprotivných častiach tej istej miestnosti. Pri objektoch toho istého druhu, ktoré sa považujú za samostatné a navzájom nesúvisiace, sa však úplná podobnosť zriedkakedy považuje za krásu alebo jej nedostatok za deformitu. Človek, a tým istým spôso-

<sup>1</sup> Preložené z anglického originálu: Smith, Adam: Of the Nature of that Imitation which Takes Place in What Are Called the Imitative Arts. Part I. In: Smith, Adam, 1795. *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*. Eds. Black, Joseph – Hutton, James. London, s. 131 – 148.

bom aj kôň, je pekný alebo škaredý, každý z nich pre svoju vrodenú krásu alebo deformitu, a to bez ohľadu na to, či sa podobá alebo nepodobá inému človeku alebo inému koňovi. Záprah kočovných koní sa síce považuje za krajší, keď sú všetky kone úplne rovnaké, kôň sa však v tomto prípade nepovažuje za samostatný a s inými nesúvisiaci objekt, ani za celok sám osebe, ale za súčasť iného celku, s ostatnými časťami ktorého by mal do istej miery korešpondovať – oddelený od celku, neodvodzuje ani krásu na základe svojej podobnosti ani deformitu na základe svojej nepodobnosti s ostatnými koňmi, ktoré tvoria tento celok.

Dokonca ani pri náprotivných častiach toho istého objektu často nepožadujeme viac ako podobnosť všeobecných črt. Ak sú menšie zložky týchto častí príliš malé na to, aby ich bolo možné vidieť zreteľne bez samostatného a jednoznačného preskúmania každej časti ako samostatného a s inými nesúvisiaceho objektu, niekedy by sme mali byť dokonca nespokojní, ak by podobnosť presahovala tieto všeobecné črty. V náprotivných častiach miestnosti často vešiame obrazy rovnakej veľkosti, tieto obrazy sa však na seba nepodobajú ničím iným len rámom, prípadne svojou povahou. Ak je na prvom obraze obraz krajiny, aj na druhom obraze bude krajina, ak ide o náboženský alebo dionýzovský motív, druhý obraz bude rovnakej povahy. Nikomu nikdy nenapadlo použiť ten istý obraz vo dvoch rámoch. Rám a celková povaha dvoch alebo troch obrazov predstavuje to, čo dokáže oko pochopiť jedným pohľadom alebo z jedného miesta. Na každý obraz, ktorý má byť zreteľne viditeľný a dôkladne pochopený, sa musí pozerieť z určitého miesta a skúmať sa musí ako samostatný a s ničím nesúvisiaci objekt. V hale alebo na portáli zdobenom sochami sa závesy alebo podstavce môžu na seba podobáť, ale sochy sú vždy iné. Dokonca aj kamenné podobizne, nachádzajúce sa na rôznych častiach tej istej arkády alebo na dverách a oknách toho istého priečelia, sa môžu na seba podobáť všeobecnými črtami, ale každá z nich má vždy svoje zvláštne znaky a svoj vlastný výraz. Existuje niekoľko gotických budov, v ktorých sa náprotivné okná podobajú iba všeobecnými črtami, nie však drobnými ornamentami alebo ďalšími členeniami. Tie sú v každom okne iné a architekt ich považoval za príliš drobné na to, aby ich bolo možné vnímať zreteľne, bez osobitného a samostatného skúmania každého okna ako samostatného a s inými nesúvisiaceho objektu. Takáto rozmanitosť však, z môjho pohľadu, nie je vhodná. Pri objektoch, u ktorých sa predpokladá len istý podradný stupeň krásy, ako sú napr. rámy obrazov, závesy alebo podstavce sôch, sa často vyskytuje afektovanosť v štúdiu rozmanitosti, ktorej význam je len zriedka postačujúci kompenzovať nedostatok nápaditosti a odlišnosti, čo je prirodzeným

dôsledkom úplnej uniformity. Na portáli korintského alebo iónskeho slohu sa stĺpy podobajú na seba navzájom nielen vo všeobecných črtách, ale aj vo všetkých najmenších ornamentoch – aj keď niektoré z nich, aby ich bolo možné zreteľne pozorovať, môžu vyžadovať samostatné a zvláštne skúmanie každého stĺpu ako aj entablatury každého medzistĺpia. Intarzované stoly, ktoré sú podľa súčasnej módy niekedy umiestnené v náprotivných častiach tej istej miestnosti, sa líšia iba obrázkami. Všetky ostatné frivolnejšie a fantazijnejšie ornamenty sú bežne, aspoň pokiaľ si túto módu všimam, na všetkých stoloch rovnaké. Tieto ozdoby však na to, aby boli zreteľne viditeľné, vyžadujú samostatné a zvláštne skúmanie každého stola.

Mimoriadna podobnosť dvoch prírodných objektov, napríklad dvojčiat, sa považuje za zvláštnu okolnosť, ktorá síce nezväčšuje, no ani neuberá na kráse ani jedného ani druhého samostatného a s inými nesúvisiaceho objektu. Ale zdá sa, že úplná podobnosť dvoch umeleckých výtvorov sa vždy považuje za určité zníženie kvality aspoň jedného z nich, čo, ako sa zdá, dokazuje, že aspoň jeden z nich je kópiou či už toho druhého, alebo nejakého iného originálu. O kópii obrazu možno dokonca povedať, že svoju kvalitu odvodzuje ani nie tak z podobnosti s originálom, ako skôr z podobnosti s objektom, ktorému sa mal originál podobať. Vlastník kópie, nepripisujúc vysokú hodnotu jej podobnosti s originálom, sa často úporne snaží zničiť akúkoľvek kvalitu alebo hodnotu, ktorá by z toho mohla vyplývať. Často sa snaží úporne presviedčať seba aj ostatných, že nejde o kópiu, ale o originál, za ktorý sa ako originál vydáva kópia. Ale bez ohľadu na to, akú kvalitu môže kópia odvodzovať z podobnosti s originálom, originál určite nemôže odvodzovať nič z podobnosti so svojou kópiou.

Hoci má umelecký výtvor len zriedka nejakú hodnotu na základe svojej podobnosti s iným objektom toho istého druhu, často sa do veľkej miery odvodzuje na základe svojej podobnosti s objektom iného druhu, či už ide o umelecký výtvor alebo dielo prírody. Maľba na plátne, dielo nejakého pracovitého holandského umelca, tak zvláštne tieňované a zafarbené, že pripomína textúru a hebkosť vlneného plátna, by mohlo mať určitú hodnotu na základe toho, že sa dokonca podobá aj na ten žalostný koberec, ktorý teraz leží predou mnou. Kópia môže mať, a pravdepodobne by v tomto prípade aj mala, oveľa väčšiu hodnotu ako originál. Ale keby bol tento koberec vystavený ako rozprestretý, buď na podlahe alebo na stole, a vyčnievajúci zo zadnej strany obrazu, s presným pozorovaním perspektívy, svetla a tieňa, hodnota tejto napodobneniny by bola ešte väčšia.

V maliarstve je obyčajná plocha istého druhu vyrobená tak, aby nepripomínala len ďalšiu obyčajnú plochu, ale všetky tri dimenzie pevného

povrchu. V sochárstve je pevný povrch istého druhu vytvorený tak, aby sa podobal inému pevnému povrchu. Rozdiel medzi napodobňujúcim objektom a napodobňovaným objektom je teda oveľa väčší v jednom umení ako v druhom, a pôžitok z napodobňovania sa zdá byť tým väčší, čím je väčší aj tento rozdiel.

V maliarstve napodobňovanie často poteší, i keď je pôvodný objekt priemerný alebo dokonca urážlivý. V sochárstve je to inak. Napodobňovanie málokedy poteší, pokiaľ pôvodný objekt nie je úplne dokonalý, krásny alebo zaujímavý. Mäsiarsky stánok či kuchynská skrinka s predmetmi, ktoré sa v nej bežne nachádzajú, nie sú určite najšťastnejšími témami ani pre maľbu. Niektorí holandskí majstri ich však zobrazili s takou precíznosťou a úspechom, že je nemožné pozerieť sa na tieto obrazy bez určitej miery potešenia. Boli by to však tie najabsurdnejšie námety pre sochárstvo, ktoré ich taktiež dokáže zobraziť. Obraz veľmi škaredého alebo zdeformovaného muža, akým bol Ezop alebo Scarron, nemusí byť nepríjemným kusom nábytku. Socha by však určite bola. Na Rembrandtových obrazoch s radosťou pozeráme dokonca aj na bežného oplzlého muža alebo ženu, ktorí sa venujú bežnej oplzlej činnosti. Tie by však zaiste boli veľmi zlým námetom pre sochárstvo. Jupiter, Herkules a Apolón, Venuša a Diana, Nymfy a Grácie, Bakchus, Merkúr, Antinoos a Meleagros, úbohá smrť Láokoóna, melancholický osud detí Niobé, zápasníci, bojovníci, umierajúci gladiátori, postavy bohov a bohýň, hrdinov a hrdiniek, najdokonalejšie podoby ľudského tela, vyobrazené buď v najušľachtilejších postojoch alebo v najzaujímavejších situáciách, aké si ľudská fantázia dokáže predstaviť, sú tým správnym námetom, a preto vždy boli obľúbenými námetmi v sochárstve: tento druh umenia nemôže bez toho, aby sa sám degradoval, poklesnúť natoľko, aby predstavoval niečo urážlivé, zlé alebo dokonca priemerné. Maľba nie je až taká pohŕdavá a hoci dokáže zobrazovať aj tie najušľachtilejšie objekty, môže sa bez toho, aby stratila svoje oprávnenie potešiť, podriaďiť aj napodobňovaniu objektov oveľa skromnejšej povahy. Samotná kvalita napodobňovania, bez prihliadania na kvalitu napodobňovaného objektu, je schopná zvýšiť hodnotu maľby, nedokáže však zvýšiť hodnotu sochy. Preto by sa mohlo zdať, že ten prvý druh napodobňovania má vyššiu hodnotu ako ten druhý.

V sochárstve je sotva na pohľad príjemná akákoľvek drapéria. Tie najlepšie z antických sôch boli buď úplne nahé, alebo takmer nahé, a tie, na ktorých je zakrytá nejaká časť tela, sú znázornené ako odeté v mokrom súkne, čo je druh odevu, ktorý určite nikdy nebol v súlade s módou žiadnej krajiny. Aj toto súkno je natiahnuté tak tesne, že pod svojimi úzkymi

záhybmi vyjadruje presný tvar a obrys každého údu a takmer každého svalu. Oblečenie, ktoré takmer nebolo, bolo podľa názoru veľkých umelcov staroveku pre sochárstvo najvhodnejšie. Veľký maliar rímskej školy, ktorý svoj štýl formoval takmer výlučne na základe štúdia antických sôch, napodobňoval na svojich obrazoch najprv ich súkno, ale čoskoro zistil, že v malbe to má nádych prostoty a chudoby (akoby si ľudia, ktorí ho nosili, nemohli dovoliť oblečenie, ktoré by ich zakrylo) a že väčšie záhyby a voľnejšie a splývavejšie drapérie sa k povahe výtvarného umenia hodia viac. V malbe dokáže potešiť napodobňovanie aj tak veľmi podradného objektu, akým je oblečenie, a aby sa mu dostalo všetkej veľkoleposti, ktorej je schopné, je potrebné, aby boli záhyby veľké, voľné a plynulé. V malbe nie je potrebné, aby bol pod záhybmi drapérie zobrazený presný tvar a obrys každého údu a takmer každého svalu tela, stačí, ak sú usporiadané tak, aby vo všeobecnosti naznačovali situáciu a postoj hlavných údov. Malba sa môže jednoduchou silou a kvalitou svojho napodobňovania odvážiť, bez hrozby, že sa znepáči, pri mnohých príležitostiach nahradiť to podradné na mieste nadradeného objektu tým, že ho takto prekryje a úplne zakryje jeho značnú časť. Sochár sa to môže odvážiť urobiť len zriedka, aj to s maximálnou rezervovanosťou a opatrnosťou a tá istá drapéria, ktorá je v jednom umení ušľachtilá a veľkolepá, v druhom pôsobí nemotorne a čudne. Niektorí moderní umelci sa však pokúšali zaviesť drapériu, ktorá je charakteristická pre maliarstvo, aj do sochárstva. Možno to nie je až také smiešne ako mramorové parochne vo Westminsterskom opátstve, no ak sa to aj nezdá také nemotorné a čudné, je to vždy prinajlepšom nevýrazné a nezaujímavé.

Nie je to nedostatok farebnosti, ktorý bráni tomu, aby sa mnohé veci, ktoré sa páčia v maliarstve, páčili v sochárstve, je to nedostatok takeého stupňa rozdielnosti medzi napodobňujúcim a napodobňovaným objektom, ktorý je potrebný na to, aby sa napodobňovanie nejakého predmetu stalo zaujímavým, aj keď objekt sám osebe zaujímavý nie je. Ak sa k sochárstvu pridá farba, takmer úplne zničí pôžitok, ktorý máme z napodobňovania, pretože odstraňuje veľký zdroj tohto pôžitku, ktorým je rozdiel medzi napodobňujúcim a napodobňovaným objektom. To, že sa nejaký pevný a farebný objekt presne podobá inému pevnému a farebnému objektu, sa nezdá byť predmetom veľkého údivu alebo obdivu. Maľovaná socha, hoci sa určite môže podobáť ľudskej postave oveľa presnejšie ako akákoľvek socha, ktorá nie je maľovaná, je všeobecne uznávaná ako neprijemný, ba dokonca pohoršujúci objekt. S touto úžasnou podobnosťou nikdy nie sme spokojní a po jej opätovnom prezeraní vždy zistíme, že sa nevyrovná tomu, čo sme ochotní si predstaviť, že by mohla byť. Aj keby sa zdalo, že

jej okrem života chýba len málo, nemohli by sme jej odpustiť, že jej chýba to, čo je úplne nemožné, aby mala. Diela pani Wrightovej, vynikajúcej umelkyne-samouka, sú v tomto smere snáď najdokonalejšie, aké som kedy videl. Obdivuhodne dobre sa hodia na to, aby sme si ich občas pozreli ako výstavu, ale to najlepšie z nich by sme našli, keby sme si ich priniesli domov a umiestnili na miesto, kde by boli často na očiach, čo by z nich však namiesto ozdobného urobilo najurážlivejší kus domáceho nábytku. Maľované sochy sú preto všeobecne odsudzované a stretávame sa s nimi len zriedkavo. Farbenie očí sôch nie je až také nezvyčajné, ani to však všetci dobrí kritici neschvaľujú. „Nemôžem to zniesť,“ (hovorieval istý pán, ktorý mal v tomto umení veľké znalosti a úsudok), „nemôžem to zniesť, vždy chcem, aby so mnou hovorili.“

Umelé ovocie a kvety niekedy tak hodnoverne napodobňujú prírodné objekty, ktoré predstavujú, že nás často klamú. Čoskoro nás však omrzia, a hoci sa zdá, že im nechýba nič okrem sviežosti a chuti prírodného ovocia a kvetov, nemôžeme im odpustiť, že im chýba to, čo je úplne nemožné, aby mali. Dobrá maľba kvetov a ovocia nás však neomrzí. Neunaví nás lístie hlavného mesta Korintu ani kvety, ktoré niekedy zdobia vlys. Takéto napodobeniny nás však nikdy neoklamú, ich podobnosť s pôvodnými objektmi je vždy oveľa nižšia ako podobnosť umelých plodov a kvetov. S takouto podobnosťou sme však spokojní a tam, kde je takýto nepomer medzi napodobňujúcimi a napodobňovanými objektmi, zistíme, že je taký veľký, aký len môže byť, alebo aký očakávame, že by mal byť. Namaľuj to lístie a tieto kvety prirodzenými farbami a namiesto toho, aby potešili viac, potešia oveľa menej. Podobnosť však bude oveľa väčšia, ale nepomer medzi napodobňujúcimi a napodobňovanými objektmi bude oveľa menší, takže ani táto väčšia podobnosť nás neuspokojí. Naopak, tam, kde je nepomer veľmi veľký, sa často uspokojíme s najnedokonalejšou podobnosťou, s veľmi nedokonalou podobnosťou, čo sa týka napríklad tvaru aj farby ovocia a kvetov v mušliach.

Možno však poznamenať, že hoci v sochárstve imitácia kvetov a lístia poteší ako ozdoba architektúry alebo poteší ako súčasť odevu, ktorá má vyzdvihnúť krásu iného a dôležitejšieho objektu, nepoteší sama osebe ani ako samostatný a nesúvisiaci objekt, tak ako poteší maľba ovocia a kvetov. Kvety a listy, nech sú akokoľvek elegantné a krásne, nie sú dostatočne zaujímavé, nemajú dostatočnú dôstojnosť, ak to môžem povedať, aby boli vhodným námetom pre sochárske dielo, ktoré má potešiť samo osebe, a nemá byť ozdobným doplnkom nejakého iného objektu.

Pri tapisériách a výšivkách sa niekedy rovnako ako v maľbe zhotovuje

povrch tak, aby kopíroval všetky tri rozmery pevnej látky. Tkáčsky stav aj ihla na vyšívanie sú však nástroje napodobňovania, ktoré sú oveľa horšie ako maliarska ceruzka, takže sa nemôžeme čudovať, že ich výtvary sú tomu primerane nižšej kvality. Všetci máme väčšiu či menšiu skúsenosť s tým, že sú zvyčajne oveľa horšie a keď hodnotíme kus tapisérie alebo výšivky, nikdy neporovnávame napodobeninu ani jedného z nich s dobrým obrazom, pretože by nikdy v tomto porovnaní nemohla obstáť, ale porovnávame ich len s inými kusmi tapisérií alebo výšivky. Berieme do úvahy nielen nepomer medzi napodobňujúcim a napodobňovaným objektom, ale aj nešíkovnosť nástrojov napodobňovania, a ak je to také dobré ako čokoľvek, čo sa od nich dá očakávať, ak je to lepšie ako väčšina toho, čo z tejto tvorby vzniká, často sme nielen spokojní, ale aj veľmi potešení.

Dobrá maliar často za niekoľko dní vytvorí predmet, ktorý by najlepšieho tkáča tapisérií zamestnal na mnoho rokov. Hoci je ten v pomere k svojmu času vždy oveľa horšie platený ako maliar, jeho dielo sa nakoniec bežne predáva oveľa drahšie. Vysoká cena za dobrú tapisériu, ktorá ju obmedzuje na paláce kniežat a veľkých pánov, jej v očiach väčšiny ľudí dodáva zdanie bohatstva a nádheru, čo ešte viac prispieva k tomu, aby sa vykompenzovala nedokonalosť jej napodobňovania. V prípade umení, ktoré sa neorientujú na rozvážnych a múdrych, ale bohatých a veľkých, pyšných a márnivých, by sme sa nemali čudovať, keby zdanie veľkej nákladnosti, (toho, čo si môže kúpiť len málo ľudí a je jednou z najistejších charakteristík veľkého bohatstva), často stálo na mieste znamenitej krásy a prispievalo by tiež k odporúčaniu ich produkcie. Zdá sa, že predstava drahoty často skrášľuje a predstava lacnosti rovnako často poškodzuje lesk aj veľmi pekných vecí. Rozdiel medzi pravými a falošnými šperkami nedokáže niekedy bez ťažkostí rozlíšiť ani skúsené oko klenotníka. Ak však neznáma dáma príde do spoločnosti s členkou, ktorá sa zdá byť veľmi bohato zdobená diamantmi, a klenotník nám len pošepká do ucha, že sú to všetko falošné kamene, nielenže dáma v našej predstave okamžite klesne z hodnosti princeznej na úroveň obyčajnej ženy, ale členka sa z objektu najveľkolepejšej nádheru okamžite stane drzým kúskom nevkusnej a pozlátkovej ozdoby.

Pred niekoľkými rokmi bolo v móde zdobiť záhradu tisími a cezminami, ktoré boli ostrihané do umelých tvarov pyramíd, stĺpov, váz a obeliskov. Teraz je v móde zosmiešňovať tento vkus ako neprirodzený. Tvar pyramídy alebo obelisku však nie je pre tis neprirodzenejší než pre blok porfýru alebo mramoru. Keď sa tis prezentuje oku v tomto umelom tvare, záhradník nechce, aby sa to chápalo tak, že v takomto tvare vyrástol – chce mu dať jednak tú istú krásu pravidelného tvaru, ktorý sa tak páči na porfýri a mra-



more, a jednak napodobniť na rastúcom strome ozdoby týchto vzácnych materiálov – chce, aby sa objekt jedného druhu podobal inému objektu úplne iného druhu a k pôvodnej kráse tvaru chce pripojiť relatívnu krásu napodobeniny. Nepomer medzi napodobňujúcim a napodobňovaným objektom je teda základom krásy napodobňovania. Práve preto, že jeden objekt sa prirodzene nepodobá druhému, sa nám tak veľmi páči, keď ho umením k tomu prinútime. Dá sa povedať, že záhradníckove nožnice sú naozaj veľmi neohrabaným nástrojom sochárstva. Bezpochyby sú také, keď sa používajú na napodobňovanie ľudských alebo dokonca zvieracích tvarov. Ale pri jednoduchých a pravidelných tvaroch pyramíd, váz a obeliskov si aj záhradníckove nožnice počinajú dostatočne dobre. Prirodzene sa prihliada aj na nevyhnutnú nedokonalosť nástroja, rovnakým spôsobom ako pri tkaní a vyšívaní. Skrátka, keď budete mať nabudúce príležitosť pozrieť si tieto nemoderné ozdoby, snažte sa len nechať samých seba na pokoji a na pár minút potlačíť bláznivú vášeň hrať sa na kritikov, a pochopíte, že im nechýba istý stupeň krásy, že dodávajú celej záhrade prinajmenšom atmosféru úhladnosti a správnej kultúry a že nie sú vzdialené, (ako hovorí Milton), voľným chvíľam, ktoré sa dajú užiť v upravených záhradách. Čo teda spôsobilo, že sa u nás dostali do takej všeobecnej nemilosti? V prípade mramorovej pyramídy alebo obelisku vieme, že materiál je drahý a že práca, ktorá ich vytesala do tohto tvaru, musela byť ešte drahšia. Pri pyramíde alebo obelisku z tisu vieme, že materiál mohol stať veľmi málo a práca ešte menej. Tie prvé sú zušľachtené svojou nákladnosťou, tie druhé sú degradované svojou lacnosťou. V kapustovej záhrade obchodníka s lojom sme niekedy možno videli toľko stĺpov, váz a iných ozdôb z tisu, koľko je ich vo Versailles z mramoru a porfýru a práve táto vulgárnosť ich zneuctila. Bohatí a veľkí, pyšní a márniví nepripustia v svojich záhradách ozdobu, ktorú môže mať aj ten najpriemernejší človek. Záluba v týchto ozdobách pochádza z Francúzska, kde sa napriek nestálosti módy, ktorú niekedy vyčítame rodákovi z tejto krajiny, stále teší dobrej povesti. Vo Francúzsku sú pomery nižších vrstiev ľudí málokedy také žičlivé, ako je to často v Anglicku a zriedka tam nájdete pyramídy a obelisky z tisu v záhrade obchodníka s lojom. Takéto ozdoby, ktoré v tejto krajine neboli degradované svojou vulgárnosťou, ešte neboli vylúčené zo záhrad kniežat a lordov.

Treba poznamenať, že diela veľkých majstrov sochárstva a maliarstva nikdy nespôsobujú svoj efekt klamstvom. Nikdy nie sú a ani nie sú určené na to, aby sa zamieňali za skutočné predmety, ktoré znázorňujú. Maľované sochy môžu niekedy oklamať nepozorné oko, naozajstné sochárstvo to nikdy neurobí. Malé kúsky perspektívy v malbe, ktoré majú potešiť klam-



stvom predstavujú vždy nejaký veľmi jednoduchý, ale aj bezvýznamný objekt; napríklad zvitok papiera alebo schodisko v tmavom kúte nejakej chodby alebo galérie. Zvyčajne sú to tiež diela nejakých veľmi podradných umelcov. Po tom, čo ich raz uvidíte a vyvolajú vo vás drobné prekvapenie, ktoré by mali vzbudiť, spolu s veselosťou, ktorá ich obyčajne sprevádza, sa už nikdy viac nezapáčia, ale zdajú sa byť mdlé a nudné.

Skutočný pôžitok, ktorý máme z týchto dvoch napodobňujúcich umení, nie je ani zďaleka dôsledkom podvodu, ale je s ním úplne nezlučiteľný. Tento pôžitok je úplne založený na našom úžase z toho, že objekt jedného druhu tak dobre znázorňuje objekt úplne iného druhu, a na našom obdive k umeniu, ktoré tak úžasne prekonáva tento rozdiel, ktorý medzi nimi vytvorila príroda. Ušlachtilé diela sochárstva a maliarstva sa nám javia ako akési zázračné javy, ktoré sa od zázračných javov prírody líšia v tom, že si so sebou nesú akoby vlastné vysvetlenie a demonštrujú aj na pohľad spôsob a metódu, akou sú vytvorené. Dokonca aj oko neskúseného diváka okamžite do určitej miery rozozná, ako je možné, že určitá modifikácia postavy v sochárstve a svetlejšie a tmavšie farby v maliarstve dokážu s takou pravdivosťou a živosťou znázorniť konanie, vášne a správanie ľudí, ako aj veľkého množstva iných objektov. Príjemný údiv z nevedomosti je sprevádzaný ešte príjemnejším uspokojením z vedy. Žasneme a sme ohromení účinkom a sami sme spokojní a šťastní, keď zistíme, že môžeme do určitej miery pochopiť, ako sa tento úžasný účinok na nás vytvára.

Dobré zrkadlo predstavuje objekty, ktoré sú pred ním postavené, oveľa pravdivejšie a živšie ako socha alebo maľba. Ale hoci optika môže vysvetliť umu, ako to funguje, samotné zrkadlo oku vôbec neukáže, ako sa tento efekt dosiahne. Môže to vzbudiť údiv nevedomosti a u klauna, ktorý nikdy predtým nevidel zrkadlo, som videl, že tento údiv vzrástol takmer do vytrženia a extázy, ale nemôže to poskytnúť uspokojenie vedy. Vo všetkých zrkadlách sa účinky dosahujú rovnakými prostriedkami, ktoré sa používajú presne rovnakým spôsobom. V každej jednej soche a obraze sú účinky vyvolané síce podobnými, ale predsa len nie rovnakými prostriedkami a aj tieto prostriedky sa v každom z nich uplatňujú iným spôsobom. Každá dobrá socha a obraz sú novým zázrakom, ktorý so sebou zároveň do určitej miery nesie vlastné vysvetlenie. Po krátkom používaní a skúsenosti prestávajú byť všetky zrkadlá zázrakmi a dokonca aj neznalí ľudia sa s nimi oboznámia tak, že si myslia, že ich účinky si nevyžadujú žiadne vysvetlenie. Okrem toho, zrkadlo môže zobrazovať len prítomné predmety, a keď sa raz údiv úplne skončí, vždy sa radšej rozhodneme uvažovať o podstate, než sa pozerieť na tieň. Vlastná tvár sa potom stáva najpríjemnejším objektom,

ktorý nám môže zrkadlo predstavovať, a jediným objektom, na ktorý sa tak skoro neunavíme pozeráť; je to jediný prítomný objekt, u ktorého môžeme vidieť len tieň: či je pekná alebo škaredá, či je stará alebo mladá, vždy je to tvár priateľa, ktorej črty presne zodpovedajú nejakému citu, emócii alebo vášni, ktorú v tej chvíli cítime.

V sochárstve sa prostriedky, ktorými sa dosahuje úžasný efekt, zdajú byť jednoduchšie a zrejmejšie ako v maliarstve. Tam, kde je nepomer medzi napodobňujúcim a napodobňovaným objektom oveľa väčší, sa umenie, ktoré dokáže tento väčší rozdiel prekonať, zjavne a takmer na prvý pohľad zdá byť založené na oveľa hlbšej vede alebo na oveľa zložitejších a hlbších princípoch. Dokonca aj na tých najpriemernejších predmetoch môžeme často s potešením sledovať dômyselné prostriedky, ktorými maliarstvo prekonáva tento nepomer. Ale v sochárstve to nemôžeme urobiť, pretože rozdiel nie je taký veľký, prostriedky sa nezdajú byť také dômyselné. A práve preto sme v maliarstve často nadšení zobrazením mnohých vecí, ktoré by sa v sochárstve zdali mdlé, únavné a nehodné pohľadu.

Treba však poznamenať, že hoci sa v sochárstve umenie napodobňovania javí v mnohých ohľadoch horšie ako v maliarstve, predsa len v miestnosti vyzdobenej sochami aj obrazmi takmer rovnakých kvalít, zistíme, že sochy spravidla odpútavajú náš pohľad od obrazov. Zvyčajne existuje len jeden, alebo len o niečo viac ako jeden uhol pohľadu, z ktorého možno s výhodou pozorovať obraz, ktorý však pre oko predstavuje vždy presne ten istý objekt. Existuje ale mnoho rôznych uhlov pohľadu, z ktorých možno s rovnakou výhodou pozorovať sochu, a z každého predstavuje iný objekt. Pôžitok z dobrej sochy je rozmanitejší ako z dobrého obrazu a jedna socha môže byť často predmetom mnohých dobrých obrazov alebo kresieb, ktoré sa od seba líšia. Okrem toho tieňový reliéf a projekcia obrazu sú veľmi sploštené a zdá sa, že takmer úplne zmiznú, keď sa porovnajú so skutočným a pevným telom, ktoré stojí vedľa nich. Nech sa tieto dve umenia zdajú byť akokoľvek príbuzné, vzájomne si veľmi dobre nerozumejú, a ich diela by sa snáď nikdy nemali vídavať spoločne.

Preklad: Sandra Zákutná

Preklad z verejných zdrojov podporil Fond na podporu umenia.

Monika  
Homulková


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## Kantova morálna filozofia: prežitý koncept alebo nadčasový odkaz?

Caranti, L., & Pinzani, A. (Eds.), 2023. *Kant and the Problem of Morality: Rethinking the Contemporary World* (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). London, New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003043126>.

Má nám v súčasnosti Kantova morálna filozofia stále čo povedať? V rozsahu 179 strán sa v recenzovanom zborníku *Kant and the Problem of Morality: Rethinking the Contemporary World* stretávame s príspevkami autorov, ktorí na položenú otázku odpovedajú kladne. V kontexte súčasných tém a problémov *tekutej* spoločnosti charakteristickej nedostatkom pomyselných pevných bodov, o ktoré by sme sa mohli pri ich riešení opierať, sa autori príspevkov obsiahnutých v knihe editovanej Alessandrom Pinzanim a Luigim Carantim zamýšľajú nad ich riešením na pozadí Kantovej praktickej filozofie, ktorá by mohla tento pevný bod predstavovať.

Zborník je tvorený súborom ôsmich štúdií, v ktorých autori príspevkov kriticky reflektujú Kantovu etiku s cieľom riešiť naliehavé globálne problémy, ako je environmentálna udržateľnosť, rasizmus, sexizmus a morálne zlepšenie. Autori predstavujú rôzne perspektívy a ponúkajú možnosť zamyslieť sa nad spôsobmi, ako môže kantovská etika viesť etické rozhodovanie a morálny diskurz v nestabilnom, globalizovanom svete dneška.



Prvý príspevok, *On Dealing with Kant's Sexism and Racism* od Pauline Kleingeld reflektuje problém rasizmu a sexizmu, ktorý je možné identifikovať v Kantovej tvorbe napriek jeho koncepcii zdôrazňujúcej rovnosť, rešpekt a ľudskú dôstojnosť. Autorka sa zaoberá tým, či (a ako) Kantove diskriminačné vyhlásenia sú alebo nie sú v súlade s jeho univerzálnymi etickými princípmi. Skúma, ako môžeme my, súčasní čitatelia, zosúladiť jeho filozofickú koncepciu s predsudkami voči rasám a ženám, ktoré sa objavujú v jeho tvorbe. Keďže je možné vidieť diskrepanciu medzi Kantovými princípmi zdôrazňujúcimi rovnosť a jeho tvrdeniami o pohlaví a rase, mali by sme si dať pozor na to, aby sme Kantove názory neskreslili a tiež neopakovali jeho chyby. Namiesto toho by sme sa mali snažiť o kritickú reflexiu v kontexte (ako minulosti tak aj súčasnosti) a rekonštruovať Kantovu teóriu našou optikou. Podľa autorky nám na kritiku predsudkov poskytuje nástroje jeho vlastná etická koncepcia, pretože vyžaduje rovnosť a rešpekt k všetkým racionálnym bytostiam.

Robert B. Loudon v štúdiu *Kant the Naturalist* predstavuje Kanta (ako už hovorí samotný názov) ako naturalistického filozofa, teda z inej perspektívy, s akou sa bežne stretávame (Kant ako transcendentalista). Autor kritizuje interpretáciu Kanta ako prísneho dualistu. Hovorí, že Kantova filozofia chápe človeka ako súčasne prírodnú a morálnu bytosť: Kant vidí morálny zákon ako produkt ľudského rozumu. Loudon poukazuje na to, že Kant túto schopnosť úplne nevyníma z kontextu prírody, keďže chápe človeka ako súčasť prírodného sveta a prírodu ako zásadný stimul k rozvoju človeka a jeho morálnych schopností. Morálna normatívnosť je tak podľa autora u Kanta zakotvená v ľudskej prirodzenosti, pochádzajúcej z prírody, o ktorej Kant povie, že je rozumná, a preto by sme nemali stavať proti sebe do striktnéj opozície prírodu a morálku. Namiesto toho by sme Kanta mali chápať ako mysliteľa, ktorý berie do úvahy človeka ako morálne slobodného, tak aj prírodného. Príspevok predstavuje pokus *zmieriť dvoch Kantov* – transcendentálneho a naturalistického.

Ústrednou témou Marie Borges v jej texte *Pleasure and Displeasure as Moral Motivation* je emocionálny rozmer prítomný pri morálnych súdoch. Autorke ide o preklopenie priepasti medzi racionalitou a emocionalitou, o *nabúranie* predstavy, že emocionálne stavy vôbec nesúvisia s morálnymi súdmi. Borges skúma, akú úlohu zohrávajú emocionálne stavy (pleasure/displeasure – pôžitok/nespokojnosť) v zmysle motivácie k morálnemu konaniu, keďže v Kantovej filozofii je motivácia primárne založená na rešpektovaní mravného zákona. Autorka však zdôrazňuje, že Kant úplne nezavrhuje úlohu pôžitok/nespokojnosti v morálnom konaní. Podľa nej

totiž v kantovskej etike fungujú ako sekundárne impulzy k morálnemu konaniu tým, že k nemu prispievajú syntézou emocionálnych reakcií s racionálnym uvažovaním. Autorka argumentuje, že zatiaľ čo Kant uprednostňuje rozum ako základ morálnej motivácie, pôžitok a nespokojnosť zohrávajú taktiež významnú úlohu. Práca prispieva k diskusiám medzi prísnyimi racionalistickými a emotivistickými prístupmi k etike vyváženou perspektívou.

Andrew Chignell v práci *Inefficacy, Despair, and Difference-Making: A secular application of Kant's moral argument* situuje kantovskú etiku a morálnu motiváciu do súčasného kontextu celospoločenských, globálnych problémov, ako sú napríklad klimatické zmeny, ktoré môžu pôsobiť na jednotlivca ako neefektívne z hľadiska jeho individuálnej činnosti. Autor skúma problém vnímanej neefektívnosti, kde jednotlivci vnímajú svoje morálne činy ako bezvýsledné a zbytočné, teda, že majú iba malý alebo žiadny vplyv na problémy, čo môže viesť k rezignácii a následnej nečinnosti. Kantova filozofia tu predstavuje východisko v zmysle zdôraznenia povinnosti pred výsledkom, čo predstavuje nástroj na vyrovnanie sa s týmto problémom. Upriamením pozornosti na hodnotu morálneho konania ako takého a nie na (ne)viditeľné výsledky môžu jednotlivci zostať motivovaní konať eticky aj v situáciách, ktoré môžu pôsobiť zdanlivo márne. Chignell spája Kantovu morálnu povinnosť s racionálnou nádejou, že morálne úsilie prispieva k dobru, v uchopení tohto príspevku v sekulárnom zmysle: ponúka rámec pre morálnu motiváciu bez spoliehania sa na náboženské predpoklady.

V poradí piata štúdia od autora Stefana Bacina s názvom *Lying, Deception and Dishonesty: Kant and the contemporary debate on the definition of lying* skúma Kantov morálny postoj ku klamstvu, podvodu a nečestnosti, keďže tejto téme sa v skúmaní Kantovej filozofie podľa autora venuje málo pozornosti. Štúdia reflektuje perspektívu interpretácie klamstva ako prísne a kategoricky nesprávneho bez ohľadu na následky, pričom analyzuje jej relevanciu v súčasných etických diskusiách. Cieľom textu je analýza Kantovho uchopenia klamstva, s ohľadom na súčasné filozoficko-etické diskusie, uvažovanie o výnimkách z Kantovho pravidla (napríklad klamstvo z dôvodu ochrany niekoho pred ublížením). Autor akcentuje Kantovo špecifické chápanie klamstva, v rámci ktorého klamstvo nie je len *nerestou*, ale faktorom ovplyvňujúcim morálne postavenie klamára, pretože predstavuje porušenie jednej z povinností voči sebe samému, ktoré majú podľa Kanta špecifickú prednosť pred ostatnými morálnymi povinnosťami.

Text *The Duty and the Maxims: Elements for a morality and culture*

of sustainable development, ktorého autorom je Anselmo Aportone skúma, ako môžu Kantove etické princípy prispieť k morálnemu uvažovaniu v kontexte trvalo udržateľného rozvoja. Aportone sa zameriava na potrebu filozofického rámca, ktorý môže slúžiť na ukotvenie princípov pre zvládanie environmentálnych, ekonomických a sociálnych výziev. Akcentuje rolu povinnosti a maxim pri rozvíjaní kultúry orientovanej na udržateľnosť. Autor poukazuje na relevantnosť Kantovho konceptu povinnosti; argumentuje, že konanie z morálnej povinnosti ako opozície ku konaniu z účelnosti je dôležité pre riešenie výziev udržateľnosti. Princípy kantovskej etiky – najmä povinnosť a formulácia univerzálnych maxim – ponúkajú pevný základ pre dosiahnutie a (následne aj) udržanie trvalo udržateľného rozvoja. Takúto kultúru však možno dosiahnuť len vtedy, ak si jednotlivci osvoja etické záväzky a budú sa považovať za súčasť globálnej komunity – kantovsky povedané, občanov sveta.

V predposlednom príspevku s názvom *Kant as an Ante Litteram Theorist and Critic of the Moral Enhancement* sa autor Alberto Pirni zamýšľa nad Kantovým postojom k morálnemu zdokonaľovaniu, najmä vo vzťahu k súčasným trendom zlepšovania (enhancement) človeka či dokonca transhumanizmu a pokúša sa o prepojenie Kantovej praktickej morálnej filozofie a etiky a nových technológií. Pýta sa: Mohli by sme povedať, že by bol Kant za ľudské zlepšovanie v morálnej oblasti? Ako problematické identifikuje možné narušenie autonómie v zmysle autonómneho morálneho uvažovania pri použití „zlepšovacích“ prostriedkov ako napr. biotechnológií, nanotechnológií, implementácii čipov, a pod. V závere konštatuje, že ako na mnoho iných problémov, ani na tento sa nedá nahliadať iba z jednej strany, a tak môžeme Kanta považovať ako za filozofa podporujúceho morálne zdokonaľovanie, tak na druhej strane je nutné kriticky zvažovať spôsoby, akými by sa malo realizovať. A práve tu nám pomáha filozofia.

Zborník uzatvára príspevok *Spielraum: Narrow and wide duties and their consequences*, ktorého autorom je Claudio La Rocca. Analyzuje Kantovu dištinkciu medzi úzkymi (dokonalými) a širokými (nedokonalými) povinnosťami a ich dôsledky pre morálne uvažovanie a praktické konanie. Dôležitým motívom v texte je analýza *Spielraum* ako hry alebo voľného priestoru, ktorý je imanentný širokým povinnostiam, teda umožňuje voľnosť, slobodu oproti úzkym povinnostiam, ktoré sú striktné vymedzené. Autor uvažuje o podľa neho problematickom vzťahu medzi dvoma pármí pojmov (úzkymi a širokými povinnosťami na jednej strane a dokonalými a nedokonalými povinnosťami na strane druhej). Rozlíšenie povinností je

problematické v otázke, či sa náš morálny život pohybuje v týchto dvoch dimenziách a *ako*. Prvá dimenzia (úzke-dokonalé) sa riadi pravidlami konania, ktoré presne vymedzujú ako má človek morálne konať; druhá dimenzia (široké-nedokonalé) je rámcovaná pravidlami, ktoré, naopak, dávajú morálnym subjektom určitý „voľný priestor“ (v nemčine „Spielraum“, termín vyjadrujúci „voľný priestor“, v angličtine „leeway“), v rámci ktorého majú možnosť zvažovať rôzne alternatívy.

O zborníku možno v pozitívnom zmysle povedať, že má interdisciplinárny presah. Venuje sa témam environmentálnych problémov, feminizmu, psychológie, etiky, technológie. Vo všetkých príspevkoch autori nielenže situujú Kantovu filozofiu do súčasných problémov a úvah, ale vstupujú s ním (rortyovsky povedané) do *konverzácie*, teda nenúti Kanta hovoriť *naším* jazykom, no ani oni sa nesnažia hovoriť *tým jeho*. Pri čítaní je jasne vidieť, že vždy prihliadajú na konkrétny kontext a na jeho pozadí pristupujú k analýzam a riešeniam otázok a výziev. Spoločným menovateľom vinúcim sa naprieč celou publikáciou sú motívy *spájania* a *zmeny (zaužívanej) perspektívy*. Autori príspevkov sa pokúšajú o preklopenie priepasti tam, kde sú rokmi a interpretáciami hlboko zakorenené a o nové pohľady na koncepcie, ktoré nám môžu pomôcť riešiť naše problémy. Texty sú zaujímavým prínosom do uvažovania o Kantovej filozofii v kontexte súčasných tém. Nesnažia sa nás však presvedčiť o relevancii či irelevancii *praktickej filozofie*, ale pohnúť našim myslením, aby sme sa na problémy, ktoré je filozoficky potrebné reflektovať, dokázali pozrieť aj *inak*. Veď kto by povedal, že nám má Kant čo povedať napríklad vo vzťahu k (bio/nano) technológiám? Odpoveďou je, že problému morálky sa dotýkame všade a tam, kde sa o nej diskutuje, sa zide Kantovo slovo.

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