

This special issue of *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* is dedicated to the relation between Kant and philosophical practice. The theme is not merely commemorative, nor does it treat Kant as a canonical figure to be repeatedly explained from a distance. Rather, the issue asks what Kantian philosophy can still do when it is brought into contact with living practices of judgment, counseling, education, ethical deliberation, and self-clarification. Kant's critical philosophy is often approached through its most demanding theoretical structures: the transcendental deduction, the limits of knowledge, the architecture of reason, the status of things in themselves. Yet these structures are never detached from the practical vocation of reason. Kant's philosophy offers, perhaps more than any other modern system, a disciplined way of thinking about autonomy without arbitrariness, moral law without moralism, dignity without sentimentality, and limits without resignation. For philosophical practice, this is a particularly fertile inheritance. It allows us to understand counseling, dialogue, education, and ethical inquiry not as techniques for producing quick answers, but as spaces in which persons learn to examine the principles under which they think, feel, decide, and act.

Elliot D. Cohen's "Logic-Based Therapy's Analytic of Practical Reason: How Kant's Categorical Imperatives Set Metarules for Regulating Clients' Emotional Reasoning" opens the issue by placing Kant in direct conversation with Logic-Based Therapy. The article develops a powerful and technically precise proposal: Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative can function as rational metarules for identifying and challenging destructive patterns in clients' emotional reasoning. Cohen's analysis begins from the LBT claim that distressing emotions often involve inferential structures, practical syllogisms, and self-defeating speech acts such as demanding, self-damning, other-damning, or disavowing one's capacity to cope. By introducing illocutionary force operators and modal operators into the analysis of emotional reasoning,

the article gives philosophical counseling a sharper diagnostic grammar. Kant's practical philosophy is not invoked here as an abstract moral authority, but as a regulative framework capable of testing whether the rules embedded in emotional life can be rationally sustained. In this sense, the paper shows how the Categorical Imperative may become therapeutically relevant without being reduced to therapy: it helps clients examine the hidden laws by which they condemn themselves, demand impossibilities, or surrender their agency.

Samuel Zinaich, Jr.'s "Kant, Boundary Violations, and Counseling Ethics" turns to one of the most morally urgent areas of counseling practice: the violation of professional and personal boundaries. Focusing on the case of Scott Owen, the article uses Kant's Formula of Humanity to illuminate why sexual boundary violations in counseling are not merely breaches of professional regulation, but profound violations of autonomy, dignity, and informed consent. Zinaich's central Kantian insight is that the wrongness of such conduct lies in treating clients merely as means: manipulating them, obscuring the real nature of the counselor's purposes, and undermining their capacity for rationally informed decision-making. The article is especially valuable because it connects Kantian ethics to the concrete architecture of professional codes, showing that the prohibition against sexual intimacy with current clients is not an arbitrary institutional rule but an expression of a deeper moral requirement. Philosophical practice, on this view, must include not only dialogue about values, but also the ethical formation of the practitioner. Without respect for clients as ends in themselves, counseling ceases to be a helping relationship and becomes a site of domination.

Ioan Buş's "The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the B Edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason: Necessity and Sufficiency in the Conditions of Objective Judgment*" provides the issue with its most technically Kantian contribution. At first glance, its focus on the B-Deduction may seem more theoretical than practical. Yet the article belongs in this issue precisely because philosophical practice depends on the possibility of judgment: on the capacity to distinguish subjective association from objective validity, private impression from communicable claim, and ungrounded certainty from warranted understanding. Buş reconstructs Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a two-stage strategy, interpreting §§15–20 as establishing the sufficiency of the categories for cognition in general, and §§22–26 as establishing their necessity for objectively valid experience within our spatio-temporal sensibility. This

reading reframes the well-known problem of the two steps of the B-Deduction by emphasizing the passage from objective validity to objective reality. For the broader concerns of the issue, the article reminds us that Kantian practice cannot be severed from Kantian critique: before reason can guide action responsibly, it must understand the conditions under which judgment can claim validity at all.

Florin Lobont and Dianna Vasiu's "From Counterpoint to Community: Bach, Kant, and Philosophical Enquiry with Adolescents" offers an original contribution to Kantian philosophical pedagogy. The article does not claim historical influence between Bach and Kant; instead, it develops a structural and pedagogical analogy between Bach's contrapuntal writing and Kantian themes of reflective judgment, autonomy, purposiveness, and rule-governed freedom. Centered on Bach's Two-Part Invention No. 1 in C major, BWV 772, the article proposes a model for philosophical enquiry with adolescents aged 13–16. In this model, music becomes neither decoration nor illustration, but a shared object of perception through which students learn to notice form, relation, independence, interdependence, repetition, transformation, tension, and closure. The Community of Enquiry (a Peircean model of collaborative inquiry later adapted by Matthew Lipman for the Philosophy for Children program he founded) then turns these perceptions into philosophical questions: Can freedom exist within rules? Can two independent voices belong to one whole? What remains the same when something changes? By bringing Kant, Bach, Philosophy for Children, and music pedagogy into dialogue, the article shows how aesthetic experience can cultivate the habits of reflective autonomy in young people before those habits are fully conceptualized.

Ovidiu Ionuț Badea's "Maxim-Based Value Elicitation in Philosophical Counselling" develops a methodologically clear and practically usable Kantian technique for philosophical counselling. The article argues that maxims, understood as self-imposed practical rules, can serve as disciplined units of ethical self-clarification. Rather than asking clients simply to name their values, the proposed method reconstructs the operative rule under which they act: "When C, I will do A in order to achieve E, for reason R." This reconstruction allows the counsellor and client to examine not merely what the client endorses in principle, but how values are actually organized in recurrent patterns of action. Badea then subjects such maxims to three Kantian tests: universalizability, respect for humanity, and publicity. The purpose is not to moralize, but to disclose hidden

tensions between declared commitments and lived rules. The article is particularly important for philosophical practice because it offers a middle path between unstructured conversation and therapeutic technique. It preserves the autonomy of the client while giving the dialogue a rigorous form through which heteronomous patterns—fear, social pressure, habit, evasive self-description—can be brought into reflective view.

Ramona Băluțescu and Adrian Marcu’s “Virtue, Duty, and the Moral Ecology of Organ Donation: From Kantian to Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Dialogue with Orthodox Theology” widens the issue’s ethical horizon by bringing Kantian ethics into conversation with neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and Christian Orthodox theological concerns. The article begins from the recognition that Kantian ethics provides indispensable moral boundaries in transplantation ethics: persons must not be instrumentalized, dignity must be protected, and consent cannot be bypassed. Yet the authors argue that duty-based reasoning alone is insufficient to explain how trust, moral motivation, institutional credibility, and communal discernment are actually formed. For this reason, they introduce neo-Aristotelian concepts such as character, practical wisdom, moral formation, and institutional virtue. This synthesis is especially significant in contexts where organ donation is shaped not only by medical facts and legal rules, but also by grief, religious hesitation, distrust, and symbolic meanings of the body. The article does not try to force agreement where metaphysical and theological uncertainties remain. Instead, it proposes a more patient moral vocabulary, one in which organ donation may be understood as admirable without being compulsory, and in which ethical legitimacy depends as much on trustworthy practices as on correct principles.

Diana Ghinea’s “The Relevance of the Incognoscibility of Kant’s Things in Themselves for Modern Philosophical Counseling” brings one of Kant’s most difficult theoretical doctrines into the heart of counselling practice. The article argues that the structural incognoscibility of things in themselves can guide philosophical counsellors toward epistemic humility, respect for the opacity of the other, and resistance to paternalism. Clients often seek definitive answers about who they truly are, what their lives ultimately mean, or what decision would finally reveal their essence. Ghinea’s Kantian proposal is that the counselor must resist the temptation to offer such metaphysical certainties. The client’s “true self” is not an object available to theoretical possession by the counselor, nor even by the client in any final and transparent way. This does not make counseling

futile; it makes it more ethically responsible. The counselor's task is not to uncover a hidden noumenal essence, but to help the client examine empirical self-narratives, clarify concepts, identify tensions, and deliberate within the limits of finite human knowledge. In this way, Kant's doctrine of limits becomes a practical discipline of respect.

The issue concludes with Florin Lobont's review of Marcus Willaschek's *Kant: A Revolution in Thinking*, translated by Peter Lewis. The review presents Willaschek's book as a rare achievement: an introduction that preserves Kant's systematic range while making his philosophy newly available to a wider readership. Particular attention is given to Willaschek's emphasis on the primacy of practice, his treatment of Kant as a philosopher of modern freedom, and his capacity to connect Kant's theoretical, moral, political, and religious concerns without reducing them to a textbook schema. The review also notes the book's limits, including the inevitable compression of a broad interpretive project and the relatively limited engagement with some areas of Kant's reception. Yet its final judgment is generous and persuasive: Willaschek succeeds in showing why Kant still matters, not because the historical Kant can answer all contemporary questions, but because the questions he formulated remain unfinished. In that respect, the review offers a fitting close to this special issue. Kant's revolution in thinking continues wherever reason is asked to become practical: in counseling, in education, in ethical life, in institutions, and in the fragile but necessary work of human self-understanding.