




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STUDIA PHILOSOPHICA KANTIANA

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STUDIA PHILOSOPHICA
KANTIANA

filozofický časopis pre kriticko-rekonštrukčné uvažovanie

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Vážení čitatelia,

časopis *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 2/2025, venovaný kriticko-rekonštruktívemu prístupu ku Kantovmu myslению, prináša päť zaujímavých štúdií z oblasti estetiky, metafyziky, psychoanalýzy, pedagogiky a etiky.

Luciana Martínez v článku „Originality and Taste: Kant on Shakespeare's Genius“ sleduje vývoj Kantových názorov na umeleckú tvorbu od predkritických prameňov až po *Kritiku súdnosti*. Ukazuje, že počas konca Kantovej tichej dekády sa pre Kanta stal génius špecifickým pre umeleckú tvorbu, pričom ako príklad uvádzal Shakespeara. V *Kritike* však Kant Shakespeara vynecháva a namiesto toho zdôrazňuje technické vzdelenie a predkladaná štúdia analyzuje tieto dva obraty a ich dôsledky pre Kantovu estetiku.

Edvardas Rimkus v štúdii „How is Metaphysics Possible without Transcending Experience?“ spochybňuje Kantovu transempirickú metafyziku tým, že ju spája so súčasným výskumom anomálnych javov (napr. prípadov reinkarnácie) prostredníctvom Peirceovho pragmatizmu, Kuhnovej teórie vedeckých paradigiem a Feyerabendovho anarchistického prístupu k vede.

Thiago Ehrenfried Nogueira a Julio Alexandre Fachini v článku „The Kantian Teleology in the Freudian Concept of Death Drive“ skúmajú prepojenia medzi Freudovým smrteľným pudom (*Todestrieb*) – regresívnu silou smerujúcou k anorganickému návratu – a kantovskou teleológiou, pričom porovnávajú ich pohľady na konečnosť prírody.

Loreenna Fyama Pereira Marques v štúdii „Autonomy as the Foundation of Learning in Kant and Paulo Freire“ spája Kantove (*Prednášky o pedagogike*) a Freireho (*Pedagogika autonómie: vedomosti potrebné pre pedagogickú prax*) koncepcie autonómie ako základov kritického, samostatného myslenia smerujúceho k osvietenému občianstvu.

Komparatívna štúdia Milana Petkaniča „Etika povinnosti I. Kanta a S. Kierkegaarda“ skúma deontologickú etiku Kanta a Kierkegaarda, zdôrazňujúc spoločný princíp povinnosti ako morálneho motívu a kritiku eudaimonizmu, ako aj ich rozdielny pohľad na autonómiu a vzťah medzi povinnosťou a náklonnosťou.

Toto číslo obsahuje aj dve slovenské recenzie: recenziu Moniky Homulkovej na knihu *Kant a praktická filozofia* (eds. P. Kyslan – S. Zákutná, Prešov 2024) a recenziu Martina Pazderu na knihu *Kantian Ethics and the Attention Economy: Duty and Distraction* (T. Aylsworth – C. Castro, Palgrave Macmillan 2024).

Prajem Vám príjemné čítanie!

Sandra Zákutná

Dear Readers,

Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2/2025, the Slovak journal for critical-reconstructive engagement with Kantian thought, presents five compelling studies spanning aesthetics, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, pedagogy, and ethics.

Luciana Martínez's article, "Originality and Taste: Kant on Shakespeare's Genius," traces the evolution of Kant's views on artistic creation from pre-critical sources to the *Critique of Judgment*. The article shows that, at the end of the silent decade, genius became specific to art-making, with Shakespeare cited as an example. Yet, in the *Critique*, Kant omits Shakespeare and emphasizes technical training instead. The article analyses these two shifts and their implications for Kant's aesthetics.

In his article, "How is Metaphysics Possible without Transcending Experience?", Edvardas Rimkus challenges Kant's transempirical metaphysics by linking it to contemporary research on anomalous phenomena (e.g., reincarnation cases) via Peircean pragmatism, Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms, and Feyerabend's anarchistic approach to science.

Thiago Ehrenfried Nogueira and Julio Alexandre Fachini in their article, "The Kantian Teleology in the Freudian Concept of Death Drive," explore the links between Freud's death drive (*Todestrieb*) – a regressive force toward inorganic return – and Kantian teleology, contrasting their views on the ultimate finality of nature.

In her article, "Autonomy as the Foundation of Learning in Kant and Paulo Freire," Lorenna Fyama Pereira Marques relates Kant's (*Lectures on Pedagogy*) and Freire's (*Pedagogy of Autonomy: Knowledge Necessary for Educational Practice*) concepts of autonomy as foundations for critical, self-reflective education toward enlightened citizenship.

Milan Petkanić's comparative study, "Kant's and Kierkegaard's Ethics of Duty," (in Slovak) examines the deontological ethics of both philos-

ophers, highlighting their shared view of duty as a moral motive, their critiques of eudaimonism, and their divergences on autonomy and the relationship between duty and affection.

This issue also includes two Slovak reviews: Monika Homulková's review of *Kant a praktická filozofia* (eds. P. Kyslan and S. Zákutná, Presov, 2024) and Martin Pazdera's review of *Kantian Ethics and the Attention Economy: Duty and Distraction* (T. Aylsworth and C. Castro, Palgrave Macmillan, 2024).

Pleasant reading!

Sandra Zákutná

Luciana
Martínez

University of Lisbon

Originality and Taste: Kant on Shakespeare's Genius

Abstract: From the earliest sources up to the *Critique of Judgement*, we can identify some variations in Kant's thinking on artistic creation. The most significant variation that occurred during the pre-critical period, and which took place towards the end of the silent decade, is the specification of genius as a feature of art-making. Kant began to mention Shakespeare as a genius. In relation to the figure of Shakespeare, there is another significant turn in Kant's thinking about artistic creation. This change is expressed in the *Critique of Judgement*, where Kant omits Shakespeare's name and, moreover, adds an explanation of the technical aspects of artistic creation. The present study analyses the evolution of Kant's thinking on artistic production, with a particular focus on the two significant turns that occurred in this intellectual journey. It provides an explanation of these turns, offering a perspective on their implications for Kant's philosophical position.

Keywords: Aesthetic Ideas, *Critique of Judgment*, Genius, Kant, Shakespeare

Introduction

During the 18th century, the figure of William Shakespeare was considered one of the focal points of the debates on artistic creation. His name, however, is not mentioned in a key text in the history of such debates: the *Critique of Judgement*. The fact that Kant did not mention it in his text does not mean, however, that he was unaware of and uninterested in the polemics about his dramaturgy. In fact, Shakespeare is one of the names mentioned in the anthropology lecture notes currently available. I intend to explain the omission of Shakespeare in the *Critique of Judgement* by means of an evolutive historical reading of the doctrine of genius. I argue that between 1770 and 1790 there are two significant alterations in the Kantian view of genius. The first alteration occurred from the middle of the silent decade and caused Kant to specify the notion of genius, and to begin to employ it only to explain artistic creation. The second alteration occurred in the

following decade and brought back previously omitted elements of artistic production, such as training and the culture of genius. I think the omission of Shakespeare is specifically linked to this second change.

In the first section of the text, I will analyse the early vision of genius. For this, I will use the class notes of his students as my main source. In the second part of the text I will deal with what I consider to be the first major change in the Kantian view of genius, which in my interpretation is linked to the reception of Alexander Gerard's thought. In the third section I will analyse what is new in the *Critique of Judgement*, in what I consider to be the second change that motivates the omission of Shakespeare as an example of genius.

1. Kant's pre-critical period and genius as an original talent in general

The overall aim of this section is to analyse the evolution of this concept during the silent decade. Two important pieces of research have previously been done on this topic. Piero Giordanetti (1995) found some changes throughout these years. His main hypothesis is that the relation of the concept of genius to artistic production was not modified until the KU, while its association with science and mechanical arts was. For Giordanetti, the principal reason for this change is the evolution of the Kantian doctrine of taste.¹ It seems to me that the restriction of the concept of genius to the artistic sphere is not already developed in the lectures of the silent decade. But, like Giordanetti, I think that crucial changes in Kant's thoughts are related to his knowledge of Alexander Gerard's book about genius.

Long before Giordanetti, an exhaustive study of the precritical Kantian reflections on this topic had already been made by Giorgio Tonelli (1966). In his work, we can find a detailed explanation of the evolution of the principal notions involved in the doctrine of genius. One of the numerous contributions made in his paper is the explanation of the concept of spirit and its relation to the concept of genius. According to Tonelli, the concept of spirit has a more general meaning than the concept of genius in Kant's reflections before 1776. After that, spirit is considered merely as an animated talent. Tonelli quotes a reflection according to which genius requires spirit, but also involves Judgement and taste.

In this section, I will examine the changes in the Kantian doctrine of genius through the silent decade, using the precritical lecture notes as my

¹ Giordanetti, P., 1995. Das Verhältnis von genius, Künstler und Wissenschaftler in der Kantischen Philosophie. *Kant-Studien*, 86(4), p. 409.

main source. Some manuscripts based on Kantian early lectures are studied.² Two sets of manuscripts from 1771 and 1772, the Blomberg Logic and the Philippi Logic respectively, are currently available. There is also a text from the middle of the silent decade, the Hinz Logic (1775). In these sets of notes, four major topics related to genius are discussed. These are, namely: i) the difference between acquiring knowledge through rules and mere understanding, ii) the concept of *Originalgeist* in opposition to the spirit of imitation, iii) the concept of spirit and iv) the empirical determinations of the development of genius. Firstly, in the Blomberg Logic, Kant introduced the concept of genius to explain different ways of acquiring knowledge. One way is by learning. To learn, it is necessary to have a spirit of imitation (*Nachahmung*). Furthermore, some rules are involved in this process.³ By imitating other people we develop the ability to create artefacts. Another way of learning is through instruction, which requires explicit rules. Through instruction, we improve our ability to develop scientific knowledge.⁴ On the other hand, some sciences, such as Philosophy, also require a healthy (*gesund*) or common (*gemein*) understanding. This healthy understanding is necessary for aesthetic Judgements too.⁵ We can, then, acquire knowledge with rules – through imitation or instructions, or without rules – through our healthy understanding.

In connection with this healthy understanding and the development of those sciences, Kant introduces the idea of the “spirit of genius,” which he explicitly confronts with the imitation of others’ understanding. While in sciences such as Mathematics it is possible to learn through the imitation of others’ faculties, Philosophy needs this specific spirit.⁶ For this reason, Kant concludes that “to Philosophy belongs more genius than imitation.”⁷ Philosophy is presented as a science of genius and genius is described as

² There are many difficulties that have to be taken into account in investigating them. On this topic, s. Conrad, E., 1994. *Kants Logikvorlesungen als neuer Schlüssel zur Architektonik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Ausarbeitung der Gliederungsentwürfe in den Logikvorlesungen als Auseinandersetzung mit der Tradition*. Frommann-Holzboog, pp. 52–61; Hinske, N., 1999. *Tra Illuminismo e critica della ragione. Studi sul corpus logico kantiano*. Scuola Normale di Pisa, p. 12; Sánchez Rodríguez, M., 2015. Estudio preliminar. In: Kant, I. *Lecciones de Antropología*. Comares, p. xvii.

³ V-Log/ Blom, AA 24: 16.

⁴ V-Log/ Blom, AA 24: 17.

⁵ Kant repeats later that there are sciences that need genius, such as Philosophy and beauty sciences, and, on the other hand, sciences that require imitation, such as the useful sciences and Mathematics. V-Log/ Blom, AA 24: 299; V-Log/ Phil, AA 24: 494.

⁶ V-Log/ Blom, AA 24: 19.

⁷ V-Log/ Blom, AA 24: 20.

an “original spirit.” This is a spirit that never imitates.⁸ There are sciences of genius and sciences that have to be learned. Philosophy is a science of genius because a philosopher wants to demonstrate his ideas and define his concepts.⁹ He doesn’t have a book and needs to develop his own method.¹⁰ Thus, according to Kant, there are two kinds of science – sciences of imitation and sciences of genius. The latter are not capable of being taught. So we cannot learn Philosophy, but we can learn Mathematics. Kant does not explain the reasons for this difference. It seems to be related to the intuitive feature of the principles of Mathematics, which is not to be found in Philosophy.¹¹ Another aspect linked to the necessity of genius in the development of science is that the discovery of new knowledge has no rules. For this reason, it cannot be produced through mere imitation.¹²

Kant stresses these considerations at the end of his lectures on Logic. He indicates the contrast between the capacity of imitation and the capacity of genius.¹³ He does not reserve the word “spirit” to describe the latter alone. Indeed, he also mentions a “spirit of imitation.”¹⁴ In these lectures, then, the concept of spirit seems to be less specific than in the later lectures, where it will be considered as a particular feature or even as a synonym of genius.

In the Philippi Logic, dated a year later, the difference between taste and genius is also registered.¹⁵ Taste is not genius, although genius has

⁸ V-Log/ Phil, AA 24: 321.

⁹ It is important to consider this early explanation of the opposition between the sciences of genius and the sciences of learning/ imitation. Giordanetti thinks that Gerard’s influence can be detected here (Giordanetti, P., 1995. Das Verhältnis von genius, Künstler und Wissenschaftler in der Kantischen Philosophie. *Kant-Studien* 86(4), 688f.), but it seems that the Kantian doctrine had already been developed. The same is to be remarked about the “vocaboli tedeschi,” including words such as *Kopf* and *Nachahmung* (ibid., p. 690).

¹⁰ V-Log/ Phil AA 24: 322.

¹¹ V-Log/ Blom, AA 24: 53.

¹² V-Log/ Phil, AA 24: 495.

¹³ They are opposed. V-Log/ Phil, AA 24: 493.

¹⁴ V-Log/ Blom, AA 24: 299.

¹⁵ The relation between taste and genius has been a major topic of discussion. Alexander Pope described genius as an irreducible dimension within taste and learning (Pope, A., 1711. *An Essay on Criticism*. London: Lewis, 48f). In *An Essay on Taste*, translated into German in 1766, Alexander Gerard wrote a chapter about it. According to him, both spring from imagination and do not have a regular relation (Gerard, A., 1759. *An Essay on Taste*. London, p. 177). Later, Herder established a priority of taste. This is considered by Herder as a presupposition of genius. Indeed, taste is described as a set of faculties, while genius is considered as some kind of ordering of them (Herder, J. G., 1964. Ursachen des gesunkenen Geschmacks bei den verschiedenen Völkern, da er geblühet. In: *Herders Werke in fünf Bänden*, drittes Band. Aufbau Verlag, p. 158).

taste.¹⁶ Unfortunately, this difference is not explained in the notes. Finally, another aspect of the doctrine of genius that is elaborated in this lecture describes some empirical determinations of the development of genius. The notes refer to some conditions verified in the countries where genius is specially cultivated. In countries that are small and free, like Greece and England, beauty sciences (*schöne Wissenschaften*)¹⁷ and Philosophy can be improved.¹⁸ For Kant, Germany seems to be a place where genius is not cultivated.¹⁹

Kant also talked about genius in his courses on Anthropology. Several manuscripts of Anthropology notes have been published in the *Akademie Ausgabe*. Two of these might be based on the lectures of the winter semester of 1772/73. They are the so-called Collins and Parow Anthropology. A further set from the winter semester 1775/76 has been published as the Friedländer Anthropology. In them, we can find a study of three principal topics of interest. These are, namely, i) the concept of wit, ii) the explanation of our *Gemütsfähigkeiten*, and iii) the doctrine of genius.

For Kant, wit is a capacity that is necessary for the production of concepts since it makes it possible to compare representations and to find similarities between them. In this sense, it becomes necessary to consider the difference between wit and two other faculties, which are our Judgement and our understanding. Briefly, the main difference between wit and Judgement is that the latter differentiates between our representations, by identifying their variations, while wit recognizes their similarities. On the other hand, our understanding provides some formal element for concepts, while wit presents their content. For Kant, the development of these capacities in the European countries has been uneven: the Germans have great understanding, the English have better wit, and the French have good Judgement.²⁰

In the German translation of Baumgarten, the second meaning of *ingenium* was called *Kopf*. Kant explained this concept in his lectures. The *Kopf* is the totality of our faculties of knowledge. Each person has a proportion of them. This proportion makes a person able to improve

¹⁶ V-Log/ Blom, AA 24: 46; V-Log/ Hintz, AA 24: 943.

¹⁷ On the development and the meaning of this concept, see Strube, W., 1990. Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften'. *Archiv Für Begriffsgeschichte*, 33.

¹⁸ V-Log/ Phil, AA 24: 325.

¹⁹ V-Log/ Hinz, AA 24: 943. This topic is also developed in the lectures on Anthropology. V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 437.

²⁰ V-Anth/ Coll, AA 25: 133, 152f. V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 341, 355. V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 515, 518.

some kind of science. Like Baumgarten, Kant identified an empirical, a poetical, a mathematical and a philosophical *Kopf*. So far, Kant remained faithful to Baumgarten. But a difference emerged when he explained the contrast between mathematical and philosophical *Köpfe*. For Kant, Mathematics can be considered an art, since it can be taught.²¹ In Mathematics we can follow some order²² and learn through instruction.²³ None of this is possible in the case of Philosophy. That science requires wit to change the disposition of the objects and analyse the consequences of this change.²⁴ A method cannot be developed through instruction, because we do not have a method for the development of methods. A method is something that we have to invent for ourselves.²⁵ Kant concludes that Philosophy is a science of genius.²⁶

The concept of *Kopf* in Baumgarten involves some proportion of our cognitive faculties, so that it seems to be the intellectual component of our *Naturell*. Kant explained the relation between these concepts in his lectures on Anthropology. In Collins, we can read that the innate aptitudes of the *Kopf* belong to *Naturell*.²⁷ In Parow, the former is defined as the set of our capacities of knowledge.²⁸ The concept of *Naturell* involves our capacities (*Fähigkeiten*) and our faculties (*Vermögen*). The capacities of knowledge are called *Kopf*, while the active faculties of knowledge are called *genius*.²⁹ In Friedländer, there is a change. *Naturell* is presented as the totality of our capacities (*Gemütsfähigkeiten*). The *Kopf* seems to be a part of it, since it is defined as the sum of our forces of knowledge (*Erkenntniskräfte*). Talent, on the other hand, is the totality of our gifts (*Gemütsgabe*). If *Naturell* is an aptitude of apprehending, talent is related to the capacity of creating. Genius is a capacity to create, i.e. a talent, without any instruction.³⁰

The concept of genius is defined in Collins and Parow as an *original spirit*.³¹ In Parow, it is, moreover, defined as a spirit from which we

²¹ V-Anth/ Coll, AA 25: 164.

²² V-Anth/ Par, AA 25:364.

²³ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 556.

²⁴ V-Anth/ Coll, AA 25: 164.

²⁵ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 556.

²⁶ V-Anth/ Coll, AA 25: 164. V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 556.

²⁷ V-Anth/ Coll, AA 25: 226.

²⁸ V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 363.

²⁹ V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 436.

³⁰ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 554f.

³¹ V-Anth/ Coll, AA 25:167. V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 366.

can derive the origin of our thoughts.³² The spirit is not to be confused with genius. Several things express spirit, such as a speech, a society or a picture, without being products of genius.³³ Spirit is what vivifies (*das Belebende*);³⁴ it is a principle of life.³⁵ Kant underlined the idea of an “original spirit.” This originality is opposed to imitation.³⁶ This opposition, which is maintained in Friedländer,³⁷ becomes meaningful when we consider i) the difference between Mathematics and Philosophy, and ii) the mistakes in German education. It seems that, for Kant, there is no necessity of originality in Mathematics. This science can be taught because it has stable rules. German pedagogy, on the other hand, is grounded in the idea of copying. This is the reason why there are no German geniuses.³⁸

In Friedländer, genius is described as a creative talent that *has* spirit.³⁹ The doctrine of genius is explained more profoundly here. Genius is presented as innate⁴⁰ and rare.⁴¹ It is a capacity for creating without instruction – so that it cannot be learned or obtained, – or rules.⁴² Genius is described as *free* of rules. Moreover, it is a model of rules. Imitators take its productions as a pattern. In other words, it does not follow rules, but provides them.⁴³

Note that Kant emphasises that rules are, however, critical. Everything we do is organised by rules. People without genius cannot overlook the rules. They are necessary for life. It is furthermore crucial to note that genius itself provides the rule when it produces something. For genius, there is no given rule. For this reason, standard forms of education can be unfavourable to genius. In school, people are taught to respect the rules. According to this kind of instruction, they cannot act without rules. But that is precisely what genius does.⁴⁴ In other words,

³² V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 437.

³³ A “spirit of observation” is, furthermore, mentioned. It is to be found in the medical *Kopf*. V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 363.

³⁴ V-Anth/ Coll, AA 25:167. V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 557.

³⁵ V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 366.

³⁶ V-Anth/ Coll, AA 25: 167, 227. V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 437.

³⁷ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 557.

³⁸ V-Anth/ Coll, AA 2: 227. V-Anth/ Par, AA 25: 437.

³⁹ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 557.

⁴⁰ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 556.

⁴¹ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 557.

⁴² The thesis that genius cannot be learned is established in the lectures on Metaphysics of this period, i.e. the so-called Metaphysik L1, too. Cf. V-Met, PM 164.

⁴³ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 556f.

⁴⁴ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 556.

there are ruled and unruled actions. Unruled actions alone correspond to genius and are restricted to its genial production. Standard forms of education are not adequate to the end of developing this kind of production.

Some of these issues are further developed in the notes on Philosophical Encyclopaedia. Kant taught this subject from 1767 to 1782, with a three years interruption between 1772 and 1775, but we only have some notes taken around the middle of the silent decade.⁴⁵ In the notes based on Kant's lectures, we find a classification of the sciences. On the one hand, there are the sciences of erudition (*Wissenschaften der Gelahrtheit*), such as History. On the other hand, there are the rational sciences (*Wissenschaften der Einsicht*), such as Mathematics and Philosophy.⁴⁶ The difference between the latter is, for Kant, related to their form, and not to their objects.⁴⁷ Philosophy is the science of concepts, while Mathematics is the science that constructs them. For that reason, Philosophy is a discursive science while Mathematics is an intuitive one.⁴⁸ Another significant difference between them is the following. Mathematics can be taught: there are rules that one can learn in order to become a Mathematician. This is not so with Philosophy. We cannot memorise a system of Philosophy and then teach it. First of all, there is no such perfect system to be memorised. There is no model to be imitated. Secondly, Philosophy is not just a set of pieces of knowledge. It also involves a method. Someone who would teach Philosophy should explain how to philosophise.⁴⁹

According to this idea of Philosophy, there are some expectations about the nature of a philosopher. A philosopher is not supposed to be superstitious, nor an imitator. Philosophy, like the taste, needs genius and not imitation.⁵⁰ At this point, the question arises about the nature of genius. Genius is not the same as talent. It is, nevertheless, a kind of

⁴⁵ Kühn, M., 1983. Dating Kant's Vorlesungen über philosophische Enzyklopädie. *Kant-Studien*, 74, pp. 302–13.

⁴⁶ PhilEnz, AA 29: 5.

⁴⁷ This is a thesis that Kant reiterates from the very beginning of the sixties. In the commented notes on logic, however, the classical rationalistic thesis, according to which the difference between Mathematics and Philosophy is determined by their objects, is also stated by Kant. See Deut, AA 2: 276, V-Log/Blom, AA 24: 24.

⁴⁸ PhilEnz, AA 29: 6. This contrast is also presented in the lectures on Anthropology. In Friedländer, the mathematical talent is described as intuitive, while the philosophical talent is a discursive one. Cf. V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 558.

⁴⁹ PhilEnz, AA 29: 7.

⁵⁰ PhilEnz, AA 29: 10.

talent. Genius is a talent from which many others originate, and it is free of ends. Kant also stated that the talent needed in Philosophy, i.e. genius, is quite different from the talent needed by the builder who constructs concepts, i.e. the Mathematician.⁵¹ A philosopher must have wit and the capacity of considering abstractly the singular and concretely the general.⁵² He cannot imitate and requires genius, like taste.⁵³

2. The first turn: Kant and Gerard⁵⁴

In 1774 a major contribution to the topic of genius was published by Alexander Gerard. This is his *Essay on Genius*. In 1776, the text was translated into German, by Christian Garve.⁵⁵ Kant got notice of this book immediately.⁵⁶ Indeed, he wrote an annotation on it in those years. Specifically, in R494⁵⁷ Kant suggested an objection to Gerard. He accused Gerard of considering genius as a particular capacity of our soul. In this case, genius would have a determinate object. Instead, it is, according to Kant, a *principium* for the vivification of our capacities through the ideas of the desired objects. Kant considered two different ways of producing. On the one hand, we can produce a determined object through one of our faculties. There is no explanation of the nature of this object and its determination. On the other hand, some principles can stimulate our capacities with the idea of the desired object.

An invention is the product of the stimulation of our faculties and not just a result of any of them. This invention requires an idea of the desired object and this idea intervenes in the stimulation. Without this idea, which is conceived as an aim of our production, we do not produce

⁵¹ PhilEnz, AA 29: 12.

⁵² PhilEnz, AA 29: 13.

⁵³ PhilEnz, AA 29: 10.

⁵⁴ In his book on this topic, Bruno considers Gerard as the main influence on Kant. I agree with him in considering Gerard as a great influence, but the basis for his conviction is not clear. See Bruno, P., 2010. *Kant's Concept of Genius*. Continuum, p. 30ff.

⁵⁵ On the reception of Gerard's *Essay*, see Klukoff, P. J., 1967. Review of Alexander Gerard. An *Essay on Genius* (1774), ed. by B. Fabian (Theorie und Geschichte der Literatur und der Schönen Künste, vol. III). München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, *Studies in Scottish Literature*, 5(3), pp. 201–202.

⁵⁶ A very detailed study of the relevance of Gerard for the evolution of Kantian doctrine of genius has been carried out by Piero Giordanetti (1991). Joāo Sinho Beckenkamp (Beckenkamp, J., 2015. Kant und Gerard über Einbildungskraft. In: Dörflinger, B., Rocca, C. La, Louden, R., Azevedo Marques, U. R. de. *Kant's Lectures / Kants Vorlesungen*. Walter de Gruyter; Beckenkamp, J., 2016. Kant e Gerard sobre imaginação. *Studia Kantiana*, 20, pp. 117–127) argues that the target of Kant's criticism was not actually Gerard, but a comment on Gerard, written by Johann N. Tetens.

⁵⁷ R. 494, phase φ, 1776–1778, in AA 15: 420f.

an invention, but an accidental discovery. An invention is something that has been produced in accordance with an idea. There is another Kantian consideration that is to be explored. This is, namely, a comparison between the stimulation of our cognitive faculties through an idea and the sharpening of our learning capacities.

Briefly, Kant distinguishes two different doctrines of genius. On the one hand, genius can be considered as (a) a singular power. This, according to Kant, is Gerard's idea of genius. On the other, it can be considered (b) as a principle of the animation of the other powers. I think that in the comparison between (a) and (b) and in the preference for (b), an argument with three moments is to be identified. The first moment is related to the *object* that is produced by genius. If genius were a power, its object would be a determinate one. But a genius as a principle of animation involves ideas of wanted objects. For Kant it seems obvious that the product of genius must be undetermined. The second step in Kant's argumentation is related to the *action* of genius: genius *invents*. Somebody who invents is considered a genius. However, in order to invent, having a great power of learning isn't enough. For this reason, a genius, i.e., someone who invents, is not just a person with developed powers. The third step in Kant's argumentation distinguishes invention from discovery. An invention is a creation of something that did not exist before. One discovers something that actually existed but was not known. To the end of inventing, it becomes necessary to have some idea. Then genius is an animation of powers through some ideas of a wanted object. To sum up, Kant considers that genius is not a power, but an animation of our powers. His argumentation is grounded on three premises. These are: i) invention does not suppose a determined object, ii) inventing is not the power of learning, iii) inventing is not discovering. Through this triple negation, Kant puts forward the representation of a genius who invents thanks to an animation of their powers through ideas.

The concept of idea is in this context especially meaningful. On the one hand, a stimulating idea grounds the possibility of the production of an object that is not determined. The product of a singular faculty is determined, but the product of our stimulated faculties can be whatever we want to produce. On the other hand, however, because of this idea, the product is not an accidental discovery, but an invention. The reason for this is that the idea functions as an end.

According to Beckenkamp, it is possible that R949 does not refer directly to Gerard's book. I think, however, that the analysis of the main

theses of Gerard's work makes it evident that the objections contained in this reflection are pertinent *apropos* of them, even if Kant had not read Gerard directly. Firstly, Gerard describes a genius as someone who has numerous powers. But the power that makes them a genius is their imagination. For Gerard, as for Kant, a genius invents. But invention is directly associated with a singular power, i.e., the imagination, and this association can be considered the target of Kant's objections. In the second place, a common misreading in the consideration of genius is the belief that it consists in the capacity of learning. This belief involves two mistakes. Firstly, it forgets that the capacity for learning belongs to the human condition, and is not, for this reason, a privilege of genius. Secondly, this belief does not consider that learning involves Judgement and memory, but not imagination. Kant picks up the argument of the difference between inventing and learning, and uses it against Gerard. To this end, Kant associates the capacity of learning with the development of a power, on the one hand, and invention with the animation of *all* powers, one the other. Thirdly, Gerard mentions two kinds of geniuses. Artistic genius produces beauty. Scientific genius discovers truths. Kant objects to this second kind of genius. In the analysed reflection, Kant explicitly regrets the assignment of discovery to genius. As a consequence of this differentiation and the identification of the genial task with inventing, the idea of a scientific genius should not be accepted.

2.1 The last years of the silent decade

In agreement with Tonelli's view, I think that, perhaps as a consequence of Kant's contact with Gerard's ideas, there was a turn after 1776. In the previous section, we studied the Kantian objections to Gerard's doctrine of genius – or to some interpretation of it. Kant considered that genius was not a singular faculty, but a harmonious unification of our faculties. These objections were presented in R 949. We have just one set of manuscripts that corresponds to the precritical lectures on Anthropology after this reflection. This is the Pillau Anthropology (1777–78).

Mixed up with the repetition of some topics that have been developed in the previous courses, such as the independence of genius from rules, its presentation as a source of rules and the emphasis on its innate character, we can find in the above-mentioned annotations some issues first presented in R 949. In Pillau, indeed, the distinction between inventing and discovering, the topic of the unity and harmony of our

faculties and the concept of an idea are explained. We can find other innovations that could be related to Gerard's book but are not mentioned in R 949. During the final years of the decade, Kant developed a concept of spirit that is not to be identified with the French concept "*esprit*" and is considered a synonym of genius. In what follows, we will examine our sources, in order to mention some insights that were developed before the reflection and maintained in Pillau, analyse the effects of the criticism of Gerard and describe and explain the changes matured in Pillau.

There are three main opinions that Kant preserved from the beginning of the decade. The first of them is the representation of genius as being free of rules. Furthermore, in Collins, Kant described the poet as having some freedom concerning the intellectual rules.⁵⁸ In addition, he still emphasised genial originality and linked it with spirit.⁵⁹ Finally, he insisted on discussing a topic that could be considered critical at the beginning of the decade. This is, *viz.*, the contrast between Philosophy and Mathematics. If Philosophy is to be considered a science of genius, Mathematics can be learned. This last point indicates that in the lectures of the end of the decade the restriction of genius to the sphere of art had not yet appeared. At the beginning of 1778, Kant still stated that there were sciences of genius.⁶⁰

In this set of notes, the difference between discovering and inventing, which played a significant role in the criticism of Gerard, is explained. Kant introduced it as an explanation for some phrases that are used in everyday speech. We say that someone has discovered something if they were the first in finding what was already there. In this set, there are two good examples of this kind of experience. Firstly, Kant repeated the instance of the discovery of America. Then, he mentioned the discovery of heliocentrism. America was already existent when Columbus arrived, and the Earth was already moving around the Sun before Copernicus. On the other hand, the above-mentioned example of the invention is Pythagoras' theorem.⁶¹

As in the previous lectures, in Pillau the concept of genius is linked with the invention.⁶² Two main features of genius are emphasised in the notes. It is first all a *principium* of the new and an original talent. Sec-

⁵⁸ V-Anth/ Col, AA 25: 761f.

⁵⁹ V-Anth/ Col, AA 25: 783.

⁶⁰ V-Anth/ Col, AA 25: 784.

⁶¹ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 758.

⁶² V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 784.

ondly, it has spirit, which makes it rare.⁶³ Both features are connected, since genius and spirit can be considered identical, and originality is their main feature.⁶⁴ There is a detailed explanation of these concepts in the notes. It is to be emphasised that Kant did not confuse imagination and genius. He inquired into the nature of the mentioned *principium* of originality. For him, this nature cannot be easily defined. The products of the imagination are chaotic, but the product of genius is organised according to an idea.⁶⁵ Moreover, genius cannot be considered as a singular faculty. The spirit, according to Kant, is not a faculty, but something that gives unity and harmony to our faculties.⁶⁶

The concept of spirit received much attention in this lecture. In the French language, the concept of “*esprit*” is ambiguous and means not only genius, but also wit.⁶⁷ In the German language, two different words refer to different talents. Our talents are aptitudes to make use of certain faculties. They are gifts.⁶⁸ Wit is a talent required for comparing things.⁶⁹ Spirit is a talent to invent or create.⁷⁰ As mentioned previously, this capacity of invention involves a special unity and harmony of our faculties. Although it is not easy to explain the relation between this disposition of our capacities and a gift that makes us able to invent. Kant does so through the doctrine of ideas.

First of all, the concept of spirit can be considered as an adjective.⁷¹ We can use it to describe a book, society or even a person. We say that they have spirit and we mean that they are stimulated (*belebend*). This representation of being stimulated is linked to a particular disposition of our faculties, in which they are in a harmonious play (*harmonische Spiele*). This harmony can make us eloquent, if our concepts are stimulated, or poetic, if our sensibility is stimulated.⁷² Poetry and eloquence seem to be two spiritual talents. The stimulation of our sensibility

⁶³ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 784.

⁶⁴ Cf. V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 772, 782.

⁶⁵ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 783.

⁶⁶ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 782.

⁶⁷ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 782. This point is not explained in the studied sources. Tonelli states that spirit is called *genius* by the French because the word *esprit* means ‘wit’. (Tonelli, G., 1966. Kant’s Early Theory of Genius (1770–1779): Part II. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 4(3), p. 116).

⁶⁸ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 780.

⁶⁹ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 753f.

⁷⁰ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 781.

⁷¹ Tonelli considers that we can find several meanings for the word “spirit” in Kant’s reflections during these years. (Tonelli, G., 1966. Kant’s Early Theory of Genius (1770–1779): Part II, *ibid.*, p. 115)

⁷² V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 772.

through an idea produces the harmony that characterises genius. This idea is not an intellectual concept. Intellectual concepts are originated by our understanding through abstraction. An idea is a design for a whole and involves its unity. This kind of representation is necessary when we want to produce (*verfertigen*) something or to design a whole science.⁷³

According to this interpretation of the text, genius originates new, original representations. It has a spirit that provides harmony to its faculties through ideas. This harmony is actually a stimulation of sensibility that makes genius able to invent. This invention is not grounded in rules or intellectual concepts. Moreover, it is based on ideas, which are drafts or designs of desired representations. For this reason, genius is free from the coercion of rules,⁷⁴ since it is not stimulated by concepts and does not follow them in order to create. The origins of this creation do not lie in abstraction, but rather in ideas.

3. The second turn: Kant on Shakespeare

In relation to the issue I am interested in addressing in this section of my paper, which is the Kantian view of William Shakespeare as a genius, the documents of the 1770s and 1780s exhibit a subtle, but not non-existent, process in which some changes can be seen. I have already pointed out the effect on these documents of Kant's reception of Alexander Gerard. Moreover, since the 1780s, Kant's doctrine of genius seems to have become much more specific, including a detailed treatment of the faculties of genius, the notion of aesthetic ideas, and the role of scholastic training in the manifestation of genius.⁷⁵

One of the most evident changes over the two decades prior to the publication of the *Critique of Judgement* concerns precisely the scope of genius. In the 70s, Kant still admitted the possibility of genius expressing itself in some areas of knowledge. Already in the *Critique of Judgement*, he not only rejected the consideration of outstanding scientists, such as Newton, as holders of genius, but even restricted the list of artists he included in this select group.

One of the most notable cases is precisely that of William Shakespeare. Although, according to the testimony of his students, Kant mentioned him in his lectures in the 1780s, his name does not appear in the

⁷³ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 782.

⁷⁴ V-Anth/ Pill, AA 25: 784.

⁷⁵ For a detailed explanation of this, see Martínez, L., 2020. El desarrollo del genio artístico, *Con-Textos Kantianos*, 11, pp. 176–190.

edition of the *Critique of Judgement*. In order to suggest some reasons for this omission, we will first briefly comment on the relevance of the dramatist in the Enlightenment discussions of genius. Secondly, we will dwell on the passages in the Kantian corpus in which he is mentioned. Finally, we will review the changes in the consideration of genius in the years between these passages and the publication of the *Critique of Judgement*.

3.1 Shakespeare's controversial genius

At the end of the 17th century, certain poetic ideas were developed in France that sought to regulate artistic production in accordance with Aristotelian indications, reinterpreted. This artistic movement had supporters of the stature of Nicolas Boileau. Already in the first lines of the third canto of his *L'Art poétique* (1674), Boileau makes clear what the basic rules of dramaturgy are. William Shakespeare's plays violated such rules. His figure has been instituted, precisely, as a paradigm of the break with neoclassicism and of a revision of the possibility of establishing rules for art.⁷⁶

In France, in Voltaire's texts, references to Shakespeare combine praise with harsh criticism. If Voltaire recognises him as the father of English theatre and does not fail to point out his genius, the bad taste, banality and chaos of his plays are also identified by the French author.⁷⁷ In England, Edward Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition* (1759) relegate the problem of taste to the background and rescue, instead, the *originality* of Shakespeare's work. The modern writer must make a choice: either repeat tradition or invent something new. The original genius chooses the second of these options. For Young, moreover, excessive admiration of the classics must be avoided, for it could act as an inhibitor of creativity.⁷⁸ In this direction, Alexander Gerard mentions Shakespeare as a model of supreme genius. Gerard, however, highlights the relevance of judgement in artistic production and points out that although in Shakespeare's work judgement is subordinated to genius, its

⁷⁶ Cf. Olszewicki, N., 2022. El concepto de 'genio' en la Francia pre-Ilustrada. In: Martínez, L., E. Ponce, E. *El genio en el siglo XVIII*. Herder, pp. 13–32.

⁷⁷ Cf. Brandão, R., 2014. Voltaire sobre Shakespeare e Newton ou o gênio e o gosto nas artes e ciências. *Discurso*, 1(44), pp. 161–188.

⁷⁸ Nascimento, L., 2022. Crear y apreciar: el genio en la Inglaterra del siglo XVIII. In: Martínez, L., E. Ponce, E. *El genio en el siglo XVIII*. Herder, pp. 77–100.

function is not eliminated.⁷⁹

In Germany, Johann Christophe Gottsched tried unsuccessfully to maintain the classical French roots, even avoiding the use of the term “genius”. The English influence, however, was massive. The doctrine of genius in Germany was immediately confronted with attempts to subsume artistic creation under rules, and in the work of numerous thinkers such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Johann Gottfried Herder it was directly associated with the example of Shakespeare.⁸⁰ Herder links artistic genius with the ability to express the spirit of a nation in an epoch. The rules had succeeded in capturing this element in classical antiquity, but their recovery by the moderns constituted a kind of blindness, a mistake. Shakespeare's creative capacity consists, for Herder, precisely in being able to express the spirit of an epoch.⁸¹

3.2 Mentions of Shakespeare in the Kantian corpus

In this general framework, it is interesting to note that we find some mentions of the dramatist in Kantian sources. Most of these sources are notes from students attending Kant's courses. Admittedly, these sources present specific difficulties,⁸² but they serve as testimony that Kant was aware of the aforementioned controversies and intervened by defending Shakespeare's genius in his lectures. There is a reference to Shakespeare in the lectures on Philosophical Encyclopaedia, supposedly taken in 1775/76. Kant discusses the utility of literature for the development (*Bildung*) of the human character and mentions the case of the Shakespeare's *Comedien*. Kant states in the text that to this end it is crucial that the work is produced by genius.⁸³ In a similar way, the Shakespearean

⁷⁹ Amaral, A., 2022. El genio y la naturaleza humana según Gerard. In: Martínez, L., E. Ponce, E. *El genio en el siglo XVIII*. Herder, pp. 127–146.

⁸⁰ Del Valle, J., 2022. Dos glosas sobre A. G. Baumgarten dentro de la historia del concepto de genio en el siglo XVIII. In: Martínez, L., Ponce, E. *El genio en el siglo XVIII*. Herder, pp. 147–170.

⁸¹ López Domínguez, V., 2022. La idea de genio en Herder y el Sturm und Drang. In: Martínez, L., Ponce, E. *El genio en el siglo XVIII*. Herder, ibid., pp. 191–208.

⁸² For an insight into the difficulties involved in working with lecture notes and the methodological issues to be taken into account, see Conrad, E., 1994. *Kants Logikvorlesungen als neuer Schlüssel zur Architektonik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Ausarbeitung der Gliederungsentwürfe in den Logikvorlesungen als Auseinandersetzung mit der Tradition*, ibid., pp. 52–61; Hinske, N., 1999. *Tra Illuminismo e critica della ragione. Studi sul corpus logico kantiano*, ibid., p. 12. Also, about Kant's “double life thesis” and the relationship between what he taught in his classes and what he wrote in his works, cf. Sánchez Rodríguez, M., 2015. Estudio preliminar, ibid., pp. xvi–xix.

⁸³ V-Phil Enz, AA 29: 29.

comedies had already been referred to in the previous Lectures on Anthropology. Both in Collins⁸⁴ and Parows⁸⁵ a passage from *As You Like It* is invoked. This reference is to be found in Home's *Elements of Criticism*, too. Like Home,⁸⁶ Kant considered that Shakespeare deeply understood the human heart, and, for this reason, his work was useful for anthropological research.⁸⁷

At the very beginning of the silent decade, Shakespeare was mentioned in relation to the concept of esthetical perfection. This requires taste, spirit, sensation (*Empfindung*) and Judgement. The distinction between them and their relation is unfortunately not explained. It is stated that some of them are to be found in different proportions within different countries. In Germany the Judgement is more developed, while in France people have better taste. In Shakespeare's texts we can find spirit, *but not taste*.⁸⁸ This topic is also introduced in the lectures *Menschenkunde* (1780/1781). In this source, the requirements for genius are examined. They are, namely, sensation, Judgement, spirit, and taste. Sensation involves sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) and imagination. It is, so Kant, specially developed in Shakespeare. The British author is not identified in this lecture as an example for spirit, but for sensation.⁸⁹

The lack of taste in Shakespeare's work is mentioned in these notes as well. An interesting metaphor is used there to explain the relation between the faculties that are required by genius. This is the metaphor of a tree. The relation with vegetation for the description of genius was already used in Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition* (1759).⁹⁰ Kant introduced it for the first time, according to the available documents, in the lectures on Anthropology of the winter semester 1781/82. He explained the original, i.e. genial, production as a mirror of a tree, in which each element has a meaning, i.e. a function. The taste is presented as the flower of the tree, which makes this one pretty but not productive. The actual product of the tree is a fruit. We can get, then, original products, that is: fruits, that do not involve taste. Shakespeare is mentioned as an example of this kind of production. His work is not delicate, but rough.⁹¹

⁸⁴ V-Ant/ Col, AA 25: 120.

⁸⁵ V-Ant/ Par, AA 25: 336.

⁸⁶ Home, H., 2005. *Elements of Criticism*. Liberty Fund.

⁸⁷ V-Anth/ Fried, AA 25: 472; V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25: 858.

⁸⁸ V-Ant/ Col, AA 25: 175, n.

⁸⁹ V-Anth/ Mensch, AA 25: 1060.

⁹⁰ Ritter, J., 1971. Genie. In: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. Schwabe Verlag, v. 3, p. 283.

⁹¹ V-Anth/ Mensch, AA 25: 1062; also, V-Anth/ Mrong, AA 25: 1312; R.1509, AA 15:823.

In the same notes, Shakespeare is considered as a paradigm of another crucial aspect of genius. Since the beginning of the silent decade, genius had been described by Kant as the opposite of imitation. A genius produces without copying others' productions. It creates originals and does not follow rules. This is the point in which Shakespeare appears in *Menschenkunde* as the best example of genius. He did not respect the classic drama rules. The reason for this is not some lack of knowledge. His imagination is rich and not to be limited by external rules. As a genius, he is not a slave of rules but a master of them. His own, free creations are to be considered as rules. Conventional rules go against the possibility of the development of genial products. However, this is not to be considered as an apology of disobedience, but as a *licentia poetica*.⁹²

Without later explanation, Shakespeare is finally mentioned in some manuscripts from the end of the 1780 decade. There his name is used to differentiate genius from mere talent. This one is able to be cultivated and developed. Genius, on the other hand, is just given and cannot be increased.⁹³ After this, the only remaining reference to the British author is in the published text of *Anthropology*. This reference, however, does not refer to the writer's aesthetic virtues, but to one of his characters' capacity to fantasise.

In short, the passages under discussion highlight one of Shakespeare's virtues: his originality. This originality is linked to his genius and not to a talent. It also involves a deviation from the rules which Kant admits only as poetic licence. But over the years Kant also pointed out a weakness of the dramatist, associated with his lack of taste. His work is neither subtle nor meticulous, but crude and rough.

3.3 A piece of speculation: about the lack of Shakespeare in the Critique of Judgement

In the most elaborate and careful text devoted to the study of genius, Shakespeare is not mentioned. I refer in particular to the explanation of the doctrine of genius that Kant included in the deduction of judgements of taste in the *Critique of Judgement*. In this account of the subject, Kant does not mention Shakespeare. Considering that this writer was regarded by several thinkers as a model of genius and that Kant himself had mentioned him earlier, the omission may come as a surprise.

⁹² V-Anth/ Mensch, AA 25: 1057.

⁹³ V-Anth/ Dohna, Ko 171; V-Anth/ Bus, AA 25: 1496.

Within the limitations of this contribution, we cannot analyse the changes in the doctrine of genius as it is presented in the *Critique of Judgement*. Nevertheless, I would like to highlight some peculiar aspects of this text. First, the doctrine of genius appears in the context of a justification of the thesis that judgements of taste are based on a priori principles. The guiding thread of the text is provided, precisely, by the investigation of reflective judgement. In this framework, the doctrine of genius allows Kant to introduce a key notion for understanding beauty. This is presented, after all, as an expression of aesthetic ideas.⁹⁴ Kant explains the possibility of judgements of taste about artistic objects through an analysis of the concept of art that concur in the explanation of genius. Thus, in the general investigation of the a priori principles of reflective judgement it becomes possible for Kant to intervene in the debate about genius, which had already developed extensively in and outside Prussia. The Kantian doctrine of genius contains numerous specificities. One of them is that it includes a notion of the spirit and, with it, of aesthetic ideas. The inclusion of aesthetic ideas in this context also constitutes real progress in the understanding of beauty. For this notion makes it possible to understand what natural beauty and artistic beauty have in common and makes the possibility of pure aesthetic judgement in general comprehensible.

Aesthetic ideas have their origin in a highly developed imagination, which for Kant is a talent.⁹⁵ The expression (*Ausdruck*) of these ideas, however, involves two aptitudes.⁹⁶ On the one hand, it is necessary to find a suitable concept to present them. Aesthetic ideas cannot be exposed (*exponiert*), since they are representations of intuition for which no concept is adequate. However, they can be presented (*dargestellt*).⁹⁷ Finding a concept that presents an aesthetic idea is a skill of the spirit.⁹⁸ But this only provides the material for the art. The material of art is, I repeat, an aesthetic idea associated with a concept. The work of art also requires someone to give form to that material. Giving form to the material consists of presenting it through words, or marble manipulation, or a combination of aquarelles. Although beautiful art differs from mechanical art, in the *Critique of Judgement* Kant mentions that the production of beautiful art

⁹⁴ KU, AA 05: 320.

⁹⁵ KU, AA 05: 342.

⁹⁶ This broader view of the notion of genius, found in the *Critique of Judgement*, has already been described in detail by Robert Clewis, who distinguishes a 'thin' and a 'thick' version of it. (Clewis, R., 2023. *The Origins of Kant's Aesthetics*. Greenwich Medical Media, p. 103f).

⁹⁷ KU, AA 05: 342.

⁹⁸ KU, AA 05: 314.

does involve a mechanical aspect. Here Kant recaptures the importance of the scholastic training of the artist. Thanks to it, the artist is able to elaborate his material and “come out on top before the Judgement.”⁹⁹

In the whole consideration of art that Kant develops, rules and schools have a function.¹⁰⁰ It is true that much of the development of the doctrine of genius, especially during the pre-critical period, is closely linked to the investigation of the conditions under which it is possible to think and create without following models. A crucial question in this framework is the question of the role of education in relation to the production of genius. Kant is emphatic about the thesis that genius is innate and not acquired, and cannot be learned. Furthermore, the philosopher wonders whether and how it is possible that education does not affect the possibility for genius to express itself. The school, in the various spheres of human experience, appears to be the space to teach and train people to follow the rules. This is precisely the opposite of genius. The concern about the possibility of the school becoming an obstacle to the expression of genius is a constant in Kant's thought, according to the available evidence.

In the *Critique of Judgement*, however, the references to school education are less unambiguous. On the one hand, Kant is still aware that the genius aspects of artistic beauty cannot be learned and that mere teaching does not make us capable of producing beautiful art. Beautiful art does not follow rules, but provides new rules and is therefore original.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, however, Kant recognises that school is the place where technique is trained. It is at school that artists learn the details of metrics, the manipulation of materials and the elements of harmony.¹⁰² The notion of genius associated with the figure of Shakespeare was a kind of negation of this.

It has already been pointed out in more exhaustive research works than this one that the omission of Shakespeare may be associated with an intervention by Kant in the context of the emergence of Romanticism.¹⁰³ By virtue of the general thread of the 1790 text and the function that the

⁹⁹ KU, AA 05:310.

¹⁰⁰ J. Lemos has analysed in detail the difficulties that arise in the passages of the KU dealing with genius around these theses. He finds and resolves some tensions that we do not elaborate here. See: Lemos, J., 2017. *Se e como poderá uma obra de arte ser bela*. Madrid: CTK E-Books, Ediciones Alamanda, p. 232ff.

¹⁰¹ KU, AA 05: 307.

¹⁰² KU, AA 05: 309.

¹⁰³ Del Valle, J., 2004. *Der Kompass und die Segel. Kants Bestimmung der Kunst und des Genies, Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg*. Publisher.

doctrine of aesthetic ideas has in it, I think that, in addition, there are internal, systematic motives in the work that can also make this decision of the philosopher from Königsberg explainable. These reasons have to do with the fact that along with the spirit, other talents are required for artistic beauty, such as Judgement. With a cultivated doctrine of aesthetic ideas it becomes clear that a multiplicity of talents is involved in the expression of them. And such talents, in the usual view of the time, are not present in Shakespeare's compositions.

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How is Metaphysics Possible without Transcending Experience?

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Abstract: The article challenges Kant's view that metaphysical knowledge is purely conceptual and transcends experience, exploring whether metaphysics can be linked to some sort of empirical data. Contrasting Kant's conception of metaphysics with the pragmatist view, particularly Peirce's idea that metaphysics should align with facts, the article examines contemporary research on anomalous phenomena, such as reincarnation and other cases, as potential empirical evidence for metaphysical claims. By applying Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms and Feyerabend's anarchistic approach to science, the article suggests that grounding metaphysics in empirical facts could bridge the gap between speculative theories and observable reality, enriching our understanding of consciousness and reality.

Keywords: Anomalous Phenomena, Deductive Science, Empirical Data, Experience, Inductive Science, Kantian Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science

Introduction

The Kantian conception of metaphysics remains one of the most important in contemporary philosophy. It cannot be ignored and is often debated by philosophers advocating different approaches to metaphysical inquiries, as well as by representatives of various specialized sciences who engage in philosophical discussions. In Kant's epistemology, the distinction between metaphysical and scientific (empirical) knowledge is based on the criterion of experience – scientific knowledge is immanent or empirical knowledge, a synthesis of concepts and sensibly accessible phenomena. In Kant's philosophy, metaphysical knowledge is understood as being carried out solely through concepts – it is transemperical, or knowledge that transcends the realm of empirical phenom-

ena. Kant grants only the science of mathematics the right to develop knowledge by constructing concepts – operating within the framework of pure reason. However, ultimately, even the results of this knowledge are, in one way or another, connected to empirical objects. Metaphysical knowledge is purely conceptual knowledge that transcends experience.¹ Therefore, metaphysics, not being synthetic, is also not scientific. However, Kant allows metaphysical statements to exist as statements of faith, as certain postulates of practical reason.

Kantian metaphysics distinguishes between two types: transcendent and transcendental. The critique of the first type allows Kant to develop (transcendental) metaphysics as a specific science that examines the cognitive capacities of the human mind. In his theory, Kant discusses a priori concepts (space, time, categories, schemas) and the various theoretical principles derived from them, which are applied, for example, in the sciences of nature and mathematics. One of the most important theses of Kant's critical philosophy is his belief that a priori concepts are meaningful only as conceptual instruments for empirical knowledge. When applied transcendentally – when a priori concepts are used to examine various metaphysical entities (such as the soul, God, and the world as a whole) – the mind becomes entangled in antinomies – insoluble metaphysical paradoxes. Kant completely rejects the possibility of any transempirical knowledge through pure concepts: these concepts are not tools for knowledge that transcends experience. Kant examines the critique of cognition that transcends experience and the illusion of metaphysical cognition through pure concepts in detail in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, specifically in the section on 'Transcendental Dialectics'.²

However, this is just one way to understand metaphysical knowledge and the concept of experience in general. In pragmatism philosophy, represented by key classical figures such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and others, the concept of experience is much broader than in Kantian philosophy. It encompasses not only sensory observation and empirical knowledge – conceptualized theoretically as aspects of external experience – but also phenomena of internal experience, such as emotions and various religious experiences.³ In pragmatism, the concept of experience is related to the concept of practical action. The jus-

¹ Kant, I., 1998. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 109.

² Kant, I., 1998. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ibid.

³ Nekrašas, E., 2010. *Pozityvus protas. Jo raida ir įtaka modernybei ir postmodernybei*. Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, pp. 17, 288–289.

tification of ideas, concepts, and theories in practice, or in practical human activity, is understood as a way to determine their validity. In this theoretical context, we can refer to C. S. Peirce's view that metaphysics must be aligned with facts and that metaphysical statements are merely preliminary hypotheses. Kant, like the positivist philosophers, believes that scientific metaphysics is fundamentally impossible because it does not examine empirical objects. Peirce, unlike Kant, believed that one need not be overly stubborn or dogmatic about any particular metaphysics or metaphysical statements. Metaphysical systems are preliminary and should be aligned with empirical facts. For Peirce, metaphysics is a broad science that encompasses all other sciences as its branches.⁴ So, can there be, and how might there be, a metaphysics that does not transcend experience?⁵

What is beyond the Kantian paradigm of metaphysics?

The main theoretical elements of the Kantian conception of metaphysics – the distinction between the types of transcendental and transcendent metaphysics, and the understanding of traditional or speculative metaphysics as a form of purely conceptual knowledge that transcends experience – can be described as essential components of the Kantian metaphysical paradigm. It is a specifically Kantian understanding of metaphysics, to which other conceptions of metaphysics or methods of justifying metaphysical claims can be opposed. For example, if there were real facts that could serve as empirical data for some form of metaphysics, we could argue that metaphysics does not necessarily have to exist only as purely conceptual constructions – as is asserted in the Kantian conception of metaphysics. In such a case, certain metaphysical statements could appeal to empirical facts and would not transcend experience. We could align metaphysical theories with facts, similarly to how theories in the natural sciences are aligned with facts.

⁴ Feibleman, J., 1945. Peirce's Use of Kant. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 42(14), p. 371. Peirce's ideas in relation to Kant's theoretical philosophy were examined in more detail in my dissertation, specifically in section 4.3.3, "The Rejection of Kantian Distinctions Between the Thing-in-Itself and Phenomenon, Sensibility and Thought: C. S. Peirce" – see: Rimkus, E., 2014. *The Kantian Conception of Experience and Its Reception*. Doctoral dissertation. Vilnius: Vilnius University Press, pp. 122–128.

⁵ This article is based on the presentation 'How is metaphysics possible without transcending experience?' The presentation was delivered at the scientific conference 'Scientia et Historia' on April 4, 2024, at the Lithuanian Culture Research Institute. The conference was held to commemorate the 300th anniversary of Immanuel Kant's birth.

In examining the question of how there might be a metaphysics that does not transcend experience, the studies of reincarnation by J. B. Tucker and his mentor I. P. Stevenson may be relevant. Ian Stevenson, head of the Department of Psychiatry and Neurology at the University of Virginia, began studying children's memories of past lives in 1960.⁶ After his death in 2007, his student, psychiatrist Jim Tucker, along with others, has continued this research to this day. Both academics became well-known for their publications, conference presentations, and various appearances on television programs and internet platforms, discussing children (approximately 2 to 7 years old) who claim to remember their past lives. As Tucker states, over a period of more than 60 years, the University of Virginia database has accumulated more than 2,500 such accounts from various countries around the world. Interestingly, some of these accounts are referred to as 'strong cases' because they have been verified in the sense that real individuals have been found whose life facts match the children's stories. These authors also discuss birthmarks – some children who begin talking about their past lives have various unusual physical anomalies, such as being born without fingers, and these anomalies correspond to different traumas experienced by individuals from their past lives, as described by the children.⁷ Moreover, it is important to note that children who talk about their past lives are found not only in countries where the doctrine of reincarnation is religiously practiced but also in various Western countries, including Catholic families.

What to do with such facts? Do they prove that the phenomenon of reincarnation itself exists? As the researchers themselves state, reincarnation is one of the best hypotheses available that theoretically explains these facts. One could also speculate differently – that the fact that children somehow obtain information about people who lived in the past and identify with them only demonstrates that human consciousness is capable of acquiring information about others who have already died in ways that we do not understand. Thus, such phenomena may not necessarily prove the transmigration of the soul into other bodies. Maybe such stories do not necessarily prove that the child and the character in their stories are the same person. Just as a single computer can connect to the internet, so too might human consciousness connect to some sort of

⁶ Tucker, J. B., 2008. Ian Stevenson and Cases of the Reincarnation Type. *Journal of Scientific Exploration*, 22(1), pp. 36–43.

⁷ Stevenson, I., 1997a. *Reincarnation and Biology: A Contribution to the Etiology of Birthmarks and Birth Defects* (2 Vols.). Westport, CT: Praeger; Stevenson, I., 1997b. *Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

informational cloud, where, like a divine server or mind, all experiential information about people is stored. Perhaps we all have access to such a super-transcendent library, where the lives of all people are recorded. This is, of course, pure speculative transcendent metaphysics, which, as a science, is blocked by Kantian critique of pure reason.

Children's memories of their past lives are not the only type of anomalous facts that can be used as a basis for some form of speculative or transcendent metaphysics. In addition, there are phenomena such as 'near-death experiences' and 'out-of-body experiences' that are extensively described.⁸ According to researchers, between 10 and 20% of patients who have experienced clinical death – whose brains showed no signs of life for a period of time – report having such strange memories upon being resuscitated or awakening. This likely does not mean that the remaining 80% of people do not have a soul. Therefore, if all such and similar facts are true, they could serve as empirical data for a metaphysics that does not transcend experience. These are anomalous facts, or fact-anomalies, that are inconsistent with materialistic metaphysics, the conception of consciousness as an epiphenomenon of the brain, and so on. As Kant observed, a person cannot be without some type of metaphysics. Thus, we either have a materialistic-positivist empirically oriented metaphysics or other types of metaphysics. Kantian metaphysics is close to positivist-empiricist metaphysics. In Kant's system, where the doors to metaphysics are closed, it enters through the window. Although speculative metaphysics as a science is not possible, Kant defends it in another sense as beliefs that, while they transcend experience, are important for human practical activity.⁹ Metaphysical beliefs can justify or give meaning to human actions and can influence the relationships of individuals who adhere to such metaphysical ideas with others, and so on. This means that metaphysics has a practical impact. However, the Kantian argumentation here is rationalistic; it does not refer to any significant empirical facts that could serve as empirical data to support any metaphysical claims. For example, people who have had out-of-body experiences, as researchers claim based on their surveys, radically changed their views on life and death – after their transcendent or mystical experience, they no longer fear death, are less attached to material things and material success, and are able to create more open and respectful relationships with others

⁸ See for example – Moore, L. E., Greyson, B., 2017. 'Characteristics of memories for near-death experiences'. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 51, pp. 116–124.

⁹ Kant, I., 1998. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ibid., pp. 116–117.

(e.g., see: Bruce Greyson and others 2024).¹⁰ Thus, a person's metaphysics, changed by certain experiences, has also led to practical changes in their actions and life.

Significant facts for metaphysics: from the perspective of the philosophy of science

If we do not rely on any facts, discussing the journey of the soul, its transfer to other bodies (whether human, plant, or animal), and analyzing other qualities of the soul in the context of Kant's critical philosophy can be viewed as a narrative of traditional speculative metaphysics. Such and similar philosophical discourses are characteristic of the old European tradition of transcendent metaphysics, including various medieval speculative systems. In these theories, it was common to analyze not only the qualities of the soul but also the attributes of the world's creator, God, and to contemplate the world as a whole or the very nature of reality in one way or another – for example, we can also recall here the Leibniz-Heidegger question: Why is there being, rather than nothing? Such and similar accounts, in the context of Kant's theory of knowledge, can be viewed as speculative metaphysical claims that transcend experience. Kant constrains the human mind within very strict limits in his critical philosophy. Concepts, as certain mental images, must be synthesized or combined with sensory images. This actually happens in the study of nature, for example, in physics. Taking the concept or theory of inertia as an example, we can explain what will happen to a person if a car moving quickly suddenly stops and the person is not wearing a seatbelt. Similarly, pure mathematical concepts are also applied to the analysis of various empirical phenomena. Metaphysics, which claims to generate knowledge solely from concepts, is doomed to failure – this is not true knowledge of the object. The result of such a process is various concepts, claims, and theories that cannot be clearly confirmed or refuted. Such metaphysical concepts are not linked to empirical objects. These may only be certain metaphysical illusions, or at best, statements of belief (religion) that can guide or influence our lives and practical actions in certain situations, but in terms of cognitive value, they do not represent true or reliable knowledge. According to Kant, knowledge that transcends experience and re-

¹⁰ Weiler, M., Acunzo, D. J., Cozzolino, P. J., Greyson, B., 2024. Exploring the transformative potential of out-of-body experiences: A pathway to enhanced empathy. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews*, 163. [Accessed: 2025-08-30]. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105764>

lies solely on concepts is not genuine scientific knowledge. This is the Kantian view of traditional or speculative metaphysics in his critical philosophy or in his project of transcendental metaphysics. If there can be a metaphysics that does not transcend experience, then we would need to discuss facts that could support any metaphysical claims. If metaphysical theories are particularly complex, such as those about the soul's post-mortem journeys, the facts should be impressive – at least paranormal – since, as is generally acknowledged, we cannot observe the soul in the same way we can physical phenomena like atoms, cells, microorganisms, or galaxies. We cannot easily conduct experiments that would prove any properties of the soul or its interactions with other phenomena.

Metaphysically significant facts can be evaluated from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science, such as the theoretical positions of T. Kuhn, P. Feyerabend, and others. T. Kuhn's theory of paradigms presents a universal schema for the historical development of science: pre-science – normal science (paradigm) – crisis – revolution – new normal science (new paradigm) – new crisis, and so on.¹¹ In the pre-scientific state, fundamental scientific concepts are not yet established within the scientific community, there is no agreement on research methods or standards, and the research object itself is not clear. All of this becomes clarified when science becomes 'normal' as the scientific community reaches a consensus on these matters. A crisis in science arises when researchers encounter facts or observed phenomena that cannot be explained by existing theories, theoretical tools (concepts), and research methods. These are anomalies. To resolve a crisis in science, a new theory is developed, new research methods are proposed, and even the understanding of the research object may change. Once these issues are resolved, science resumes functioning normally, entering a new paradigm stage... Eventually, a new crisis in science arises... and so on. If various mentioned anomalous facts are true, which we could appeal to when developing metaphysical theories or hypotheses, it seems that our current understanding of consciousness and the phenomenon of the soul is still in a pre-scientific state.

P. Feyerabend, the proponent of anarchistic science theory,¹² did not entirely dismiss the possibility of teaching students not only convention-

¹¹ Kuhn, T. S., 1970. *The structure of scientific revolutions*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

¹² Feyerabend, P., 1975. *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge*. London: NLB; Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

al, traditional sciences such as chemistry, physics, or mathematics, but also considered the idea that, for the realization of democratic ideals in education, it might be beneficial to teach children about magic or occult sciences, or to let them acquire practical skills through activities like rain dance practices. According to Feyerabend, modern science is an ideology just like religion once was. The state is separated from the church, but it is still not separated from science. Certainly, Feyerabend's idea that there is no difference between astrology, voodoo, magic, and any Western science is highly controversial and questionable. However, his principle that 'anything goes' in science – that any methods are acceptable if they lead to discoveries and inventions (in technological or in technique-oriented sciences) – is compatible with the idea that the aforementioned anomalous facts might serve as a basis for some form of metaphysics.

Final remarks and conclusions

Not transcending experience metaphysics would be one that can support its claims with empirical facts. In this way, it would resemble standard science, which relies on, for example, inductivist or deductivist methodologies. From the perspective of inductive science, identifying a set of empirically significant facts for metaphysics means supporting metaphysical claims that could be generalizations of observed phenomena. In other words, if metaphysical theories can be derived from a broad array of empirical observations, they align with an inductive approach. From the perspective of deductive science, it would be necessary to derive specific empirical statements from a general metaphysical theory. This approach involves formulating metaphysical theories that generate testable hypotheses, which can then be empirically verified. In both cases, the aim is to bridge the gap between metaphysical concepts and empirical evidence, ensuring that metaphysical theories are not merely speculative but grounded in observable reality.

Anomalous facts invite a reconsideration of the traditional boundaries between empirical science and speculative metaphysics. Ultimately, the continued investigation of these phenomena may either weaken existing scientific paradigms or even lead to the emergence of new frameworks. Metaphysics that is compatible with empirical facts would either go beyond the Kantian conception of metaphysics or fall outside the Kantian metaphysical paradigm.

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The Kantian Teleology in the Freudian Concept of Death Drive

Abstract: The aim of this research is to investigate the potential relationships between Freud's theoretical constructs in psychoanalysis and the heuristic teleology proposed by Kant. An element of the death drive in Freud, its regressive character, identified through repetition, can be observed as a force that directs life and nature in a regressive movement with the aim of returning to the inorganic state, a hypothesis set out especially in *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920). Based on considerations about the apparent purpose of this movement in nature, we propose to investigate the possibilities of relationships between the death drive and the teleology present in Kant's works. Furthermore, we develop a discussion on the ultimate finality of nature, apparently divergent between Freud and Kant.

Keywords: Death Drive, Freud, Kant, Psychoanalysis, Teleology

Introduction: A Kantian project in Freud

Freud can be comprehended as an author inevitably influenced by Kantian ideas. Loparic situates Freud as part of the "Helmholtz School", recognized as a school of the Kantian tradition. Preceding Freud, researchers such as Meynert, Griesinger, and Jackson – contemporaries of the Helmholtz School – were already engaged in speculative physiology of the brain, as well as in developing speculations about the functioning of the psyche. This research tradition traces back to Herbart, Kant's replacement at the University of Königsberg.¹ It is also worth mentioning that Krafft-Ebing – contemporary of Freud and sometimes critical of his work – who was responsible for popularizing psychiatric concepts, is likewise situated in this sphere of Kantian influence.

¹ Loparic, Z., 2003. De Kant a Freud: um roteiro. *Natureza Humana*, 5(1), pp. 231–245. doi: <https://doi.org/10.59539/2175-2834-v5n1-778>.

Fulgencio explores the impact that Kant had on Mach and, consequently, the effect that the post-Kantian philosophers had on Freudian psychoanalysis. The author notes that Paul-Laurent Assoun identifies a *Machian vocabulary* in Freud's proposal of the drives, and that Borch-Jacobsen & Shamdasani consider that Freud adopts an epistemological stance similar to Mach's. Notably, Mach recognizes certain *scientific concepts* as *provisional fictions*, and Freud, in turn, uses *metapsychological concepts* as *heuristic fictions*.²

The Kantian metaphysics of nature, according to Fulgencio, is located at the ground of the *speculations* of Freudian psychoanalysis.³ The author also describes psychoanalysis as the heir to the Kantian *a priori* research program for the natural sciences, as well as noting that psychoanalysis "was built on this ground of Kantian metaphysics of nature".⁴ This influence is observable in the speculative fundaments of the auxiliary constructs developed by Freud in his methodological groundwork for the construction of psychoanalysis. Fulgencio emphasizes that concepts of Freudian metapsychology, such as the psychic apparatus, are described as *theoretical fictions*; just as libido is characterized as an *auxiliary construct*, and the concept of *drive* itself is indicated as a *convention*. He summarizes this position thus:

[...] the Freudian metapsychology – with its concepts of drive, libido, and apparatus – consists of heuristic fictions that make it possible for Freud to treat psychic life as an object like any other foreign to man, making psychoanalysis a proposal for empirical psychology within the framework of the natural sciences, which, in turn, has the same type of causality presented by Kant in his *a priori* research program or, in other terms, in his metaphysics of nature, causality that is one of the categories of understanding.⁵

The speculative fundamentals do not appear to be something concealed by Freud. He himself suggests in 1925 that parts of his speculative psychoanalytic superstructure can be sacrificed if an insufficiency is found.⁶ Indeed, Freud shows no hesitation in revising, modifying, altering, or pointing out errors in his theoretical assumptions. One of his most consistent revisions took place

² Fulgencio, L., 2014. Ernst Mach & Sigmund Freud. *Clínica & Cultura*, 3(2), pp. 58–89.
Fulgencio, L., 2016. *Mach e Freud: influências e paráfrases*. São Paulo: Fapesp.

³ Fulgencio, L., 2008. *O método especulativo em Freud*. São Paulo: Fapesp.

⁴ Fulgencio, L., 2007. Fundamentos kantianos da psicanálise freudiana e o lugar da metapsicologia no desenvolvimento da psicanálise. *Psicologia USP*, 18(1), p. 47. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-65642007000100003> (our translation).

⁵ Ibid., p. 48 (our translation).

⁶ Freud, S., 1959. An autobiographical study In: Freud, S. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XX*. London: Hogarth, pp. 7–74.

at the moment known as the “turn of 1920”. At this point, in addition to presenting the second topography (structural model) – which, it is noteworthy, overlaps with but does not replace the first topography (topographic model) in *The Ego and the Id* (1923)⁷ – he develops a concept that changes the considerations about the finality of the actions of the unconscious in the psychoanalytic tradition. The key to the turning point seems to be concentrated in a fundamental concept of Freud's suggestion of an *unconscious system* that would drive human actions *beyond the pleasure principle*: the death drive.⁸

This introduction has outlined how we can observe a Kantian influence in Freud's works based on considerations regarding the Kantian tradition in the Helmholtz School; the presence of a *Machian vocabulary* in Freud; and psychoanalysis as an heir to Kant's *a priori* research program for the natural sciences. Having established the Kantian ground in Freudian metapsychology, we now turn to an investigation of potential relationships between the characteristics of the concept of *drive* in Freud's psychoanalytic theory and the Kantian *teleology*. To this end, an analysis of Kantian teleological judgment within the scope of Freud's drive theory will be presented, followed by a discussion about the ultimate finality of nature, apparently divergent between Freud and Kant.

Kantian heuristic teleology and its application in Freud's theory⁹

Within the scope of Kantian transcendental philosophy, the teleological judgment appears as a part of the third *Critique*, the *Critique of the power of judgment* (1790), which is the book where Kant finalizes his critical project. The main objective of the book is to mediate the two scopes of reason, the theoretical and the practical:

⁷ In the text published in 1924, *The economic problem of masochism*, Freud states that “Kant's Categorical Imperative is thus the direct heir of the Oedipus complex” (1961, p. 167). In the preface to *Totem and taboo* (1912-1913), Freud had already developed a relationship between the *taboo* and the *categorical imperative*.

Freud, S., 1955. The Ego and the Id. In: Freud, S. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XIX*. London: Hogarth, pp. 3-66.

Freud, S., 1961. The economic problem of masochism. In: Freud, S. *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XIX*. London: Hogarth, pp. 159-170.

Freud, S., 1955. Totem and taboo. In: Freud, S. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XIII*. London: Hogarth, pp. 1-162.

⁸ Freud, S., 1955. Beyond the pleasure principle. In: Freud, S. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XVIII*. London: Hogarth, pp. 7-64.

⁹ We will use the Cambridge translations of Kant for English, but the quotation will follow the classic version of the German Academia, indicating the edition and the page in the first *Critique* and the volume and the page in the third *Critique*.

[...] the power of judgment, provides the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, which makes possible the transition from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness in accordance with the former to the final end in accordance with the latter.¹⁰

To this end, Kant must find a transcendental principle – the principle of finality – for the judgment faculty and analyze this principle in all its possible uses and limitations. For this to be accomplished, the third *Critique* had to be separated into two parts: the part of the Aesthetic Judgment and the part of the Teleological Judgment. Firstly, we will introduce the broad discussion of the book, the general use of the faculty of judgment, its transcendental principle, and the separation between the aesthetic judgment and the teleological one. Then we will investigate some peculiarities of the teleological judgment and argue for the compatibility of the Kantian teleological judgment with Freud's theory of drives as presented in *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920).

The faculty of judgment appears in the *Critique of pure reason* (1787) as the mind's faculty of subsuming the particular under a universal rule: "the power of judgment is the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands under a given rule (*casus datae legis*) or not".¹¹ In the scope of the first *Critique*, the faculty of judgment merely applies the determination power of the understanding – i.e., the universal *a priori* categories to specific objects (sensible data) – making, by this operation, the experience possible. This operation is named, in the first *Critique*, the *transcendental schematism*, in which the rules that are given each time by the pure categories of understanding order what is being received by the pure sensibility, determining fully the experience in a transcendental way – i.e. in general form, in its conditions of possibility – and enabling it to be given to the subject. That same operation is named in the third *Critique* as *determinative judgment*. The "determinative" characteristic is because it is by this schematism that the subject determines the objective appearances for himself. But there is a part of the experience that is not determined – and cannot be – by the power of the understanding, i.e., the *empirical experience*. That is, the experience that is given *a posteriori* to the subject, i.e., its content; that has vast particularities that the finite subject can only receive and has no determinative power in this regard.

¹⁰ Kant, I., 2002. *Critique of the power of judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5:196.

¹¹ Kant, I., 1998. *Critique of pure reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, B 171.

Since the finite subject can only know things as they appear to him, i.e., as phenomenon, the empirical experience remains accessible only through the investigation of nature. But, for the subject to investigate the vastly different scopes and layers of empirical nature, it must have some universal concept through which the empirical realm is organized. However, since the finite intellect (*intellectus archetypus*) can only find concepts to determine nature as phenomenon, its power within the empirical world is limited. This means that the concept by which the subjects can organize how nature presents itself to them is not a determinative one – a category of the understanding – but a subjective one; that is, a concept that is only valid for the subjective experience; i.e., that does not form the objective appearance of nature for us (as phenomena) but organizes the way nature relates to us and to itself. That concept is the transcendental principle of the judgment faculty, the *finality of nature*. If we analyze it, this principle is just the natural operation of the judgment faculty, but without any determinative concept that rules its operation. Following its definition already given in the first *Critique*¹² as the faculty that mediates the others, the faculty of judgment, by applying one universal concept to the particular, puts this particular in some universal ordination of the relation of the parts (particular) with the whole (universal); that means it puts the parts in a final organization that orders all parts, a finality that overcomes the parts towards the whole. By thinking the faculty of judgment as an operation that also works free of the determinative power of the understanding, Kant finds its transcendental power in the third *Critique*.

The reflexive judgment is the specific judgment that the faculty of judgment operates transcendently; that means it operates as a condition of possibility for empirical nature to be related to us. But in opposition to the determinative judgment, which determines how pure nature is objectively *given* to us, the reflexive judgment has no determinative power; its competence is only subjective, and it refers to how empirical nature *relates* to us. The reflexive judgment can only operate in what has already been given as phenomena to us by the determinative judgment. Since there is no universal determinative concept (category) given by the understanding for the judgment faculty to operate the reflexive judgment, the concept of the universal must be found in the reflection itself, in the pure act of mediating that characterizes the judgment faculty: “To reflect (to consider), however, is to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with

¹² Ibid., B 171.

one's faculty of cognition, *in relation to a concept thereby made possible*".¹³ This pure mediation of the faculties, which is the faculty of judgment and characterizes its finality principle, since it cannot be done with the understanding – otherwise it would be a determinative judgment – must be done with the other faculties for the finality to be established: the faculty of imagination and the faculty of reason. These two faculties are not faculties of concepts as the understanding, so they cannot establish a universal concept that is satisfactory in a determinative way. They can only give the faculty of judgment a subjective form through which the finality of nature in the reflexive judgment relates to our subjectivity – in the case of mediating with the imagination – or can give a *regulative idea* through which the faculty of judgment subjectively organizes how empirical nature relates to itself – in the case of mediating with reason.

Thus, there are two possible uses of reflexive judgment, i.e., two ways of establishing a finality in nature: a) as subjective finality in the aesthetic judgment¹⁴ and b) as internal (or real) finality in the teleological judgment. Since our question refers only to the possibility of finding a Kantian root in the way Freud speculates about a teleological finality of nature in *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920), the aesthetic judgment will not be further explained.

The teleological judgment is the reflexive way of the subject to organize empirical nature for himself in order to investigate its empirical laws; it is a possibility of organization of its laws by an idea of finality that grounds the investigation and can be confirmed or denied by it. This idea is merely regulative; it is a supersensible concept given by the faculty of reason that expresses a totality that can never be experienced but only thought. Therefore, for us to not exceed the limits of knowledge, we cannot think of this idea as determinative concept but as a regulative one that guides the investigation of nature.¹⁵

¹³ Ibid., 20:211 (our emphasis).

¹⁴ As already mentioned, both uses of the reflexive judgment are only subjective uses – since they do not have the power to logically determine nature in itself. But what Kant calls "subjective finality" is a finality that appears to have us, our subjectivity, as the final point to which nature is created; i.e., nature seems to have been created for our subjective faculties, for our appreciation and contemplation, giving us pleasure in this act. That is the core of the aesthetic judgment; this subjective finality can match our subjectivity in the judgment of something as beautiful or appear as inadequate to our faculties in the judgment of something as sublime.

¹⁵ "The reflecting power of judgment must serve as a principle itself, which, since it is not objective, and cannot be presupposed as a sufficient ground for cognition of the intention of the object, can serve as a merely subjective principle for the purposive use of the cognitive faculties, namely for reflecting on one kind of objects" (Ibid., 5:385).

In the first *Critique* the transcendental dialectics is the part that deals with the illusions that reason falls into when trying to exceed its limits and understand the unconditional totality, the thing-in-itself; the result is that it has to deal with unsolvable antinomies. Reason tends to fall for these illusions because it has the will to go beyond its finite limits and try to know everything, so it extends its concepts and develops concepts of totalities, which are called ideas. Ideas are concepts that cannot have their counterpart, the intuitions that are adequate for them,¹⁶ since it is impossible to experience the whole reality being a finite mind. The way to resolve these antinomies is not to try to find a definitive answer for them – that is impossible – but to see the ideas of totality as regulative ideas that guide us to develop a hypothesis for the totality: “in order to guide itself in the contemplation of nature in accordance with a principle of a completeness to which it can never attain, and thereby to further the final aim of all cognition”.¹⁷ There are three ideas that correspond to the three possible ways of thinking totalities:

Consequently, all transcendental ideas will be brought under *three classes*, of which the *first* contains the absolute (unconditioned) *unity* of the *thinking subject*, the *second* the absolute *unity* of the *series of conditions of appearance*, the *third* the absolute *unity* of the *condition of all objects of thought* in general. The thinking subject is the object of *psychology*, the sum total of all appearances (the world) is the object of *cosmology*, and the thing that contains the supreme condition of the possibility of everything that can be thought (the being of all beings) is the object of *theology*.¹⁸

Following the classical doctrine of the *metaphysica specialis*, Kant is grounding its disciplines – *psychologia rationalis*, *cosmologia rationalis* and *theologia transcendentalis* – in his critical project. In these doctrines, no ultimately secure knowledge is possible, but the ideas can regulate and guide the scientist to research the empirical world;¹⁹ that

¹⁶ “*Ideas*, however, are still more remote from objective reality than *categories*; for no appearance can be found in which they may be represented *in concreto*. They contain a certain completeness that no possible empirical cognition ever achieves, and with them reason has a systematic unity only in the sense that the empirically possible unity seeks to approach it without ever completely reaching it.” *Ibid.*, B 595-596.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5:168.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, B391.

¹⁹ “The power of judgment’s concept of a purposiveness of nature still belongs among the concepts of nature, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition.” (*Ibid.*, 5:197).

is Kantian heuristics.²⁰ Freud's main concept, the unconscious, is a hypothesis; psychoanalysis cannot know the unconscious as such but only research its effects and symptoms guided by the hypothesis of how the unconscious works, and, by confirming the hypothesis or denying it, the results of the research can alter the hypothesis that guided the work – that explains the turns of Freudian theoretical scope, the topographical changes. From what was discussed, we can see that Freud's theory is based on an idea of the unconditional totality of the subject – its psyche, or, as Kant names the totality of the subject, the soul – named as unconscious. In *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920), Freud proposes another speculation of totality to complement psychoanalysis, one that involves not only the subject but the totality of life; when he speaks of the death drive as a finality of nature, he is using an idea of the unconditional nature (world) to guide his speculation – also based on some biological research that was done by that time to support his speculation.²¹

The way that the speculation regulated by the idea of nature works in the Kantian critical apparatus – the way he explains how natural scientists operate in their theoretical craft even without knowing the proper manner in which it works – is by the teleological judgment presented in the third *Critique*. With the supersensible idea of nature as a whole, there is another one that is necessary for us to understand the finality of nature as a transcendental principle of the judgment faculty, that is, the *idea of liberty* – or the idea of an end in itself. This idea is the only idea that is determined because it is the way reason determines itself in the second *Critique* as a free agent. In summary: in this book Kant defines human liberty as a capacity of the faculty of reason to put forth for itself a law that governs its own will – the categorical imperative – so that the will is not determined by external causes. Reason has a capacity of doing this because its own nature is a formal one, and it is this very nature that determines the form of the will – the will has a form that is filled with content (the external object of desire) when the will is determined externally – but it can determine itself by having its own form as its content, i.e., putting a law for itself as a duty. This form, as all concepts that come from the faculty of reason, represents a totality; the idea of a totality of all causality, a supersensible and unconditional causality,

²⁰ We here indicate, as a detailed investigation of Kantian heuristic, as well as precise examples of how this works in physics, the great book of Zeljko Loparic: Loparic, Z., 2024. *Kant's transcendental semantics*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

²¹ The peculiarities of the death drive as a finality of nature will be explained further in the next topic.

which is the idea of liberty that the categorical imperative fills.²²

So, the antinomy of liberty – i.e., if humans are determined by causes external to them or if they can initiate by themselves another causality order – of the first *Critique* is resolved in the second *Critique* by admitting that the two causalities are parallel; the conditional causality of the sensible realm of the world (nature and physics) and the unconditional causality of its supersensible realm of freedom and morals. That leads us to two ways of thinking and acquiring knowledge of nature: as a mechanism or an organism. A mechanical nature is the way we experience nature in the determinative judgment, having the phenomenon determined by the faculty of understanding's category of causality, i.e., as an efficient causality. On the other hand, an organic nature is the way we experience nature through the reflexive judgment of the faculty of judgment in its teleological use, by thinking nature as a totality that has a finality within itself, that is, as a final causality – analogous to our liberty.

Kantian teleological judgment and the finality of nature in the scope of Freud's drive theory

We will now further explain the mediation that the faculty of judgment does with the faculty of reason in the teleological judgment. To revise what we already explained: the teleological judgment is used to organize empirical nature for us as a coherent system of empirical laws by the idea of nature as a totality that has a finality that relates it to itself – having a status of hypothesis; a subjective value only for organizational means that have to be confirmed by research, not a secure knowledge of it – which makes possible the investigation and research of nature as an organism. The faculty of judgment is the faculty of finding and subsuming the universal under the particular; in the case of its reflexive judgment, the universal is not given by the faculty of understanding determinative power, so in its teleological use it has to fill this gap caused by the lack of the universal concept by borrowing from the fac-

²² This does not mean that – by showing the nature of liberty within reason – we can have any knowledge of what liberty is, liberty remains as a practical scope; it is the *ratio essendi* of any speculation or even the possibility of thinking (*ratio cognoscendi*) something as liberty. In the theoretical scope, reason cannot conclude the antinomy of liberty because it cannot have a sensible experience of a totality of causality adequate to the idea of liberty that can give us theoretical and secure knowledge of liberty – liberty remains, as the other ideas, as a regulative idea in the theoretical world.

That was a summary of the first part of the *Critique of practical reason*. For following this investigation and problematic in a detailed way, we recommend the reader to check the original source: Kant, I., 1997. *Critique of practical reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ulty of reason its supersensible regulative ideas of nature as a totality and of liberty.²³ Using these two ideas, the teleological judgment allows us to investigate nature as a totality that has an end within itself (organism) rather than a machine (mechanism) – and by applying them in its use of organizing the particular by a universal, it gives a teleological finality to the particular that is being investigated:

Through the possibility of its *a priori* laws for nature the understanding gives a proof that nature is cognized by us only as appearance, and hence at the same time an indication of its supersensible substratum; but it leaves this entirely undetermined. The power of judgment, through its *a priori* principle for judging nature in accordance with possible particular laws for it, provides for its supersensible substratum (in us as well as outside us) determinability through the intellectual faculty. But reason provides determination for the same substratum through its practical law *a priori*; and thus the power of judgment makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.²⁴

Thus, the teleological judgment is the true mediator of the two scopes of reason, because it borrows from the practical scope the supersensible concept of a causality by freedom and from the theoretical scope the regulative idea of nature as a totality and applies these concepts in an analogous way²⁵ – a heuristic way²⁶ – to the theoretical scope for investigating and explaining nature

²³ The teleological judgment does not teach us “how things are judged, but rather how they *ought* to be judged” (*ibid.*, 5:182 *our emphasis*) in nature. This, as well as the liberty in us, is also a *duty* for the researcher, that is, he knows that this judgment is a way he *must* judge nature if he wants to have a complete theory of it – so the teleological judgment, as well as the categorical imperative, is a duty of judgment precisely because it is the same supersensible idea that was operating in the practical realm that now is used in the theoretical realm – but is not the way of *how* the finite mind *usually judges* nature, i.e., the determinative judgment: “By contrast, the teleologically employed power of judgment provides the determinate *conditions under which something* (e.g., *an organized body*), *is to be judged* in accordance with the idea of an end of nature” (*Ibid.*, 5:194, *our emphasis*).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 5:196.

²⁵ “Nevertheless, teleological judging is rightly drawn into our research into nature, at least problematically, but only in order to bring it under principles of observation and research in *analogy* with causality according to ends, without presuming thereby to *explain* it.” *Ibid.*, 5:360.

²⁶ “On the other hand, it is an equally necessary maxim of reason not to bypass the principle of ends in the products of nature, because even though this principle does not make the way in which these products have originated more comprehensible, it is still a *heuristic principle for researching the particular laws of nature*, even granted that we would want to make no use of it for explaining nature itself, since although nature obviously displays an intentional unity of purpose we still always call that a merely natural end, i.e., we do not seek the ground of its possibility beyond nature.” (*Ibid.*, 5:411, *our emphasis*).

as an organism. As Kant puts it, the finality of nature is another way of judging nature when the research conducted through the traditional way – the determinative judgment – is not sufficient: “The concept of the combinations and forms of nature in accordance with ends is still at least *one more principle* for bringing its appearances under rules where the laws of causality about the mere mechanism of nature do not suffice”²⁷ But what does it mean to say that the traditional way is not sufficient? The traditional way is the only way to gain secure knowledge of nature without risking the research on some unstable hypothesis, but it has some limitations that prevent the scientist from analyzing some of nature’s empirical products that are given to us in the empirical experience. These are organic beings, and the mechanical way of researching those beings does not advance the research or do them justice because they operate in a universal finality that is different from the universal concept of mechanical causality grounded by the faculty of understanding.

I would say provisionally that a thing exists as a natural end *if it is cause and effect of itself* (although in a twofold sense); for in this there lies a causality the likes of which cannot be connected with the mere concept of a nature without ascribing an end to it, but which in that case also can be conceived without contradiction but cannot be comprehended.²⁸

Some natural beings appear to have a form that is an end within itself, and that form is contingent to the normal use of our determinative judgment – that judges by efficient causes – and that contingency of this form, which comes from its empirical complexity, is the ground that allows our reason to admit the causality of this being as only possible in an analogous way to our causality as an end in itself – judging it as possible only by a final cause.²⁹ Kant gives us examples and requirements of these beings in the §64 of the *Critique of the power of judgment* (1790):

²⁷ Ibid., 5:360.

²⁸ Ibid., 5:371.

²⁹ “But now since the particular, as such, contains something contingent with regard to the universal, but reason nevertheless still requires unity, hence lawfulness, in the connection of particular laws of nature (which lawfulness of the contingent is called purposiveness), and the *a priori* derivation of the particular laws from the universal, as far as what is contingent in the former is concerned, is impossible through the determination of the concept of the object, thus the concept of the purposiveness of nature in its products is a concept that is necessary for the human power of judgment in regard to nature but does not pertain to the determination of the objects themselves, thus a subjective principle of reason for the power of judgment which, as regulative (not constitutive), is just as necessarily valid for our *human power of judgment* as if it were an objective principle” (Ibid., 5:404).

First, a tree generates another tree in accordance with a known natural law. [...] Second, a tree also generates itself as an *individual*. [...] Third, one part of this creature also generates itself in such a way that the preservation of the one is reciprocally dependent on the preservation of the other.³⁰

We can see that the main factor in these examples is a concept of the whole that interconnects its parts finalistically, that is, as the end and cause of the parts – and that each part is also seen as contributing to the balance and production of one another with the whole as the end – in which nothing is in vain. These beings, which we can summarize as having a life, we find in nature and we cannot fully understand them without the concept of the finality of nature; *they give reality to the idea of nature as an organic totality*.³¹ And this finality is one that is internal to them; that is, it is not a finality that comes from an external creator of nature – the regulative idea that is used in the teleological judgment is the idea of nature, not the idea of god – that prevents and separates the natural sciences from theological speculations. To summarize:

For a body, therefore, which is to be judged as a natural end in itself and in accordance with its internal possibility, it is required that its parts reciprocally produce each other, as far as both their form and their combination is concerned, and thus produce a whole out of their own causality, the concept of which, conversely, is in turn the cause (in a being that would possess the causality according to concepts appropriate for such a product) of it in accordance with a principle; consequently the connection of *efficient causes* could at the same time be judged as an *effect through final causes*. In such a product of nature each part is conceived as if it exists only *through* all the others, thus as if existing *for the sake of the others* and *on account of* the whole, i.e., as an instrument (organ), which is, however, not sufficient [...] rather it must be thought of as an organ that *produces* the other parts (consequently each produces the others reciprocally), [...] only then and on that account can such a product, as an *organized* and *self-organizing* being, be

³⁰ Ibid., 5:371.

³¹ “Organized beings are thus the only ones in nature which, even if considered in themselves and without a relation to other things, *must nevertheless be thought of as possible only as its ends, and which thus first provide objective reality for the concept of an end that is not a practical end but an end of nature, and thereby provide natural science with the basis for a teleology*, i.e., a way of judging its objects in accordance with a particular principle the likes of which one would otherwise be absolutely unjustified in introducing at all (since one cannot at all understand the possibility of such a kind of causality *a priori*)” (Ibid., 5:376, *our emphasis*).

called a *natural end*. [...] One says far too little about nature and its capacity in organized products if one calls this an *analogue of art*: for in that case one conceives of the artist (a rational being) outside of it. Rather, it organizes itself, and in every species of its organized products, of course in accordance with some example in the whole, but also with appropriate deviations, which are required in the circumstances for self-preservation.³²

We can now reach the principle that Kant gives us to judge teleologically the organized beings: "This principle, or its definition, states: *An organized product of nature is that in which everything is an end and reciprocally a means*. Nothing in it is in vain, purposeless, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature."³³ In other words, we can say that in an organized being, the efficient cause is a final cause, i.e., all its parts are means to sustain the whole being, as well as this totality is also what creates the parts and what pulls the parts together to the same destination, which is the sustainability and development of the being itself; its totality – that is, its internal finality, that makes the whole being a relationship with itself, an end within itself. We already explained that these beings are products of nature given in experience for us, that for their comprehension and investigation we must judge them teleologically. But if these beings are given for us by nature, then does this not open a possibility of thinking the totality of nature as a final cause system that ends within itself? That is precisely what Kant says – this also gives some credibility to these investigations of nature as a totality, because although we can never be sure of nature as a totality because we cannot experience it, we can experience some organic beings within nature that give us some data that could confirm or deny our heuristic idea of nature as a whole:

In this section we have meant to say nothing except that once we have discovered in nature a capacity for bringing forth products that can only be conceived by us in accordance with the concept of final causes, we may go further and also judge to belong to a system of ends even those things (or their relation, however purposive) which do not make it necessary to seek another principle of their possibility beyond the mechanism of blindly acting causes; because the former idea already, as far as its ground is concerned, leads us beyond the sensible world, and the unity of the supersen-

³² Ibid., 5:373-374.

³³ Ibid., 5:376.

sible principle must then be considered as valid in the same way not merely for certain species of natural beings but for the whole of nature as a system.³⁴

The only possibility natural sciences have, if they aim for completeness of their theory, is by completing the gap that we cannot experience with the regulative idea in the teleological judgment – this idea also leads the experiments that scientists conduct in the laboratory. Only by having a supersensible hypothesis can the system of nature be thought of as a coherent totality, thereby also grounding the mechanical way of seeing nature in conjunction with the organic way: “Now, however, the common principle of the mechanical derivation on the one side and the teleological on the other is the supersensible, on which we must base nature as phenomenon”³⁵.

Freud, in his investigations into the nature of the human psyche, always deals with these speculations; as we already said, we see that the first topographical model is one that is based on a speculation about the idea of the subject as a totality; the name that Freud gives to this idea is “*unconscious*”. Reading his works, it is easy to see that the unconscious commands the totality of the subject, in which desire – or the pleasure principle – functions as the final cause that the subject responds to, and all the psychic structures, symptoms, and effects – like dreams³⁶ – are related to how we deal with the unconscious desires. In *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920) the speculation is expanded; this leads, in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), to the proposal of

³⁴ Ibid., 5:381. Also: “It is in fact indispensable for us to subject nature to the concept of an intention if we would even merely conduct research among its organized products by means of continued observation; and this concept is thus already an absolutely necessary maxim for the use of our reason in experience. It is obvious that once we have adopted such a guideline for studying nature and found it to be reliable we must also at least attempt to apply this maxim of the power of judgment to the whole of nature, since by means of it we have been able to discover many laws of nature which, given the limitation of our insights into the inner mechanisms of nature, would otherwise remain hidden from us.” (Ibid., 5:398).

³⁵ Ibid., 5:412.

³⁶ It is interesting to notice that Kant also made a speculation about how dreams are also something that responds to a final causality of nature – and some of the speculation is relatable to psychoanalysis when he says that dreams by affection relief some of our stress: “I would ask whether dreams (from which our sleep is never free, although we rarely remember them) might not be a purposive arrangement in nature, since, when all the motive forces in the body have relaxed, they serve to move the vital organs internally by means of the imagination and its great activity (which in this condition often amount to an affect); and in the case of an overfilled stomach, where this movement during nocturnal sleep is all the more necessary, they commonly play themselves out with all the more liveliness; consequently, without this internal motive force and exhausting unrest, on account of which we often complain about dreams (which nevertheless are in fact perhaps a remedy), sleep, even in a healthy condition, might well amount to a complete extinction of life” (Ibid., 5:380).

a second topographical model – that subsumes the first – which opens up to a speculation about the finality of nature as a whole, that the unconscious subject, being a part of nature, is also contained. The finality that Freud proposes as a speculation is the *death drive*, i.e., the hypothesis that all organic life tends and wills to return to the inorganic state³⁷ – so all the unconscious effects are restructured as expressions of the drives that command the life of the subject. He tries to prove this heuristic thesis using the biological literature of his time, but he knows that he cannot prove it with certainty and doubts the capacity of science to ever find secure answers for these questions; thus, thinking as a Kantian.³⁸ We showed the Kantian background of Freudian speculation. Now, the death drive, as well as the return to the inorganic as its finality, will be discussed below.

Final Considerations: A teleology in the death drive

In this essay we identified some elements of teleology in Kant's work, as well as observed how the Kantian project reverberates in Freud's way of thinking. Kant's influence on Freud appears in the author's way of thinking, which, as previously noted, passes through the inheritance of his own academic formation.³⁹ We show how Freud, in his frequent movements of substitution and alteration of his theory, presents the *death drive* as a concept at the turn of the 1920s.⁴⁰ This turn showed even more clearly the Kantian roots in the speculative method of psychoanalysis, as now Freud deals with speculations about not only the totality of the subject as unconscious but also with the totality of nature, i.e., life, as death drive. Subsequently, we will present some broad articulations on the observation of a teleology in the death drive, as well as discuss related elements, such as

³⁷ Freud speaks of a double finality in *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920), life drive (*Eros*) is also a finality that reaffirms itself in nature, but we can read the death drive as the primary finality since the inorganic was here before the organic life.

³⁸ As he says in the final passages of *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920): "This turn raises a host of other questions to which we can at present find no answer. We must be patient and await fresh methods and occasions of research. We must be ready, too, to abandon a path that we have followed for a time, if it seems to be leading to no good end. Only believers, who demand that science shall be substitute for the catechism they have given up, will blame an investigator for developing or even transforming his views. We may take comfort, too, for the slow advances of our scientific knowledge" (Ibid., pp. 63–64).

³⁹ Loparic, Z., 2003. De Kant a Freud: um roteiro. *Natureza Humana*, 5(1), pp. 231–245. doi: <https://doi.org/10.59539/2175-2834-v5n1-778>.

⁴⁰ We do not overlook the fact that the concept of death drive – and concepts with certain similarities – had already been used by other psychoanalysts prior to its use in *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920).

the idea of progress, in Kant and Freud.

In *Critique of the power of judgment* (1790), Kant suggests that there are good reasons to believe that nature, based on particular laws, has certain subjective purposiveness.⁴¹ For the author, when we observe nature, it seems to have some organization. The perception of an organization in nature can lead us to see that nature does not act contingently, but that elements of nature seem to have a certain relationship with each other. This organization of nature appears to have a finality, which Kant understands as *teleology*: a purpose inherent in nature and the beings that make it up. Nature has an apparent reason for being.

As argued, Freud is influenced by some speculative positions of Kant, and we point out that Freud does not hide the speculative character when exploring a finality of the death drive in nature. The first sentences of part IV of *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920) are regarding this speculative consideration: "What follows is *speculation*, often far-fetched *speculation*, which the reader will consider or dismiss according to his individual predilection. It is further an attempt to follow out an idea consistently, out of curiosity to see where it will lead".⁴² The referenced passage is located precisely in the pages that precede Freud's proposal about the return to the inorganic as a finality of nature.

Alongside Freud, we can observe life as a contingency of nature that initially appears bereft of an intrinsic developmental intention. In its primitive form, its primary intentionality – the first drive – would be to return to its previous state – the inanimate – in a process analogous to the psychic apparatus's search for stability, a proposal influenced by Fechner. These suggestions contrast with elements that we identify as aligned with Freud's idea of progress, as we will present further.

An element of the death drive in Freud, its regressive character, identified through repetition, can be observed as a force that directs life and nature in a regressive movement with the aim of returning to the inorganic state, a hypothesis set out especially in *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920). Repetition offers a direction to the death drive, and we analyze how Freud explores, from a speculative point of view, a purpose for the death drive. By evaluating the suggestions of a finality of nature from Freudian thought, especially in relation to the phenomenon of the death drive, we are able to perceive a certain movement that we propose can be revealed as a Freudian teleology: a continuous tendency in nature to return to a state of stability, avoiding unpleas-

⁴¹ Kant, I., 2002. *Critique of the power of judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴² Freud, S., 1955. Beyond the pleasure principle. In: Freud, S. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XVIII*. London: Hogarth, p. 24 (our emphasis).

ant excitations. Based on considerations about the apparent purpose of this movement in nature, we identify a possible Kantian influence on teleological thinking in Freud's concept of death drive.

Nevertheless, we intend to highlight an apparent divergence within this teleological framework. When Kant looks at animals and tries to identify a purpose of nature,⁴³ this purpose seems to be progressive, directed towards the development and adaptation of species in the world. Freud, on the other hand, by projecting his gaze beyond the pleasure principle onto species, suggests that when the first forms of life appeared, they immediately returned to their previous state, the pre-life state. The author establishes this relationship from his evolutionary perspective, wherein the initial life forms had a very short life expectancy, which expands with the development of the species. However, even in subsequent species in an evolutionary chain, the movement to get back to the previous state remains.⁴⁴

We do not ignore the fact that Freud is affected by an idea of progress, which brings some of his considerations about the development of nature closer to Kant's perspectives. We can see that Freud is influenced by a positivist tradition when he considers stages in the development of worldviews (*Weltanschauung*). The author suggests that the civilizing process would be composed of three worldviews: animistic, religious, and scientific, a conceptualization very similar – or even analogous – to Comte's law of the three states, in which human conceptions pass through the states: theological (or fictional), metaphysical (or abstract), and scientific (or positive). One difference lies in the fact that, for Freud, later worldviews preserve characteristics of previous stages, and it is possible, for example, to observe the persistence of manifestations of animism in the scientific worldview. This aspect of the preservation of previous characteristics can also be recognized in the suggestion that nature possesses a force that directs it to return to the simplest state of matter, and that this force would also manifest itself in the beings that followed – as well as descended from – primitive life forms.

The influence of evolutionism on Freud goes further. The author puts forward the hypothesis of the recapitulation of ontogeny in phylogeny, profoundly inspired by Haeckel. We consider that the proposal of the recapitulation theory may have influenced Freud's way of thinking about the action of the death drive in nature, and not just in the subject. The death drive in nature would have the same finality as its expression in the subject: the search for

⁴³ Kant, I., 2002. *Critique of the power of judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁴ Freud, S., 1955. Beyond the pleasure principle. In: Freud, S. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XVIII*. London: Hogarth, pp. 7–64.

maximum stability, with a yearning towards a state prior to the animate.

The teleology in Kant and in Freud seems to share the same format, but in divergent or even opposite directions. The death drive makes Freud reconsider his ponderations regarding progress in civilization, but a structure of the finality of nature seems to be conserved in Freud's writings. This turning point is not so clear or definite, and it is not possible to locate it in a single and precise moment such as "the turn of the 1920s". However, the proposal of the death drive represents a sufficient milestone allowing Freud to reinterpret important claims from the past.

While in *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim* (1784), Kant seems to bet on an advancement of the human species based on the idea of progress, in which civilization seems to evolve with a moral finality – even through conflicts –⁴⁵ in Freud, on the other hand, the hypothesis of a development seems to be jeopardized. From Freud's perspective, *civilization* precisely consists in distancing itself from nature. In *The future of an illusion* (1927), he underlines that he intentionally does not make a distinction between culture (*Kultur*) and civilization (*Zivilisation*).⁴⁶ Starting from the *primal myth*, the so-called "scientific myth" present in *Totem and taboo* (1913), Freud explores a hypothesis regarding the emergence of civilization, and consequently we can explore the emergence of morality, law, social structures, religion, exogamy, monogamy, prohibition of incest, family, and other elements of the culture.⁴⁷ Culture here is seen as the moment when man distances himself from nature through repression, carried out in an internal direction (the repression that the subject exerts on his own wills) and an external direction (the repression that the subject imposes on others, preventing them from carrying out their wills arbitrarily and consequently damaging the civilizing structure). In 1930, the development of culture – synonymous with distancing itself from nature – was found to be one of the causes of the discontents in civilization, in an almost homonymous work. For Freud, the more culture advances, the greater the neurosis – and consequently, the greater the discontents.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Kant, I., 2007. *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim*. In: Zöller G.; Louden, R. *B. Anthropology, History, and Education*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 107–120.

⁴⁶ Freud, S., 1961. *The future of an illusion*. In: Freud, S. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XXI*. London: Hogarth, pp. 1–58.

⁴⁷ Freud, S., 1955. *Totem and taboo*. In: Freud, S. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XIII*. London: Hogarth, pp. 1–162.

⁴⁸ Freud, S., 1961. *Civilization and its discontents*. In: Freud, S. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – Volume XXI*. London: Hogarth, pp. 64–145.

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Autonomy as the Foundation of Learning in Kant and Paulo Freire

Abstract: This article aims to relate the concept of autonomy in the educational philosophy of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, more specifically in *Lectures on Pedagogy* (1804), and in the educational philosophy of the Brazilian educator and philosopher Paulo Freire, more precisely in *Pedagogy of Autonomy: Knowledge Necessary for Educational Practice* (1996), in order to understand how autonomy can be understood and used as a tool to support the teaching-learning process, aiming at learners capable of thinking for themselves, of being critical, and, thus, having the means to become enlightened citizens and moral agents. For this purpose, the article is divided into three sections: (i) and (ii) analyze each philosopher's approach to education and autonomy, and (iii) relates the concept of autonomy in these pedagogical projects.

Keywords: Autonomy, Education, Teaching-Learning, Kant, Freire

Introduction

Education is the means by which the individual can reach his majority, in other words, through which he can become enlightened. Within the Kantian educational perspective, education has the function of enlightenment and morality, of intellectual and moral autonomy, of thinking for oneself and giving oneself moral laws. This thinking for oneself means seeking within oneself, that is, seeking in reason, the touchstone of truth. It is a matter of assuming the project of enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) as a maxim. As in Kant, autonomy for Paulo

Freire¹ is fundamental to an effective educational project, capable of transforming and emancipating. It is on the basis of this perspective that the article presents its proposal for an analysis of the concept of autonomy in both philosophers.

Giving oneself laws – this is the definition of autonomy.² Although it is a concept whose definition, apex, and foundation lie in Kant's practical philosophy, according to Zatti (2007), historically its notion was already considered in Ancient Greece. In Plato, for example, the notion of autonomy did not have the moral character it acquires in the Modern historical-philosophical period; however, his reflection on self-mastery contributed to the later conception of autonomy as self-determination. Machiavelli, in turn, presents a pioneering concept of political autonomy by combining two meanings, namely, freedom from dependence and the power of self-legislation. Another important contribution was the notion of autonomy presented by the Enlightenment thinkers, who gave voice to reason, to mathematics and to experience, avoiding the dogmas and superstitions arising from Scholasticism. All these notions, together with the notion of autonomy presented by Rousseau in his *Social Contract* and in *Emile*, or *On Education*, were fundamental for the definition of autonomy presented by Kant in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*,³ namely, "autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)."⁴ For Kant, on the one hand, reason must guide sensible inclinations, therefore the will must be determined by practical reason. On the other hand, reason itself, as a faculty, needs exercise and development. Education is one of the paths to the development of rationality and of various human capacities. Moral education is the key to the transformation of

¹ Paulo Reglus Neves Freire (1921–1997), born in Recife/Pernambuco – Brazil, was a Brazilian philosopher and educator who, through his proposals for critical pedagogy and liberating education, defended education as a means of transforming the individual and his reality. Freire criticized traditional education and developed adult literacy methods aimed at autonomy and political engagement.

² For Schneewind (1998), Kant was responsible for conceptualizing morality as autonomy. According to him, Kant's assumptions about the human condition can still be used today. For more on research into the concept of autonomy, see Schneewind, J. B., 1998. *The Invention of Autonomy*. Cambridge University Press.

³ All references to Kant's works are made according to the edition of the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (AA). According to the model: GMS, AA 04:445 (abbreviation of the work, volume number and page number) and according to English translation.

⁴ GMS, AA 04:440 / Kant, I., 1993. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: With, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, p. 44.

the agents' way of thinking and the foundation for the construction of a moral character.⁵

In turn, in Paulo Freire's pedagogical proposal,⁶ autonomy plays a fundamental role in social transformation. According to Freire, the transformation of the student into a socially active subject capable of freeing themselves from heteronomy and oppression is possible through a critical and transformative education. Thus, we can find similarities with the Kantian proposal, since both believe in human progress and in the development of human capacities through education.

In light of the above, the guiding question of the article is: how can autonomy, as conceived from the perspective of Kant and Paulo Freire, contribute to the teaching-learning process? Guided by this question, the article is divided into three sections. In the first section, the focus of the discussion is the approach to the concept of autonomy according to Kant. The second section addresses autonomy from Paulo Freire's perspective, and the last section focuses on the relationship of the concept of autonomy in the two pedagogical proposals, with an emphasis on the teaching-learning process. Finally, in the conclusion, some fundamental distinctions and similarities between Kant and Freire are outlined in order to consolidate the proposed analysis.

⁵ Kant develops his concept of character in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), which has specific types and definitions. Specifically regarding moral character, it is possible to find Kant's explanation of its connection with moral education, for example, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), in the Doctrine of Method. "The Doctrine of Method as a path to the construction of a genuinely moral attitude serves as a teaching – a pedagogical method – for the construction of a moral character. The pure moral motive is the only motive that can ground this character. Since it is necessary to make the moral law concrete in the world, the Doctrine of Method serves as an intermediary between the normative and the descriptive, between morality and applied ethics." (Marques, L. F. P., 2023. *A Doutrina do Método como um processo contínuo de tomada de consciência e ajuizamento moral*. In: *Comentários às obras de Kant: crítica da razão prática*. Florianópolis: NéfipOnline, pp. 497–498.) – my translation.

⁶ "Paulo Freire made an extremely important contribution to education, especially in countries where situations of oppression are a marked feature, as is the case in Brazil. He formulated an educational proposal that seeks to transform the student into a subject, which implies the promotion of autonomy. His method proposes literacy, an education that leads to awareness of one's own social condition. Awareness would make social transformation possible, through the praxis of action and reflection. We would then have a subject emancipated from an oppressive social condition. In Freire's view, liberation from heteronomies, normally imposed by the unjust and/or authoritarian socio-economic-educational order, is a necessary condition for autonomy." (Zatti, V., 2007. *Autonomia e educação em Immanuel Kant e Paulo Freire*. Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, p. 10.) – my translation.

1. Educational Autonomy⁷ according to Kant

For Kant, education is an art, and every art can be taught. The human being, for him, is neither good nor evil by nature, but possesses dispositions for good and propensities for evil.⁸ Therefore, the human being has dispositions and propensities for both paths; that is, the agent must adopt the moral law as his fundamental maxim, otherwise his action will not be from duty, and if he has as a fundamental maxim to follow self-love (*Eigenliebe*), the agent may commit immoral actions. Assuming a possible “innate neutrality of human nature,” considering innate dispositions and propensities, education can be used as a tool in the moral development process of human beings, assisting them in constructing a way of thinking capable of subjecting sensibility to reason, self-love to practical reason.

Kant, in *Lectures on Pedagogy* (1804), states:

Now we come to the question whether the human being is by nature morally good or evil. He is neither of the two because by nature he is not a moral being at all; he only becomes one when his reason raises itself to the concepts of duty and of law. However, one can say that originally he has impulses to all vices in himself, for he has inclinations and instincts which incite him, although reason drives him in the opposite direction. Therefore he can only become good by means of virtue, that is, by self-constraint; although without impulses he can be innocent.⁹

⁷ It is necessary to clarify that the concept of autonomy analyzed in this article is not the strictly normative concept as a supreme principle of morality as developed by Kant in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, but rather the more general concept of autonomy, linked to the Kantian moralization project, that is, to the project of elucidating tools that serve as aids for society to move away from a pathological whole and towards a moral whole, as Kant mentions in the *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective*: “And here all of the talents are gradually developed, taste is formed, and, even, through continual enlightenment, the beginning of a foundation is laid for a manner of thinking which is able, over time, to transform the primitive natural predisposition for moral discernment into definite practical principles and, in this way, to ultimately transform an agreement to society that initially had been pathologically coerced into a *moral whole*” IaG, AA 08:21 / (Kant, I., 2006. *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective*. In: P. Kleingeld, ed. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 7.)

⁸ RGV, AA 06:26 and RGV, AA 06:29 / Kant, I., 1998. *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. In: A.W. Wood and G. di Giovanni, eds. *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 74–77.

⁹ Päd, AA 09:492 / Kant, I., 2007. *Lectures on Pedagogy*. In: G. Zöller and R.B. Louden, eds. *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 478–479.

The human being needs education both for his enlightenment and to achieve morality; he is the only creature that needs to be educated.¹⁰

For Kant, most animals require nourishment and protection, but not *care*, as is the case with the human being.¹¹ An animal is everything that can be by instinct, but the human being needs to dispose of his own reason. “The human species is supposed to bring out, little by little, humanity’s entire natural predisposition by means of its own effort.”¹² Therefore, the human being truly becomes human through education; he is what education makes of him. This education must always become better with each generation so that future generations advance a step toward the moral improvement of the species, toward the perfection of humanity. The project of an educational theory starts from a hopeful idea of improvement, that human nature can always become better. In Kant’s words,

An outline of a theory of education is a noble ideal, and it does no harm if we are not immediately in a position to realize it. One must be careful not to consider the idea to be chimerical and disparage it as a beautiful dream, simply because in its execution hindrances occur. An idea is nothing other than the concept of a perfection which is not yet to be found in experience – as is the case of a perfect republic governed by rules of justice. Is the latter therefore impossible? If our idea is only correct, then it is by no means impossible, despite all of the obstacles which stand in the way of its execution. [...] Now the idea of education which develops all the human being’s natural predispositions is indeed truthful.¹³

To educate according to the idea of humanity is to teach that one must act “in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and

¹⁰ “Kant’s proposal for education is to discipline the will. At the same time as man is born with a disposition to follow impulses and vices, he is born with the law within him (Zingano, M. A., 1989. *Razão e História em Kant*. São Paulo: Brasiliense). Education must have rationality as its objective, because the rational being can enact universal law for himself, achieved by learning to exercise the rules on a theoretical and practical level. One of the fundamental aspects in the Kantian vision would be discipline for the achievement of autonomy, because through its man would emerge from animality to humanity.” (Brandão, J., Guariniello, S. Q., 2017. *Immanuel Kant e Paulo Freire: a escola, os educandos e a questão da autonomia*. *Lumen et Virtus*, 8(19), p. 175) – my translation.

¹¹ Päd, AA 09:441 / Kant, I., 2007. *Lectures on pedagogy*, *ibid.*, p. 437.

¹² Päd, AA 09:442 / *Ibid.*, p. 438.

¹³ Päd, AA 09:444-445 / *Ibid.*, pp. 439–440.

never simply as a means.”¹⁴

According to Manfred Kuehn (2012), educability is an essential process for Kant’s philosophy. He states that for Kant

educability is not just one of the essential characteristics of human beings, but the most important one of all. It has not just moral, but also political implications that go far beyond the needs of any particular government or state. The well-being of humanity in the long run depends on it.¹⁵

Education is capable of promoting both scientific and technical development as well as human development; however, in order for the individual to reach such development, they must be active, that is, each individual must seek the exit from their immaturity.¹⁶ This immaturity, for Kant, is understood as the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. In this sense, one may mention the famous opening sentence of the essay on *An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?* “Sapere aude! Have the courage to make use of your own intellect!”¹⁷ Therefore, this exit consists in thinking for oneself and being able to assume the conduct of one’s own life in an autonomous and responsible way. Ultimately, to be free in order to be autonomous.

According to Robinson dos Santos (2007), Kant understands education as a fundamental process through which the human being is constituted as such. Education is, therefore,

a knowledge connected to experience that must be guided and planned in connection with ethics. Kant emphasizes that it is of utmost importance that this knowledge, which is part of practical Anthropology, be studied with a view to its constant improvement, and it does not matter that this process never

¹⁴ GMS, AA 04:429 / Kant, I., 1993. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: With, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns*, ibid., p. 36.

¹⁵ Kuehn, M., 2012. Kant on Education, Anthropology, and Ethics. In: *Kant and Education Interpretations and Commentary*. New York: Routledge, p. 66.

¹⁶ I agree with Menezes that: “Aufklärung identifies itself deeply with this educational project, because its ideals of humanity and autonomy, without it, would be doomed to chimera. Transforming itself into a philosophy of education, it assumes this project as the vehicle that improves humanity to the point of no longer needing external authority and superstition as shields for its minority. Believing in the possibility of a man educated for freedom is what allows Aufklärung to be structured as a process.” (Menezes, E., 2014. Kant: Esclarecimento e Educação Moral. *Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã*, 19(1), p. 144.) – my translation.

¹⁷ WE, AA 08:35 / Kant, I., 2006. *An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?* In: P. Kleingeld, ed. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 17.

reaches completion. For this very reason, the relation between pedagogy and knowledge becomes necessary and vice versa. Pedagogy must be in constant dialogue with the various spheres of knowledge, drawing upon the progress achieved in different fields, as well as being itself a knowledge that reflects upon its own foundations.¹⁸

It is through education that the human being must be disciplined, cultivated, civilized, and moralized. These are, therefore, the four fundamental stages of the education of the human being.

Among the sources of knowledge are, on the one hand, sensibility – through which objects appear to us – and, on the other, the understanding – through which objects are thought. In this context, bodies are in relation to the pure forms of sensible intuition, namely space and time. Through the relation of these forms with the sources of knowledge, we are capable of formulating concepts. Thus, knowledge *begins* in sensibility, passes through understanding, and is completed by reason.¹⁹ Thinking of the individual as belonging both to the sensible and intelligible world, they are both capable of knowing through the senses and of being influenced by sensibility; for this reason, Kant proposes a twofold education, namely a disciplinary one – which he calls negative – and an instruction – which he calls positive. It is also through discipline that autonomy is attained.

¹⁸ Santos, R., 2007. Educação Moral e Civilização Cosmopolita: Atualidade da Filosofia Prática de Kant. *Revista Iberoamericana de Educación*, 41(4), p. 5 – my translation.

¹⁹ Regarding the relationship between sensitive intuitions and educational theory, Gary B. Herbert states that: “Kant’s explanation of the organization of sensuous intuitions under the forms of sensuous intuition is the analogical template for understanding his theory of education. We are told by Kant that “morality is a matter of character” (LP: 9:486), and also that the fundamental objective of education is the “formation of character,” i.e., keeping promises, acting with dignity, and respecting the rights of others (LP: 9:487). Promoting character requires that the child “be allowed to think for himself, and to enjoy a certain amount of freedom, although still obliged to follow certain rules [...] [W]e must allow the child from his earliest childhood perfect liberty in every respect [...] provided that in acting so he does not interfere with the liberty of others” (LP: 9:454). Freedom is fundamental to character and dignity because it is only a person whose choices are freely made who can keep promises and be held accountable for what he does. Character is to the child what space and time, the a priori forms of sensuous intuition, are to objects. Just as only the spatially and temporally determinate object can become an object to which the categories of understanding can be imputed, so also it is only a person of character who can be obligated, i.e., whose past and future actions can be imputed to him. Character transforms the child into a moral subject to whom the categories of free causality can meaningfully be applied. The existence of an inner, unobservable autonomy is not something we need to verify. It is enough to know it as a necessary condition of the attributes of character which we can observe.” (Herbert, G. B., 2012. Bringing Morality to Appearances: Kant’s Theory of Education. In: *Kant and Education Interpretations and Commentary*. New York: Routledge, p. 91.)

Kant, in the Päd, lists the four stages of education in human beings, they must:

1) be disciplined. To discipline means to seek to prevent animality from doing damage to humanity, both in the individual and in society. [...]; 2) The human being must be cultivated. Culture includes instruction and teaching. It is the procurement of skillfulness. The latter is the possession of a faculty which is sufficient for the carrying out of whatever purpose. [...]; 3) It must be seen that the human being becomes prudent also, well suited for human society, popular, and influential. This requires a certain form of culture, which is called civilizing. [...]; 4) One must also pay attention to moralization. The human being should not merely be skilled for all sorts of ends, but should also acquire the disposition to choose nothing but good ends. Good ends are those which are necessarily approved by everyone and which can be the simultaneous ends of everyone.²⁰

Education is an art that requires practice, it must be perfected over several generations, so that one generation educates another. For Kant, good education is the source of all good in the world. Human beings are capable of acting according to maxims and deviating from their impulses, which stem from self-love (*Eigenliebe*).

Specifically regarding the first stage, according to Robinson dos Santos (2007),

Discipline may be considered as a preamble to education and fulfills a propaedeutic function for morality. In itself, discipline means merely a process of heteronomy, through which the student is not only accustomed to obedience and even to familiarity with rules for acting, but gradually develops in themselves the understanding of the necessity of self-discipline.²¹

Discipline subjects human beings to the laws of humanity and begins to make him feel the force of these very laws. "Discipline prevents the human being from deviating by means of his animal impulses from his destiny: humanity. [...] it is merely negative, that is to say, it is the

²⁰ Päd, AA 09:449-450 / Kant, I., 2007. *Lectures on pedagogy*, ibid., pp. 443-444.

²¹ Santos, R., 2007. *Educação Moral e Civilização Cosmopolita: Atualidade da Filosofia Prática de Kant*. *Revista Iberoamericana de Educación*, p. 5 - my translation.

action by means of which man's tendency to savagery is taken away.”²² I agree with Santos (2007) that, as the stages of education develop, discipline ceases to be external – grounded in the authority of another – and becomes internal, that is, it becomes obedience to reason, to oneself, and the individual becomes capable of discovering autonomy within.

I argue that educational discipline is not contrary to autonomy; it is a path toward autonomy, for through it the individual learns to guide their will by their own reason. It follows, therefore, that as the individual learns to discipline themselves, they are capable of giving themselves laws – which, from a Kantian perspective, are moral laws. Thus, the aim of discipline in Kant is not to standardize bodies or promote blind obedience in individuals; on the contrary, the aim of the use of discipline (whether educational or other types) is to serve as a tool for the process of moralization and the construction of moral character.²³

Therefore, autonomy, in its definition, means the property of the will of being a law unto itself. Based on this, one of the main roles of school education is to educate students so that they may reach and achieve autonomy, for in doing so they will not only be capable of becoming enlightened but also of expressing their individualities and creativity, since they will be capable of thinking for themselves, of being critical and self-critical. For this, it is necessary to teach how to think. Knowing how to think is fundamental to autonomy. Kant, in the *Critique of the power of judgment*, lists three maxims that may serve as guidance: “1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself. The first is the maxim of the unprejudiced way of thinking, the second of the broad-minded way, the third that of the consistent way.”²⁴ The first is the maxim of a reason that is never passive. It is freed from prejudices and superstitions, thus preventing reason from becoming passive and guided by another. The second requires an enlarged thought, capable of placing itself in the standpoint of others. Finally, the third way of thinking, the consistent one, can only be achieved through the combination of the first two; it is thinking in agreement with oneself. The

²² Päd, AA 09:443 / Kant, I., 2007. *Lectures on pedagogy*, ibid., pp. 438 – 439.

²³ For more on the theory of discipline in Kant's practical philosophy, see Marques, L. F. P., 2024. *Discipline and Reason: The Theory of Discipline in Kant's Practical Philosophy*. Doctoral dissertation.

²⁴ KU, AA 05:294 / Kant, I., 2002. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 174.

Kantian pedagogical proposal is a project that aims not only at discipline and instruction but also at humanity, autonomy, and morality.

2. Educational Autonomy according to Paulo Freire

Danilo Streck and Evaldo Pauly (2010), in the *Paulo Freire Dictionary*, analyze the concepts of pedagogy in Freire. According to Streck (2010), the qualification of the term pedagogy for Freire is diverse and there is not a single pedagogy; it may be of hope, of conflict, of dialogue, and of autonomy. According to him,

Pedagogy is situated within the scope of this tension, in which practice and theory are in permanent dialogue. In this sense, pedagogy refers to concrete educational practices carried out by educators, professional or not. It comes to be the very act of knowing, in which the educator plays a testimonial role in the sense of redoing before the students and with them their own process of learning and knowing. At the same time, pedagogy refers to a set of knowledges, always linked to practice.²⁵

This vision oriented toward educational practice, which implies the teaching process as a two-way path in the relationship between educator and student, is found in *Pedagogy of Autonomy* (1996). According to Pauly (2010),

today, in Brazil, common sense accepts the thesis that school could be another instrument for reducing youth violence and disseminating a more civilized morality. This is the classical ethical function of the school in the Democratic Rule of Law. Freire resumes this ethical thesis because he likewise proposes that the dignity of the human person is neither a favor granted by the State nor a gift from the Divinity. The ethics of teaching is not a heteronomous decision; on the contrary, human dignity is an ethical value collectively constructed by autonomous subjects. Freire follows the modern tradition of Enlightenment since his notion of autonomy resembles that of Kant [...]. Autonomy is an ethical commitment that establishes demands for both student and educator [...] Autonomy presupposes an emancipatory conception of education.²⁶

²⁵ Streck, D., Redin, E. and Zitkoski, J., eds., 2010. *Dicionário Paulo Freire*. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica Editora, p. 374 – my translation.

²⁶ Pauly, E. L., 2010. Pedagogia da autonomia. In: *Dicionário Paulo Freire*. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica Editora, p. 376 – my translation.

Autonomy is a commitment to the emancipation of oneself and of society, for the human being is a social, political, ethical, and transformative being. Even though education itself has its limitations, despite the human inability to know everything, despite its “unfinished” nature, education liberates and forms in the subject a conception of oneself as capable of transforming both oneself and one’s own reality.

Paulo Freire conceived pedagogy as linked to autonomy, that is, to the possibility of the subject being autonomous. For him, it is necessary that the subject understand themselves as a subject of history, create their own representations of the world, and think about how to solve their problems; “thus, autonomy is a process of decision and humanization that we construct historically, based on various, countless decisions that we make throughout our existence.”²⁷ In this sense, autonomy is fundamental for the construction of a more just, egalitarian, and democratic society. An autonomous subject is capable of expressing their consciousness, their voice, and having a place in society and political participation. Autonomy is not defined only by the freedom to think for oneself and the capacity to be guided by principles that accord with one’s own reason, but also involves the capacity to act, to realize oneself as a conscious and active individual.

The education for autonomy proposed by Freire aims not only at learning, but at conquering. The conquest of autonomy occurs through lived experiences, expressions of freedom, and decision-making. Differently from modern autonomy, Freire – more clearly and strongly – links it to a socio-political-pedagogical perspective. In this way, he understands autonomy as a socio-historical condition of a liberated people, that is, a people emancipated from the oppressions of its time. Therefore, to be autonomous is to be liberated from oppressive structures. In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1968), the necessity of the conquest and struggle for autonomy becomes evident, in Freire’s words: “The liberation that they will not reach by chance, but through the praxis of their quest; through the knowledge and recognition of the need to fight for it.”²⁸

According to Freire, education is formation; the human being is not born ready and finished, and needs education for the construction of the self as an active subject. In other words, “What I mean is

²⁷ Machado, R. C. F., 2008. Autonomia. In: *Dicionário Paulo Freire*. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica Editora, p. 57 – my translation.

²⁸ Freire, P., 1983. *Pedagogia do oprimido*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, p. 32 – my translation.

that education, as formation, as a process of knowledge, of teaching, of learning, has become, throughout the human adventure in the world, a connotation of its nature, being gestated in history as the vocation for humanization [...].”²⁹ To educate is to form. And the human being has a vocation for humanization. Education is not limited to the construction of technical-scientific knowledge, but also of citizenship, of social action; therefore, content cannot be disconnected from the moral and aesthetic formation of the human being. Education for autonomy has as one of its primary tasks the creation of means for the exercise of autonomy, that is, it must provide conditions for students to understand and assume their socio-historical condition, capable of creating, transforming, thinking, communicating, and feeling. In this sense, autonomy is not self-sufficiency, but being connected to others, to the other, to the social dimension, to action, a dynamic between theory and practice.

There is a close relationship in this pedagogical proposal of autonomy with society and all its structures; therefore, it is necessary to explore the relationship between authority and freedom. For Freire, for example, the teacher is an authority; however, this authority must be based on competence. For there to be a relationship between discipline, authority, freedom, and autonomy, it is necessary to break with authoritarianism – understood as the abuse of authority.³⁰ For Freire, autonomy is the point of equilibrium capable of establishing the legitimacy of this relationship. Autonomy is, therefore, a dialectical process of constructing individual subjectivity, which depends on interpersonal relationships developed in the social space, on lived experiences. Freire believes that the construction of autonomy must “be centered on experiences that stimulate decision and responsibility, that is, on experiences that respect freedom.”³¹ These allow for the development of autonomous subjectivity, capable of generating a respectful and committed relationship among individuals that encompasses all exist-

²⁹ Freire, P., 2003. *Política e educação*. São Paulo: Cortez, p. 20 – my translation.

³⁰ “Therefore, the discipline of the will is a difficult but necessary practice. It is through it that internal authority is constituted from the internalization of external authority (cf. idem, p. 35), which will allow freedom to fully live its possibilities, which include the construction of one’s own autonomy. The experience of the dialectical tension between freedom and authority shows us that they may not necessarily be antagonistic to each other.” (Zatti, V., 2007. *Autonomia e educação em Immanuel Kant e Paulo Freire*. Campinas: Autores Associados, ibid., p. 57.) – my translation.

³¹ Freire, P., 1998. *Pedagogia da autonomia: saberes necessários à prática educativa*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, p. 121 – my translation.

ing social relations, whether school-related, familial, or social.

Freire seeks not only education, but also the liberation of the oppressed. This liberation is individual – someone cannot liberate someone else; thus, such liberation occurs through a responsible self-configuration aimed at autonomy. As they realize this self-configuration, active subjects are able to suppress their oppressions, to free themselves from the social bonds that once limited them.³² This is an autonomous construction of conscientization. It is necessary, according to Freire, to have critical knowledge of the obstacles that hinder and limit autonomy; it is necessary to overcome heteronomous conditions. It is through this process that active subjects are capable of transforming themselves and society; to seek autonomy is not only an individual or educational duty, but a political one.

Freire proposes a problem-posing and dialogical educational approach. He does not view students as repositories of content, but as capable subjects. Therefore, paths must be promoted so that the student can be a subject and build their own autonomy. According to Freire, “no one educates anyone else, nor do we educate ourselves alone: we educate each other in communion, mediated by the world.”³³ Education constitutes itself as dialogical as far as it centers the dynamic in doing and in thinking about doing. Therefore, autonomy requires communion between educator and student, methodical rigor, research, curiosity, and creativity. Dialogue is fundamental to the act of creating and recreating the world; therefore, for education to be able to create the means for the student to reach their autonomy, it must be dialogical.

3. Autonomy as a Teaching-Learning Process

Many interpreters of moral and pedagogical philosophy debate the seemingly contradictory undertaking found in the pedagogical paradox of autonomy, which can be summarized in the following statement: one cannot force people to be free. According to Lars Løvlie (2012),

³² “A person with autonomy is able to emancipate himself. He produces relevance in his actions, defends his point of view in an argumentative manner and understands the truth in movement, being constantly reconstructed; he creates a subjective structure, capable of using rationality and sensitivity in the defense of his individual and collective interests. He is a subject aware of his political condition in the interaction with the world and is able to reveal the phenomena that prevent him from being visible in the decisions he needs to make.” (Silva, L. E., 2009. *Autonomia como princípio educativo. Revista Espaço Acadêmico*, 9(101), p. 106) – my translation.

³³ Freire, P., 1983. *Pedagogia do opriido*, p. 79 – my translation.

The paradox is pragmatic or performative in the sense that there is a clash between what is said and what is actually done; in the speech act “Be spontaneous!” the summons to act freely is contradicted by the implicit command to be free. Examples abound in the field of education, as when a teacher invites students to a free dialogue but insists on determining the rules for the dialogue herself; or when the candidate who sits for an oral exam is told to talk freely, when everyone knows that the examiners wield the criteria for the correct answers. Or in more general terms, if we celebrate the fact that young people are capable of autonomous moral judgment, but take for granted that the teacher is the authority who determines what autonomy is and how it should be practiced.³⁴

This paradox exists due to the duality between internal and external authority, that is, due to self-determination and determination that comes from the other. On the one hand, an infinity of alternatives for the “resolution” of this paradox can be found in pedagogical theories; on the other hand, the persistence of the paradox throughout the history of ideas lies in the dynamism of educational thought – that is, reflective judgment on educational practices that aim at the freedom of human beings in its intellectual aspect, but also immersed in historical, social, and political contexts, requires renewal and resignification. In other words, *normatively* the educational goal is always the same: that human beings become autonomous. But *descriptively*, one must always reflect on *how* this will be implemented.

As I explained in the previous section, in Kant’s educational perspective, education aims at freedom, but it requires, for example, as a first educational step, discipline. In the Kantian view, it is emphasized that discipline is a means for the agent to reach autonomy, and it must never be used so that the will becomes servile. Free judgment and the exercise of freedom must be allowed in the educational process so that the agent, for example, becomes conscious of themselves and of their role in the world.

Given the above, it is evident that education for autonomy has long been proposed by various philosophers and educators – whether it is

³⁴ Løvlie, L., 2012. Kant’s Invitation to Educational Thinking. In: *Kant and Education Interpretations and Commentary*. New York: Routledge, p. 109.

linked to morality, as in the case of Kant, or as a foundation for liberation from oppression and heteronomy, as Paulo Freire conceives. I believe that autonomy is both the goal of education and the path to human progress, the touchstone between being and ought-to-be. It is the key concept capable of providing improvements at both the private and collective level. Therefore, the autonomy that brings forth critical thinking and enlightenment can be achieved through education, by means of teaching and learning.

For Kant, school education is committed to promoting in students the development of their skills, abilities, and faculties – in Kantian terms, to develop the natural dispositions aimed at the use of reason. In this way, students will have a rational formation, self-aware, capable of acting with creativity, and knowledgeable of their rights and duties as citizens. According to Santos (2014), the teaching-learning process, in the Kantian perspective, has a dual role, namely, “to educate oneself for oneself, when education takes on the challenge of forming, in an integral way, the human-individual with their ethical and moral values”, and “to educate oneself for the other, when education is committed to thinking about citizenship in all its breadth and complexity.”³⁵ It is clear that the Kantian project is not limited to education as instruction, but rather as education for morality, for conscious and free action in society, for autonomous action. Thus, it may be considered a pedagogical, moral, and political project.

In turn, Freire believes that in the teaching-learning process, the educator must create conditions for students to be autonomous, must know how to listen to and respect their students, for only then will they avoid an authoritarian practice and instead be a legitimate authority in the classroom. For the educator to reach the highest goal of education, dialogue, listening, and respect are necessary. For Freire, teaching is not the transmission of knowledge but rather the act of problematizing so that learners – together with the educator – construct their knowledge. In his words, “[...] teaching is not the transferring of knowledge, but the creating of possibilities for the production or construction of knowledge.”³⁶

Listening and dialogue are fundamental for autonomy and for knowing how to exercise autonomy. The educator must be attentive to

³⁵ Santos, M. P., 2014. As relações entre ética, moral e educação escolar sob a ótica de Immanuel Kant: uma análise filosófico-pedagógica. *Revista Intersaberes*, 9(17), p. 214 – my translation.

³⁶ Freire, P., 1998. *Pedagogia da autonomia: saberes necessários à prática educativa*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, ibid., p. 25 – my translation.

their own practices so that they may see not only themselves as such, but also their students, listen to them, and be able to engage in dialogue with them. Therefore, “to teach is not to transfer the intelligence of the object to the student, but to challenge them so that, as a knowing subject, they become capable of understanding and communicating what is understood.”³⁷ This means that the communication of what is understood begins in the classroom, in the teaching-learning process, so that students may then replicate the process in society and in their interpersonal relationships. The educator must teach how to think and how to express thought. For students to learn to use words and speak in a committed and autonomous manner, to think rightly. One of the educator’s roles in the process of teaching how to think rightly is found in letting it “become apparent to the students that one of the beauties of our way of being in the world and with the world, as historical beings, is the capacity to, by intervening in the world, know the world.”³⁸

Freire’s political-pedagogical project is grounded in the action and reflection of the educator. Pedagogical *praxis* involves the mutual engagement of educator and student in the reflection on the many dimensions of the world, and for there to be effectiveness, there must be harmony between teaching and everyday life. That is why for Freire, education is formation, and is not restricted to school education; it must be centered on experiences that stimulate decision-making and responsibility. Thus, the student acquires the conditions to act in a critical, independent, and creative way. Therefore, the educator must seek coherence between their practice and their teaching. In this sense, for Freire, the educator must respect the autonomy, dignity, and identity of the student, and “in practice, seeking coherence with this knowledge leads me inescapably to the creation of certain virtues or qualities without which that knowledge becomes inauthentic, empty speech, and the arrogant will of the teacher.”³⁹

Final remarks

Chronologically, in attempting to establish a relation between Kant and Paulo Freire, one searches for some mention in Freire’s texts to

³⁷ Ibid., p. 134–135 – my translation.

³⁸ Freire, P. and Shor, I., 1996. *Medo e ousadia: cotidiano do professor*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, p. 31 – my translation.

³⁹ Freire, P., 1998. *Pedagogia da Autonomia: Saberes Necessários à Prática Educativa*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, ibid., p. 69 – my translation.

theoretically ground such a connection. In this sense, it must be noted that there is no direct reference to Kant. On the other hand, indirectly, after readings and mappings of argumentative presuppositions, it becomes evident that Freire, in many instances, approaches Kantian conceptions. The most expressive common point is the aim of forming autonomous subjects, capable of thinking for themselves, thereby attributing strong importance to rationality, freedom, and humanity. The dialogue between Kant and Freire is thus as possible as it is demonstrable; however, one cannot overlook or fail to highlight the distinctions, for they are among the important hallmarks of these two authors as classics in philosophical and educational thought.

One of the similarities between Freire and Kant lies – as shown in previous sections – in the belief that education is formative of the subject. For Kant, the human being becomes human only through education; it is what education makes of them, just as for Freire, who affirms that education is formation, thus forming the subject through educational practices that endure throughout one's existence, in the dialectical process between theory and practice. Both believe in and defend the subject as capable of constructing themselves. Another important point is the rejection of mechanical education and memorization, as well as the importance given to discipline – not understood as an end in itself, but precisely as a means to achieve autonomy, as an educational process that promotes an individual capable of guiding themselves by reason and acting socially. Both conceived pedagogy as a constant dialogue with politics, so that citizens would be capable of knowing, demanding, and exercising their rights.

There are many differences between Kant's theory, especially the pedagogical one, and that of Paulo Freire. Taking the object of analysis in this article as a thematic cut-off point, I would like to point out that the greatest distinction between the perspectives of Kant and Paulo Freire lies in the point of departure. Kant conceives autonomy as stemming from freedom, morality, and the ought-to-be. Freire, in turn, thinks autonomy in an inverted way, that is, starting from oppression, authoritarianism, and heteronomy. Nevertheless, both seek for the individual to overcome the state of heteronomy. Another distinction lies in the fact that for Freire, autonomy is not a presupposition of reason – as it is for Kant – but is linked to historical and social aspects that may either facilitate liberation or limit autonomy.

Thus, it is clear that – both in terms of similarities and distinctions,

as well as in how each philosopher conceives and structures their theory – autonomy is held as a crucial point for human development. Autonomous education is fundamental for achieving social, political, moral, and subjective development. It is through autonomy that the individual is capable of thinking for themselves, of giving themselves their own laws; it is through it that political, social, and historical awareness is achieved. In order to have conscious citizens, engaged and capable of transforming their environment and society, it is necessary not only to have quality education, but also an education whose goal is autonomy.

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Kant's and Kierkegaard's Ethics of Duty

Abstract: The ethics of duty is also called deontology, and Immanuel Kant's ethics is usually cited as a model for deontological moral theory. However, it is often unfairly overlooked that Søren Kierkegaard's existential ethics is also deontological at its core, both in the case of his first ethics (the ethics of choice) and the second ethics (the ethics of love). In this comparative study, I will attempt to capture the convergent and divergent lines of their deontologically constructed ethical theories. The common starting point in the ethical thinking of both philosophers is the principle of duty, which is for them the determining motive for moral action. However, they differ in their conception of the nature and sources of this duty. Among the most fundamental differences in the ethical thinking of both authors, which I will analyze in the study, are their different views on the place of autonomy in ethics and on the relationship between duty and affection. In addition to the principle of duty, the lines of their ethical thinking meet particularly in their fundamental critique of eudaimonism and the elaboration of a consistent ethics of intention.

Keywords: Autonomy, Deontology, Dressed Duty, Eudaimonism, Kant, Kierkegaard, Morality

Abstrakt: Etika povinnosti je nazývaná aj deontológia, pričom zvyčajne za vzor deontologickej morálnej teórie sa kladie etika Immanuela Kanta. Často sa však nespravodlivo prehliada, že existenciálna etika Sørena Kierkegaarda je v jadre taktiež deontologická, a to tak v prípade jeho prvej etiky (etiky voľby), ako aj etiky druhej (etiky lásky). V tejto komparatívnej štúdii sa pokúsim postihnúť konvergentné a divergentné línie ich deontologicky konštruovaných etických teórií. V etickom myšlení oboch filozofov je spoločným východiskom princíp povinnosti, ktorý je

pre nich určujúcim motívom morálneho konania. Rozchádzajú sa však v poňatí povahy a zdrojov tejto povinnosti. Medzi najzásadnejšie odlišnosti v etickom myšlení oboch autorov, ktoré budem analyzovať v štúdii, patrí ich rozdielny pohľad na význam a miesto autonómie v etike a na vzťah medzi povinnosťou a náklonnosťou. Okrem princípu povinnosti sa línie ich etického myšlenia stretávajú najmä v ich zásadnej kritike eudaimonizmu a vypracovaní dôslednej etiky motívu.

Kľúčové slová: Autonómia, Deontológia, Eudaimonizmus, Kant, Kierkegaard, Moralita, Oblečená povinnosť

Úvod

Takmer zakaždým, keď je predmetom diskusie deontológia, vezme sa za modelový príklad Kantova etika mrvnej povinnosti, ktorej základy systematicky predstavil predovšetkým v dvoch etických dielach svojho tzv. kritického obdobia: v *Základoch metafyziky mrvov* (1785) a *Kritike praktického rozumu* (1788). V dejinách etického myšlenia však nájdeme aj iné, nemenej významné, deontologické etické teórie. Často sa prehliada, že taktiež Kierkegaardova existenciálna etika v sebe obsahuje jasné znaky deontológie. V prípade Kierkegaarda sa však situácia s jednoznačnou interpretáciou jeho etiky viac komplikuje jednak tým, že ako autor s pomocou rôznych pseudonymov využíva svoju metódu nepriamej komunikácie, a tak je v niektorých prípadoch neisté, či možno určitým pseudonymom vyslovené názory považovať za jemu vlastné, a jednak, že u Kierkegaarda možno identifikovať hneď niekoľko rôznych koncepcíí etiky. Napokon aj sám Kierkegaard skrývajúc sa za pseudonymom Vigilius Haufniensis v diele *Pojem úzkosti* (1844) rozlišuje dva typy etiky: prvú a druhú.¹ Prvá etika predpokladá univerzálnu ríšu hodnôt, ustanovenú Bohom či božstvom, nejde preto o etiku výlučne a ani eminentne kresťanskú, druhá predpokladá zjavenie a vieru v jej eminentnom, kresťanskom zmysle slova. V prvej tvoria základné protiklady cnosť a vina, v druhej viera a hriech; prvá spočíva v imanencii, druhá naopak v transcedencii. Avšak pri detailnejšom pohľade na Kierkegaardovo dielo sa musí ukázať, že aj toto Haufniensovo rozlišenie dvoch etík úplne nepostačuje na postihnutie rôznorodosti Kierkegaardových etík naprieč celým jeho dielom. My sa ale v tejto štúdii obmedzíme na toto Hauf-

¹ „Prvá etika predpokladá metafyziku, druhá etika predpokladá dogmatiku“ (Kierkegaard, S., 1980. *The Concept of Anxiety*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, s. 24).

nienovo rozlišovanie dvoch etík, pričom za príkladné stelesnenie prvej etiky budeme považovať jeho etiku voľby predstavenú v druhej časti *Bud – alebo* (1843) a za príklad druhej etiky budeme považovať koncept etiky lásky v jeho diele *Skutky lásky* (1847). Napriek značným rozdielom v Kierkegaardovom etickom učení, ktoré sa líši od diela k dielu, sa ale ukazuje, že jedným z jednotiacich princípov všetkých Kierkegaardových etík je práve tak ako pre Kanta to, že vo sfére morálky je povinnosť určujúcim motívom.

Je nepopierateľné, že Kierkegaardovo myslenie v sebe nesie zreteľné stopy vplyvu a kritického vyrovnaní sa s Kantovou etikou, gnozeológiou a filozofiou náboženstva. Názory, do akej miery bola Kierkegaardova etika ovplyvnená tou Kantovou, sa však veľmi líšia. Z tohto pohľadu je azda prekvapujúce, že meno Immanuela Kanta sa v celom publikovanom diele Sørena Kierkegaarda explicitne zmieňuje len sedemnásťkrát,² čo je v porovnaní s výskytom priamych referencií na iných mysliteľov (Aristoteles: 55, Hegel: vyše 300) výrazne menej. Táto štúdia však nemá ambíciu predstaviť historicko-filozofické skúmanie vzťahu medzi oboma autormi; jej cieľom preto nie je komplexné zmapovanie rozsahu Kantovho vplyvu na Kierkegaardovo dielo. Svojím zameraním ide o komparatívnu analýzu, ktorej úlohou je identifikovať tie najdôležitejšie konvergentné a divergentné línie v deontologicky konštruovaných etických teóriach Immanuela Kanta a Sørena Kierkegaarda.

I. Kantova a Kierkegaardova kritika eudaimonizmu

Obaja filozofi, Kant aj Kierkegaard, ešte prv než vo svojich dielach plne rozvinuli svoje deontologické teórie, venovali značný priestor kritike eudaimonistického prístupu v etike a antropológii. Totiž, pokiaľ človek bude žiť v zajatí životného názoru, že ústredným cieľom ľudského života je šťastie či pôžitok, tak nikdy nedospeje k morálnej perspektíve dobra a zla. Na tento jav svorne poukazujú vo svojich dielach Kant i Kierkegaard. Kant predovšetkým tým, že vo svojich klúčových etických textoch dôsledne vylučuje šťastie ako motivačný horizont v morálnom konaní.³ To, čo zásadne chýba každej životnej orientácii na vlastné šťastie, je to,

² Pozri Green, R. M., 2016. A Debt both Obscure and Enormous. In: Stewart, J., ed. *Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries. Tome I: Philosophy*. Abingdon – New York: Routledge, s. 179.

³ To však neznamená, že by podľa Kanta človek pri plnení svojej povinnosti zároveň vždy musel poprieť svoju prirodzenú túžbu po šťastí, ako na to poukazujú Nizhnikov, S.A., Zekrist, R.I., Zhusupova, A., 2014. Kant's Moral Law in the Social and Legal Context. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 3(2), s. 45.

čo je základom morálnej hodnoty akéhokoľvek konania: prekonanie vlastného egoizmu. Bez ohľadu na rôzne užitočné dôsledky či ušľachtilé sprievodné motívy nášho konania, ktorými si chceme ospravedlniť naše konanie zamerané primárne na hľadanie vlastného šťastia, vždy takéto konanie sleduje aj vlastný sebecký záujem. Úsilie o vlastné šťastie je totiž vždy tiež úsilím o nakímenie vlastného egoizmu.

Kierkegaardov pohľad na eudaimonizmus je v zásade veľmi blízky Kantovmu, hoci z hľadiska formy sa jeho prístup veľmi lísi, čo súvisí najmä s jeho literárny štýlom a využitím tzv. nepriamej metódy komunikácie založenej na hre na skrývačku so pseudonymami. Kierkegaard svoje autorstvo začína tým, že najprv vo svojich pseudonymných spisoch z prvého obdobia tvorby, predovšetkým v *Bud' – alebo a Štádiach na ceste životom* (1845), obšírne líči pôvab rôznych podôb estetického spôsobu života, aby následne v týchto dielach poodhalil, že za týmto, na prvý pohľad príťažlivým, prístopom k životu sa vskutku skrýva stav väčnej duchovnej biedy: zúfalstva.⁴ Životným názorom estetického spôsobu života je z pohľadu Kierkegaarda eudaimonizmus v jeho rôznych podobách.⁵ To značí, že estetická existencia nie je vskutku formovaná klúčovými kategóriami etiky: dobrom a zlom (hoci tzv. estetik sa nimi môže príležitostne zastrešovať), ale kategóriami príjemného a nepríjemného (teda kategóriami, ktoré i Kant používa na charakteristiku človeka v živote eudaimonisticky orientovaného podľa náklonnosti). A preto dobré z pohľadu estetického je v princípe to, čo nám je príjemné, to, čo nám spôsobuje pôžitok, nech už má ten pôžitok rôznu podobu, počnúc vulgárne hedonisticky poňatou slastou, skrz krásu, zdravie, zamilovanosť, bohatstvo, moc, spoločenskú česť až po intelektuálny pôžitok „zaujímavosti“. Avšak to „dobré“ z estetického pohľadu, teda to príjemné môže byť pre nás dnes jedno, zajtra druhé, často i celkom protikladné k tomu dnešnému. Estét si však nad tým neláme hlavu, neprekáža mu, že jeho život je vo svetle pravdy plný protirečení.⁶ Ak je totiž dobré definované ako príjemné, tak je vskutku vydané napospas prchavým pocitom, sebeckým záujmom a premenlivým situáciám. Kierkegaard argumentuje, že dobré a zlé nemá u estéta žiadnu stálosť, pretože mu chýba bytostný vzťah k večnosti.⁷ Estét nežije podľa zásad kvalitatívnej dialektiky, preto na rozdiel od etika nerozoznáva absolútnu kvalitatív-

⁴ Pozri Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud' – alebo*. Bratislava: Kalligram, s. 679.

⁵ „Estetická existencia je bytostne vzaté pôžitok...“ (Kierkegaard, S., 2003. *Má literární činnost*. Brno: CDK, s. 34).

⁶ Pozri Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud' – alebo*, ibid., s. 618.

⁷ Estét na rozdiel od etika zakladá svoj život na tom, čo môže byť i nemusí. Ibid., s. 679.

nu protikladnosť medzi dobrým a zlým.⁸ Tieto kategórie sú pre neho tekuté, plastické a egoisticky podmienené pocitom príjemnosti, a tým vo vzťahu k tomuto pocitu druhoradé. Život založený na príjemnom, na pôzitku, na šťastí ako primárnom cieli je podobne ako u Kanta aj u Kierkegaarda vnímaný ako sebecky orientovaný, a preto vskutku neschopný morálne hodnotného konania, hoci navonok sa tak môže druhým javiť. V eudaimonizme sa vďaka egoizmu v ňom bytostne obsiahnutom ukrýva pasca inštrumentalizmu vo vzťahu k druhým, t. j. druhí sú nám iba prostriedkom našich vlastných (sebeckých) cieľov a záujmov, druhí sa stávajú len médiom nášho šťastia. Obaja filozofí vnímajú ako podmienku morálneho konania prekonanie prirodzeného egoizmu, a to prekonaním konania založeného na náklonnosti či bezprostrednosti vlastnej estetickému spôsobu života, t. j. „prvotnej bezprostrednosti“ – ako ju pomenúva Kierkegaard.

Kant v *Základoch metafyziky mrvov* prichádza s dôležitým argumentom proti celej tradícii eudaimonizmu, kde vysvetluje, že šťastie nemôže byť skutočným zmyslom ľudského života:

Keby u bytosti, ktorá má rozum a vôľu, bolo skutočným cieľom prírody jej *zachovanie*, jej *blaho*, jedným slovom, jej *blaženosť*, potom by jej výbavu na to vybrala veľmi zle, keby si za vykonávateľa svojho zámeru zvolila rozum tohto stvorenia. Všetko konanie, ktoré má ono stvorenie s týmto zámerom vykonať, a všetky pravidlá jeho správania by mu totiž oveľa presnejšie predpisovali jeho inštinkty, a onen účel by mohlo oveľa istejšie dosiahnuť nimi, než ako sa to môže stať prostredníctvom rozumu.⁹

Takže ak by účelom nášho života bolo šťastie, potom by sa náš rozum so zreteľom na cieľ ľudskej existencie vskutku ukazoval ako druhoradý a nadbytočný nástroj, pretože lepšie a istejšie by nás k napĺňaniu tohto životného cieľa privádzali naše inštinkty. A preto, ako si správne Kant všíma, čím je nejaký človek intelligentnejší, čím kultivovanejší rozum má a súčasne pristupuje k životu so zámerom si ho čo najviac vychutnávať, tým viac sa takýto jedinec vo svojom živote vzdaľuje od pocitov spojnosti a šťastia. Tento rozpor ho môže napokon viesť až k mizológií: nenávisti k rozumu.¹⁰ Tu sa ukazuje, že pravý účel, zmysel, našej existencie obdarenej rozumom musí byť vyšší a úctyhodnejší než len spočinúť

⁸ Pozri ibid., s. 624–625.

⁹ Kant, I., 2004. *Základy metafyziky mrvov*. Bratislava: Kalligram, s. 18.

¹⁰ Ibid., s. 19.

v spokojnosti a blaženosti. Pravým účelom praktického rozumu je z pohľadu Kanta vytvárať „vôľu dobrú osebe.“¹¹ Kant vzápätí podotýka, že táto vôle nie je súčasťou jediným a celým doblom, je však nevyhnutnou podmienkou všetkého ostatného dobra, vrátane mrvných cností i túžby po blaženosti. V morálke totiž nejde o to byť šťastným, ale o to byť hodným šťastia, ako hľásia Kant v *Kritike praktického rozumu*.¹² Obaja rozoberaní filozofi tak odmietajú nielen považovať šťastie za princíp, ktorým by bolo možné zdôvodniť morálku, ale ho i chápaa ako ústredný cieľ ľudskej existencie. Šťastie ako životný cieľ nezodpovedá človeku ako rozumnej bytosti (Kant), ani ako duchovnej bytosti (Kierkegaard).¹³

Kierkegaard v zásade rozoznáva dva základné druhy eudaimonizmu, ako to môžeme vyčítať z nasledujúcej pasáže z *Uzatvárajúceho nevedecného dodatku* (1846), a to priemerný a rozumný:

Všetka svetská múdrost je v skutočnosti abstrakciou, a len ten najpriemernejší eudaimonizmus nemá žiadnu abstrakciu, ale je pôžitkom z okamihu. V rovnakej miere, v akej je eudaimonizmus chytrý, má v sebe aj abstrakciu; čím viac chyrosti, tým viac abstrakcie. Eudaimonizmus tým nadobúda prchavú podobnosť s etickým a eticko-náboženským a na okamih sa môže zdať, akoby mohli kráčať pospolu. A predsa to tak nie je, pretože prvým krokom etiky je nekonečná abstrakcia, a čo sa stane? Tento krok sa stáva príliš veľkým pre eudaimonizmus, a hoci určitá abstrakcia je chyrostou, nekonečná abstrakcia, chápaná eudaimonisticky, je šialenstvom.¹⁴

Priemernému typu eudaimonizmu chýba abstrakcia, čiže dostatočná úroveň reflexie, ktorou by sa jedinec dokázal odpútať od toho, čo ho bezprostredne obklopuje. To však neznamená, že by ten druhý, rozumný typ eudaimonizmu bol vďaka abstrakcii a reflexii schopný prekročiť rámec egoizmu, i ten zostáva nadálej primárne orientovaný na svoje šťastie a spokojnosť, akurát k tomuto cieľu volí rozumnejšie prostriedky ako eudaimonista prvého typu: jeho cieľom je užívať život rozumne. Ako naznačuje citovaný text, druhý typ eudaimonizmu obsahuje v sebe teda istú svetskú múdrost v podobe rozumnosti. Nejde však o rozumnosť v zmysle Kantovej praktickej racionality, lež v zmysle chyrosti

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Kant, I., 1990. *Kritika praktického rozumu*. Bratislava: Spektrum, s. 178.

¹³ Pozri napr. Kierkegaard, S., 2018. *Choroba na smrť*. Bratislava: Premedia, s. 33.

¹⁴ Kierkegaard, S., 1992. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*. Vol. I. Princeton: Princeton University Press, s. 426.

(Klugheit),¹⁵ racionalita tu nestanovuje konečné ciele našej praxe, ale len prostriedky. Kierkegaard podrobuje kritike tento druhý typ i v *Bud – alebo*, kde ho nazýva epikureizmom, pričom za jeho charakteristický rys považuje „rafinovaný egoizmus.“¹⁶ Jediný rozdiel oproti prvému typu vidí Kierkegaard v tom, že epikureizmus si užíva život reflektované, nie bezprostredne. Jeho reflexia však nesiahá dostatočne vysoko, aby presiahla ríšu bezprostrednosti (náklonnosti), a tým i egoizmu. Oba typy eudaimonizmu sú rovnako pre oboch autorov v etike neprijateľné a neobhájiteľné, ani cez jeden z týchto typov nie je možné sa dopracovať k morálnej životnej perspektíve dobra a zla.

II. Etika motívu

Kant začína svoje učenie o morálke v prvom zo svojich systematických diel z etiky, v *Základoch metafyziky mrvov*, zásadnou otázkou, čo možno považovať za bezpodmienečne dobré, za dobré osebe. V odpovedi na túto otázkou sa hned na úvod tejto útlej knihy kriticky vyrovňáva s tromi veľkými tradíciami etiky: etikou cnosti, eudaimonizmu a konzektivencializmu. Morálna hodnota cnosti, šťastia a výsledného činu je totiž podmienená, ako Kant následne ukazuje, dobrým úmyslom. V kontraste s tradičnou etikou cnosti Kant prehlasuje, že žiadnu z morálnych cností nemôžeme považovať za dobrú nepodmienene. Vezmíme do úvahy príkladnú cnosť, ktorú tak veľmi ctili a pestovali starovekí grécki myslitelia, cnosť umiernenosti (*sófrosyne*), to jest schopnosť ovládať svoje afekty a väsne; táto nimi velebená cnosť sa môže v spojitosti so zlou vôľou ukázať ako nemorálna, zvrátená a odsúdeniahodná. Napríklad umiernenosť pri vražde prezrádza chladnokrvnú povahu zločinu, ktorý sa javí už nášmu bežnému mrvnému predporozumeniu, čiže predkritickému, intuitívnomu pohľadu určite viac ohavný a trestuhodný než zločin vraždy z náhleho afektu. Tým však Kant v žiadnom prípade nevráví, že cnosti nemajú svoje miesto v morálnom živote, lež to že musia byť podmienečne dobrým úmyslom. Teda to, čo môžeme považovať za neobmedzene dobré, je výlučne *dobrá vôle*. Dobrá vôle je tiež podmienkou blaženosť, ak má ona mať nejakú morálnu hodnotu.¹⁷ Navyše, ako ďalej Kant argumentuje, dobrá vôle nie je dobrá tým, čo spôsobuje alebo dosahuje, ale len samotným chcením, t. j. osebe. To znamená, že užitočnosť alebo

¹⁵ Prekladané aj ako prezieravosť; ide o „zručnosť vo voľbe prostriedkov pre svoje vlastné, čo najväčšie blaho...“ (Kant, I., 2004. *Základy metafyziky mrvov*, ibid., s. 42).

¹⁶ Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud – alebo*, ibid., s. 646.

¹⁷ Kant, I., 2004. *Základy metafyziky mrvov*, ibid., s. 20.

neužitočnosť činu nič k jeho hodnote nepridáva, ani z nej nič neuberá. Čin je preto morálne posudzovaný podľa motívu, ktorý tvorí vnútornú kvalitu konania, nie podľa následku tohto konania. Treba však zdôrazniť, že dobrá vôľa v Kantovom podaní nie je len nejakým „čírym želaním“ (t. j. pasívnu túžbou), ako si to podaktori kritici jeho etiky zjednodušene predstavujú, ale vynaložením všetkých prostriedkov, ktoré sú v moci subjektu konania, na dosiahnutie morálneho zámeru.¹⁸ Kladenie dôrazu na motív pri posudzovaní morálnosti činu sa teda ukazuje ako jeden z hlavných znakov deontologickej etiky, tak ako ju formuloval Kant.

Avšak aj Kierkegaardova etika, svojou podstatou taktiež deontologická, je rovnako dôslednou etikou motívu: V tomto mieste sa línne ich etického uvažovania azda najviac prelínajú. Jedným z najzásadnejších a najstabilnejších elementov Kierkegaardovej etiky ako celku je jeho pojmom „vnútrajškovosti.“ Akcent na vnútrajškovosť kladie Kierkegaard už vo svojom prvom etickom spise, vo *Wilhelmovej*¹⁹ druhej časti *Bud – alebo*. Tu Kierkegaard argumentuje, že etické ako všeobecné síce požaduje od človeka, aby sa prejavilo i navonok, pretože ten, kto sa nevie vyjaviť, nemôže ani milovať,²⁰ no zároveň prízvukuje, že „pri etickom... nikdy nejde o vonkajšie, ale o vnútorné.“²¹ Kierkegaardov pojmom vnútrajškovosť v podstate označuje vnútorný, duchovný svet jednotlivca, ktorý je v bežnej ľudskej reči obrazne nazývaný aj srdce. Vnútrajškovosť je podľa Kierkegaarda to podstatné, čo je ukryté v nás, vo vnútri, pod povrhom, a čo je zvonku nevnímateľné, teda neprístupné zmyslovému poznaniu a nazeraniu druhých. Vnútrajškovosť je tým miestom existencie človeka, kde dochádza ku všetkým jeho existenciálnym rozhodnutiam: je to jeho pravé, skutočné, hlbinné Ja. Do kontrastu s vnútrajškovosťou kladie Kierkegaard „vonkajškovosť“ – tá predstavuje len vonkajšiu, javovú, zmyslami vnímateľnú stránku Ja. Preto Kierkegaardov *Climacus* v *Uzatvárajúcim nevedeckom dodatku* prichádza s tézou: „vnútrajškovosť je pravda.“²² Kierkegaardovo akcentovanie vnútrajškovosti odhaluje okrem iného jednu z významných črt, ktorú má jeho existenciálna etika spoločnú s Kantovou deontologickej etikou, a to, že v oboch prípadoch ide o dôsledné etiky motívu, pre ktoré pri hodnení morálnosti činu nie je

¹⁸ Ibid., s. 17.

¹⁹ Sudca Wilhelm je Kierkegaardov reprezentant etického spôsobu života a pseudonymný autor druhej časti *Bud – alebo*.

²⁰ Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud – alebo*, ibid., s. 616.

²¹ Ibid., s. 718.

²² Napr. Kierkegaard, S., 1992. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, ibid., s. 204.

dôležitý výsledok, ale vnútorný motív činu, t. j. úmysel vôle. Kierkegaard dokonca prehlasuje, že je krajne neetické myslieť na následok, pretože to vedie k oslabeniu úsilia vôle a k nemorálnosti; etické je naopak myslieť vždy na úmysel.²³ Pritom podobne ako Kant aj Kierkegaard zdôrazňuje, že vôle (chcenie) nie je len nejaké číre želanie; napríklad keď jeho etik Wilhelm porovnáva estetický a etický prístup k životu, napomína estetika slovami: „umením nie je želať si, ale chcieť.“²⁴ Inými slovami, nastačí si iba priať, pretože prianie je len iným výrazom pre pasívne očakávanie, ale treba v prvom rade chcieť, pretože až chcenie zodpovedá aktívnej sebadeterminácii. Ako ale poznamenáva Kant, úmysel (ako vnútorná kvalita činu) nie je očiam druhých dostupná. Na tento pohľad následne nadväzuje Kierkegaard, ktorý argumentuje, že úmysel činu sa skrýva vo vnútrajškovosti, pričom vnútrajškovosť druhých nám nie je dostupná – tá je totiž dostupná len im samým a Bohu. Kierkegaard prichádza s myšlienkovou, že vnútrajškovosť je principiálne nesúmernateľná s vonkajškovosťou, to znamená, že žiaden vonkajší prejav, akt, čin nejakého jednotlivca nemôže priamo vypovedať o jeho charaktere, o jeho vnútrajškovosti, a teda o jeho pravej etickej realite. Z toho dôvodu nie lenže je neprípustné z kresťanského hľadiska morálne posudzovať činy druhého človeka (v zmysle slov z evanjelia: „Nesúdte, aby ste neboli súdení.“²⁵), ale podľa Kierkegaarda je to i principiálne nemožné, „pretože etické ako vnútorné nemôže byť nikým zvonku nazerané;“²⁶ preto napríklad „niekto, kto nemá ani halier, môže byť rovnako milosrdný ako človek, ktorý daroval kráľovstvo.“²⁷

Každá etika motívu, ak je v sebe dôsledná, musí napokon dospieť k tomuto záveru, teda že vskutku nejestvuje možnosť posúdiť morálnu hodnotu konania druhého človeka, čo prekvapujúco nevzbudzuje do-statočnú pozornosť pri výklade deontologickej etiky. Zdá sa, že už Kant si tento problém uvedomoval (hoci z neho otvorené nevyvodil podobný záver), keď písal: „ak je reč o morálnej hodnote, nejde o konanie, ktoré vidíme, ale o tie jeho vnútorné princípy, ktoré nevidíme.“²⁸ Ako sme si ukázali vyššie, Kierkegaard v tomto bode ide ešte ďalej, až k bodu, kde otvorené vyhlasuje principiálnu nemožnosť morálneho posudzovania

²³ Porovnaj ibid., s. 135–136, 155.

²⁴ Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud – alebo*, ibid., s. 706.

²⁵ Mt 7, 1; tiež Lk 6, 37.

²⁶ Kierkegaard, S., 1992. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, ibid., s. 320.

²⁷ Ibid., s. 339.

²⁸ Kant, I., 2004. *Základy metafyziky mravov*, ibid., s. 32.

činov a charakterov druhých ľudí. A tak nakoniec jediným adekvátnym objektom morálneho posudzovaniu je samotný subjekt konania a posudzovania, jeho charakter a jeho činy, a to na základe konfrontácie so svojím vlastným svedomím (resp. s Božím zákonom). Človeku teda náleží možnosť a zároveň povinnosť morálne posudzovať výlučne seba samého.

III. Univerzálnosť povinnosti

Tak Kantovu etiku, ako aj Kierkegaardovu možno považovať za deontologické morálne teórie, pretože povinnosť (déov: povinnosť, záväzok) zohráva v etickom učení oboch filozofov rozhodujúcu rolu. Morálnu hodnotu má totiž podľa nich len to konanie, ktorého hlavnou vzpruhou je morálna povinnosť. Pojem povinnosti v sebe podľa Kanta obsahuje pojem dobrej vôle, pričom dobrá vôle je vôle, ktorá je určovaná predstavou morálneho zákona. Kant definuje povinnosť slovami: „povinnosť je nevyhnutnosť konáť z úcty k zákonom.“²⁹ Prirodzene, Kant na tomto mieste nemá pod nevyhnutnosťou na mysli prírodnú nevyhnutnosť, založenú na kauzalite, lež morálnu, založenú na slobode. Povinnosť teda vyjadruje váhu záväznosti morálneho zákona. Morálny zákon pritom označuje Kant za bezprostredný fakt praktického rozumu, teda považuje ho za niečo, čo je každej rozumnej bytosti zrejmé. Morálny zákon má v jeho učení podobu kategorického, a preto nepodmieneného imperatívu. Kant je presvedčený, že kategorický imperatív je jediným morálnym zákonom praktického rozumu a zároveň postačujúcim kritériom k tomu, aby každá rozumná bytosť bola schopná v akejkoľvek konkrétnej situácii rozoznať, čo je morálne správne od nesprávneho, dobré od zlého.

Kierkegaard pri výklade svojej etiky v druhej, etickej časti *Bud – alebo* postupuje úplne inak, na rozdiel od Kanta tu Kierkegaard deduktívne nevychádza z prvotného princípu, nezačína pojmom dobrej vôle a ani vskutku neuvádza žiadnen konkrétny morálny zákon, len pohľadom zvnútra, z perspektívy eticky existujúceho jedinca, skrz osobnosť a životný názor fiktívnej literárnej postavy sudcu Wilhelma opisuje etický modus existencie a rysuje cestu, ako sa k nemu z prvotného, estetického štátia existencie dopracovať. A predsa i Wilhelmovu etiku, ako Kierkegaardovu príkladnú prvú etiku, možno považovať za model deontologickej etiky. Ako Kierkegaardov Wilhelm tvrdí, zmysel etikov-

²⁹ Ibid., s. 24.

ho života spočíva práve v plnení si svojich povinností.³⁰ Aj v ostatných Kierkegaardových eticky zameraných knihách vystupuje do popredia povinnosť ako určujúci moment pre naše konanie. V *Bázni a chvení* Kierkegaard pod pseudonymom Johannes de Silentio zdôrazňuje, že základom každej morálnej povinnosti je vskutku Božia autorita: „Povinnosť nie je nič iné ako výraz Božej vôle.“³¹ U Kierkegaardovho klúčového filozofickému pseudonymu Johanna Climaca sa v jeho *Uzatvárajúcim nevedeckom dodatku* tiež stretнемe s konceptom povinnosti. Climacus vyhlasuje, že zo stanoviska etiky je starosť o vlastnú existenciu našou najvyššou povinnosťou, čím ale nemá na mysli to, že máme vyvíjať všetko úsilie na boj o prežitie, ale že sa máme stať autenticky existujúcimi jedincami. Jeho kresťanský náprotivok Anti-Climacus v *Chorobe na smrť* (1849) zase hlása, že našou povinnosťou je stať sa samými sebou a že výraz „musíš“ má byť obsiahnutý v každom náboženskom určení.³² No s najväčším Kierkegaardovým dôrazom na povinnosť sa popri druhej časti *Bud – alebo* stretнемe v jeho diele *Skutky lásky*, ktoré publikuje pod vlastným menom; tu predstavuje svoju etiku lásky založenú na novozákonné učení o láske k blížnemu, pričom za jej charakteristický formálny znak považuje povinnosť, ktorá napokon predurčuje i jej špecifický obsah.

Napriek tomu, že Kierkegaard v *Bud – alebo* priamo neformuluje žiadnen morálny zákon, je zrejmé, že tu postuluje morálny zákon v hľa- se svedomia: Tajomstvo toho, ako sa má človek zachovať v konkrétnej situácii, je totiž podľa Wilhelma „ukryté vo svedomí.“³³ Skutočnosť, že Kierkegaardov etik Wilhelm vkladá nepísaný morálny zákon do hlasu svedomia, bez toho, aby mal potrebu ho nejak racionálne formulovať, naznačuje, že jeho etika svedomia korešponduje v tomto smere skôr s pozíciou J. G. Fichteho než Kanta. Z pohľadu Wilhelma je totiž našou povinnosťou vždy konať v súlade s naším svedomím.

V tomto bode sa začína črtať aj ďalší význačný rozdiel medzi Kierkegaardovou a Kantovou deontológiou: U Kierkegaarda sa nestretneme s jasne definovanými normami správania (odvodenými od všeobecnej formulácie mravného zákona), ktoré by nepripúšťali žiadne výnimky – čo býva často nesprávne predstavované ako znak deontologickej etiky vôbec – napríklad, že za žiadnych okolností nie je prípustné klamať, dokonca ani v prípade, že by naša pravdovravnosť vo svojich dôsled-

³⁰ Pozri Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud – alebo*, ibid., s. 707–708.

³¹ Kierkegaard, S., 2005. *Bázeň a chvenie*. Bratislava: Kalligram, s. 66.

³² Pozri Kierkegaard, S., 2018. *Choroba na smrť*, ibid., s. 130.

³³ Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud – alebo*, ibid., s. 709.

koch spôsobila vážnu ujmu inému človeku. Kant odmieta priznať právo na tzv. milosrdnú lož, a vo svojom rigorizme ide v tomto smere až do krajných dôsledkov, keď vo svojom článku „O domnelom práve z lásky k ľuďom klamať“ z roku 1797 prízvukuje: „Pravdivosť vo výpovediach, ktorým sa nemožno vyhnúť, je formálna povinnosť človeka voči každému, či už z toho jemu alebo niekomu inému plynie akákoľvek ujma...“³⁴ A na to prichádza s až neľudským argumentom vraha predo dvermi, keď od nás požaduje, aby sme i v takej vyhrotenej situácii, akou by bolo, keby sme predo dvermi nášho domu stretli človeka, ktorý má v úmysle zavraždiť nášho suseda, v žiadnom prípade nezaklamali v odpovedi na otázku, kde sa ukrýva náš sused. Kant argumentuje, žeby sme tým vraj uškodili „ľudstvu vôbec“, pretože v tom momente by sme povýšili klamstvo na morálny zákon pre všetkých, a tým učinili základ všetkého práva a povinností celkom nepoužiteľným.³⁵ S obdobnou rigoróznosťou a neoblomnosťou v morálnych pravidlach či s prehliadaním jedinečnosti a konkrétnosti situácie sa rozhodne v Kierkegaardovej verzii deontologickej etiky nestretneme.

Z pohľadu Kanta i z pohľadu Kierkegaardovho etika Wilhelma je morálka vskutku len jedna, je všeobecne platná, a teda je rovnako platná pre každú ľudskú bytosť. To znamená, že morálka si rovnakou miere uplatňuje svoje nároky na každého jedného z nás ľudí. Táto univerzálnosť morálky tkvie priamo v základoch etik oboch filozofov. Zákony určujúce pre ľudskú prax sa podľa Kanta musia vyznačovať rovnakou všeobecnosťou ako prírodné zákony. Z tejto požiadavky univerzálnosti Kant napokon vyvodil formálnu podobu morálneho zákona praktického rozumu, podľa ktorého len také konanie, ktoré by sa mohlo stať všeobecným morálnym zákonom, teda zákonom pre všetkých, je morálnym konaním.

Pre Kierkegaarda je natol'ko dôležitá kategória univerzálneho pre etické, že ich priam stotožňuje: Etik totiž vo svojom živote „realizuje všeobecné,“³⁶ inými slovami, etik realizuje to, čo je všeobecne ľudské: všeľudské hodnoty. Treba podotknúť, že všeobecné obsiahnuté v etike nepotláča ani neprehliada individualitu osobnosti a konkrétnosť situácie, preto Wilhelm vraví, že v etike ide v skutočnosti o jednotu všeobecného a konkrétneho: „Kto k životu pristupuje eticky, vidí všeobecné, a kto žije eticky, vyjadruje vo svojom živote všeobecné, stáva sa vše-

³⁴ Kant, I., 2016. *Studie k dějinám a politice*. Praha: Oikomenh, s. 61.

³⁵ Ibid., s. 61–62.

³⁶ Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud – alebo*, ibid., s. 710.

obecným človekom nie tým, že odloží konkrétnosť, veď tým by sa nestal ničím, ale tým, že si ju osvojí a prenikne ju všeobecným.³⁷

Dôraz na klúčovú rolu, ktorú zohráva všeobecné v etickom, sa u oboch autorov odzrkadluje aj v ich chápaní rovnosti všetkých ľudí pred morálnym zákonom a v z nej vyplývajúcej univerzálnej rovnosti v prístupe k morálnemu zákonu. Kant zdôrazňuje, že vzhľadom na to, že morálny zákon je apriórnym zákonom praktického rozumu, tak nemôže byť závislý od našej skúsenosti, nadobudnutého vzdelania, výchovy, úrovne chytrosti, inteligencie či sociálnej triedy, a preto „...znalosť toho, čo robí, a teda aj vedenie o tom prináleží každému človeku, a ... (je) vecou každého, aj toho najobyčajnejšieho človeka.“³⁸ Taktiež sme si podľa neho rovní aj v schopnosti splniť si svoju morálnu povinnosť: „Urobiť zadost kategorickému príkazu mrvnosti je schopný každý...“³⁹ V Kierkegaardovej etike z *Bud – alebo* postoj analogický Kantovmu konceptu univerzálnej rovnosti vo vzťahu k morálnej povinnosti môžeme vyčítať napríklad z Wilhelmových nasledujúcich slov: „každý človek je človekom všeobecným, to jest, každému človeku je ukázaná cesta, ktorou sa stane všeobecným človekom.“⁴⁰ To implikuje, že každý človek, ak je úprimný sám k sebe, vie rozoznať, čo je jeho morálnej povinnostiou v konkrétnej situácii: stačí sa len poradiť so svojím svedomím. Toto Kierkegaardovo presvedčenie nájdeme aj v ďalších Kierkegaardových dielach, bez ohľadu na použitý pseudonym.

Obom autorom tak patrí veľká poklona za to, že nepodľahli lákavému pokušeniu etického intelektualizmu, ale zdôraznili všeobecnú ľudskosť, rovnosť všetkých ľudí pred morálnym zákonom. Tak Kant ako aj Kierkegaard rázne odmietajú morálny intelektualizmus, dnes tak veľmi rozšírený názor medzi intelektuálmi, ktorý vo svojich dôsledkoch viedie k vedomiu morálnej nadradenosti. Akoby stačilo samo poznanie morálnych teórií, a akoby nás ono samo robilo morálne lepšími! Ani znanosť etických teórií z nás neučiní morálne lepších ľudí, tobôž morálne povyšených: morálka predsa nie je o poznáni, ale o konaní. U oboch autorov postulovaná univerzálna rovnosť, t. j. rovnosť všetkých ľudí bez výnimky vychádza konzistentne z najvyšších morálnych imperatívov, ktoré stojia v základe ich deontologických etík. U Kanta ju môžeme zreteľne vyčítať najmä z jeho formulácie kategorického imperatívu, ktorý nám kladie za povinnosť vnímať bezpodmienečnú a nevyčísliteľnú

³⁷ Ibid., s. 709.

³⁸ Kant, I., 2004. *Základy metafyziky mrvov*, ibid., s. 28.

³⁹ Kant, I., 1990. *Kritika praktického rozumu*, ibid., s. 59.

⁴⁰ Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud – alebo*, ibid., s. 710.

hodnotu, to jest dôstojnosť všetkých ľudí bez rozdielu. U Kierkegaarda ju nájdeme obzvlášť akcentovanú v jeho druhej etike, kde hľasa, že kresťanská povinnosť lásky k blížnemu nás musí viesť k bezpodmienečnému rozpoznaniu blízneho v každej ľudskej bytosti.⁴¹

Mohlo by sa zdať, že princíp univerzálneho poznania morálnej povinnosti je v rozpore s vyššie rozvedenou myšlienkou Kierkegaarda, že pre estetika je perspektíva dobra a zla neznáma. Myslím si, že pre udržanie konzistencie výkladu Kierkegaardovej (Wilhelmovej) etiky je možné to interpretovať cez Kierkegaardov pojem transparentnosti. Esteticky žijúci jedinec podľa neho nie je transparentný sám v sebe, a z toho dôvodu je i jeho svedomie zatemnené, nejasné. Až vollenou seba samého a vstupom do etickej sféry, kde sa mu otvorí perspektíva dobra a zla, sa jedincovi jeho svedomie prejasní. V tomto duchu hovorí Kierkegaard o etikovi, že je na rozdiel od estetika transparentný sám v sebe, to značí, že má jasno o tom, kto je, čo chce a kým sa má stať. Keď sa človek zvolí, v každej jednotlivej situácii uvidí všeobecné ako úlohu (povinnosť) pre seba. V prvotnej estetickej existencii bolo jedincovi všeobecné zastrené, pretože mu bolo ľahostajné. Voľba, ktorá existenciu otvára bránu do etického štátia, je však výrazom jeho slobody, a preto za ňu nesie zodpovednosť, tak ako nesie principiálnu zodpovednosť za to, ak by sa rozhodol ďalej zotvrať v nezrelem estetickom štádiu existencie, a tým i za stav svojho zatemneného svedomia.

IV. Kierkegaardova kritika (Kantovej) autonómie

Etika oboch autorov je svojou povahou deontologická, založená na princípe povinnosti, avšak v odpovedi na otázku, odkiaľ pochádza morálny zákon, teda čo je zdrojom našej povinnosti, sa zásadne líšia. Kým Kant posväcuje autonómu ako jedine správne východisko v etike, Kierkegaard je veľkým kritikom autonómie. A tento zásadný rozdiel sa najviac ukazuje pri juxtapozícii Kantovej etiky a Kierkegaardovej druhej etiky: etiky lásky (k blížnemu). Kierkegaardova etika lásky predstavuje osobitý variant deontologickej morálnej teórie božích prikázaní, ako to tvrdí taktiež C. Stephen Evans.⁴² Predsa sa však medzi interpretáciami Kierkegaardovho konceptu lásky nájdú aj autori, ktorí tento výklad spochybňujú alebo nedostatočne reflektujú.⁴³ Kierkegaard však jednak

⁴¹ Kierkegaard, S., 2000. *Skutky lásky*. Brno: CDK, s. 35.

⁴² Evans, C. S., 2004. *Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love*. New York: Oxford University Press, s. 120–121.

⁴³ Napríklad Ferreira, M. J., 2001. *Love's Grateful Striving. Commentary on Kierkegaard's Works of Love*. New York: Oxford University Press, s. 40–42.

jasne vyhlasuje, že povinnosť je tým hlavným dištinktívnym rysom pravej lásky, lásky k blížnemu ako sebe samému, ktorú chápe ako určujúci morálny zákon. A jednak tvrdí, že táto povinnosť lásky, a tým i odpoved na základnú etickú otázku, čo máme robiť, nám nie je immanentná, ale je nám daná z moci Boha, čiže základom Kierkegaardovho konceptu lásky je heteronómne, teologické východisko, ktoré predpokladá akt viery.

Kresťanský koncept lásky k blížnemu práve vzhľadom na to, že ide o lásku prikázanú, stavia Kierkegaard do ostrého kontrastu s čisto ľudským, prirodzeným chápaním lásky, založeným na cite, sympatii a náklonnosti. Kierkegaard vyslovuje názor, že pojem prikázanej lásky k blížnemu prekračuje naše ľudské chápanie a mysenie,⁴⁴ čo implikuje, že sa nemohol zrodiť v rozume. A navyše prikázanie lásky ani „v žiadnom ľudskom srdci (samo od seba – pozn. autor) nepovstalo.“⁴⁵ Jeho pôvod teda nemôže byť ľudský. Kierkegaard následne podotýka, že na to, aby nám niekto mohol prikázať milovať, musí mať „božské zmocnenie,“⁴⁶ inak povedané, prikázanie lásky predpokladá existenciu a božskú autoritu autora tejto povinnosti. Pre Kierkegaarda môže byť zadávateľom našej mrvnej povinnosti milovať výlučne Boh, lebo nik iný podľa neho nedisponuje takou autoritou.

Podľa Kierkegaarda teda nemôžeme nahliadať na morálny zákon oddelene od toho, kto ten morálny zákon stanovuje, teda od autora povinnosti. A toto sa potvrdzuje aj v jeho prvej etike, veď hned v úvode Wilhelmových úvah o voľbe, keď opisuje vstup jedinca do etického štátia, poznamenáva: „Ked sa totiž voľba vykoná s celou vnútrajškovosťou osobnosti, jeho bytosť sa vyčíri a on sám dospeje do bezprostredného vzťahu s onou večnou mocou, ktorá všadeprítomne preniká celým bytím.“⁴⁷ Etické je u Kierkegaarda v ustavičnom vzťahu s náboženským (ako vráví iný predstaviteľ prvej etiky: *Climacus*⁴⁸), nemožno ho teda koncipovať od neho oddelene. Hoci na rozdiel od druhej etiky (etiky lásky k blížnemu) k tomu, aby človek porozumel tomu, čo je jeho povinnosťou, nepotrebuje nejaký heteronómny zásah z vonku (zjavenie či Sv. Písmo), nepotrebuje k tomu nič okrem toho, aby naslúchal svojmu svedomiu, nedokáže si Kierkegaard predstaviť zákon svedomia v úplnej nezávislosti od svojho náboženského základu: „človek by nemal nič na

⁴⁴ Pozri Kierkegaard, S., 2000. *Skutky lásky*, ibid., s. 22.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Budť – alebo*, ibid., s. 623 (mierne modifikovaný preklad).

⁴⁸ Pozri Kierkegaard, S., 1992. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, ibid., s. 162.

svedomí, keby nebol Boh, pretože vzťah jedinca k Bohu, boží vzťah, je práve svedomie.⁴⁹ Z pohľadu Kierkegaarda by sa bez náboženského rozmeru váha záväznosti morálneho zákona celkom rozpadla.

Morálna povinnosť sa podľa Kierkegaarda nenachádza mimo Božej vôle, mimo Božskej autority. Ako to jasne preukazuje Kierkegaardov citát z *Bázni a chvenia*: „Povinnosť nie je nič iné ako výraz Božej vôle,“⁵⁰ teda niet inej morálnej povinnosti, než tej, ktorá je nám uložená na ramená našej zodpovednosti samotným Bohom. V ostrom kontraste s Kierkegaardom nás Kant v predhovore k prvému vydaniu svojho spisu *Náboženstvo v medziach číreho rozumu* (1793) uistuje: „Morálka teda nepotrebuje ani ideu inej bytosti nad človekom, aby poznával svoju povinnosť, ani inú pružinu než sám zákon, aby svoju povinnosť plnil... Morálka teda sama pre seba vôbec nepotrebuje náboženstvo...“⁵¹

Navzdory tomu, že v Kierkegaardovej prvej i druhej etike môžeme nájsť viacero príbuzných motívov a azda i podlžnosti voči Kantovej etike, narazíme tu i na významné rozdiely, z ktorých za ten najzásadnejší možno považovať fakt, že v prípade Kierkegaarda ide o heteronómne založenú etiku na rozdiel od tej Kantovej, pre ktorú je autonómia (rozumu) východiskovým princípom, čo vo výsledku znamená, že ide o celkom odlišné etické doktríny. Na tento podstatný rozdiel napokon upozorňuje aj Kierkegaard sám, keď v jednom zo svojich denníkových záznamov podrobuje kritike Kantovu etiku práve z dôvodu jej základného princípu autonómie:

Kant zastával názor, že ľudská bytosť je svojím vlastným zákonom (autonómiou) – to znamená, že sa zaväzuje zákonom, ktorý si sama dala. V skutočnosti, v hlbšom zmysle sa práve takto kladie bezprávie alebo imaginárne konštruovanie... Musí tu byť nejaké obmedzenie, ak má ísť o vážnosť. Ak ja nie som viazaný ničím vyšším ako samým sebou a pritom sa ja mám zviazať, odkiaľ by som vzal prísnosť ako A, ako ten, kto viaže, ktorú nemám ako B, teda ten, ktorý má byť viazaný, keď A a B sú to isté Ja?⁵²

V citovanej pasáži Kierkegaard odhaluje paradox autonómie, keď argumentuje, že autonómia v etike musí napokon nevyhnutne vyústiť do ľubovôvôle, nezákonnosti a straty vážnosti. Na druhej strane Kant sám svoju

⁴⁹ Kierkegaard, S., 2000. *Skutky lásky*, ibid., s. 98.

⁵⁰ Kierkegaard, S., 2005. *Bázeň a chvenie*, ibid., s. 66.

⁵¹ Kant, I., 2013. *Náboženstvív hranicích pouhého rozumu*. Praha: Vyšehrad, s. 49.

⁵² Kierkegaard, S., 1967. *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*, vol. 1. HONG, H. V. – HONG, E. H., eds. Bloomington; London: Indiana University Press, s. 76.

etiku nedovádza k žiadnej arbitrárnosti, práve naopak, a preto sa zdá byť na mieste námieta, či Kierkegaard skôr nepodrobuje kritike autonómu v zmysle jenského romantizmu či Sartrovho konceptu radikálnej voľby.⁵³ Nazdávam sa, že Kierkegaardovým cieľom útoku vlastne neboli ani tak celok Kantovej praktickej filozofie ako skôr samotný princíp autonómie, ktorý leží v jej jadre – čím však zároveň Kantovu etiku od základov podkopáva. Autonómia je podľa neho princípom, ktorý sám osebe nemôže dostačovať na vysvetlenie morálneho záväzku. Na druhej strane aj Kierkegaardova etika v sebe obsahuje istý a nezanedbatelný aspekt autonómie, ktorý možno rozpoznať v jeho koncepciach voľby, växne, viery, subjektivity, slobody či objektívnej neistoty. Vždy však už v sebe obsahuje aj prvok heteronómie, totiž morálnu teonómiu: základom každej našej morálnej povinnosti musí byť Božia vôľa. Výraznou mierou autonómie sa spomedzi Kierkegaardových etických koncepcií vyznačuje najmä etika voľby súdca Wilhelma, z toho dôvodu je niektorými komentátormi, napríklad A. MacIntyreom,⁵⁴ nesprávne vykladaná ako arbitrárna na spôsob Sartrovej radikálnej voľby. Pri podobných interpretáciach sa predovšetkým prehliada to, že Wilhelmova etika voľby má aj duchovný, náboženský rozmer. Jeho etika (ani žiadna iná z Kierkegaardových etických variácií) nie je mysliteľná mimo vzťahu k Bohu, teda bez vzťahu k božskému základu povinnosti, k božskému pôvodu ľudského svedomia.

Kierkegaard ako kritik autonómie v etike argumentuje, že v morálnom konaní nemôže byť jedinec zákonodarcou i súdom zároveň. Preto napriek viacerým podobnostiam medzi Kantovou a Wilhelmovou etikou, vďaka čomu ich niektorí komentátori stotožňujú, vyčnievajú v ich juxtapozícii aj zásadné odlišnosti. Ako píše sám Wilhelm v kontraste ku kantovskému a sartrovskému poňatiu autonómnej etiky: Osobnosť „[n]ie je bezzákonná, ani si sama nedáva zákony.“⁵⁵

V. Sformované srdce a oblečená povinnosť

Ďalším bodom divergencie, na ktorom možno demonštrovať jeden z najzásadnejších rozdielov medzi Kierkegaardovou a Kantovou deontológiou, je ich chápanie vzťahu medzi morálnym zákonom a ci-

⁵³ Ako na to poukazuje napríklad Roe Fremstedal: Fremstedal, R., 2020. Søren Kierkegaard's Critique of Eudaimonism and Autonomy. In: Moggach, D. – Mooren, N. – Quante, M., eds. *Perfektionismus der Autonomie*. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, s. 301–302.

⁵⁴ Pozri MacIntyre, A., 2004. *Ztráta cnosti*. Praha: Oikoyemenh, s. 54–67.

⁵⁵ Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud – alebo*, ibid., s. 717.

tom, medzi povinnosťou a náklonnosťou. So zásadne odlišným Kierkegaardovým pohľadom na tento vzťah od toho Kantovho sa stretneme v oboch jeho etikách: v etike volby (v pojme oblečenej povinnosti), ako aj v etike lásky (v pojme sformovaného srdca).

Kierkegaard lásku k blížnemu, ktorú predstavuje ako základný morálny zákon vo svojej druhej etike, nechápe nijak sentimentálne či romanticky, naopak, jeho chápanie lásky ako povinnosti túto dnes tak veľmi rozšírenú, ľahkovážnu a sentimentálnu predstavu o láske úplne rozbíja. V tomto bode by sa mohlo zdať, že Kierkegaardov koncept lásky k blížnemu v podstate zodpovedá Kantovmu pojmu „praktickej lásky“, ktorá v jeho očiach korešponduje s morálnym zákonom praktického rozumu. Samotný Kant totiž vníma rovnako ako Kierkegaard lásku k blížnemu ako jedinú lásku, ktorú možno prikázať.⁵⁶ Skutočná láska pre Kierkegaarda takisto prvotne neznamená cit, také poňatie lásky by spadalo do oblasti estetickej, a neprekročilo by tak prah egoizmu.

Ale znamená to vari, že u Kierkegaarda podobne ako u Kanta niet vôbec miesta pre cit v láske k blížnemu? Z toho by ale napokon vyplývalo, že výraz lásky k blížnemu by sme mohli celkom nahradiť bezpodmienečným rešpektom k druhému. Zaiste, tento bezpodmienečný rešpekt k druhému je neodmysliteľnou súčasťou Kierkegaardovho konceptu lásky k blížnemu, no nemožno ho predsa naň plne redukovať. Totiž pri pozornejšom čítaní *Skutkov lásky* nám nemôže uniknúť Kierkegaardov výrok: „Láska je vášeň citu.“⁵⁷ Kierkegaardovi je totiž na rozdiel od Kanta cudzí postoj, ktorý kladie do ostrého protikladu rozumu a citu, morálne povinnosť a náklonnosť. Autentická láska (láska k blížnemu) v Kierkegaardovom ponímaní nie je prvotnou bezprostrednosťou, pretože tá náleží do sféry estetického životného postoja, ale je bezprostrednosťou, a teda citovosťou druhotnej, nadobudnutou, ktorej predchádza znekonanečňujúca reflexia a predstava absolútnej povinnosti. I v tomto bode možno pozorovať zásadný rozdiel medzi Kierkegaardovou etikou lásky a Kantovou dôsledne dualistickou etikou; pre Kierkegaarda totiž naše konanie nemusí byť nevyhnutne v rozpore s citom a náklonnosťou, aby ho bolo možné považovať za morálne hodnotné. Takáto interpretácia Kierkegaardovej etiky lásky by bola navyše v rozpore s jedným z najvýznačnejších a najstabilnejších prvkov Kierkegaardovho diela ako celku: s jeho akcentovaním vášne v zmysle zvnútornenia idey, ideálu či povinnosti ako základného predpokladu autentického životného postoja.

⁵⁶ Kant, I., 2004. *Základy metafyziky mravov*, ibid., s. 23.

⁵⁷ Kierkegaard, S., 2000. *Skutky lásky*, ibid., s. 79.

Koncepcia lásky ako druhotnej, nadobudnutej citovosti počínajúcej povinnosťou zároveň implikuje, že láska u Kierkegaarda môže byť chápaná i ako cnosť v zmysle získanej citovej náklonnosti k dobru. A preto napriek faktu, že povinnosť zohráva nielen v Kierkegaardovej etike lásky, ale aj v iných modeloch jeho etiky, ústrednú rolu, netreba ju chápať príliš úzkostlivu a rigorózne na spôsob vyhroteného dualizmu Kantovej deontológie, ktorý v tomto smere ide napokon až do krajnosti.⁵⁸ Hoci explicitne sa s pojmom cnosti v Kierkegardovom korpuse stretneme pomerne zriedka, i na Kierkegaardovej etike lásky možno demonštrovať, že etika povinnosti nemusi byť nevyhnutne v rozpore s etikou cnosti tak, ako je to zväčša ilustrované. Napríklad už v úvodnej kapitole *Skutkov lásky* interpretujúc parabolu z evanjelia o strome a jeho ovocí píše Kierkegaard o láske, že „ak má skutočne priniesť ovocie (t. j. skutky – pozn. autor) a ak má byť poznaná po ovocí, musí najprv utvoriť srdce.“⁵⁹ Vzápäť však upozorňuje na to, že v pravej láske nejde o nejaké prirodzené hnutia ľudského srdca, ale o skutky lásky, ktoré na svet prináša srdce sformované dotykom večnosti. Inými slovami, podobne ako iba zdravý strom môže splodiť zdravé ovocie, predpokladom k tomu, aby láska prinášala zdravé plody v podobe pravých skutkov lásky, je správne sformovanie srdca (vnútrajškovosti, charakteru človeka), a to prostredníctvom „zmeny večnosti“, teda na základe osobného osvojenia si prikázania lásky. Zdá sa teda, že u Kierkegaarda sa etika cnosti ukazuje ako komplementárna k etike povinnosti.

Tento vzájomne komplementárny vzťah medzi povinnosťou a cnosťou sa odhaľuje ešte viac v druhej časti diela *Bud – alebo*. Veď čo iné než nadobudnutie cnosti ako návyku správne konáť označuje Kierkegaardov etický pseudonym, sudca Wilhelm, výrazom „obliecť si povinnosť“?⁶⁰ Podľa Wilhelma si povinnosť musíme osvojiť, internalizovať, učiniť ju súčasťou našej bytosti. Zároveň sa v tomto kontexte nemožno ubrániť dojmu, že Kierkegaard prostredníctvom Wilhelma a jeho konceptu „oblečenej povinnosti“ implicitne podrobuje kritike práve Kantovo chápanie povinnosti, obzvlášť keď poukazuje na to, že hoci je povinnosť

⁵⁸ Najvýraznejšie sa to ukazuje na príklade dobrosrdečného človeka, „ľudomila“, ktorého dobré skutky, „láskavé konanie“, bez nejakých „samolúbych či sebeckých pohnútok“, Kant pozbaľuje akejkolvek morálnej hodnoty iba preto, že vyvieračú z vrúcneho srdca, a teda z citovej náklonnosti k dobru (pozri Kant, I., 2004. *Základy metafyziky mravov*, ibid., s. 21–22). Ako s istou dávkou sarkazmu podotýka L. Švhura: „Úprimne dobrosrdečný človek sa tak so sférou vysokej morálky v Kantovej etike míňa“ (Švhura, L., 2021. Postmoderná morálka a Kantova etika. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 10(2), s. 28).

⁵⁹ Kierkegaard, S., 2000. *Skutky lásky*, ibid., s. 14.

⁶⁰ Kierkegaard, S., 2007. *Bud – alebo*, ibid., s. 708.

základným pilierom etického spôsobu života, ide o veľmi nedokonalý výraz, ktorý môže naopak slúžiť na zdiskreditovanie etického.⁶¹ K tomu dochádza vtedy, ak sa povinnosť nesprávne chápe ako niečo osobnosti vonkajšie a cudzie. Ako uštipačne poznamenáva Wilhelm: „neviem si predstaviť nešťastnejšiu či utrápenejšiu existenciu, ako keď človek vyčlení povinnosť mimo seba, a pritom sa ju ustavične usiluje realizovať.“⁶² Proti tomuto rýdzo vonkajšiemu poňatiu povinnosti Wilhelm namieta: „Povinnosť totiž nie je príkaz, je to čosi, čo mi prináleží.“⁶³ Povinnosť má teda hlbokú súvislosť s mojou vlastnou osobou, je „výrazom (mojej) najvnútornejšej podstaty.“⁶⁴ Aby sme tento vzťah povinnosti k nášmu najvnútornejšiemu Ja objavili, potrebujeme si povinnosť najprv vnútorné osvojiť: „Iba vtedy, keď si jedinci osvoja a internalizujú povinnosť, vstupujú do etického štátia existencie.“⁶⁵

Myslím si, že napriek odlišnostiam medzi Kierkegaardovými etikami, môžeme jeho koncept „oblečenej povinnosti“ bez výhrad navliecť i na jeho chápanie lásky ako povinnosti. V etike lásky z pohľadu Kierkegaarda totiž ide o to, aby si jedinec obliekol na seba povinnosť lásky, aby teda sformoval svoje srdce v zmysle večnosti. Touto cestou jedinec nadobudne náklonnosť k dobru, totiž sklon ku konaniu skutkov lásky, i bez toho, že by si túto povinnosť musel neustále vo svojom vedomí sprítomňovať – to značí, že jeho povinnosť už nie je preňho čímsi vonkajším, ale vnútorným, jemu vlastným. Etické z perspektívy Kierkegaarda tak vždy začína povinnosťou, no internalizáciou postupne prechádza v cnosť.

Záver

V predloženej komparatívnej štúdii som sa zameral na analýzu konvergencných a divergencných línií deontologicky konštruovaných etických teórií Immanuela Kanta a Sørena Kierkegaarda. V prvom rade som sa pokúsil demonštrovať samotný deontologický charakter ich etík, ktorý mi poslúžil ako spoločné východisko pre ich komparáciu. Základným prvkom etických koncepcíí oboch filozofov je totiž presvedčenie, že morálna hodnota konania je podmienená povinnosťou. Avšak chápanie povahy

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., s. 709.

⁶³ Ibid., s. 708.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ako túto pasáž interpretuje Azucena Palaviciniová Sánchezová: Palavicini Sánchez, A., 2014. Duty. In: Emmanuel, S. M. – McDonald, W. – Stewart, J., eds. *Kierkegaard's Concepts. Tome II: Classicism to Enthusiasm*. Farnham – Burlington: Ashgate, s. 208.

i zdrojov tejto povinnosti sa u nich v mnohom líši.

Medzi najzásadnejšie odlišnosti v etickom myšlení oboch autorov patrí ich rozdielny pohľad na význam a miesto autonómie v etike a na vzťah medzi povinnosťou a náklonnosťou. Kým pre Kanta je autonómia základným východiskom jeho etiky a zdrojom morálnej povinnosti, pre Kierkegaarda je autonómia nedostatočná na určenie záväznej morálnej povinnosti, keďže vo svojich dôsledkoch môže viesť až k arbitrárnosti. V prípade oboch Kierkegaardových etík je autorita morálneho zákona konštituovaná heteronómne – má Božský pôvod. V štúdii som predviedol, že Kierkegaardovo chápanie povinnosti nie je ani zdáleka také rigorózne ako Kantovo, preto sa nazdávam, že jeho deontologickej teóriu možno charakterizovať nielen ako heteronómnu, ale aj ako umiernenú. Totiž na rozdiel od Kanta, ktorý vďaka svojmu vyhrotenému racionalistickému dualizmu viedie deontológiu až ku krajným záverom (prípad ľudomila či argument vraha predo dvermi), Kierkegaard do svojej etiky povinnosti harmonicky zapracováva aj prvky emocionality, cnosti i teleológie.⁶⁶ U Kierkegaarda sa tak oproti Kantomu nenachádza povinnosť v ostrom konflikte s citovosťou; tento aspekt Kierkegaardovej deontologickej etiky som ilustroval na jeho konceptoch „sformovaného srdca“ a „oblečenej povinnosti“. V Kierkegaardovej existenciálnej etike ide o to dať povinnosť do súvislosti s vlastnou existenciou, prostredníctvom osobného osvojenia a internalizácie, aby sa tým stala našou druhou prirodzenosťou, a touto cestou sa napokon rozvinula v našu cnosť, to jest v našu sebaformovaním získanú schopnosť konať svoju morálnu povinnosť bezprostredne i bez jej neustáleho sprítomňovania si vo vedomí.

Napokon sa domnievam, že rozdielne chápanie povahy a zdrojov povinnosti medzi oboma autormi vyviera aj zo skutočnosti, že u Kierkegaarda sa v jeho etike prejavuje hlbšie porozumenie dynamike ľudskej existencie. Zatiaľ čo Kant celú svoju etickú teóriu konštruuje konzistentne čisto neempiricky za pomoci racionalnej dedukcie z východiskového faktu mravného zákona praktického rozumu, Kierkegaard, ktorý sice tiež postihuje základ etického v podstate neempiricky (z metafyzických a náboženských východísk), súčasne zapracováva do svojej konštrukcie etického aj zásadné motívy zo svojej existenciálnej antropológie.

⁶⁶ K poslednému prvku, prvku teleológie v Kierkegaardovej deontologickej etike láske, ktorá je obsiahnutá v jeho ponímaní lásky nielen ako povinnosti, ale aj ako potreby, pozri moju štúdiu: Petkanič, M., 2022. Kierkegaard's Deontology of Love. *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook*, 27(1), s. 215–230. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0011>.

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
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Vydanie zborníka je načasované k dvom jubileám: 300. výročiu Kantovho narodenia a 30 rokom kantovských štúdií v Prešove. Je zjavné, že publikácia tak nadväzuje na dlhú tradíciu, no je dôležité poznamenať, že intenciou nie je len obzretie sa do minulosti, akoby sa mohlo zdať, alebo analýza Kantovej filozofie, ale práve naopak. Príspevky obsiahnuté v zborníku otvárajú aktuálne otázky Kantovej praktickej filozofie v kontexte súčasných problémov.

Publikácia je tvorená siedmimi štúdiami, pričom šesť z nich je prácou slovenských autorov a jedna je textom autorky z nemeckého prostredia.

Tematické rozpätie štúdií je široké, no všetky spája spoločný cieľ: posunúť Kantove myšlienky do súčasnej doby, teda ich aktualizovať, a nemenej dôležitým cieľom je aj ich posunutie do iných, nových kontextov.



Dôležité je poznamenať, že o to sa autori snažia s dôrazom (ako napovedá samotný názov zborníka) na praktickú stránku filozofie.

Najprv sa pri čítaní stretávame s historickou reflexiou, s dokumentáciou kontinuity kantovského výskumu Prešove. Prvý príspevok, „300. výročie Kantovho narodenia, 30 rokov výskumu Kanta v Prešove. Venované pamiatke Lubomíra Beláša (1957–2022)“, ktorého autorkou je S. Zákutná, je vstupom do ďalšieho čítania a uvažovania, pretože späťne reflektuje počiatok i evolúciu kantovského výskumu v Prešove, ktorý bol iniciovaný profesorom Lubomírom Belásom. Ako píše autorka o zborníku, „je pokračovaním dlhoročných vedeckých skúmaní filozofického odkazu Immanuela Kanta na pôde Inštitútu filozofie a etiky Filozofickej fakulty Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove, pričom práca na projekte vychádza z rekonštrukcie a analýzy Kantovej praktickej filozofie, jej východísk a súvislostí, avšak okrem interpretácií Kantových diel a komparácie Kantových ideí s ďalšími osobnosťami dejín filozofie, sa projekt zameriava na problematiku človeka, spoločnosti a dejín a potenciál Kantových ideí pre dnešné filozofické uvažovanie“.¹ Tieto riadky nám hovoria o dlhodobom záujme autorov o Kanta a snahe o praktický prístup k jeho filozofii.

V nadväznosti na príspevok S. Zákutnej sa s pohľadom do minulosti stretávame aj v príspevku R. Dupkala „Reflexie Kantovej filozofie dejín v tvorbe Lubomíra Beláša“. Autor sa zameriava na Belásove reflexie dejín v rámci Kantovej filozofie a považuje ich za originálny prínos v skúmaní jeho diela. Dupkala ukazuje, že „L. Belás bol nepochybne jedným z prvých bádatelia na Slovensku, ktorý obrátil svoju výskumnú pozornosť na Kantove tzv. „malé spisy“,² ktoré dovtedy neboli dostatočne reflektované. Dupkala prináša analýzu Belásovej interpretácie Kantovej filozofie dejín, zdôrazňujúc jej perspektívny charakter, teda ako projekt orientovaný do budúcnosti, ktorý otvára premýšľanie o pokroku či morálnom zdokonaľovaní ľudstva.

Štúdia M. Ruffing „Kants Idee des Menschen“ („Kantova idea človeka“) sa koncentruje na Kantove koncepcie človeka v horizonte antropológie a morálnej filozofie. Autorka zdôrazňuje, že Kant vníma človeka ako rozumnú bytosť schopnú morálneho konania, pričom jeho prirodzenosť je dvojrozmerná – zahrňa zmyslovú stránku aj rozumovú schopnosť sebapoznania a reflexie. Poukazuje na to, že Kantov cieľ nie je redukovať človeka na izolovaného jednotlivca, ale chápať ho ako predstaviteľa

¹ Zákutná, S., 2024. 300. výročie Kantovho narodenia, 30 rokov výskumu Kanta v Prešove. Venované pamiatke Lubomíra Beláša (1957–2022). In. P. Kyslan a S. Zákutná, eds. *Kant a praktická filozofia*. Prešov: Občianske združenie Pro Kantiana, s. 17.

² Dupkala, R., 2024. Reflexie Kantovej filozofie dejín v tvorbe Lubomíra Beláša, *ibid.*, s. 27.

ľudstva, ktorý sa podieľa na uskutočňovaní mravných ideálov. Ruffing ukazuje, že Kantova antropológia poskytuje rámec na pochopenie ľudskej prirodenosti, ktorý zahŕňa nielen racionalitu, ale aj úlohu citlivosti a prirodzených sklonov v živote človeka. Autorka interpretuje Kantomu koncepciu človeka ako projekt sebazdokonaľovania, ktorý smeruje k dosiahnutiu mravných ideálov. Otvára tak diskusiu o tom, ako možno Kantovu filozofiu aplikovať na súčasné otázky ľudskej identity, kultúry a globálnej etiky.

P. Kyslan sa vo svojom príspevku pýta „*Čo pre Kanta znamená „hovoriť verejne ako učenec“?*“? Autor sa tu zameriava na skúmanie Kantovho konceptu „verejného a súkromného používania rozumu“ v súvislosti s deliberatívnou demokraciou, a otvára tak dialóg medzi Kantovou osvietenskou a súčasnou politickou filozofiou. Hovorí, že „deliberatívne inštitúcie sú stelesnením slobodného verejného používania rozumu, ktorý Kant používa na definovanie projektu osvietenstva“.³ Zaujíma ho relevancia Kantovho odkazu pre súčasné demokratické spoločnosti. Do zborníka Kantovej praktickej filozofie prispieva tým, že ju kladie do kontextu modernej spoločnosti, najmä občianskej participácie, vzdelanosti a verejného diskurzu. Táto téma je v súčasnej spoločnosti a politickej situácii viac než aktuálna.

M. Stachoň sa vo svojej štúdii „*Sociálne fungovanie v reflexii I. Kanta*“ venuje sociálnemu fungovaniu v Kantovej reflexii, s dôrazom na otázky slobody, spravodlivosti a autonómie. Autor skúma, ako Kant uvažuje o sociálnom fungovaní človeka, pričom kladie dôraz na problematiku sociálnej spravodlivosti a jej význam pre kvalitu života v spoločnosti. Východiskom je Kantova koncepcia slobody, sebaurčenia a autonómnosti, ktoré Stachoň interpretuje ako základné predpoklady nielen individuálnych práv, ale aj sociálneho rozvoja jednotlivca. „Každý z nás má rôzne vlohy k dispozícii, ktoré môže použiť pre svoje sociálne fungovanie, a preto každý funguje veľmi originálne a špecificky. Ukazuje sa, že vzájomná reflexia a kooperácia v podobe solidarity je nevyhnutná, ako v aspekte spoločenskom, tak aj individuálnom“.⁴ Kantovo myšlenie tu poskytuje rámec, v ktorom sa sloboda neobmedzuje na izolovanú autonómiu, ale predpokladá vzájomné uznávanie a kooperáciu.

Text O. Marchevského „*Ern's Artillery from Kant's Werke*“ („*Ernovo delostrelectvo z Kantových diel*“) analyzuje špecifickú epizódu ruskej filozofickej recepcie Kanta na začiatku 20. storočia. V centre jeho po-

³ Kyslan, P., 2024. Čo pre Kanta znamená „hovoriť verejne ako učenec“, ibid., s. 52.

⁴ Stachoň, M., 2024. Sociálne fungovanie v reflexii I. Kanta, ibid., s. 86.

zornosti stojí Vladimír Francevič Ern, ktorý reagoval na Kantovu filozofiu mimoriadne ostro – prirovnal ju k delostrelectvu *Krupp Werke*, teda k zbraniam spôsobujúcim masové obete na frontoch prvej svetovej vojny. Autor odhaľuje, že Kant sa pre Erna stal intelektuálnym symbolom epochy, ktorú vnímal ako krízovú a dekadentnú: „Kant pre Erna predstavuje vyvrcholenie určitého myšlienkového dedičstva, ktoré bolo vlastné európskej filozofii“.⁵ Autor príspevku sa snaží túto kritiku systematicky rozobrat: sleduje jej argumentačné jadro, historické pozadie a ideologické motivácie. Zároveň poukazuje na to, že Ernova polemika bola súčasťou širšieho ruského hľadania identity v čase vojny a spoločenských otriasov. Marchevského analýza ruskej recepcie Kanta odhaľuje kultúrno-politické súvislosti, ktoré presahujú do dnešnej geopolitickej situácie.

Zborník užatává príspevok L. A. Švihuru *Pragmatistický význam Kantovej etiky*, v ktorom, ako napovedá samotný názov, uvažuje o význame Kantovej etiky z perspektívy pragmatizmu, a to prostredníctvom analýzy kritiky vybraných pragmatistických filozofov – W. Jamesa, R. Rortyho a R. Shustermana, ktorí spochybňujú univerzalistické rámcе etiky a zdôrazňujú pluralitu, kontext a praktickú funkčnosť morálnych noriem. Autor si kladie otázku, „či by bolo možné Kantovu etiku zdôvodniť myšlienkami tých, ktorí sa k nej vzťahujú kriticky“, a prepája kantovský racionalizmus s myšlienkovou konzistentného pluralizmu a kontextualizmu. Otvára sa tak možnosť chápať Kantovu etiku ako prakticky využiteľný nástroj v konkrétnych situáciách, ak sa odhodláme pristupovať k filozofii (pragmatisticky) ako k hľadaniu „možností, ako zmierovať myšlienky, ktoré sa na prvý pohľad môžu zdať nezmieriteľné“.⁷ Kantovu etiku možno v duchu pragmatizmu interpretovať ako jeden z funkčných inštrumentov rozvoja morálky. Aj pôvodne (voči Kantovej etike) kritickí pragmatisti s ním môžu „nájsť spoločnú reč“, ak im ide o spoločný cieľ: praktickú morálku.

Recenzovaná práca prispieva nielen k poznaniu historického pozadia kantovského výskumu v Prešove, no čo je ešte dôležitejšie, ukazuje aktuálny a praktický rozmer Kantovej filozofie a jej potenciál pre riešenie súčasných otázok v rôznych oblastiach. Vyzdvihnutie aktualizácie ako dôležitého momentu v tomto zborníku sa môže zdať ako istá banalita, o ktorej sa často hovorí. No v čase, keď sme zaplavení dezinformáciami,

⁵ Marchevský, O., 2024. Ern's Artillery from Kant's Werke, ibid., s. 69.

⁶ Švihura, L. A., 2024. Pragmatistický význam Kantovej etiky, ibid., s. 91.

⁷ Ibid.

fake news, hoaxami a používaním umelej inteligencie na najjednoduchšie úlohy, ktoré by sme bezpochyby zvládli vlastným myšlením aj sami, sa samostatné a kritické myšlenie vytráca. Filozofické myšlenie je potenciálnym liekom – ale iba ak filozofii dáme aktuálnosť a praktický rozmer, tak, ako autori príspevkov v tomto zborníku, aby hodnotné myšlienky nezostarli vo svojej teoretickosti.

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Kyslan, P. a Zákutná, S., eds. 2024. *Kant a praktická filozofia*. Prešov: Občianske združenie Pro Kantiana.

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
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Kant a éra digitálnych technológií

Aylsworth, Timothy – Castro, Clinton: *Kantian Ethics and the Attention Economy. Duty and Distraction*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, 275 s. ISBN 978-3-031-45637-4; e-ISBN 978-3-031-45638-1; DOI 10.1007/978-3-031-45638-1.

Kniha *Kantian Ethics and the Attention Economy* prináša pozoruhodný pokus aplikovať Kantovu etiku na problematiku digitálnych technológií. Autori Timothy Aylsworth a Clinton Castro skúmajú, ako smartfóny, sociálne siete a stratégie zamerané na maximalizáciu používateľskej angažovanosti ovplyvňujú autonómiu, pozornosť a morálku súčasného človeka. Výsledkom je filozoficky bohaté dielo, ktoré spája klasickú normatívnu teóriu s aktuálnymi poznatkami psychológie a kognitívnych vied.

Už úvodná kapitola predstiera základný problém knihy: súčasného človeka, žijúceho v prostredí digitálnych technológií, neustále vystaveného stimulom, ktoré narúšajú jeho schopnosť sústredenia, reflektívneho roz-hodovania a sebariadenia. Autori na viacerých miestach pracujú s empirickými údajmi o nadmernom používaní smartfónov, čo im umožňuje pre-



ukázať, že technologická záťaž má charakter rozšíreného spoločenského javu, nie individuálnej slabosti. Podrobne referencie na výskumy o zhoršenom spánku, depresívnych symptónoch či oslabení pracovnej pamäte poskytujú úvodnej argumentácii presvedčivú váhu.

Silnou stránkou kapitoly je predstavenie troch modelových prípadov, ktoré sa stanú leitmotívom celej knihy. Každý z nich reprezentuje inú rovinu autonómie – autonómiu jednotlivca, autonómiu v kontexte sociálnych vzťahov a autonómiu kolektívneho konania. Ich opakovane návraty v ďalších kapitolách napomáhajú udržať konzistentnosť celej knihy.

Druhá kapitola *Respect for Humanity* predstavuje fundamentálny teoretický rámec celého diela: Kantovu koncepciu *humanity* ako schopnosti racionálne stanovovať a sledovať vlastné ciele. Autori tu presvedčivo ukazujú, že keď v knihe hovoria o autonómii, nemajú na mysli Kantovu *moralnu autonómiu*, ale *osobnú autonómiu*, ktorú Kant označuje termínom *humanity*. Tento výklad je v súlade s modernými interpretáciami Kanta (Wood, Formosa), no zároveň pridáva vlastnú argumentačnú hodnotu tým, že obsah pojmu autonómie rozdeľuje na dve zložky: kapacitu a autenticitu.

Mimoriadne bohatá je sekcia venovaná teóriám „cudzích“ (*alien*) túžob. Autori sa opierajú o Frankfurtove vyššie rády túžob, Watsonove hodnotové súdy, Bratmanove plánovacie štruktúry či Christmanovu historickú podmienku. Toto je jedna z najteoretickejších častí knihy, v ktorej sa autorí prejavujú ako veľmi zruční systematici. Práve tu vysvetľujú, prečo je manipulácia – či už explicitná, alebo subtilná – pre autonómiu problematická.

Tretia kapitola *Mobile Devices and Autonomy: Individual-Level Effects* je najrozšiahlejšou empirickou časťou knihy. Autori zhromažďujú výsledky z psychológie, neurovied a behaviorálnej ekonómie, aby ukázali, že smartfóny a interakcie s nimi oslabujú kognitívnu kapacitu, pozornosť a pracovnú pamäť. Detailne opisujú mechanizmy upozornení, odmeňovacích cyklov a dizajnových stratégii, ktoré majú v užívateľovi vyvolať až kompluzívne správanie. Autori presvedčivo argumentujú, že ak človek nie je schopný plánovať, udržať pozornosť a konáť podľa vlastných dlhodobých cieľov, potom nie je schopný autonómneho konania v kantovskom zmysle.

V štvrtej kapitole *The Duty to Promote Digital Minimalism in Ourselves* autorí prechádzajú od deskriptívnych úvah k normatívnym tvrdeniam. Ich hlavná téza znie: existuje morálna povinnosť voči sebe samému, ktorá nám ukladá povinnosť pestovať *digitálny minimalizmus*. Pod týmto poj-

mom rozumejú stav, v ktorom sú naše interakcie s digitálnymi technológiami úmyselné a nepodkopávajú naše autonómne sebariadenie.

Argument stojí na Kantovom učení o povinnostiach voči sebe – konkrétnie na povinnosti pestovať a chrániť svoje racionálne schopnosti. Autori dobre ukazujú, že ak technologické prostredie narúša kognitívnu kapacitu, potom jej ochrana nie je len otázkou osobného komfortu, ale *morálnej povinnostiou*.

Kriticky však možno podotknúť, že koncept digitálneho minimalizmu nie je dostatočne presne definovaný. Autori ho charakterizujú vágne ako „intencionálnosť“ a „nepodkopávanie autonómie“, no neposkytujú jasné kritériá, podľa ktorých by bolo možné posúdiť, kedy presne agent túto povinnosť porušuje. Niektorí čitatelia môžu tiež diskutovať o tom, či všetky formy technologického používania jednoznačne ohrozujú autonómiu, alebo je možná existencia autonómnych kontrapríkladov.

Piata kapitola *The Duty to Promote Digital Minimalism in Others I: Duties of Virtue* sa zaobráva povinnosťami voči druhým, vyplývajúcimi z kantovských *duties of virtue*, teda povinností, ktoré nie je možné vynútiť právom, ale morálne zavádzajú. Autori tu zavádzajú pojem *attention ecologist* – človeka, ktorý aktívne podporuje autonómiu iných, najmä tým, že im nenarúša pozornosť a nie je súčasťou kultúry neustáleho digitálneho bombardovania.

Najsilnejšou časťou kapitoly je aplikácia týchto povinností na špecifické roly. Kniha na tomto mieste presvedčivo ukazuje, že povinnosti nevyplývajú len zo seba-vzťahujúcej morálky. Rodičia a učitelia – tí majú osobitnú povinnosť pestovať u detí autonómiu, priatelia – vzťahuje sa na nich povinnosť nenarúšať pozornosť blízkych, zamestnávatelia a vývojári – tí by nemali zneužívať digitálne platformy na manipuláciu či nadmernú kontrolu pracovníkov.

Hoci autori argumentujú premyslene, miestami prílišne idealizujú. Napríklad povinnosť rodičov „kultivovať autonómiu“ je teoreticky nepochybná, ale prakticky naráža na socio-ekonomickej nerovnosti a technologické tlaky, ktoré autori len okrajovo spomínajú.

V šiestej kapitole *The Duty to Promote Digital Minimalism in Others II: Duties of Right* autori posúvajú diskusiu od morálnych povinností individuál k povinnostiam, ktoré možno právne vynucovať. Opierajú sa o Kantovu koncepciu *duty of right*, ktorá legitimizuje zásahy štátu vtedy, ak sú potrebné na ochranu slobody všetkých. Síce neponúkajú konkrétnie legislatívne návrhy, ale načrtávajú rámec postavený na ochrane autonómie ako verejného dobra. Diskutujú, napríklad, o možných zásahoch do dizajnu

aplikácií, transparentnosti algoritmov či regulácií upozornení.

Silným momentom tejto kapitoly je jasné rozlíšenie medzi *povinnosťami cnosti a povinnosťami práva*. Menej presvedčivo však pôsobí tvrdenie, že samotná ochrana autonómie dokáže odôvodniť výrazné zásahy do technologických trhov. Kantovská tradícia je vo vzťahu k paternalizmu skôr zdržanlivá a autori sa tejto otázky dotýkajú len okrajovo, hoci by si zaslúžila podrobnejšiu analýzu.

Jednou z najinovatívnejších častí knihy je siedma kapitola *The Duty to Promote Digital Minimalism in Group Agents*. Táto kapitola predstavuje diskusiu o kolektívnej autonómii. Autori vychádzajú z predpokladu, že spoločnosť ako celok môže konať autonómne alebo neautonómne, napríklad, keď je verejná diskusia skreslená polarizáciou a algoritmickej zosilnenými konfliktnými obsahmi. Ich argument, že rozklad dôveryhodnosti ohrozuje *demokratickú legitimitu* je silný a aktuálny. Jasne nám ukazujú, ako algoritmické selekcie obsahu môžu narušiť verejné uvažovanie (a zvažovanie rôznych možností) a tým aj schopnosť spoločnosti autonómne sa rozhodovať.

Kriticky však možno upozorniť, že koncept „autonómie skupiny“ je filozoficky sporný. Autori sa opierajú o existujúcu literatúru o kolektívnom zvažovaní, no nepoložia si esenciálnu otázku. Môže mať skupina autonómu nezávislú od autonómie jednotlivcov?

Záverečná kapitola sa vracia k trom modelovým prípadom z úvodu, čím uzatvára argumentačný oblúk knihy. Autori ukazujú, že fenomény, ktoré pôsobia ako banálne problémy každodennosti, majú hlboké morálne implikácie. Záver pôsobí odľahčenejšie a optimisticejšie než zvyšok knihy. Autori tvrdia, že digitálny minimalizmus nie je asketická disciplína, ale spôsob obnovenia ľudskej autonómie a autentickej činnosti. Niektorí čítaťia však môžu vnímať tento optimizmus ako kontrast k pomerne temnému výkladu rizík v predchádzajúcich kapitolách.

Kantian Ethics and the Attention Economy je odvážna a originálna kniha, ktorá významne prispieva k filozofickej diskusii o etike technológií. Jej hlavné kvality spočívajú v originálnej aplikácii Kantovej etiky na súčasné technologické problémy. Rovnako možno oceniť značné prepojenie s empirickým výskumom a tiež originálny koncept „*attention ecologist*“. Medzi slabšie stránky knihy možno zaradiť nedostatočnú reflexiu obmedzení empirických štúdií, miestami príliš široké a vágne definície „digitálneho minimalizmu“ či filozoficky nevyjasnený koncept kolektívnej autonómie.

Napriek týmto pripomienkam je kniha intelektuálne stimulujúcim a dôležitým príspevkom k rastúcej literatúre o digitálnej etike. Môže

byť užitočná nielen pre kantovcov, ale aj pre odborníkov v oblasti etiky technológií, učiteľov, vývojárov digitálnych služieb a podobne. Aylsworth a Castro v nej presvedčivo ukazujú, že autonómia nie je abstraktný pojem 18. storočia, ale živý problém 21. storočia. V čase, keď digitálny svet sústavne útočí na našu autonómiu, je táto kniha mimoriadne aktuálna a potrebná.

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Aylsworth, T., Castro, C., 2024. *Kantian Ethics and the Attention Economy: Duty and Distraction*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

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