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Perpetual Peace Today: Ethics and Politics of Sustainability

Abstract: The article focuses on contemporary philosophical revisions of Immanuel Kant's concept of perpetual peace in the perspective of sustainability of peace, fundamentally threatened by our construction of inner and outer enemies. Its goal is to rethink this concept in relation to Gregg Lambert's theory of conceptual figures, understood as one of its relevant revisions, and to link them to the topic of individual papers collected in this special issue. As I argue, the papers creatively rethink the mentioned figures of political thinking to illustrate the ethical and political ways how to philosophically think about the problems of peace today. Finally, by questioning the role of our construction of alterity in our relation to identity, leading to our invention of inner and outer enemies, the article opens new directions in ethical and political discussion on the sustainability of peace today.

Keywords: Enemy, Gregg Lambert, Immanuel Kant, Peace, Sustainability, War

I. Introduction: Rethinking Kant Today

By introducing the concept of perpetual peace in his 1795 essay *Toward Perpetual Peace*,¹ Kant formulates the idea of universal hospitality and security as a moral maxim for human behavior. I propose to join contemporary philosophers² in their efforts to rethink the ethical and po-

¹ Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. In: Kant, I. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on. Politics, Peace, and History*, trans. David L. Colclasure. New Haven: Yale University, pp. 67 – 109.

² Similar philosophical initiatives have been recently undertaken in legal, political, and ethical philosophy in Dörflinger, B., 2016. *Právne a etické aspekty Kantovej idey mieru*. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 5(1), pp. 3 – 17; Šajda, P., 2024. *Working for Peace in Situations of Conflict: On Schmitt's Reception of Kant*. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 13(1), pp. 28 – 44; Kupš, T., 2024. *Kant's Project of Perpetual Peace Today*. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana* 13(1), pp. 9 – 27.

litical problems related to this concept. The idea Kant's essay came with is still challenging. Contemporary world evolves into violent situations that force people to migrate. Some of them find themselves in the middle of a war zone. From one day to another, they discover they are seen as enemies. And they get bombed, wounded, killed. Sometimes in their sleep, sometimes in the streets, looking for safety. Those who are quicker and luckier leave their homes immediately. Trying to save bare lives, they leave all behind. Suddenly, they lose their homes, houses, apartments. By leaving their country, they become emigrants, outsiders in relation to other countries. Without the possibility to return, they lose trust and sense of security. In war, they lose peace.

More than two hundred years ago, Kant suggested it would be possible to avoid this situation. He even wrote a list of measures to prevent future wars, but none of his anti-war conditions were implemented and fulfilled. Why? Is there an answer to this question? Are there more than one?

In my view, one of the possible answers could be that global peace cannot exist constantly, perpetually. It can be only declared and signed, as a promise, as a word that must be kept. But to last, it needs more than that. It must be recalled, reexperienced, renewed over time. Even this consistent performative effort, however, does not guarantee that the vow of peace would not be broken. If this promise is broken, Kant's ethical-political duty of human hospitality and security remains unfulfilled. Old friends turn into new enemies. This means that enemies are not simply declared. They are progressively constructed, created, invented and re-invented.

In his essay *Inventing the Enemy*³ Umberto Eco observes that friends may unite in shared hate for common enemy. To illustrate this problem, he recalls that some years ago in New York he found himself in conversation with a Pakistani taxi driver, who asked him where he came from. When Eco replied "Italy", the taxi driver asked how many of them there were and was surprised they were so few and that their language wasn't English. Then the driver asked Eco who our enemies were. He even explained that he wanted to know who were the people against whom we have fought through the centuries over land claims, ethnic rivalry, border incursions, and so forth. Surprised, Eco told him Italians are not at war with anyone. The driver insisted that he wanted to know who were

³ Eco, U., 2012. *Inventing the Enemy and Other Occasional Writings*, trans. Richard Dixon. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

our historical enemies, those who kill them and whom they kill. Eco repeated that we don't have any, that we fought our last war more than half a century ago—starting, moreover, with one enemy and ending with another. The taxi driver wasn't satisfied with this answer. How can a country have no enemies? Thinking further about the conversation, Eco has come to the conclusion that “Italians have no outside enemies, or rather they are unable to agree on who they are, because they are continually at war with *each other*—Pisa against Lucca, Guelphs against Ghibellines, north against south, Fascists against Partisans, mafia against state, Berlusconi's government against the judiciary”.⁴ He finds he could have explained to the taxi driver that “one of Italy's misfortunes over the past sixty years has been the absence of real enemies”.⁵ Eco further argues that having a common external enemy is an important factor in building internal friendship, which is a practice that shall be explained by thinking in binary oppositions. To build and maintain an identity, we are involved in the process of creating and demonizing an alterity. As he puts it, “Having an enemy is important not only to define our identity but also to provide us with an obstacle against which to measure our system of values and, in seeking to overcome it, to demonstrate our own worth. So when there is no enemy, we have to invent one”.⁶ In other words, Eco notes that it is the fear of enemy that unites us. By constructing an outer enemy, we construct inner unity. If there is no outer enemy, we keep ourselves busy with searching for inner enemies.

From another angle, the same problem is poetically described in Franz Kafka's story “The Burrow”⁷ where he comments on his search for safety because of inner and outer threats. The figure of the narrator is an animal-like being who builds a vast hole or tunnel dug into the ground, connected to a network of subterranean passages. As the burrow is constructed for refuge or flight, the burrowing way of life is motivated mostly by fear of being vulnerable and unprotected from the outside world. It provides a form of shelter against predation and exposure to danger. In some interpretations, it is not only this fictional character, it is Kafka himself who burrows into language and constructs a subterranean shelter for refuge and safety from external predators.⁸ But the struggles of

⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Kafka, F., 1995. Burrow. In: *The Complete Stories*. New York: Schocken Books, p. 323 – 359.

⁸ As Lambert puts it, Kafka “found refuge in this system from how he was determined as an individual by family and society; in the stories and tales, he escaped from the condition of

Kafka's animal character do not end here; the external threat is not his only nightmare. He realizes that he has to invent the outer enemy. Without doing so, he would start wars with his inner enemy, which would be much worse and would destroy his identity from the inside.

Is our identity, as Eco claims, destined to protect us from a threat coming from the outside? Is it, as Kafka claims, based on our fear that a bigger threat, the threat of disintegration, might come from the inside? In other words, do we construct outer enemies to help us unite? In the domain of philosophy, such a construction of enmity can be elaborated through conceptual work. To review this problem and answer the previously formulated questions, I propose to have a closer look at several new ways the traditional concepts of friend, enemy, war, and peace can be philosophically reinvented, recognized, and rethought today.

II. Rethinking Peace Today: Who is the Enemy?

One of the possible new ways of rethinking this old topic was recently opened by Gregg Lambert in his book *Philosophy after Friendship*.⁹ Although Lambert realizes that some of Kant's claims might sound as a philosopher's sweet dream, or an idea fit only for the academy, he recalls Kant's assertion that the idea of perpetual peace should be affirmed as a reality. Even if this reality cannot be empirically proven or disproven, it can still function as an *a priori* idea of reason for any future political philosophy. Lambert proposes to substitute this philosophy with his concept of "post-war philosophy".¹⁰

To elaborate on his post-war philosophy, Lambert returns to Deleuze and Guattari's book *What is Philosophy?* where they explain the figure of a philosopher. In their view, philosopher is not a wise man himself, but rather a "friend of wisdom".¹¹ Analogically, enemies of wisdom are not stupid themselves, they befriend stupidity. Being a creative friend of wisdom, Deleuze's and Guattari's philosopher creates concepts to or-

being human; in the novels, he escaped and found temporary refuge in hallways and passages between each chamber or conjoining room. *The Castle* is actually described as a giant burrow of passages in which there is no outside. This is one reason why K. cannot get to the Castle by walking across the surface of the earth in a single straight line; he must take tunnel or enter through the labyrinth." Lambert, G., 2012. *In Search of a New Image of Thought. Gilles Deleuze and Philosophical Expressionism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 71.

⁹ Lambert, G., 2012. *Philosophy after Friendship*, pp. 3 – 4.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 23.

¹¹ Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., 1994. *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University.

ganize chaos. To do so, he needs an imaginary “friend” who entertains a dialogue of wisdom with him. They have to create the wisdom, it does not preexist anywhere and cannot be simple uncovered or discovered. Deleuze’s *conceptual personae* are figures that in the form of a concept help the philosopher think – it is an imaginary person created by the philosopher to accompany his thoughts and to help them unfold.

At this point we must turn to another distinction that Deleuze and Guattari make immediately after discussing the difference between aesthetic figures and conceptual personae, which is the distinction between psychosocial types. Following their comments, Lambert attempts to reconstruct a genealogy of the different political situations and social personae to which this final statement might refer in order to arrive at “a moment of recollection where perhaps the essential meaning of philosophy might be interrogated anew, especially in relation to Deleuze’s assertion that the democratic ideal of friendship has become corrupted”.¹² Consequently, following Deleuze and Guattari’s views, Lambert proposes to question a very commonplace and patently metaphorical equivalence between the ideas of friendship and the democratic form of politics. Lambert conceives a philosophy after this friendship with wisdom... there are other conceptual figures than friends created by philosophers. He emphasizes the need for clarification of various philosophic figures of socio-political insiders and outsiders, such as friend, enemy, foreigner, stranger, deportee, and revolutionary people.

Lambert’s first conceptual person is the friend, the one I can trust. I feel safe in his presence because I believe he won’t betray me, he won’t attack me. As Lambert reminds us, however, this concept of “friend” should be distinguished from the Greek idea of friendship as containing the intensive states of competition, rivalry, and conflict between citizens in the form of a “generalized athleticism”¹³ where the virtue of friendship would also be judged in ethical and aesthetic terms. The contemporary term “friend” refers to this original “conceptual persona” invented by the Greeks, but its meaning is now difficult to discern, since many of its social ritual significations have become lost.

The second figure is the enemy. This conceptual person is defined by more than just not sharing of common sense – it is also a threat, a sign of danger coming from disrespect. Enemy makes one feel unsafe,

¹² Lambert, G., 2012. *Philosophy after Friendship*, p. 2.

¹³ Ibid., p. 5.

vigilant, ready for defense. According to Lambert, however, enemy may be also seen as the one who is excluded from friendship, defined as a social experience of the negation of the self. The enemy would then have “a social existence reduced to its barest abstraction, bereft of all other social relations, as well as all forms of dependency and for this reason, either condemned to death, to nothingness, or to wandering outside the limits of community”.¹⁴ If friends ally to produce common experience, it is against the existence of such an isolated, purely solipsistic self.

Lambert’s third conceptual person is the foreigner. Following Benveniste’s etymological work, Lambert sees the stranger is the one who comes from beyond the limits of a state or community. Consequently, foreigner is not any ‘stranger’. He is seen as a foreigner in case of recognition of his cultural difference. Foreigner is a citizen of another country entering the territory from behind its external boundary. He comes inside from behind the frontier, marking the distinction between the inside and outside. He is a traveler, a tourist, a migrant who originates from a distinct state. As a temporary hosts, foreigners must respect local laws. Otherwise, the locals would not feel safe in their presence and their behavior would be rightfully corrected by a coercive power.

Lambert’s following figure is the stranger. To challenge the common “xenophobia” against people transgressing the inner limits of a law, he raises the question concerning the group’s right to determine the very identity of the stranger as if from the inside. At this point Lambert asks what would be the origin of stranger’s right to acceptance, tolerance, and hospitality? In his view, it is only in a limit-situation that the full meaning of the obligation of hospitality appears, according to which the “stranger-guest”¹⁵ is bound to the same observance of community already enjoyed by the natural citizen but by means of a special pact that is premised on the sign of recognition of absolute dependency on the host.

Lambert’s fifth conceptual person is the deportee. This figure designates a refugee, an immigrant who has no right to stay. Lambert comes to three figures that represent the broken circle of friendship: first, contemporary strangers who appear today in the very center of the polis; second, refugees, those survivors who have passed through an experience of war; and finally, global poor. This last figure is becoming the

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 92.

wellspring of terrorism and thus regarded with renewed fear and suspicion. Lambert argues that “today there is no possibility for any political philosophy, much less any new concept of the political”¹⁶ that does not address at its beginning these three figures as the new conceptual personae who will determine the future compass and the extreme limit of our common species.

Lambert’s last figure is the revolutionary people. At this point he turns to Deleuze and Guattari who distinguish two species of violence. The first one is the bureaucratic state violence that can be found in the state apparatus: it either applies disciplinary violence against its own citizens (its police forces, its judges, its bureaucrats); or it acquires an army. The second one is the primitive violence of “pólemos” that is exterior to state power. In their view, this “war machine” was invented by the nomads, since the terror that it causes is not only transgressive, but also lawless, random, undisciplined, and nondialectical. Lambert argues that in the context of today’s war on terror requires the same vigilance as the nomadic “tyrannical state of lawlessness”,¹⁷ which corresponds to the Kantian state of nature that existed in the era before constituted nations, in wastelands and deserts.

This problematic was further developed in Gregg Lambert’s international *Perpetual Peace Project*. Its opening page recalls one major political event that invites us to rethink what peace means to us: “On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014. With the current wars in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and well over twenty major conflicts globally today, we can no longer continue to see the state of peace as merely the temporary absence of war, since perpetual war now appears as the horizon of our world”.¹⁸ In relation to this approach of contemporary international political situation, Lambert investigates universities as institutional spaces best equipped to forge new practices of peace, especially in addressing current geopolitical conditions that would make peace impossible. The goal of his initiative is not simply another academic discussion, but an engaged and active effort to redesign the concept of peace itself—from new course offerings, international collaborations, and new trans-disciplinary knowledges that may be useful for re-designing a sustainable planetary peace.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 121.

¹⁸ <https://perpetualpeaceproject2022.org/>

III. Re-Designing Perpetual Peace in Ethical and Political Thinking

As a correlate to Lambert's *Perpetual Peace Project*, this special issue focuses on the possibility to rethink and re-design the concept of peace today. Articles collected in this special issue, however, do not copy Lambert's conceptual persons of ethically and politically justified "non-friends". In some ways, they touch the topic directly related to these figures, in some others, they build an autonomous space and open new theoretical directions. By pointing to previously untouched or unsolved problems, the articles written by Michaela Fišerová, David Peroutka, Krzysztof Skonieczny, Martin Šimsa, and Jan Šmíd introduce five innovative lines of reflection in contemporary ethical and political thinking of peace.

The main goal of this special issue is to reevaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Kant's idea of perpetual peace and to examine its reception in contemporary ethical and political philosophy with a focus on issues of national and international law. To critically evaluate acute and current issues of the present global justice, international declarations and institutions, migration, right to asylum, cosmopolitan education, environmental rights and obligations, war and military interventions, this special issue sets two partial aims. First, to find out what is Kant's idea of perpetual peace in comparison with related ethical and political concepts of contemporary philosophy (forgiveness, hospitality, democracy, sovereignty, defense, human nature). Second, to examine the possible applications of Kant's concept of perpetual peace in relation to contemporary political situation in the world and its historical-political background (Shoah, Chart77, War in Ukraine).

The conceptual figure of enemy as threat appears in Peroutka's article discussing the ethic-political problem of defense. This first line of thinking aims to show that Kant's theory invites us to a certain degree of pacifism. According to Peroutka, Kantian practical reason as a source of morality excludes the right to war. Federalism seems to involve only the international law of peace, whereas the state of nature has no real international law, and thus no right to war. To declare a particular war "just" would presuppose a competent "judicial decision", which, however, does not exist. Therefore, neither of the two parties is entitled to declare the other side an unjust enemy. Everyone is prepared to declare his enemy unjust, but that does not constitute any meaningful justification for anything. If, in the international state of nature, "each state is judge in

its own case”, then such judgments are of little validity. Peroutka, finally, finds such validity in the principle that warfare can only be considered permissible if it is defensive war in the strict sense of the word (which does not include pre-emptive war).

Šimsa’s article partially joins Peroutka’s views on “just war” by proposing to rethink the topic of migrant fleeing the violent political conditions of totalitarianism. This second line of revising Kant’s perpetual peace examines Jaspers’, Arendt’s, Habermas’, and Rawls’ interpretations of Kant’s project of perpetual peace, as well as their influence on Czechoslovakian democratic thought. To restore the broken circle of friendship, Šimsa explains the way Patočka used Kantian framework to justify human rights in Charter 77. In his own reading, however, Kant oscillates between sweet dreams of philosophy, ironic comments and concrete proposals for advancing civil, international and world law to move closer to the end of all wars and eternal peace. To challenge Kant’s theory, Šimsa’s article inspects Russian aggression against Ukraine through the lens of Kant’s conditions. In contrast with Kant’s preference for a republican setting of the peace, democratic Europe would not hesitate to intervene and get embroiled in a war. While one democratic state had to defend itself, other democratic states had to help the refugees from this defensive, unsolicited war.

Šmíd’s article pays attention to the topic of foreigner’s political relation to state sovereignty. Following Kant’s theory of perpetual peace, foreigner is seen as a temporary guest who respects sovereignty of the state he visits during his travels between the inside and the outside. This third line of rethinking peace today presents Kant’s theory of perpetual peace with regard to its political applicability in the present day. It traces Kant’s assumptions of perpetual peace – primarily a republican form of government and secondarily a federal community of states. In Šmíd’s reading, Kant rejects the state of nations or the world republic. If he prefers a federated union of states that arrive at a republican polity, which he considers to be a matter of luck, then the resulting union will, depending on luck, consist of random combinations of states that luckily happen to have a republican polity. However, since the republican form of government is not firmly fixed, then the stability of this union cannot be guaranteed, and states can join it, but then also leave it. The composition of the union would be subject to the choice of each state after it fulfills the conditions of accession. Subsequent withdrawal would be a matter of choice (with a republic) or necessity (if the state ceased

to have a republican form of government). A federal union would most likely have no coercive power, not even in international relations, and certainly not within states. It could therefore not influence either the internal conditions of individual members or their external behavior. Foreigners would remain a permanent threat.

The topic of stranger as a weird insider, as an alterity that absolutely depends on tolerance and hospitality of the host, appears in Fišerová's article bringing an ethical focus on our struggles with hospitality. This forth line of rethinking peace today elaborates on Derrida's revision of Kant's concept of perpetual peace as the opposite of war. Its goal is to introduce the way deconstruction subversively bridges binary oppositions. When deconstructed, Kantian duty obliges all people to peace, hospitality, and friendship but, simultaneously, contains and displaces traces of past wars, hostility and enmity. Fišerová proposes to follow Derrida's work to interconnect these binary oppositions by the promise of ongoing forgiveness. Because of the individual and uncertain healing process, forgiveness is deferred and never fully accomplished. It can only be approached partially, by little steps. As Derrida puts it, for the invited guest as much as for the visitor, crossing the threshold remains a transgressive step. In every new step of hospitality, we are transgressing our limits in forgiveness, we are overcoming these interminable thresholds. In the perspective of deconstruction, therefore, it is not the peace that is to be considered perpetual, it is the poetic performative work on forgiveness that is.

Finally, the figure of revolutionary people as lawless and unpredictable warriors is challenged in Skonieczny's article focusing on the ethical problem of human nature. This fifth line of thinking uses a discussion of the relationships between war, peace and "human nature" in the First Supplement of Kant's *Perpetual Peace* essay to make a wider observation about the interplay of the three concepts. Pointing to more contemporary attempts to frame the term "human nature" present in biological discourses, Skonieczny's article sketches a possible alternative to the argument that human nature is "evil", but only through it can we foster conditions of perpetual peace-to-come. He questions Kant's view of nature by referring to evolutionary theory that uncovers a set of complex mechanisms that depend on the interplay of genetic and environmental factors. Such a transgressive understanding of human nature, in the context of war, leads to considering each instance of peace and war is a singular interplay of factors. In with Fišerová's views on difficulties with

maintaining the state of “peace”, Skonieczny’s article finally suggests that thinking the conditions for perpetual peace relies on perpetual vigilance to the singular interplay of humans and their political environment.

IV. Conclusion: Toward Sustainability of Peace

By studying and interpreting Immanuel Kant’s major works and short writings, this special issue rethinks his philosophy with a focus on the issue of perpetual peace. Kantian peace is a duty of improvement of human coexistence in universal respect to otherness. As a moral maxim, it cannot be totally present in human behavior or simply implemented in the real world. Any declaration of total presence of peace on Earth would be totalitarian as it would abandon the promise to improve human sense of hospitality. By systematically construing an inner our outer “enemy” related to the particular imposed version of peace, it would head towards a totalitarian “nightmare”. Any attempt to design peace should, therefore, providently include a reflection of this risk.

The contemporary ethical and political forum of thinkers gathered in this special issue challenges this risk incorporated in promises of perpetual peace – of projecting an “enemy”. In addition to the historic-philosophical analysis of Kant’s theory of perpetual peace, they focus on its comparison with contemporary philosophy discussing problem areas of today’s social, political and cultural reality. These acute issues require philosophical analysis and bring new global challenges such as war crimes and global justice, forgiveness and hospitality, right to defense and asylum, human nature and non-human nature.

There are various possible answers to the question why none of Kant’s anti-war conditions were ever implemented and fulfilled. The first line of possible answers is politically oriented. Peroutka argues that there is no right to war except the right to armed defence against an actual war of aggression. In other words, the traditional notion of “just war” must be clearly restricted to that of defensive war in the strictest sense. For this purpose, the article goes beyond the limited sphere of Kantian interpretive efforts and presents arguments concerning our present, i.e. the 21st century. Similarly, Šimsa finds Kant’s universally normative moral, legal, and political reasoning inspiring, but challenging to implement. Although his moral disapproval of war and unethical politics is valuable, it can be hard to enforce in the contemporary political reality of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Another approach to Kant’s essay *Toward*

Perpetual Peace is proposed and elaborated in Šmíd's legal view, which analyzes Kant's idea of republican form of government as incomplete and in tension with Kant's conception of sovereignty, which grants supreme power to the head of state. Moreover, Šmíd finds that the global union of states could not enforce uniform action against the foreign states outside the federal union, with whom war is possible and probable. Another approach, this time ethically oriented, is proposed by Fišerová and Skonieczny. According to Fišerová, in Derrida's view, we need to focus on possible performativity of the Kantian "leap over the abyss", even if it remains an ongoing, unfinished work. What permanently defers war and maintains peaceful relations is their constant renewal by iterable ethical ornament of peace by performing ongoing rituals of mourning and forgiveness. Finally, Skonieczny situates Kant's *Perpetual Peace* essay in a polemical context proposing a mechanism through which nature sets this inherently evil tendency to work against itself, thus producing conditions for perpetual peace.

People become enemies in the process of constructing enemies, which can lead to aggressive warfare. To minimize this risk, friendships shall be consistently performatively constructed. The thinkers publishing in this special issue meet in a challenging perspective of thinking, which indicates that peace is never declared and guaranteed once and for all. Precisely because of its expected potential presence, it is necessary opting for peace, tending to it, searching for it, defending it. Paradoxically, sometimes even by means of entering a "just" war.

Let us return, finally, to the Eco's essay and to the Kafka's story. Our questioning of the construction of identity through the construction of alterity may open new directions of discussion on the sustainability of peace today. Eco and Kafka remind us that, besides the outer threat, there is another xenophobic trouble coming from a seemingly opposite direction. Seemingly, because those who invent and hate inner enemies, fear and fight alterity inside themselves.¹⁹ Haters try to cover this fear by arrogance. Unable to overcome their xenophobic worries, these "warriors" make war against those who do to make war. They keep on constructing prejudices against the most vulnerable "strangers" such as immigrants, women, racially different or queer people. Through their judgmental ter-

¹⁹ As Josef Fulka explains, in such a situation, "the alterity coming from outside starts to resonate with the alterity inside us, with the violence of primary conflicts, on the basis of which what we are began to form." Fulka, J., 2015. Násilí, subjekt, politika. In: Mahler, M. – Telerovský, R., eds. *Strach z cizího. Antisemitismus, xenofobie a zkušenost "uncanny"*. Praha: Česká psychoanalytická společnost, p. 204. Personal translation.

ror and bullying they persistently participate on destruction of peace.

This path of reflection suggests that we may need an effective ethical and political regulation that would nourish friendships across various social environments. Such a regulation would avoid construction of identity on the basis of prejudices and hate that would occasionally “unite” us. In this perspective, acceptance of alterity would not destroy identity of democratic states, it would complete and strengthen it. To sustain the peace today would mean to cultivate new ethically and politically justified set of communication skills imposing respect for vulnerable people. To not “befriend stupidity” by constructing new inner and outer “enemies” would mean to redirect common admiration from the seemingly strong, “resilient” value of arrogance toward peacefully powerful values of thoroughness, curiosity, and vulnerability. Sustainable ethics and politics of planetary peace would focus on constructing safe spaces where one feels free to invent friends instead of enemies.

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