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Vážené čitateľky, vážení čitatelia,

v roku 2024 si pripomínáme trojsté výročie narodenia Immanuela Kanta. Podujatia k tomuto výročiu sa počas celého roka organizujú v mnohých krajinách. V Nemecku sa v Berlínsko-brandenburskej akadémii vied v deň jeho narodenia, 22. apríla, konal slávnostný ceremoniál, na ktorom mal príhovor aj spolkový kancelár, pri tejto príležitosti vydali pamätnú dvadsaťeurovú mincu s vyrazeným citátom „*Der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir*“, a najväčšie vedecké podujatie sa uskutoční v Bonne, kde bude od 8. do 13. októbra prebiehať 14. medzinárodný kantovský kongres.

Svojím malým dielom do série týchto podujatí prispela v roku 2024 aj Prešovská univerzita v Prešove, na ktorej sa v dňoch 10. – 12. mája uskutočnila 15. medzinárodná vedecká kantovská konferencia, ktorá bola venovaná nielen Kantovmu výročiu, ale aj pamiatke profesora Lubomíra Belása, vďaka ktorému sa na Prešovskej univerzite v Prešove pred tridsiatimi rokmi objavili prvé práce, ktoré predznamenal začiatok kantovského výskumu na Slovensku. O ďalších desať rokov neskôr, v roku 2004, sa pod jeho vedením začal realizovať prvý vedecký projekt súvisiaci s výskumom Kantovej filozofie na Slovensku VEGA 1/1306/04 *Filozofický odkaz I. Kanta a súčasnosť*, a tieto projekty pokračujú až dodnes. Jedným z ich výsledkov je aj vydávanie časopisu *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*.

Predkladané číslo prináša tri vedecké štúdie v anglickom jazyku. Článok Tomasza Kupśa z Univerzity Mikuláša Kopernika v Toruni *Kant's Project of Perpetual Peace Today (Kantov projekt večného mieru dnes)* upozorňuje na aktuálnosť Kantovho spisu *K večnému mieru* aj v dnešnej dobe a poukazuje na to, že idea mieru nemá byť zavrhnutá iba preto, že reálnosť jej dosiahnutia je ťažko uskutočniteľná. Autor príspevku sa zaoberá aj analýzou Kantovho projektu v kontexte súčas-

nej geopolitickej situácie, a to najmä v súvislosti s vojnou na Ukrajine.

Peter Šajda zo Slovenskej akadémie vied sa vo svojej štúdií *Working for Peace in Situations of Conflict: On Schmitt's Reception of Kant* (*Práca pre mier v konfliktných situáciách: O Schmittovej recepcii Kanta*) venuje pojmu politického nepriateľa v politickej filozofii Carla Schmitta, ktorý sa inšpiroval Kantovou teóriou večného mieru, i keď odmieta pojem nespravodlivého nepriateľa, ktorý zaviedol Kant. Šajda prichádza s návrhom, ktorý je komplementárny k tomu Schmittovmu aj Kantovmu a ukazuje, ako je možné politickými i existenciálnymi spôsobmi podporovať mier v konfliktnej situácii.

Kristína Bosáková z Univerzity Pavla Jozefa Šafárika v Košiciach v príspevku *Moving Around the Question of the Human. Was Kant an Anthropological Philosopher?* (*Uvažovanie nad otázkou človeka. Bol Kant antropologickým filozofom?*) ukazuje, že Kantova antropologická pozícia nie je len periférnym aspektom jeho filozofie, ale kľúčovým prvkom, ktorý súvisí so širšími epistemologickými, etickými a metafyzickými problémami. Autorka sa zasadzuje za komplexné chápanie Kantovej filozofie, ktoré uznáva ústredné postavenie ľudskej prirodzenosti a jej vývoj v kozmopolitnom rámci.

Časopis prináša aj tri recenzie. Jana Migašová predstavuje knihu Corduly Grewe *The Arabesque from Kant to Comics*, ktorá mapuje prekvapujúcu premenu arabesky z ikonoklastickej literárnej teórie raného nemeckého romantizmu až po estetické experimentovanie v avantgarde a populárnej kultúre.

Marek Stachoň vo svojej recenzii knihy Petra Unruha *Kant und der Weltföderalismus. Zur Grundlegung und Aktualität von Kants global-politischer Philosophie* poukazuje spolu s autorom na aktuálnosť Kantovej predstavy svetového federalizmu v kontexte dnešnej politickej filozofie a v kontexte politickej reality.

Recenziu anglického prekladu knihy Saloma Friedlaendera *Kant for Children*, ktorý vychádza sto rokov po origináli a je doplnený o šesť štúdií k tejto Friedlanderovej práci, prináša Monika Homulková, ktorá oceňuje aj to, že táto kniha má potenciál zaujať mladých ľudí a širšiu verejnosť.

Všetky tri štúdie, ako aj knihy, ktoré nám predstavujú autori recenzií, sú vysoko aktuálne. Poukazujú na to, že Kantova filozofia, jeho dôkladné skúmanie ľudskej situácie, neochvejná oddanosť morálnym zásadám, jeho mierový projekt a jeho hľadanie odpovede na štvrtú otázku „*Was ist der Mensch?*“ nás naďalej inšpirujú a sú pre nás výzvou.

Touto cestou pozývame všetkých, ktorých tieto myšlienky zaujali, aby sa s chuťou začítali do predkladaného čísla, ako aj Kantových prác, ktoré sú dodnes dôležitým a inšpiratívnym zdrojom filozofického uvažovania. Nech tieto oslavy trojstého výročia nie sú len spomienkou, ale oživením Kantovho filozofického odkazu vo svete, ktorý zápasí s vážnymi politickými, etickými aj existenciálnymi otázkami. Oslávme Kantov odkaz tým, že sa budeme jeho dielom zaoberať aj naďalej.

*Sandra Zákutná*  
jún 2024

Dear Readers,

The year 2024 marks the three-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Immanuel Kant. Throughout the year, events will be organized in many countries to commemorate this anniversary. In Germany, a ceremony was held at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities on April 22, the day of his birth, at which the Federal Chancellor also spoke; a commemorative twenty-euro coin was issued, with the quotation “*Der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir*”; and the largest scientific event will take place in Bonn, where the 14<sup>th</sup> *International Kant Congress* will be held from October 8 to 13.

In 2024, the University of Presov also made a small contribution to this series of events with the *15th International Scientific Kant Conference* held on May 10–12, which was dedicated not only to Kant’s anniversary, but also to the memory of Professor Lubomir Belas, thanks to whom the first works, which heralded the beginning of Kant research in Slovakia, were published at the University of Presov thirty years ago. Another ten years later, in 2004, the first scientific project related to the research of Kant’s philosophy in Slovakia *VEGA 1/1306/04 Philosophical Legacy of I. Kant and the Present* was launched under his leadership and these projects continue to this day. One of their results is also the journal *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*.

Issue 1/2024 presents three articles in English. The article *Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace Today* by Tomasz Kups from the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun draws attention to the relevance of Kant’s work *Towards Perpetual Peace* even today and points out that the idea of peace should not be discarded just because the reality of achieving it is difficult. The author of the paper also analyses Kant’s project in the context of the current geopolitical situation,

especially in the context of the war in Ukraine.

In his paper *Working for Peace in Situations of Conflict: On Schmitt's Reception of Kant*, Peter Sajda from the Slovak Academy of Sciences discusses the notion of the political enemy in the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt, who was inspired by Kant's theory of perpetual peace, although he rejects the notion of the unjust enemy introduced by Kant. Sajda offers a proposal that complements both Schmitt's and Kant's and shows how peace can be promoted in a situation of conflict in both political and existential ways.

Kristina Bosakova from the University of Pavol Jozef Safarik in Kosice in her paper *Moving Around the Question of the Human. Was Kant an Anthropological Philosopher?* shows that Kant's anthropological position is not just a peripheral aspect of his philosophy, but a key element related to broader epistemological, ethical and metaphysical problems. The author argues for a comprehensive understanding of Kant's philosophy that recognizes the centrality of human nature and its development within a cosmopolitan framework.

The journal also features three reviews. Jana Migasova introduces Cordula Grewe's *The Arabesque from Kant to Comics*, which traces the arabesque's surprising transformation from the iconoclastic literary theory of early German Romanticism to aesthetic experimentation in the avant-garde and popular culture.

Marek Stachon in his review of Peter Unruh's *Kant und der Weltföderalismus. Zur Grundlegung und Aktualität von Kants global-politischer Philosophie*, agrees with the author on the relevance of Kant's idea of world federalism in the context of contemporary political philosophy and the political reality of today.

Monika Homulkova reviews the English translation of Salomo Friedlaender's *Kant for Children*, which is published a century after the original and accompanied by six studies of Friedlander's work, and she appreciates – among other things – the book's potential to engage young people and the general public.

All three studies, as well as the books reviewed, are highly topical. They point out that Kant's philosophy, his thorough examination of the human situation, his commitment to moral principles, his peace project and his search for an answer to the fourth question "*Was ist der Mensch?*" continue to inspire and challenge us.

We invite all those who are interested in these ideas to read this issue, as well as Kant's works, which continue to be an important and

inspiring source of philosophical reflection to this day. May this tercentenary be not just a commemoration, but a revival of Kant's philosophical legacy in a world grappling with serious political, ethical, and existential questions. Let us celebrate Kant's legacy by continuing to engage with his work.

*Sandra Zákuťná*

June 2024



Tomasz  
Kupś

Nicolaus Copernicus  
University

## Kant's Project of Perpetual Peace Today

**Abstract:** The paper is an extended analysis of selected fragments of Kant's essay *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795). On October 24, 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron, during an official meeting in the Vatican, presented Pope Francis with a copy of the French edition of Immanuel Kant's treatise *Toward Perpetual Peace*. The paper begins by emphasizing the symbolic meaning of this event, which shows the timeliness of the text, which was written almost 230 years ago. Kant appears here as a publicist who comments on the political events of his era and formulates bold normative projects for future politics. In the following, metaphors of war and peace in Kant's philosophy are reflected on and essential ideas in *Toward Perpetual Peace* are analysed. Although today there is no doubt that many international institutions are a practical implementation of Kant's postulates, the concept of 'perpetual peace' may still seem to be utopian. Therefore, the arguments that Kant presents in defence of the reality of his philosophical project are analysed in more detail. Particular attention is given to the so-called 'guarantees of nature' and Kant's project is confronted with the reality of contemporary politics, especially the war in Ukraine.

**Keywords:** Immanuel Kant, peace, war, philosophical project, philosophy of politics

**Abstrakt:** Príspevok je rozšírenou analýzou vybraných fragmentov Kantovej eseje *K večnému mieru* (1795). Dňa 24. októbra 2022 francúzsky prezident Emmanuel Macron počas oficiálneho stretnutia vo Vatikáne odovzdal pápežovi Františkovi kópiu francúzskeho vydania tohto Kantovho diela. Príspevok sa začína zdôraznením symbolického významu tejto udalosti, ktorý poukazuje na aktuálnosť textu, ktorý bol napísaný pred takmer 230 rokmi. Kant tu vystupuje ako publicista, ktorý komentuje politické udalosti svojej doby a formuluje odvážne normatívne projekty pre budúcu politiku. Následne text reflektuje metafory vojny a mieru v Kantovej filozofii a analyzuje podstatné myšlienky textu *K večnému mie-*

ru. Hoci dnes už niet pochyb o tom, že mnohé medzinárodné inštitúcie sú praktickou realizáciou Kantových postulátov, koncept „večného mieru“ sa stále môže zdať utopický. Preto sa podrobnejšie analyzujú argumenty, ktoré Kant predkladá na obranu reálnosti svojho filozofického projektu. Osobitná pozornosť je venovaná tzv. „zárukám prírody“ a Kantov projekt je konfrontovaný s realitou súčasnej politiky, najmä s vojnou na Ukrajine.

**Kľúčové slová:** Immanuel Kant, mier, vojna, filozofický projekt, filozofia politiky

On 24 October 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron, during an official meeting in the Vatican, offered Pope Francis a copy of the French edition of Immanuel Kant's treatise *Toward Perpetual Peace*. The donated specimen stands as a unique witness to history. The book, before it went to France, was in the collection of the *Academic Reading Room*, the first Polish scientific student society, active in Lviv from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century until the outbreak of the Second World War.<sup>1</sup> Lviv and much of western Ukraine were then part of Poland. In 1939, as a result of the implementation of a pact between fascist Germany and the Soviet Union, these territories, including Lviv, fell under Soviet occupation.

Looking more closely at the donated book, it is a French translation of an essay written by Kant. In its contents, the French saw an endorsement of the overthrow of the despotic monarchy and the establishment of the first republic, while the Poles read it as a condemnation of the partitioning policies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The copy that Macron offered Francis had been used by Polish students during the brief period when their homeland, after one hundred and twenty-three years of non-existence, was briefly reconstituted within its new borders. This took place in Lviv, a city that, in its turbulent history, had been ruled by Ruthenia, Poland, Austria, the Soviet Union, and Germany. For more than thirty years now, Lviv has been an important cultural and scientific centre of an independent Ukraine.

<sup>1</sup> Lubov, D. C. 2022. Pope meets French President Emmanuel Macron. *Vatican News*. [cited on 2024-05-30]. Available online: <https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2022-10/pope-francis-meets-french-president-emmanuel-macron.html>. Almost all Polish reports on this meeting focused only on the consideration of whether we were dealing with plundered Polish property (so-called war loss after World War II). This speculation transpired to be unfounded, but effectively overshadowed the significance of the gesture. (Anonymous. *An International Scandal*. [cited on 2024-05-30]. Available online: <https://www.wiecejnizpolska.pl/en/post/an-international-scandal/>).

The offering of this book is deeply symbolic today. More than a century ago, readers of the French translation of the treatise, penned by Kant, still lived in Lviv. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, people reading Kant's treatise could believe that many of the philosopher's forecasts had come true in their lifetime. Today, with Russian missiles raining down on Lviv, the very same book is expected to give hope that the philosopher's project, although not yet realised, does not cease to be an inspiration to us.

## Kant – The publicist

It is to Immanuel Kant that we owe one of the most incisive characterizations of the Enlightenment:

*Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment.*<sup>2</sup>

With these words begins arguably the most famous of all the essays that Kant published in the last twenty years of his life, in the popular journal *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, one of the most important periodicals of the era. It also shows that Kant, towards the end of his long life, broke his own stereotype of being an exclusively academic philosopher, devoted solely to scholarly work. In fact, Kant did not live in isolation from the contemporary world; he took a keen interest in current political events, commenting on them and proposing bold solutions.

With the publication of his famous essay *An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?*, Kant not only engaged in the then discussion about the Enlightenment, but also initiated a new area of his research: reflection on history and politics.<sup>3</sup> Thus, Kant's earlier treatises on moral

<sup>2</sup> Kant, I., 1784/1999. *An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?* (1784), trans. M. J. Gregor. In: Gregor, M. J., ed. I. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 17 [8:35]. For a more recent reading of Kant's essay, see: Švihura, L. A., 2022. *Audire aude! Alúzia na Kantovu Odpoveď na otázku: Čo je osvietenstvo?* [Audire aude! An allusion to Kant's Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?]. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 11(1), pp. 55–60.

<sup>3</sup> The essay on the Enlightenment is one of many texts Kant published in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. The most important of these were: *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan sim*

philosophy gained an important addendum in the form of a philosophical theory of state and law. It became evident that it was not enough to indicate what was meant by freedom, but that the question also had to be answered: how could an individual human's right to freedom be reconciled with the same right of all other human beings?

Kant's essays dealt with themes that most sparked the imagination of his readers, inquiring about the source of evil, the beginning or end of history, the relationship between theory and practice. He referred to the most topical events of the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, such as the French Revolution or the idea of moral progress. Moreover, he did so in such a way that his voice continues to be relevant even today. The most famous example to this day remains the 1795 essay *Toward Perpetual Peace*.<sup>4</sup>

To begin with the place that the essay *Toward Perpetual Peace* occupies in Kant's philosophy will be outlined. Then the most important ideas expressed in this essay will be discussed. Some of the themes will briefly be presented, others will be discussed in greater depth, also referring to other texts by Kant and to some contemporary examples. Finally, there is a reflection on the topicality of Kant's philosophical project.

### ***Toward Perpetual Peace* in Kant's philosophy**

War and peace imagery permeates all of Kant's philosophy and cannot be reduced to mere concerns of political philosophy or historiosophy. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant describes metaphysics as a battlefield, as a place of endless disputes, most notably disputes between rationalism and empiricism.<sup>5</sup> The image of a war between conflicting philosophical schools still appeals to our imagination today, but for Kant it must have been particularly natural. The 18<sup>th</sup> century was indeed an age of perpetual warfare, and 18<sup>th</sup> century philosophy was an arena of constant rivalry between philosophical currents.

(1784), *Of the radical evil in human nature* (1792), *On the Common Saying: That may be correct, but it is of no use in practice* (1793), *The end of all things* (1794).

<sup>4</sup> Although this essay was not published in a journal, Kant continues in it the same thematic focus that he had previously presented in the pages of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. The essay generated a great deal of interest, and almost immediately a translation into French was produced, and shortly afterwards, also into Polish.

<sup>5</sup> Kant, I., 1781/1787/1998. *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and edited by Allen W. Wood, Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 99–101 [A VIII–XII]. For an exploration of the conflict between empiricism and rationalism in ethics from a contemporary pragmatist point of view, see: Švihura, L., 2021. Postmoderná morálka a Kantova etika [Postmodern Morality and Kant's Ethics]. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 10(2), pp. 21–41.

Kant addresses this philosophical rivalry in a special way; he favours neither side but subjects the dispute itself to a procedure of judgement, typical of liberal democracy. Thus, Kant makes it clear that a dispute should not be resolved by force, but on the contrary by law and its public application, i.e. by judicial process. This is precisely what the title word ‘critique’ implies. Kant’s main work, *Critique of Pure Reason*, carries out a formal judicial process over metaphysics.<sup>6</sup> Thereby, Kant provides an exemplary answer, not only to the question regarding the way in which a theoretical dispute in philosophy can be resolved, but also – indirectly – how liberation from the spiral of violence can be achieved in the real world. The solution that Kant offers as an answer to the conflicts between scholars, and which was labelled “perpetual peace in philosophy,”<sup>7</sup> became a universal antidote to war in any form.

Two conclusions may be drawn from this. First, Kant believes that the achievement of durable peace is attainable. Secondly, that the achievement of durable peace in any field can only be achieved by peaceful methods. Hence, Kant not only sides with legal and judicial procedures, but also formulates a secular response to the long tradition of the religious way of understanding ‘perpetual peace’ merely as a supernatural gift of grace.

Already the first sentences of the essay *Toward Perpetual Peace* reveal Kant’s polemical intention. The text begins with irony. Apparently, a Dutch innkeeper, the owner of the inn “Towards Perpetual Peace,” was said to have painted a cemetery on his signboard. The ingenious innkeeper thus made known what he thought of the efforts of politicians, rulers, and, above all, the military, who keep promising peace and can never permanently secure it. The radical understanding of peace as the result of total war, after which all life disappears, is one that we must completely reject as a blind alley that cannot be pursued. Kant also rejects such a way of resolving conflicts, exposing himself to accusations of utopian pacifism. These accusations need to be confronted, especially today, in the face of a new war in Europe, and raise questions about the effectiveness of the institutions that are tasked with guarding world peace. This thread will be revisited at the end of the text.

To emphasize again: true peace, according to Kant, is not the peace of

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 622–623 [A 703]; Höffe, O., 2022. Der wahre Weltbürger: zur philosophischen und politischen Aktualität Kants. In: Gerhard, V., Weber, M., Schepelmann, M., eds. *Immanuel Kant 1724–2024. Ein europäischer Denker*. Oldenburg: De Gruyter, p. 108.

<sup>7</sup> Kant, I., 1796/2009. Proclamation of the imminent conclusion of a treaty of perpetual peace in philosophy (1796), trans. and edited by Peter Heath, in: I. Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

the burial ground, but the peace resulting from law.<sup>8</sup> Kant's proposal in 1795 was the radical opposite of what the reality of the late 18<sup>th</sup> century offered. Most European states, including Prussia, Kant's homeland, were autocracies embroiled in endless wars. During this time, some nations were fighting wars of independence, like the United States of America; others were struggling to change their political system, like France; and still others were losing their sovereignty completely through annexation, like Poland. Most European states pursued an imperial policy, reaping immoral benefits from colonies and conquests. Meanwhile, Immanuel Kant, a loyal subject of the King of Prussia, urges the universal introduction of a republican system. With nearly all European states engaged in war, Kant calls for a perpetual peace. In the face of ever-expanding European imperialism, Kant explicitly condemns colonialism.<sup>9</sup> Given all this, Kant's philosophical project must be either utopian or visionary.

### The key tenets of the perpetual peace project

The direct reason that prompted Kant to publish the essay *Toward Perpetual Peace* was the conclusion of the peace treaty between France and Prussia in Basel on 5 April 1795. This treaty was of symbolic importance, because in it the monarchy acknowledged for the first time the right of the new republic to exist.<sup>10</sup> Kant not only speaks on the actual events of the French Revolution, but also refers to the diplomatic practices that permeated the entire political life of Europe at the time. If, therefore, one was looking in *Toward Perpetual Peace* merely for Kant's commentary on the Peace of Basel, one would be disappointed, as instead of a position on current political events, Kant formulated a strictly philosophical proposal. In other words, Kant saw the Peace of Basel as an opportunity to utter what he thought it would be if reason (rather than simply politicians) was in charge. Any reader of the essay *Toward Perpetual Peace* could, on their own account, compare reality with the ideal Kant presented. At the cost of historical actuality, Kant's treatise gained a timeless, universal value.

Kant's essay, in its formal layers, retains the semblance of a genuine treaty, as it contains preliminary and definitive articles, supplements, appendices, and even one secret article. However, ultimately the text is

<sup>8</sup> Kleingeld, P., 2022. Kant über Freiheit und Frieden. In: Gerhard, V., Weber, M., Schepelmann, M., eds. *Immanuel Kant 1724–2024. Ein europäischer Denker*. Oldenburg: De Gruyter, p. 117.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Lefebvre, G., 1964. *The French Revolution*, vol. II: *From 1793 to 1799*, trans. J. H. Stewart and J. Fruglietti. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 153.

not a proposal for a solution to any particular political problem, nor is it a polemic against any particular political stance. Rather, Kant's essay is a travesty of political practice and an ironic exposure of its dark side. On the one hand, Kant presents with seriousness the rational conditions for a permanent peace between states; on the other hand, he exposes to ridicule the game of appearances played by politicians. It could be said that *Toward Perpetual Peace* is a manifesto in which Kant enunciates a series of principles, almost all of which are the opposite of those proclaimed by the treaty concluded in Basel.

One may say that Kant proposes a *sub specie aeternitatis* perspective. The peace he contemplates is not a temporary one but is an eternal peace. On the grounds of Kant's philosophy, this means that *Toward Perpetual Peace* discusses the necessary conditions whose fulfilment will make it possible for war as such to be altogether eliminated. 'Perpetual peace' is not just a rhetorical phrase with which we decorate the ceremonial end of this or that war but is the idea of the definitive end of war in general. In other words, Kant lays out the rational conditions that are necessary for perpetual peace to be truly realised. He calls these conditions preliminary articles:

1. "No treaty of peace shall be held to be such if it is made with a secret reservation of material for a future war."
2. "No independently existing state (whether small or large) shall be acquired by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation."
3. "Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall in time be abolished altogether."
4. "No national debt shall be contracted with regard to the external affairs of a state."
5. "No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state."
6. "No state at war with another shall allow itself such acts of hostility as would have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peace; acts of this kind are employing *assassins* (*percussores*) or *poisoners* (*venefici*), *breach of surrender*, *incitement to treason* (*perduellio*) within the enemy state, and so forth."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Kant, I., 1795/1999. *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795). In: I. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. M. J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 317–320 [8: 343–347].

All preliminary articles take the form of negation or restriction. They prohibit something in the relationship between states or eliminate something in the sphere of facts. Kant's intention is to create conditions in which peace ceases to be only a temporary *interbellum*. This can only be achieved by eliminating all motives for beginning a war in the future. It must be done in the sphere of law and in the sphere of facts. In the sphere of law, the first step is to formulate a treaty in such a manner as to leave war out of consideration at all as a possible future solution. In short, thinking of war as a possible option must be abandoned. The second step is to stop the practice of treating any state and its citizens merely as objects. The catalogue of unacceptable practices is long: the succession of states typical of former monarchies, all colonial policy, but also the annexation of territories, or even selling them or exchanging them for others, if this is done with complete disregard for the will of the inhabitants. Examples of many of these practices are provided by the events of recent years and for that matter of recent months. Another condition, the abolition of standing armies, is not just an expression of Kant's naive anti-militarism. Maintaining a standing army not only implies enormous expenditure that deprives us of resources for other purposes. It is known from history that this situation always leads to an endless arms race. Besides, a standing army means consenting to an extreme form of purely instrumental treatment of human beings. Kant sees this as a grave violation of the law of nature. At the same time, Kant is not a utopian and realistically accepts the temporary existence of what can be called a voluntary civil service to which people voluntarily mobilise in defence of the fatherland. The fourth condition concerns the loans taken out for armaments. Just as in Kant's time, this practice today drags poor countries into a spiral of debt, prevents their development, and, as a consequence, deprives them of their sovereignty. This article hardly requires any comment. Article five is equally unequivocal. No state may, under any circumstances, intervene by force in the internal affairs of another state. The allusion embedded in this article was clear to the people of the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. The Poles, for instance, may have believed that Kant was referring directly to the policy of Prussia, Russia, and Austria, which, exploiting Poland's political and military vulnerability, partitioned its territory and, in 1795, led to the complete erasure from the map of Europe of one of its largest states.<sup>12</sup> Regrettable examples of such

<sup>12</sup> *Toward Perpetual Peace* was the first treatise by Kant translated into Polish. As early as 1797, a Polish translation of this treatise was published in Warsaw, based on the French version published in Königsberg in 1796. According to historical sources, even before 1802, the same



practices continue to occur and are still justified by deceitful excuses similar to those used by the propaganda of Prussia and Russia at the time. The last preliminary condition describes in quite some detail the unacceptable behaviour to be eliminated from political practice and from social life in general. The examples listed by Kant (employing assassins or poisoners, breach of surrender, incitement to treason) certainly do not exhaust all the forbidden practices that impede the restoration of trust. Many of these behaviours are currently prohibited by various international conventions. Certainly, the catalogue of behaviours that we do not accept even in war-time is longer than that of Kant. It is not a matter of detail, but of principle: even during conflict, it is not permissible to go too far. 'Too far' means any such act that makes it impossible to rebuild future relations and renders hope for peace in the future impossible. Unfortunately, the modern world has greatly expanded our awareness of what can indeed be an obstacle to mutual trust between states. Kant does not preach naive fair play, as if borrowed directly from medieval romances of chivalry. The matter is serious and requires the realisation that human beings simply cannot go as far as engaging in certain behaviours.

In the second part, Kant outlines the conditions that make it possible to maintain the peace that has been achieved and indeed cause it to transform into perpetual peace. The three definitive conditions are as follows:

1. "The civil constitution in every state shall be republican."<sup>13</sup>
2. "The right of nations shall be based on a *federalism* of free states."<sup>14</sup>
3. "Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal *hospitality*."<sup>15</sup>

Kant believes that the most important guarantee for maintaining peace lies in the internal political system of states. It is also clear for us that certain types of political system can be an effective obstacle to starting a war (e.g. a liberal democracy), while others can facilitate the decision to commence a war (e.g. an authoritarian or totalitarian system). In Kant's view, the republican system offers the greatest guarantee of peace. This observation is extremely pertinent. Kant was probably one of the first philosophers to link the question of the internal system of states with the

treatise by Kant was translated from German into Polish and published in Königsberg by one of the then students of the University of Königsberg, Józef Władysław Bychowiec (1778–1845).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 322 [8: 349].

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 325 [8: 354].

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 328 [8: 357].

international order and to point out serious arguments in favour of the strong interdependence of the two orders.

What Kant writes about the republican system requires some clarification. First and foremost, the expression 'republican system' in contemporary usage can be misleading. Kant does not have in mind a form of government, but a manner of governance. For Kant, a monarchy can also be a 'republic' as long as the citizens themselves, through their representatives in the legislature, make laws independently of the executive. In short, a republican system is one in which the three powers (legislative, executive, and judicial) are separated, the freedom of the citizens is guaranteed, and the equality of all before the law is ensured. Kant did not believe that democracy could guarantee the same. Like many other philosophers before him, Kant regarded democracy as a form of despotism. This may seem shocking, but it is true of direct democracy, in which the will of the majority becomes law. Thus, we cannot instantly dispute what Kant has to say about this, as in the general sense one might be in agreement with him. Of course, today's democracy is different from what Kant had in mind when he wrote about it. On the other hand, certainly what Kant wrote about the republican system is in many respects in line with what is understood by liberal democracy today.

The second definitive article introduces the condition underpinning international relations. Kant does not postulate the establishment of some worldwide superstate whose structure would completely reproduce the structure of states as we know them today. Just as in relations between human beings, relations between states must accommodate freedom and refrain from violating it. That is why, in addressing the sovereignty of states, Kant proclaims the need for a federation of free states. This is one of the best elaborated and most commented upon points of Kant's philosophical project. Today, there is no doubt that this idea found its realisation in the League of Nations in 1920 and continues to be emulated in all international institutions that provide a legal framework for free cooperation between autonomous states. Of course, one can always complain about the inadequacies of current legislation or point out the weaknesses of international organizations with examples of their ineffectiveness during conflicts. However, the benefits of international organizations cannot be overlooked, while hoping that, in the future, the validity of the best practices can be extended and their effectiveness enhanced.

The final, third definitive article concerns the so-called law of hospitality and constitutes further development of the idea of cosmopolitanism.

Kant warns us, however, not to understand hospitality naively, as philanthropy devoid of an instinct for self-preservation. Like all things, hospitality too must have a certain framework. The context in which Kant's essay was written makes the restrictions on the rights of the newcomer apply completely differently as compared to contemporary times. Kant, in fact, cites European colonialism as an example of a violation of the law of hospitality and appreciates with understanding the cautious policies of Japan or China, which consistently restricted foreigners' access to their territory. Today, the law of hospitality is viewed almost entirely from the perspective of mass economic migration. In response to this problem, we are seeking solutions to avoid paradoxes that we could not foresee years ago when the international regulations in force today were introduced.

### **Nature knows better, or guarantees of perpetual peace**

Compared to political practice, the Kantian project of perpetual peace offers radical demands of revolutionary significance. They were difficult to implement at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and are no less demanding today as well. Kant uncompromisingly prohibits war, except for necessary self-defence;<sup>16</sup> he recommends the universalisation of the republican system (in essence, the prototype of modern liberal democracy); he encourages global cooperation and the federalisation of free states, but one that is limited by respect for the specificity of national communities and does not seek to create a monolithic superstate. In addition, Kant demands adherence to the principles of universally applicable law, and the enabling of free and public discussion; he demands openness in public life and in international relations and expects scrutiny of every legal regulation with respect to its intrinsic fairness. The list of conditions is long and demanding. The bar has been set high, but the goal is also more ambitious than before.

Kant, however, was not naive. He was familiar with all the major political and legal theories developed by Western philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Kant interlinked the various conceptions of peace and divorced them from theological elements. In particular, he rejected purely religious apocalyptic thinking and laid the

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 318–319 [8: 345]. Steven Pinker believes that we owe one of the most important changes in our thinking about war to the Enlightenment: war is simply illegal (Pinker, S., 2018. *Enlightenment now*. New York: Viking, p. 163).

foundations for philosophical chiliasm.<sup>17</sup> When Kant speaks of ‘perpetual peace,’ he has in mind neither the Christian promise of a transcendent paradise, nor a temporary truce that ends any particular war. Kant is considering the rational conditions that make possible the end of ‘war’ in general. Whatever is to be created between states is not meant as a provisional covenant: “so there must be a league of a special kind, which can be called a *pacific league* (*foedus pacificum*), and what would distinguish it from a peace pact (*pactum pacis*) is that the latter seeks to end only one war whereas the former seeks to end all war forever.”<sup>18</sup> One might say that Kant considers the philosophical conditions of the possibility of peace philosophically. His conception is transcendental rather than empirical. ‘Perpetual peace’ is an eschatological project.

The impermanence of all previous treaties that promised ‘perpetual’ peace must have given rise to the suspicion that in Kant’s philosophical project an idea detached from reality can be found, in short, a utopia. With such an attitude, one might wrongly assume that the expectation of the realisation of everlasting peace is an illusion in which only devotees of divine providence are inclined to believe. Kant does not share this theological pessimism, although, like theologians, he believes that the guarantor of ‘perpetual peace’ cannot be any human being. The answer given in *Toward Perpetual Peace* is different. Kant writes explicitly: “What affords this *guarantee* (surety) is nothing less than the great artist nature (*natura daedala rerum*) from whose mechanical course purposiveness shines forth visibly, letting concord arise by means of the discord between human beings even against their will.”<sup>19</sup> How are we to understand this? Quite simply: there exist such natural conditions of human life that cause people to constantly be forced to confront each other (examples include

<sup>17</sup> “And if we are not satisfied yet, we need but consider a state wondrously compounded from both the others, namely that of a people in its external relations, where civilized peoples stand vis-à-vis one another in the relation of raw nature (the state of constant war) and have also firmly taken it into their heads not to get out of it, and we shall become aware of fundamental principles in the great societies we call *states* directly in contradiction to official policy yet never abandoned, principles which no philosopher has yet been able to bring into agreement with morality or else (what is terrible) suggest [how to replace with] better ones, reconcilable with human nature: So *philosophical chiliasm*, which hopes for a state of perpetual peace based on a federation of nations united in a world-republic, is universally derided as sheer fantasy as much as *theological chiliasm*, which awaits for the completed moral improvement of the human race” (Kant, I., 1793/1996. *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, trans. G. Di Giovanni. In: Wood, A. W., Di Giovanni, G., eds. *I. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 81 [6: 34]).

<sup>18</sup> Kant, I., 1795/1999. *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795), p. 327 [8: 356].

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331 [8: 360].

limited resources and even the sphericity of the globe<sup>20</sup>). In turn, in order to minimise the distressing effects of rivalry, they must make an effort to impose legal limits on their activity. In brief, people are forced to cooperate with one another.

By this means, Kant brilliantly incorporates into his theory what many authors have hitherto regarded as obstacles to the realisation of the idea of peace. This is pointed out by Norman Davies, who argues that Kant:

[L]ike his contemporary, [a great historian Edward – T.K.] Gibbon, [...] was impressed by the ‘tissue of folly,’ the ‘puerile vanity,’ and the ‘thirst for destruction’ which filled the historical record. At the same time, he strove to find sense amidst the chaos. He found it in the idea that conflict was a teacher which would extend rationality from a few noble individuals to the conduct of all mankind.<sup>21</sup>

In his most famous historiosophical treatise, titled *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim*, published a decade before the essay *Toward Perpetual Peace*, Kant wrote: “The human being wills concord; but nature knows better what is good for his species: it wills discord. He wills to live comfortably and contentedly; but nature wills that out of sloth and inactive contentment he should throw himself into labour and toils, so as, on the contrary, prudently to find out the means to pull himself again out of the latter.”<sup>22</sup>

It seems that war, as the most extreme form of antagonism of which man is capable, paradoxically has the potential to bring out those qualities of human character that have become corrupted by an overly comfortable lifestyle. In his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), Kant wrote something that may leave us stunned: “Even war, if it is conducted with order and reverence for the rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and at the same time makes the mentality of the people who conduct it in this way all the more sublime, the more dangers it has been exposed to and before which it has been able to assert its courage; whereas a long peace causes the spirit of mere commerce to predominate, along with base selfishness, cowardice, and weakness, and usually debases the mentality

<sup>20</sup> Kant, I., 1797/1999. *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). In: I. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. M. J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 489 [6: 352–353].

<sup>21</sup> Davies, N., 1996. *Europe: A History*. New York: Harper Perennial, p. 686.

<sup>22</sup> Kant, I., 1784/2007. *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784), translated by Allen W. Wood. In: Louden, R., Zöller, G., eds. I. Kant, *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 112 [8:11].

of the populace.”<sup>23</sup> There is no doubt that Kant commends here only a defensive war in which a nation at risk of annihilation sees its only chance of preserving its identity. Contemporary events in Ukraine bring to our mind an example of a war that Kant would consider justifiable. Nor can it be doubted that in the heat of this war the idea of a free nation, whose identity was still contested until very recently, is being forged.<sup>24</sup> If we look at Kant's ‘praise of war’ from this perspective, it becomes clear that it cannot be seen as an obstacle to the idea of perpetual peace.

However, it is difficult not to detect a certain ambiguity here, which is easily exploited by sceptics doubting the feasibility of eliminating war from human life. Norman Davies, mentioned earlier, on another occasion quotes a statement by the Prussian general and Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke, illustrating such scepticism: “Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream. War is part of God's order. Without war, the world would stagnate and lose itself in materialism. In it, Man's most noble virtues are displayed—courage and self-denial, devotion to duty, willingness to sacrifice oneself, and to risk life itself.”<sup>25</sup> Kant would have agreed with this view, but on one condition, namely that we reject the thesis that war is part of God's order. The viewing the history of mankind as one of war does not have to be accepted, nor does it have to be considered that war cannot be eliminated simply because it has not been thus far. Of course, war is part of the natural world, and in a variety of ways. An example of this naturalistic justification of war can be found in Charles Darwin's natural selection, which was termed the struggle for existence by Thomas Malthus (1763–1834). However, I think Kant's position is that nature has placed much higher demands on man, as a rational being, than it has imposed on animals. The assumption that all social human life is to be reduced to a struggle for existence is a spurious simplification that calls into question the difference between nature and culture.

Without denying the obvious, it must be acknowledged that man has

<sup>23</sup> Kant, I., 1790/2002. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. P. Guyer, E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 146 [5: 263]. If we are anxious to soften the sense of this statement, we may draw our attention to the publication dates of Kant's writings. Evidently Kant's view of war evolved (Kleingeld, P., 2022. Kant über Freiheit und Frieden, pp. 118–119).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Timothy Snyder's lectures titled “The Making of Modern Ukraine” available on YouTube. Snyder, in one of his first columns following Russia's aggression against Ukraine, cited some of the arguments used by Russian propaganda (Snyder, T., 2022. We Should Say It. Russia Is Fascist. *The New York Times*. [cited on 2022-05-18]. Available online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/opinion/russia-fascism-ukraine-putin.html>).

<sup>25</sup> Moltke, H. von, 1892. *Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten*. Mittler und Sohn: Berlin, p. 194, cited after N. Davies.

the potential to subject the life of his species to such regulations as transcend purely instinctive animal behaviour. As a rational being, man can be guided by law as the sole motive for his conduct. Of course, Kant certainly believed that humans are compelled to compete with one another. It is equally obvious that rivalry has advantages that can hardly be overestimated. Kant listed many of them.<sup>26</sup> However, this by no means indicates that it must be accepted that rivalry is to take the form of war as the most extreme struggle for existence. The misconception that rivalry and war are only quantitatively different must also be abandoned. War is not rivalry, but its absolute negation. Rather, rivalry is a form of cooperation and one of the main drivers of prosperity and development. It is easy to see that Kant's view of human nature is more complex than many one-sided notions and perhaps understands antagonism between human beings in a more nuanced fashion.<sup>27</sup>

According to Kant, society is not just any association of individuals, as the idea of a social contract seems to imply. Such an interpretation of social contract would be a complete distortion of its meaning. Instead, society is a work of nature through which the natural predispositions of each individual are developed, while the social contract implies an implicit agreement on the rules of social coexistence: "One can regard the history of the human species in the large as the completion of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an inwardly and, to this end, also an externally perfect state constitution, as the only condition in which it can fully develop all its predispositions in humanity."<sup>28</sup> Consequently, society is not merely a safeguard against violence and suffering (Hobbes), nor is it only the source of new sufferings that nature has not known (Rousseau). Rather, society is a means for the collective attainment of goals that man cannot achieve alone.<sup>29</sup> Hence, Kant does not describe the state as a security with which man fences himself off from nature, but as an opportunity for the development of hidden human potential. Taking all this into account, one must conclude that perpetual peace is not an alternative to war. Perpetual

<sup>26</sup> Whatever positive things Kant wrote about war in *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is nothing compared to the romantic militarism of authors such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Emil Zola and John Ruskin.

<sup>27</sup> "I understand by 'antagonism' the *unsociable sociability* of human beings, i.e. their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society" (Kant, I., 1784/2007. *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784), p. 111 [8: 20]).

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116 [8: 27].

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113 [8: 22].

peace is an idea whose realisation is a true affirmation of the unique potential that is contained in humanity.

### **This is not a utopia. Conclusion**

The essay *Toward Perpetual Peace* was not the only text in which Kant spoke on perpetual peace, but it was certainly Kant's most important voice in defence of this idea. In this essay, Kant proposed a thoughtful conception of a global legal order that remains inspiring today and provides philosophical arguments for any project of an international order, but one that is devoid of the shortcomings of globalisation.

Can it be hoped that a plan such as that outlined by Kant will be realised? Above all, one must reject the erroneous accusations of utopianism and pacifism with which attempts are sometimes made to question the relevance of Kant's project. Pacifism disregards systemic issues in its aspirations and does not reckon with social realities. This cannot be said of Kant's project. Kant sets out a series of concrete systemic and political solutions, which he sees as milestones in the pursuit of perpetual peace. His project is not utopian, but normative. However, yet no one considers every norm to be utopian simply because it requires the existence of something that does not currently exist.

Now that the main ideas of *Toward Perpetual Peace* are more familiar, one can wonder whether Kant's text is merely a collection of wishes detached from reality. It seems that in order to answer this question, new facts must be taken into account, especially the new war in Europe that Russia is waging against an independent Ukraine. These doubts can easily be challenged. First of all, the preliminary articles, which Kant regards as the necessary conditions for perpetual peace, have not been fulfilled so far. Kant would be wrong if wars were to break out under the conditions he describes as conditions for perpetual peace. Thus, we can still believe that once the preliminary conditions are fulfilled war will not break out. It can still be seen that history has not taught avoidance of making old mistakes.

From the point of view of reason, war is something illegal. War cannot be justified by any arguments. Of course, the force of rational arguments cannot be contrasted with the physical force of armies and weapons, but one should weigh up various arguments with one another. The justification that the aggressor proffers to justify war contradicts what Kant propounds in defence of peace. Here is one such example. The Russian Federation openly demands the surrender of the territory of the state and



its inhabitants, invoking the right of the empire to exist within whatever borders it chooses from its own past.<sup>30</sup> It is already known all this and how it should be judged in the light of the second and fifth preliminary articles to perpetual peace.

Realists will surely ask: isn't it better to have an army and weapons? It seems that the war in Ukraine and the heroic defence with which the Ukrainians have astonished the world confirms the old principle, "if you want peace, prepare for war."<sup>31</sup> It should be remembered, however, that this is a maxim of the age to which Kant counterposes his project. Kant would probably argue that the establishment of a republican system, along with other preliminary conditions, would create a reality that would not lead to war. Kant would therefore rather say: "if you want peace, ensure justice."<sup>32</sup> The only thing that keeps deferring the project of perpetual peace is the fact that the preliminary conditions are not universally realised. Of course, Kant, when writing his treatise, gave no date for the realisation of this project. All the more so, it cannot naively be stated that we have waited long enough for its realisation and, since it has not yet happened, it will probably never happen. Such an approach would compromise us as overly impatient students of Kant. It must not be concluded from the fact that we still have not yet realised the conditions of perpetual peace that they are not attainable at all.

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<sup>30</sup> Steven Pinker aptly observed that Russia's 2014 aggression against Ukraine could not challenge the optimistic ideology of the Enlightenment because it was essentially motivated by the anti-Enlightenment ideology of Russian nationalism (Pinker, S., 2018. *Enlightenment now*, p. 164).

<sup>31</sup> "Si vis pacem, para bellum." Sentence by Publius Flavius Vegetius, a Roman historian and military theorist from the 4th century AD.

<sup>32</sup> "Si vis pacem, para justitiam" (Höffe, O., 2022. Der wahre Weltbürger: zur philosophischen und politischen Aktualität Kants", p. 114).

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## Working for Peace in Situations of Conflict: On Schmitt's Reception of Kant

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**Abstract:** The concept of the political enemy represents a cornerstone of Carl Schmitt's political philosophy. When developing this concept, Schmitt draws inspiration from Immanuel Kant's theory of perpetual peace. While appreciating a number of elements of the theory, Schmitt resolutely rejects the notion of the unjust enemy introduced by Kant. Schmitt's ambivalent reception of Kant sets the stage for his own deliberations on the relationship between enemies and ways of dealing with conflicts. A basic distinction underlying Schmitt's political theory is that between political and private enemy. In continuation of Kant, Schmitt elaborates political ways of limiting political enmity. The present paper proposes a path complementary to Schmitt and Kant identifying existential elements that can be used to limit political enmity. The paper's overall aim is to show how peace can be promoted in situations of conflict – in both political and existential ways.

**Key words:** Schmitt, Kant, political philosophy, enmity, conflict, peace

**Abstrakt:** Pojem politického nepriateľa predstavuje základný kameň politickej filozofie Carla Schmitta. Pri rozvoji tohto pojmu sa Schmitt inšpiruje teóriou večného mieru Immanuela Kanta. Hoci viaceré prvky tejto teórie oceňuje, rozhodne odmieta pojem nespravodlivého nepriateľa, ktorý zaviedol Kant. Schmittova ambivalentná recepcia Kanta je východiskom pre jeho vlastné úvahy o vzťahu nepriateľov a spôsobe riešenia konfliktov. Ústredným rozlíšením Schmittovej politickej filozofie je rozlíšenie politického a súkromného nepriateľa. V nadväznosti na Kanta Schmitt rozpracoval politické spôsoby obmedzenia politického nepriateľstva. Môj návrh, ktorý je komplementárny k Schmittovmu a Kantovmu návrhu, sa zameriava na existenciálne prvky využiteľné na obmedzenie politického nepriateľstva. Mojm cel-

kovým cieľom je poukázať na to, ako môžeme podporovať mier v konfliktnej situácii – politickými i existenciálnymi spôsobmi.

**Kľúčové slová:** Schmitt, Kant, politická filozofia, nepriateľstvo, konflikt, mier

The concept of the political enemy represents a cornerstone of Carl Schmitt's political philosophy. When developing this concept, Schmitt draws inspiration from Immanuel Kant's theory of perpetual peace in *The Metaphysics of Morals*. While appreciating a number of elements of the theory, Schmitt resolutely rejects the notion of the unjust enemy introduced by Kant. Schmitt's ambivalent reception of Kant sets the stage for his own deliberations on the relationship between enemies and ways of dealing with conflicts. A basic distinction underlying Schmitt's political theory is that between political and private enemy. In continuation of Kant, Schmitt proposes political ways of limiting political enmity. At the same time, he suggests that existential ways of limiting private enmity cannot be used productively in the political sphere. The present paper pursues a path complementary to Schmitt and Kant identifying existential elements that can be used to limit political enmity. The overall analysis aims to show how peace can be promoted in situations of conflict – in both political and existential ways.

## **1. Schmitt's Basic Distinctions: Friend-Enemy and Political-Private Enemy**

In *The Concept of the Political* (1932), Schmitt introduced a series of distinctions that represent key points of orientation in his political theory. The most basic distinctions are those between friend and enemy on the one hand, and between political and private enemy on the other.

Schmitt presents the distinction between friend and enemy as the foundational criterion of the entire political sphere. It is comparable to the distinctions between good and evil in the sphere of morality and between beautiful and ugly in the sphere of aesthetics. All these distinctions are ultimate and constitutive for their respective sphere – they cannot be reduced to any other distinctions.<sup>1</sup> The friend-enemy

<sup>1</sup> Schmitt, C., 1996. *The Concept of the Political*, trans. by G. Schwab. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 25–27. In this article, I am developing ideas that I originally presented in Šajda, P., 2021. Nepriateľ ako radikálne „iný“: politické a existenciálne spôsoby

distinction applies to human collectives and the relationships between them. Friend is a collective with which our collective enters into a positive relationship, enemy is a collective with which our collective enters into a negative relationship and against which it defends itself: "The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation".<sup>2</sup> Initially, Schmitt presents the concepts of friend and enemy as equally important, but when he delves into the intricacies of political relationships the latter concept becomes dominant.<sup>3</sup>

Schmitt depicts the enemy as the epitome of radical difference. The enemy's political mode of being differs from our own to such an extent that it potentially represents a threat. The fact that our way of life is threatened by another way of life can lead to a political conflict in which the enemy's fundamental otherness comes into full view. Schmitt rejects attempts to replace the concept of the enemy with a 'softer' concept. He points to paradigms that have "attempted to transform the enemy from the viewpoint of economics into a *competitor* and from the intellectual point into a *debating adversary*".<sup>4</sup> These concepts insufficiently reflect the radical difference of the enemy as well as the seriousness of the threat he poses. They do not take into account the possibility of a drastic negation of our own way of life, and therefore inadequately express the intensity of the political conflict.

Schmitt also highlights the difference between *the political enemy*

obmedzenia nepriateľstva. In: Gáliková Tolnaiová, S., Marchevský, O., Kyslan, P., eds. *Myslieť inak – iné v myslení*. Bratislava: Slovenské filozofické združenie pri SAV, pp. 189–196. See also two other thematically related texts of mine: Šajda, P., 2019. A Political Challenge to Christian Practical Rationality. In: Schreiber, G., ed. *Interesse am Anderen. Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Religion und Rationalität*. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 745–762; Šajda, P., 2019. Obmedzenie nepriateľstva ako výchova k ľudskosti. Carl Schmitt a Ernst Jünger. *Filozofia*, 74(10), pp. 852–865. My aim is to make use of those elements of Schmitt's political theory that have stood the test of time and can be considered *constructive*. For an in-depth analysis of the problematic elements of Schmitt's political thought, see Slováček, P., 2016. *Odvrátená strana evropského politického myšlení*. Carl Schmitt. Opava: Slezská univerzita v Opavě; Slomp, G., 2009. *Carl Schmitt and the Politics of Hostility, Violence and Terror*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>2</sup> Schmitt, C., 1996. *The Concept of the Political*, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> A substantially different view of the concepts of friend and enemy is offered by Jacques Derrida. Cf. Derrida, J., 1994. *Politiques de l'amitié*. Paris: Editions Galilée. The dominance of the concept of enemy in Schmitt was also highlighted by Heinrich Meier. Cf. Meier, H., 2011. *The Lesson of Carl Schmitt. Four Chapters on the Distinction between Political Theology and Political Philosophy*, trans. by Marcus Brainard. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 52.

<sup>4</sup> Schmitt, C., 1996. *The Concept of the Political*, p. 28 (emphasis added). See also Vad, E., 1996. *Strategie und Sicherheitspolitik. Perspektiven im Werk von Carl Schmitt*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, p. 57.

and *the private enemy*.<sup>5</sup> Political antagonism between two collectives is characterized by a different dynamic than existential antagonism between two individuals. One's relation to the private enemy is marked by negative feelings, whose concentrated manifestation is hate. Christian ethics corrects this negative attitude with the commandment of *love thy neighbour* which can take the radical form of the love of one's enemy. Schmitt claims that the dynamics of love and hate are irrelevant for political decision-making. He warns especially against the transfer of the existential principle "love your enemies!"<sup>6</sup> to the political sphere. The application of the principle to the political enemy would be self-destructive and even contrary to the principle's original meaning. The Greek text of the Bible uses the term *ἐχθρός* which refers to a private adversary, not the term *πολέμιος* which refers to a political enemy. Although in German such a lexical distinction is not common and in both cases the term *Feind* is used, the meaning of the commandment must be preserved: "The Bible quotation [...] certainly does not mean that one should love and support the enemies of one's own people".<sup>7</sup> Thus, Schmitt insists on a strict separation of the existential and the political sphere, since the confusion of their respective principles would have tragic consequences.

## 2. Kant on the Equality of Political Enemies and the Notion of the Unjust Enemy

Kant developed his deliberations on political enmity in the context of his vision of perpetual peace. He launched this vision in *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795) and elaborated it further in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). In the conclusion of the latter work, he declares his unequivocal opposition to war as a means of solving disputes between political collectives: "Now, morally practical reason pronounces in us an irresistible *veto*: *There is to be no war*, neither war between you and me in the state of nature nor war between us as states [...] for war is not the way in which everyone should seek his rights".<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Schmitt, C., 1996. *The Concept of the Political*, pp. 28–30. The development of Schmitt's view of this difference was described by Ellen Kennedy. Cf. Kennedy, E. 2004. *Constitutional Failure. Carl Schmitt in Weimar*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> In the New Testament the commandment can be found in Mt 5:44 and Lk 6:27.

<sup>7</sup> Schmitt, C., 1996. *The Concept of the Political*, p. 29.

<sup>8</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 160.

While acknowledging that contemporary states view the waging of war as a natural part of their political existence and an inevitable component of international relations, Kant nonetheless proposes an ambitious project of overcoming this view and working together toward universal lasting peace. He insists that such peace is not merely one of the components of the Right of Nations, but its final end. Responding to critics, he admits that perpetual peace is an unachievable idea but argues that “the political principles directed toward perpetual peace [...] are not unachievable”.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the leaders of nations are called to work on a continual approximation to perpetual peace as a *terminus ad quem* and to take concrete steps in this direction. According to Kant, a key step in this joint endeavour is the establishment of a voluntary association of states – a congress of states – which would facilitate the solving of international problems in a peaceful way. The *state of nature* among nations – in which disputes are solved by force, as there is no legitimate judicial authority – would be replaced by a *lawful condition*, in which disputes would be dealt with “in a civil way, as if by a lawsuit”.<sup>10</sup> Just like the state represents a framework in which its citizens have overcome the state of nature and entered a rightful condition, the congress of states would represent a framework in which the states would abandon their original savagery and settle their conflicts in a civilized way. It was Kant's hope that this approach would prove appealing and the proposed congress of states would be joined by an ever increasing number of states.<sup>11</sup>

For the purposes of the present investigation, it is important to examine what Kant has to say about relationships between states in a situation of conflict when peaceful means of dealing with disputes have been discarded. Kant presents insightful analyses of these relationships both *during* and *after* war, when states face each other as enemies. He claims that the conduct of states in the critical times of conflict determines whether the ideal of perpetual peace remains relevant

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 156. At the end of *Toward Perpetual Peace* Kant states the following: “If it is a duty to realize a condition of public right, and if there is well-founded hope that this can be attained, even if only in the form of an endlessly progressing approximation of it, then the perpetual peace [...] is not an empty idea, but rather a task which, carried out gradually, steadily moves toward its goal”. Cf. Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, trans. by D. L. Colclasure. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 109.

<sup>10</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 157.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 156–157. See also Kant's earlier reflections on the federalism of free states in Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, pp. 78–81.



or becomes ever more distant. While it may seem self-contradictory to speak of law in a situation where law has been largely abrogated,<sup>12</sup> it is precisely in such times that the preservation of the vision of perpetual peace proves crucial. Kant insists that the warring parties should act “in accordance with principles that always leave open the possibility of leaving the state of nature among states [...] and entering a rightful condition”.<sup>13</sup> The parties in conflict should exercise self-restraint and the war should be conducted with a view to future peace. Actions that make the approach of peace impossible should be avoided.

A fundamental measure ensuring that war is waged in a disciplined way and the possibility of future peace remains open is the decision to view the enemy as one's equal. The principle of the equality of enemies is an antidote to such kinds of war whose very character is contrary to the ideal of perpetual peace. These are especially punitive wars, wars of subjugation, and wars of extermination, all of which presuppose inequality and hierarchization of enemies. Kant clarifies that “[n]o war of independent states against each other can be a *punitive war* (*bellum punitivum*). For punishment occurs only in the relation of a superior (*imperantis*) to those subject to him (*subditum*), and states do not stand in that relation to each other”.<sup>14</sup> This is a reiteration of the claim Kant already put forward in the Preliminary articles for perpetual peace among states in *Toward Perpetual Peace*: “A punitive war (*bellum punitivum*) between states is inconceivable (since there exists between them no relation of superior to subordinate). From this it follows that a war of extermination, in which both parties and, moreover, all right can be eradicated simultaneously, could bring about perpetual peace only over the great graveyard of humanity”.<sup>15</sup> Thus, even in the midst of conflict it is essential to bear in mind that the enemy is a state with which we should be able to live peacefully in the future.

Kant argues that the principle of the equality of enemies should also be observed after the war, when one side is victorious and the other vanquished. While the outcome of the war brings about obvious political inequality, the basic coordinates of one's approach to the

<sup>12</sup> Kant quotes the saying *inter arma silent leges*. Cf. Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 153. For more detail on Kant's differentiation between civil, international, and cosmopolitan law, see Zelizňáková, E., 2020. Súčasná kríza medzinárodného práva vo svetle Kantovej právnej filozofie. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 9(1), pp. 43–52.

<sup>13</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 153.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>15</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, p. 71.

enemy should not be altered. The victor sets the initial conditions for concluding peace but simultaneously must refrain from all actions that would imply that the enemy was waging an unjust war. This would in turn imply that the victor was waging a punitive war. Kant suggests, for example, that the victorious side should not request compensation for the costs of war or for the freeing of prisoners of war. However, above all, it must not impose measures that would degrade the status of the defeated collective as such. Transforming the vanquished state into a colony and imposing bondage on its people would be contrary to the notion of a peace treaty that necessarily involves amnesty.<sup>16</sup> The principle of the equality of enemies would be negated and the punitive measures would be in conflict with the ideal of perpetual peace.

While the principle of the equality of enemies – none of which is seen as waging an unjust war – represents a general rule, there is a single instance in which Kant speaks of an *unjust enemy*. This enemy is considered particularly dangerous, because he opposes the very core of the project of perpetual peace. The far-reaching consequences of the unjust enemy's stances need to be recognized and appropriate measures must be taken. Kant explains that this is “an enemy whose publicly expressed will (whether by word or deed) reveals a maxim by which, if it were made a universal rule, any condition of peace among nations would be impossible and, instead, a state of nature would be perpetuated”.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the enemy is not only dangerous in his own right but also sets a ‘bad example’ for other states. He contaminates international politics with impetuses that support continuous waging of war and are at odds with the objective of lasting peace. Kant warns that this is “a matter of concern to all nations whose freedom is threatened by it, they are called upon to unite against such misconduct in order to deprive the state of its power”.<sup>18</sup> The opposition to the unjust enemy must be resolute but the states united against such an enemy are bound to follow the principles directed toward perpetual peace. Kant permits the use of acceptable means to the highest degree, but prohibits the use of means that would cause injustice. While he approves of an enforced change to the inimical state's constitution – which would make it less prone to wage war – he disapproves of the division of the state's ter-

<sup>16</sup> Kant, I., 1991. *The Metaphysics of Morals*, pp. 154–155.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

ritory that would violate the rights of its citizens.<sup>19</sup> The ultimate goal should not be the punishment of the unjust enemy and its citizens but the neutralization of the state's policies that provoke international military conflicts.

### 3. Schmitt's Ambivalent Reception of Kant

In *The Nomos of the Earth* (1950), Schmitt discusses Kant's theory of political enmity and presents it as deeply ambiguous. On the one hand, Kant continues the line of classical European international law, which Schmitt appreciates, on the other hand, Kant introduces the notion of the unjust enemy which, according to Schmitt, can be easily misused by modern totalitarianisms.

1. Schmitt regards the principle of the equality of political enemies as the most valuable element of Kant's theory. He shows how this principle came to the fore in classical European international law and uncovers its roots in the works of Alberico Gentili (1552 – 1608) and Richard Zouch (c. 1590 – 1661). These thinkers laid the foundations of international law while emphasizing the equality of the different parties involved in international conflicts (*aequalitas hostium*).<sup>20</sup> The principle of the equality of enemies gained acceptance in legal and military practice especially after the Congress of Vienna (1814 – 1815).<sup>21</sup> It stipulates that the enemy is to be considered just throughout the conflict unless he violates the rules of conducting war. Schmitt considers this principle an efficient political way of limiting enmity, since it enables a clear distinction between *the enemy* and *the criminal*. It prevents political actors from viewing the enemy as an object of punishment, revenge, or degradation. A war in which both sides treat the enemy as just is *non-discriminatory*.<sup>22</sup> Seeing the enemy as our equal represents a barrier against his criminalization.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 155–156.

<sup>20</sup> Schmitt, C., 2006. *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. by G. L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press, p. 309.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Schmitt, C., 2006. *Theory of the Partisan. Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*, trans. by G. L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press, p. 9.

<sup>22</sup> Schmitt also speaks of a *just war on both sides* (*bellum utrumque justum*). Cf. Schmitt, C., 2006. *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, p. 153. For Schmitt's reflections on the non-discriminatory concept of war, see *ibid.*, pp. 122, 147, 153–154, 159, 165, 200, 246.

The opposite notion is that of the *perfidious enemy* (*perfidus hostis*)<sup>23</sup> which presupposes that only one side of the conflict is just and has the right to judge the other. The enemy is seen as condemnable and is criminalized even without violating the law of war. A war against such an enemy is *discriminatory* and has a punitive character.<sup>24</sup> In an extreme case, the negativization of the enemy is intensified to such a degree that he is not only denied the status of being just but also the status of being human. In such conditions absolute enmity is embraced and the enemy's life is radically devalued.

Kant subscribes to the tradition of regarding one's enemy as equal and just, and prohibits discriminatory kinds of war. Schmitt quotes Kant's condemnation of punitive war, war of subjugation and war of extermination as a clear example of his adherence to the vision proposed by classical European international law.<sup>25</sup>

2. Schmitt interprets Kant's introduction of the concept of the unjust enemy as a break with the philosophical and legal tradition initiated by Gentili and Zouch. He notes that Kant introduces the concept "in a highly surprising way".<sup>26</sup> He also points out that Kant defines the concept so vaguely that it can be easily appropriated by those who are searching for an instrument of discrimination.

When analyzing the concept, Schmitt first clarifies what it does *not* mean. Kant's deviation from the tradition of classical European international law is manifest in the fact that the concept of the unjust enemy does not refer to a state that violates the law of war: "Who is this unjust enemy? Certainly not the opponent who has broken the rules of war and has violated the right to war by perpetrating crimes and atrocities".<sup>27</sup> Kant's concept cannot also be understood as a revival of the theory of just war. Such war is, according to Schmitt, normally a cover for political effort to gain territory and Kant prohibits occupation of the territory of the vanquished unjust enemy.<sup>28</sup>

Determining the positive content of the concept is, however, difficult, as Kant provides only a few abstract characteristics. The unjust

<sup>23</sup> Schmitt, C., 2015. *Glossarium. Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1947 bis 1958*, ed. by G. Giesler and M. Tielke. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, p. 79.

<sup>24</sup> Schmitt comments on the discriminatory concept of war in *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, pp. 21, 124, 171, 321.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

enemy is a state which does not subscribe to the vision of an international congress of states that would help overcome the state of nature among nations. Schmitt believes that Kant does not provide reliable guidance for applying this characteristic in practice. For example, it is impossible to determine to which state or states the concept applies in Kant's own historical setting. Its vague definition means that *in concreto* the choice is a matter of guessing.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, Kant declares that the unjust enemy's "*verbally expressed will*" – when perceived as a threat by other states – can constitute a sufficient cause for preventive war.<sup>30</sup> This could, however, open the door to political overreaction and punitive military action. Schmitt's conclusion is that Kant provides a highly contentious concept, whose negative consequences he fails to anticipate: "If it is difficult for people to distinguish between a just enemy and a felon, how can they view an unjust enemy as anything other than the most grievous criminal?"<sup>31</sup>

Since Schmitt sees the concept of the just enemy as a crucial achievement of classical international law, he takes a clear stand against Kant's concept of the unjust enemy. He considers Kant's overall doctrine of political enmity self-contradictory, as it, on the one hand, rejects discriminatory types of war and, on the other hand, introduces the concept of the unjust enemy which contains an immense potential for discriminating against the opponent. In his political theory, Schmitt draws inspiration from the former component of Kant's doctrine while distancing himself from the latter.

#### **4. Inspiration by Kant: Schmitt's Political Means of Preventing Absolute Enmity**

Schmitt saw, as a key problem of his own time, the emergence of a new kind of enemy that had been created by totalitarian ideologies. As classical international law and its doctrine of respect for the ene-

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 171. Schmitt states that Kant is "content with his cautiously formulated generalities and general provisos. If freedom is threatened, then by whom, and who concretely will decide? All this remains open". Cf. *ibid.*, p. 170. In this context, Kant's philosophy of history becomes a relevant topic, which has been insightfully explored by Sandra Zákutná. She discusses, among other things, the dynamics of social and political *association* and *isolation*. Cf. Zákutná, S., 2019. Kant in the Context of 18<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy of History. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 8(2), pp. 35–44.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 169.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 171.

my lost their appeal during World War I, radical revolutionary movements began to shape the international political scene. Both on the left and the right extreme of the political spectrum ideologies came to prominence which promoted the notion of the *absolute enemy*.<sup>32</sup> The Communist and the National-Socialist movements claimed to identify an enemy that had to be annihilated under any circumstances. The *class enemy* or the *racial enemy* was presented as so radically different and 'toxic' that protective measures valid in political conflicts did not apply to him.<sup>33</sup>

Absolute enmity, as envisaged by totalitarian ideologies, represents the most intensive form of enmity, in which the enemy's otherness is maximized. Since we have nothing in common with him, he constitutes an extreme threat to our way of life. Not only does it make no sense to protect him, his elimination is even seen as a merit, because absolute conflict is the only path to victory. Absolute enmity is a radical negation of political self-restraint and has an exterminatory character.<sup>34</sup> To prepare political grounds for the elimination of the absolute enemy, dehumanizing rhetoric is employed: the enemy is described, for example, as *an inhuman monster* or *life unworthy of life*.<sup>35</sup> The exclusion of the enemy from the human sphere justifies total war against him.

Schmitt explains that the appeal of the concept of the absolute enemy has ultimately reached far beyond the boundaries of the Communist and the National-Socialist political camps. Although the concept originated in totalitarian ideologies, it has silently found its way into the camp of their non-totalitarian opponents. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the tendency to criminalize the political enemy increased and was supported by the technological progress in arms production. Weapons of mass destruction became ever more efficient and their destructive power did not allow for a differentiated approach to the enemy. The use of these absolutely destructive means would

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Schmitt, C., 2006. *Theory of the Partisan. Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*, pp. 52–53, 89.

<sup>33</sup> Schmitt, C., 2015. Vorwort. In: *Der Begriff des Politischen*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, p. 11.

<sup>34</sup> See William Hooker's statement: "Whatever the precise circumstances in which it is expressed, 'absolute' enmity is a symptom of the breakdown of political restraint". Cf. Hooker, W., 2009. *Carl Schmitt's International Thought. Order and Orientation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 170.

<sup>35</sup> Schmitt, C., 1996. *The Concept of the Political*, p. 36; Schmitt, C., 2015. Hinweise. In: *Der Begriff des Politischen*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, p. 114.

be inexcusable without an absolute enemy.<sup>36</sup> The power of the new weapons contributed to the concept of the absolute enemy being accepted even by those who had originally rejected it, but later found it necessary for the scenario of a large-scale conflict.

When searching for a political means to counter the notion of absolute enmity, Schmitt avails himself of the principle of the equality of enemies promoted by Kant. With reference to this principle, Schmitt highlights the fundamental distinction between the enemy and the criminal in contrast to the doctrine of absolute enmity which knows no distinctions. He rejects universal discrimination and degradation of the enemy and endorses the non-discriminatory approach which aims to safeguard the dignity and rights of the enemy. Schmitt's argumentation focuses on the fact that even in situations of conflict, when the enemies are deeply divided by political differences, they remain united by their human nature: "the enemy does not cease to be a human being".<sup>37</sup> Schmitt uses this motif to criticize the obscuring of the enemy's humanity in the doctrine of absolute enmity: we are supposed to see only an enemy, not a human being. Being conscious of our shared humanity remains a crucial preventive measure against the rise of absolute enmity.

Although Schmitt discusses the principle of the equality of enemies primarily in connection with the state of war, its application is meaningful at all stages of a political conflict. From the very beginning, the principle can rectify relations and contribute to the formation of the least oppressive approach to the enemy. Once the conflict has escalated, it can continuously serve as a political instrument of deescalation.

The political developments of the 20<sup>th</sup> century prompted Schmitt to look for a principle that would facilitate the systematic limitation of enmity. Due to the rise of absolute enmity, Schmitt sought to identify political means that would help defuse conflicts and prepare ground for peace initiatives. Similarly to Kant, Schmitt directed his attention to the interaction between political collectives. While rejecting the transfer of the existential principle "love your enemies!" to politics, he searched for a similar principle that would be appropriate to the political sphere. As will be shown below, despite Schmitt's insistence

<sup>36</sup> Schmitt, C., 2006. *Theory of the Partisan. Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*, pp. 93–94.

<sup>37</sup> Schmitt, C., 1996. *The Concept of the Political*, p. 54. See also *ibid.*, p. 36.

on the separation of the existential and the political sphere, he drew inspiration from the former when identifying the means for limiting political enmity.

## 5. The Unexplored Avenue: Existential Correction of Political Enmity

The present paper's contribution to the debate on political enmity developed by Kant and Schmitt consists in emphasizing the importance of existential means for deescalating conflicts and working for peace. First, those points in Schmitt's analyses will be highlighted where he crosses into the existential sphere, subsequently two existential ways of limiting political enmity will be proposed. The presented line of thought is complementary to those of Kant and Schmitt with the objective being the combination of political and existential approaches to limiting political enmity.

A closer examination of Schmitt's reflections on the premise *the enemy does not cease to be a human being* reveals that he takes into account both the collective political level and the individual existential level. Schmitt deals with existential dynamics due to their impact on the individual's stance vis-à-vis the political enemy. As it turns out, Schmitt is unable to uphold a clear separation of the political and the existential sphere in this context. This is particularly obvious when he explores the individual's psychological negativization of the political enemy: "Emotionally the enemy is easily treated as being evil and ugly, because every distinction, most of all the political, as the strongest and most intense of the distinctions and categorizations, draws upon other distinctions for support".<sup>38</sup> Thus, Schmitt devotes attention to existential processes which he originally linked solely to private enmity. It is, however, impossible to ignore them from the political perspective either, because the *cumulative* negativization of the enemy – which facilitates the development of absolute enmity – takes place at the existential level.

Schmitt acknowledges that the distinctions, which are clearly separated in his political theory, are utterly mixed in the individual's psychological reality. The political distinction of friend and enemy, as the most intense distinction, absorbs moral, aesthetic, and other distinctions. A broad spectrum of non-political negative attributes is ascribed to the enemy. The process of a cumulative negativization of the enemy occurs naturally, and if it is not corrected, it results in the enemy being vilified

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 27.



and criminalized. Political propaganda promptly appeals to this natural tendency present in the human soul.

Schmitt reacts to the cumulative negativization of the enemy only at the collective political level. He emphasizes the principle of the just enemy which should guide the interaction of the collectives that stand against each other. In a situation of conflict it represents the main guarantee of limiting the tendency to negativize the enemy: it protects him against blind discrimination and criminalization. Schmitt does not develop existential ways of countering the negativization, since this is beyond the scope of his collective-oriented explorations. He admits, however, that when reflecting on political enmity, a complete separation of the existential and the political sphere is not feasible. A crucial part of the cumulative negativization of the enemy occurs at the psychological level and the individual's existential choices are a key factor in this context. Thus, if the negativization is to be efficiently countered, existential instruments must be used, too.

At this point, it would be wise to present two existential ways of limiting political enmity which can create synergy with the political principle of the just enemy. The first one consists in the application of the existential principle "love your enemies!" to certain members of the inimical collective. It should be recalled that Schmitt rejected a universal application of the principle in politics, but was inspired by it when looking for its political analogue. I agree with Schmitt that a general application of the principle to the political enemy would be self-destructive. If we make use, however, of the distinctions provided by classical European international law, to which Schmitt appealed, we can identify individuals within the inimical collective to whom the principle of neighbor-love can be applied in a meaningful way. These include, for example, non-combatants, wounded combatants, and prisoners of war.

The second existential way of limiting political enmity does not solely concern the escalated stage of conflict which represents the main focus of Schmitt's considerations. It can be applied much earlier and thus prevent the conflict from escalating. Schmitt highlighted the fact that discrimination becomes the primary attitude once the enemy has been subject to cumulative negativization. This cumulative effect must be checked precisely at the existential level. A critical examination of our own prejudice and the elimination of non-political negative attributes ascribed to the enemy can contribute substantially to the deescalation of a conflict. If one refuses to accept narratives that turn the enemy into

a criminal, his relationship to the enemy will not become a hostage to the calls for the enemy's degradation or even extermination. On the contrary, a culture of self-restraint will prevail, thus enabling one to overcome his own prejudice and create a relation with the enemy that is as respectful as possible.

## 6. Conclusion

Schmitt's political theory emphasizes, on the one hand, the necessity of the category of the enemy and, on the other hand, it searches for means of limiting political enmity. Its point of departure is the distinction between friend and enemy, as well as between political and private enemy. In continuation with Kant and classical European international law, Schmitt proposes political means of limiting political enmity, most importantly the principle of the equality of enemies which safeguards the enemy's fundamental rights. He rejects theories – and kinds of war – which hierarchize enemies and ultimately lead to the discrimination and oppression of the opponent. At this point, Schmitt sees a contradiction in Kant's political theory: Kant prohibits discriminatory war but introduces the concept of the unjust enemy, which can easily be misused precisely for that purpose. It can even be incorporated into the agenda of totalitarian movements that promote the idea of absolute enmity. Thus, Schmitt's reception of Kant has both a positive and a negative side. I have focused on the former proposing a productive combination of existential and political ways of limiting political enmity. This line of thought is complementary to that of Schmitt who insisted on a separation between the existential and the political sphere fearing nonsensical transfer of principles from the former to the latter. In his search for political means of limiting enmity, however, he also drew inspiration from the existential sphere. He dealt with it when analyzing the cumulative negativization of the enemy which creates conditions for the rise of absolute enmity. I have used the existential elements of Schmitt's political theory to formulate concrete existential ways of limiting political enmity. These can create synergy with the political ways developed by Kant and Schmitt. The synergy can become a vital part of initiatives that seek to promote peace in situations of conflict.

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## Moving Around the Question of the Human. Was Kant an Anthropological Philosopher?

**Abstract:** On the anniversary of 300 years since the birth of one of the world's most influential philosophers, Immanuel Kant, we are still moving around the four key questions that he posed in his *Logic*. The question whether Kant was or was not an anthropological philosopher is closely related to the discussion about the significance of his lectures on anthropology that were later collected and published in the book *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*. Here, the opinions of researchers and commentators vary, as much on the significance of the text as on its compatibility with Kant's other significant writings. Humanity has, for Kant, a certain purpose that is articulated in the human nature and both ethics and anthropology have the same task; to contribute to the fulfilment the purpose of humanity as a whole.

**Key words:** anthropology, categorical imperative, cosmopolitanism, free will

**Abstrakt:** Pri príležitosti výročia 300 rokov od narodenia jedného z najvplyvnejších svetových filozofov, Immanuela Kanta, sa stále pohybujeme okolo štyroch kľúčových otázok, ktoré položil vo svojej *Logike*. Otázka, či Kant bol alebo nebol antropologický filozof, úzko súvisí s diskusiou o význame jeho prednášok o antropológii, ktoré boli neskôr zozbierané a publikované v knihe *Antropológia z pragmatického hľadiska*. Tu sa názory bádateľov a komentátorov rôznia, a to tak na význam tohto textu, ako aj na jeho kompatibilitu s inými významnými Kantovými spismi. Ľudstvo má pre Kanta určitý cieľ, ktorý je artikulovaný v ľudskej prirodzenosti, a etika aj antropológia majú rovnakú úlohu: prispieť k naplneniu cieľa ľudstva ako celku.

**Kľúčové slová:** antropológia, kategorický imperatív, kozmopolitizmus, slobodná vôľa

## Introduction

On the anniversary of 300 years since the birth of one of the world's most influential philosophers, Immanuel Kant, we are still moving around the four key questions that he posed in his book of *Logic*: "What can I know?; What should I do?; What may I hope for?; What is a human being?"<sup>1</sup> No matter how old these questions are, they remain current up until the present time. No matter how exhaustingly Kant, and many others after Kant, were trying to answer them, they remain unsolved till now, just like the essence of the human being itself. The first three questions that naturally lead to the fourth one, to the question of a human, are constitutive of the proof of almost eternal movement around and towards the human without the perspective of finding the final, forever valid answer. The essence of the human is in constant movement and so are the four Kantian questions and yet in their circular repetitions throughout the centuries, they represent four solid circles centered around one stable point. That point is the picture of a human being, whose outlines have been boldly painted at the beginning of the Enlightenment era and followed by anthropologists, philosophers, psychologists, medical doctors, and sociologists ever since.

Long before empirical anthropology was founded, the first anthropological movement in modern times began with the Enlightenment emancipation of the human from the divine with the raising effort of philosophers to create the picture of a human that would not be a mere corporeal image of God. Although Kant does not entirely belong to this group of thinkers and his perception of what is human does not entirely fall out of the theological world view, at least when it comes to theology within the frames of pure reason, he becomes clearly aware of the fact that the theological definition of human is not universal enough to define the whole of the human being and absolutely insufficient to describe the modern human as a being whose home is situated in the cosmopolis. The new, cosmopolitan location and the recognition of rational abilities and individual capabilities by Enlightenment philosophers stand not only at the beginning of the four Kantian questions, but also at the beginning of his *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*.

<sup>1</sup> Kant, I., 1819. *Logic*, trans. by J. Richardson. London: W. Simpkin and R. Marshall, Stationery Court, p. 30.

## I.

The question whether Kant was or was not an anthropological philosopher is closely related to the discussion about the significance of his lectures on anthropology that were later collected and published in the book *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*. Here, the opinions of researchers and commentators vary, as much on the significance of the text as on its compatibility with Kant's other significant writings. In any case, we cannot deny that the most significant object of Kantian philosophy was the human described from the human perspective in every aspect of his internal and external characteristics in his ability to transcend the geographical, political, cultural, linguistic, and psychological boundaries, but, of course, not almighty, because the human is limited in his knowledge of the thing for itself by his own human nature. Another problem seems to be the form of *Anthropology*, which was designed as a textbook for introductory courses for first-year students. Does that make Kant's anthropological thinking less relevant than his theory of knowledge, aesthetics, or moral philosophy?

"We may also ask", Manfred Kuehn writes in the *Introduction* to the English translation of *Anthropology* edited by Robert B. Louden,

whether a textbook should be measured by the same criteria as an original contribution to philosophical discussion. How precisely can the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* be compared with the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, or the *Metaphysics of Morals*, for instance? Does the published *Anthropology* give the best possible expression of Kant's fundamental intention? [...] Some philosophical scholars have argued not only that the *Anthropology* does not express Kant's deepest philosophical concerns, but that it is irrelevant to them. Some have even argued that it actually contradicts them. But there are also passages in Kant's work that suggest the opposite view, and so it has also been argued that the *Anthropology* is of central importance to the entire Kantian project. Support for this view can be found in a passage from Kant's *Logic*. [...] Kant then claims that all this can be included within anthropology because the four questions *relate to anthropology*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Kuehn, M., 2006. Introduction. In: Louden, R., ed. *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. xi–xii.

Kuehn, on the other hand, strongly disagrees with that kind of interpretation of Kant's anthropological texts that would intend to put the definition of human into the center of his metaphysics, arguing, similarly to Heidegger, that the question of the human and his intellectual capabilities provides a firm base for the possible foundation and justification of metaphysics. Therefore, Loudon stands in favour of the cosmopolitan explanation of Kant's anthropological motivations and claims that *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View* could as well be called *Anthropology from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*. In my opinion, he is right and I would even go a bit further and say that Kant's intentions, even in his theory of knowledge, aesthetics, or his moral philosophy, might be anthropological overall, as he does not write his critiques for pure reason, for practical reason or for judgement alone, but he is certainly turning towards those ones who have an ambition to become active universal or, in his own words, cosmopolitical citizens. Although Kant never directly addresses the problem of inequality between men and women, in his *Introduction to the Enlightenment*, we can clearly read that Kant does not deny this cosmopolitan citizenship to women, in contrary, men and women equally should be autonomous, independent, and have the courage to use their own reason.

There are many critical voices about Kant's problematic statements as much about people of different ethnicities, as about women. Kant's attempts to understand the place of female citizens within the cosmopolitan society is significantly influenced by his definition of the relationship between the sexes and these are changing with the time in mostly negative way. The texts might also differ a lot from each other. Meanwhile in the *Critique of Judgement*, there is not a single mention of women, and the word *female* is only used once, in the context of an observation of the picture of a beautiful woman,<sup>3</sup> there is wide and precisely elaborated chapter on female judgment capabilities in the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings*, where the words *woman* or *women* are mentioned more than two hundred times.

In the 1760s, Kant's attitudes towards women are articulated in the greatest detail and change the most. His view throughout this period is that the sexes are and ought to be different, that "equality" between men and women is found in a unity within which women are beautiful and

<sup>3</sup> Kant, I., 1987. *Critique of Judgement*, trans. by W. S. Pluhar. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, p. 180.



men noble. In *Observations*, Kant's discussion of women is gallant, praising them for their distinctive virtues; and his attitude towards unity with women there is fundamentally positive. However, over the course of *Remarks*, Kant's attitude changes. He focuses attention on marriage and emphasizes woman's distinctive trait as proficiency in illusion, a proficiency that inevitably disappoints. As Kant moves away from marriage in his personal life, so he also dislocates women further and further from the ideal of (masculine) virtue that comes to be identified with the good will as such. *Remarks*, thus, anticipates Kant's eventual treatment of women in *Anthropology* as mere tools by which Nature promotes the twin ends of "preservation of the species" and "cultivation of society and its refinement".<sup>4</sup>

Reduction of female citizens to a beautiful and cultivating part of the society, where merely the judgment of taste is requested or applied and their exclusion from any intellectual activities is presented, for example, through the famous exclamation: "A woman who has a head full of Greek, like Mme. Dacier, or who conducts thorough disputations about mechanics, like the Marquise du Chatelet, might as well also wear a beard; for that might perhaps better express the mien of depth for which they strive."<sup>5</sup> However, Kant's argumentation in *Anthropology*, where he is trying to reduce women to mere tools of species preservation, as some authors are suggesting is slightly problematic. Meanwhile, on page 204 of *Anthropology*, Kant writes about the relationship between the sexes and its task in the preservation of the human species, but he includes into this assumption both men and women. Although on page 207, he already speaks about "the preservation of the species"<sup>6</sup> and "the cultivation of society and its refinement by womankind"<sup>7</sup> as two most significant roles of the female part of the society.

Kant's concerns about the true position of a women in the cosmopolitan society come partially from the contemporary picture of women in society<sup>8</sup> and partially from his own experience. Being in the dependent

<sup>4</sup> Frierson, P., 2011. Introduction. In: Frierson, P., Guyer, P., eds. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. xxxiv.

<sup>5</sup> Kant, I., 2011. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 36–37.

<sup>6</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. by R. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 207.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> See Kant, I., 2011. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings*, p. 11–65.

position from men, women cannot become equal citizens of the world. They should be able to use their own reason and reach a certain grade of autonomy, but without threatening the intellectual position of man. Despite this not being an entirely applicable condition, Kant is very well aware of the problem that the dependence of women on men is caused by their relationships. If marriage is the only remedy to secure the female existence and beauty the only way to get it, then the relationship between men and women might create an illusion of love and affection. This illusion might not only disappear after the relationship becomes approved by the church authorities, but it causes an unequal partnership in which both are unfairly dependent on each other, women materially and men emotionally. For this reason, more autonomy for women would be more than desirable, if not for the sake of their world-citizenship then at least for more authentic relations between the sexes.

From this point of view, the characteristic of the cosmopolitan citizen is the characteristics of the human in general and it represents the pragmatic application of the transcendental principles previously explained in in *Critiques* or in *Metaphysics of Moral*. Although Kant's understanding of the practical concept of the human might, as Kuehn explains, seems "peripheral"<sup>9</sup> at first sight or unable to play any significant role in the foundation or justification of his main philosophical principles, he adds that

[t]his is not just an argument against the fundamental importance of anthropology to Kant's enterprise; it is also an argument against anyone who would claim that Kant's anthropological considerations are so peripheral that they would not be missed if they had not survived. I would argue that they would be missed in so far as they add a certain dimension to the "cosmopolitical sense" of Kant's entire philosophy. Even if the published *Anthropology* were to express this dimension only imperfectly, it might give significant clues about how we should or should not conceive of it.<sup>10</sup>

The assertion that Kant's thinking in all its parts, the epistemological, the aesthetical, the metaphysical, and the ethical as well, has been strongly cosmopolitan is not entirely new and has been profoundly elaborated in one of Ursula Reitemeyer's papers presented at one of the Kantian conferences in Prešov.<sup>11</sup> It is pertinent, then, to take a closer look at

<sup>9</sup> Kuehn, M., 2006. Introduction, p. xiii.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Reitemeyer, U., 2012. Kant's Bildungsgeschichtlicher Entwurf der Moderne in weltbürgerlicher

the cosmopolitan and anthropological character of Kant's philosophy. For Kant, similarly to other thinkers from the Enlightenment period or from German Idealism, especially Hegel, philosophy does not have its final objectives in itself, but is aimed to serve the cultivation of the human. The courage to use our own reason should be discovered and further developed in education, understood as formation or cultivation in the broadest meaning of the German concept of *Bildung*. In the case of Kant, equally to Hegel, who is, therefore, in his own philosophy education appropriating the Greek concept of *paideia* and the Latin concept of *cultura*, *Bildung* should lead the student to freedom, autonomy, and healthy self-confidence. An educated human being should become an entirely developed individual. The aim of education of the human is understanding and development of human nature. Kant formulates it explicitly in his *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*. He claims:

All cultural progress, by means of which the human being advances his education, has the goal of applying this acquired knowledge and skill for the world's use. But the most important object in the world to which he can apply them is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. – Therefore, to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the not yet developed empirical anthropology, Kant is, as a big admirer of natural sciences, already applying its perspectives in his own pragmatically grasped anthropological teaching, however, only as one of the possible research directions, emphasizing that his own way will be different. He writes:

A doctrine of knowledge of the human being, systematically formulated (anthropology), can exist either in a physiological or in a pragmatic point of view. – Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself or can and should make of himself.<sup>13</sup>

Absicht. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 1(1), pp. 10–22.

<sup>12</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 3.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

Therefore, it is exactly the point of freedom, the opportunity to make out of himself what the human can or should be which is the moment that connects Kant's anthropology to the rest of his philosophy. No matter if we are talking about the period between 1773 and 1785, when the application of purely rational moral rules conditioned by the free will of human and thus anthropologically can be seen, or about the period after 1785, when Kant tries to leave anthropology completely behind and build his system of morals on the concept of virtue, which means overcoming the inclinations that are rooted in human nature. Meanwhile, in the first period, Kant is following an example of Aristotelian ethics based on practical wisdom that enables him to make decisions about the concrete use of rationally given moral rules. In this period, Kantian ethics still contains two parts, the theoretical, purely rational system of moral rules, and the empirically anthropological conditions of their practical application in the situations of everyday life. During this time, the verbs *can* and *should* represent the same goals based on the execution of free will. Louden articulates it in the following way: "Kant says that ultimate moral achievement cannot be expected of any one individual, but only of the species as a whole. Morality and anthropology thus lead to political and historical considerations, to questions about what the ultimate destination of the human race is".<sup>14</sup> Humanity has, for Kant, a certain purpose that is articulated in the human nature and both ethics and anthropology have the same task; to contribute to the fulfilment the purpose of humanity as a whole.

## II.

This, however, changes after 1785, when Kant excludes from his moral philosophy the final goal of human beings and stops caring about the future of humankind. Instead, he adopts the position of the metaphysics of morals and starts working strictly on its principles and maxims. Even before Kant gets on his way towards the rehabilitation of metaphysics, on which he does not entirely destroy it, but he indeed deforms the possibilities of metaphysical thought, he already attributes to reason and intellect the primacy of moral justification. However, by that time, there is still some place left for free will as a tool for putting the intellectually justified moral rules into practice. Not only does he recognize the anthropological base of free will, but he also admits the existence of some

<sup>14</sup> Kuehn, M., 2006. Introduction, p. xv.

sort of moral sense, despite all the emphasis on the deep rational roots of morality. Kuehn explains it in the following way:

Even though Kant believed in 1773 that “the highest ground of morality is intellectual,” he also thought that it needed “primary springs of the will,” which were *not* intellectual. He takes this position also in the lectures on ethics delivered during the summer of 1775. We need both moral motivations and purely intellectual principles to judge whether an action is moral. There must be a *principium di iudicationis* that is objective, and a subjective principle that motivates us, a *principium executionis* that is related to human nature and sensibility. Kant explicitly argues that the latter is to be found in a moral sense. And this is the domain of empirical psychology and is concerned with the “sources of all the sciences that are concerned with morals, with the ability of commerce, and the method of educating and ruling human beings, or all that is practical”. Kant’s anthropology originates thus from a new conception of the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals. Both call for an empirical counterpart. Anthropology is to contain moral psychology or the discussion of “the primary springs of the will”.<sup>15</sup>

Moral imperative and the nature of human based free will still represent two complementary parts of human ethical behaviour, although Kant’s belief in the capacity of free will situated outside the area of moral duty seems to become weaker. In consequence, the role of free will as the willingness to put moral behaviour in practice is decreasing accordingly as the concepts *rational* and *moral* become almost synonymous. This movement can be traced above all in the *Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Moral*, where the moral sense or moral feeling almost disappears in favour of the rationally and transcendently grounded categorical imperative. Although anthropology does not disappear entirely from Kantian thinking, it is pushed from the centre of moral theory to the epistemological periphery to the even more distant place than the category of taste with its very low cognitive value, to the territory of pragmatic, empirical approach. “In 1785, he was convinced that anthropology and metaphysics of morals have nothing in common and should not be mixed”.<sup>16</sup>

The contradictory diversified and partially unpredictable character of human nature, particularly in case of an individual, convinced Kant about the unsustainability of free will within his anthropology and made

<sup>15</sup> Kuehn, M., 2006. Introduction, p. xix.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

him move his metaphysically understood morality onto the, for him, much safer ground of rationality. This, in his opinion, was something the whole humankind had in common and would be able to practise in the same way according to the same, universally and neutrally formulated categorical imperative, if only everybody could and would follow his instructions about the courage to use its own reason. In this moment the words *could*, *should*, and *would* seem to fuse in order to become one solid expression of obligation in free will and vice versa. As the task of anthropology, with its content of human potential disappears, the traces of human free will start to melt down within the space of moral obligation. We ought to act and behave in a certain way, because we can and if we can, then we ought to do so. Kant argues in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral*:

Since my aim here is properly directed to moral philosophy, I limit the proposed question only to this: whether one is not of the opinion that it is of the utmost necessity to work out once a pure moral philosophy which is fully cleansed of everything that might be in any way empirical and belong to anthropology; for that there must be such is self-evident from the common idea of duty and of moral laws. Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to be valid morally, i.e., as the ground of an obligation, has to carry absolute necessity with it; that the command 'You ought not to lie' is valid not merely for human beings, as though other rational beings did not have to heed it; and likewise all the other genuinely moral laws; hence that the ground of obligation here is to be sought not in the nature of the human being or the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori solely in concepts of pure reason, and that every other precept grounded on principles of mere experience, and even a precept that is universal in a certain aspect, insofar as it is supported in the smallest part on empirical grounds, perhaps only as to its motive, can be called a practical rule, but never a moral law.<sup>17</sup>

As a consequence, according to some authors,<sup>18</sup> Kant's moral theory after 1785 entirely loses its anthropological and pragmatic character, when the pragmatic of human nature and free will based motivation to the common good is replaced by exclusively rational motivation and the re-

<sup>17</sup> Kant, I., 2002. *Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Moral*, trans. by A. W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> See for example: Baron, M., 2002. Acting from Duty. In: Wood, A. W., ed. *Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Moral*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 92–110. See also Kagan, S., 2002. Kantianism for Consequentialists. In: Wood, A. W., ed. *Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Moral*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 111–156.

spect of transcendently given, pragmatically neutral moral law. However not just the motivation to good deeds, but also the understanding of the concept of pragmatic changes in late-period Kant. Kuehn is pointing at the fact that the concept “pragmatic” not only means an opposite notion to the scholastic, highly academic style of lecturing and writing, but on the area of ethics, it means practical personal motivation, which, contrary to the rather subjective and barely controlled impulse, represents an objective cause that does not exclude the motive of moral good, an idea that later American pragmatists developed into a theory of self-forming moral learning,<sup>19</sup> thereby moving far beyond Kant’s *a priori* moral rationalism. By that time, pragmatic and moral motivations do not exclude each other and are considered as almost synonymous expressions.<sup>20</sup> This is also the case of critical theory, where, two extremes ought to be avoided “the hyperbolic belief in the unlimited power of philosophical reason and inevitable moral and societal progress on one hand and on the other the wholesale rejection of rational argumentation and reason-giving as attainable ideals of moral and civilizational advancement”.<sup>21</sup> With the turn that comes after the *Groundwork on Metaphysics of Moral*, pragmatic imperative is not categorical anymore, it becomes conditioned and hypothetical and is of no more use for the pure moral.<sup>22</sup> This might bring one to the assumption that Kant’s moral theory has its aim in creating a perfect, virtuous being without any particularly human weaknesses or motivations, a being that is fully obedient to his duties and to the categorical imperative. Having said that, where is the place for reflection? Why would Kant, a philosopher with so much courage to use his own reason, discourage his contemporaries from doing the same? Not only is the rationally grounded moral law not immune to any sort of reflection, so is the formulation of the categorical imperative itself, logically clear yet very general, provoking and challenging us in the discussion about its concrete practical application in the everyday life. Allen Wood articulates it precisely:

<sup>19</sup> See Dorstewitz, P., 2020. Provinces of Imaginative Intelligence: A Taxonomy. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 56(4), pp. 600–619.

<sup>20</sup> Kuehn, M., 2006. Introduction, p. xxi. For a critical review of Kantian ethics from a pragmatist perspective, see e.g. Švihura, L., 2021. Postmoderná morálka a Kantova etika. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 10(2), pp. 21–41. By the same author, see: Švihura, L. A., 2023. Let’s Make Morality Great Again: Etika pragmatizmu v službách morálky. In: Maco, R., Rozemberg, A., eds. *Etické teórie – neetická prax*. Bratislava: Slovenské filozofické združenie pri SAV, pp. 94–104.

<sup>21</sup> Dunaj, L., Mertel, K., C., 2022. Introduction. In: Dunaj, L., Mertel, K. C., eds.: *Hans-Herbert Kögler’s Critical Hermeneutics*. London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, p. 1.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, xxii.

If we rest our theory of duties on FH,<sup>23</sup> as Kant actually does in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, then we have to admit that the fundamental principle of morality yields no universal decision procedure for all cases. Moral deliberation generates moral rules applicable in particular cases only in a loose fashion, leaving (as Kant himself says) considerable *playroom* for individual discretion and judgment. It will also depend heavily on what Kant called “*practical anthropology*, that is, on our fallible, constantly changing, and always deeply problematic knowledge of what human beings and the human predicament are like (both in general and under specific social and historical conditions). A major source of error here is a common misconception about what moral theory is for, and especially about the function of the fundamental principle in such a theory. The function of a fundamental principle can never be directly to settle difficult moral issues; it can serve only to provide the right general framework in which moral rules and controversial issues should be raised and discussed. Even then, any formulation of it must be regarded as provisional—an object of constant critical reflection and continual reinterpretation and rearticulation.<sup>24</sup>

Kant’s ethics is not virtue ethics. It does not contain any ideals of the virtuous behaviour as can be observed in the ethical rigorism of Plato.<sup>25</sup> Despite the universal, objective, and rational principles represented by moral law, it does not contain any specific rules for their practical application, but reliable points of orientation. Marchevský argues “that philosophy should not have the character of a doctrine. The role of philosophy is to protect science from metaphysical speculation, preserve its scientific nature, and guard the boundaries of science”.<sup>26</sup> These points must be based on reason and serve the common good, but the way they are put in practice, is always the matter of individual decision in a given situation. This common good, according to Stachoň, “for as many people as possible is expected as a standard behaviour in politics”<sup>27</sup> or ethics. From this point of view, Kantian ethics seems to be rather an Aristote-

<sup>23</sup> The Formula of Humanity as End in Itself: “Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means”.

<sup>24</sup> Wood, A. W., 2002. What is Kantian Ethics? In: Wood, A. W., ed. *Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Moral*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 174.

<sup>25</sup> Gadamer thinks here the opposite, when he sees in Kant the same sort of ethical rigorism like he sees in Plato. See Gadamer, H.-G., 1978. Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles, In: *Griechische Philosophie III. Plato im Dialog*, GW 7 (1991). Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, pp. 128–227.

<sup>26</sup> Marchevský, O., 2022. Immanuel Kant “on the Borders” of A. Bely’s Symbolism. *RUDN Journal of Philosophy*, 26(2), p. 431.

<sup>27</sup> Stachoň, M., 2021. Kant a problém vztahu stát a občan. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana*, 10(1), p. 83.



lian than a Platonic project and it does not entirely exclude the anthropological orientation in the common ethical practice.

### III.

Despite his focus on the principles themselves, rather than on their application, Kant cannot get the question of human nature out of his philosophy. First, because every kind of philosophy and every sort of science were invented by humans for humans with the aim of satisfying vital human needs, hence philosophy, just like science, has *a priori* an anthropological character. Second, even after Kant changed his opinion on the objectives of education, from the development of human nature to its suppression, he still must reflect on it. How would he otherwise be able to write about overcoming the harmful inclinations in human nature through virtuous behaviour, if except for the definition of virtue, he would not have also defined human nature? How can we have some knowledge about anything at all, when we give up the knowledge about ourselves? How can we become cosmopolitan citizens without being first and above all human beings? How can we reach out to people from other foreign countries, if we don't reach out to our neighbours first? Is this not the sense and final aim of Kant's anthropology, when he writes:

Such an anthropology, considered as knowledge of the world, which must come after our schooling, is actually not yet called pragmatic when it contains an extensive knowledge of things in the world, for example, animals, plants, and minerals from various lands and climates, but only when it contains knowledge of the human being as a citizen of the world. [...] Travel belongs to the means of broadening the range of anthropology, even if it is only the reading of travel books. But if one wants to know what to look for abroad, in order to broaden the range of anthropology, first one must have acquired knowledge of human beings at home, through social intercourse with one's townsmen or countrymen. Without such a plan (which already presupposes knowledge of human beings) the citizen of the world remains very limited with regard to his anthropology. General knowledge always precedes local knowledge here, if the latter is to be ordered and directed through philosophy: in the absence of which all acquired knowledge can yield nothing more than fragmentary groping around and no science.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Kant, I., 2006. *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 4.

Here it is fair to claim that Kant is not so much concerned about the concrete citizen, as he is concerned about the definition of cosmopolitanism, or much less about an individual, as he is concerned about the humankind and its fulfilment of the criteria of the cosmopolitical existence. However, as the proper knowledge of the human starts with the knowledge of the people in the immediate neighbourhood, and only afterwards should we be able to broaden, step by step, the viewpoint of humanity till we are able to become citizens of the world and see each individual from the cosmopolitical perspective, so this perspective will later provide a very solid anthropological base for any individual development of every human being.

## Conclusion

Kant's philosophy is, in every aspect, a cosmopolitan project. Starting with the *Critiques*, moving forward to metaphysics of moral, ending up with *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*, it is meant to design the universal and generally valid principles and maxims of human knowledge and human behaviour. It would be a misunderstanding to blame late-period Kant for having given up anthropology in favour of the metaphysics of moral or from having given up the human in favour of the universal principles and imperatives articulated in the concepts of moral duty. Principles and imperatives should serve as the solid and secure orientation points for each individual human action, not as a list of exact application of the virtues. Even in times of its critical distance towards human nature, Kant's thinking is constantly circulating around the question of man.

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## The Arabesque from Kant to Comics (Arabeska: od Kanta po komiks)<sup>1</sup>

**Grewe, Cordula:** *The Arabesque from Kant to Comics*. New York: Routledge; Taylor & Francis, 2021. ISBN 978-0-8153-8358-1; DOI 10.4324/9781351187350.

Oscilujúc medzi poctivo budovaným vedeckým textom a obrazotvorným rozprávaním je kniha americkej kunsthistoričky Corduly Grewe pozoruhodným pohľadom na estetiku romantizmu cez prizmu pochoopenia a sledovania manifestácií arabeskového ornamentu. Ústrednou tézou knihy je rekonštrukcia romantizmu ako revolučného autorského postoja vyplývajúceho z novej východiskovej myšlienkovj architektúry, ktorej pôdorysom je arabeska.

Autorka diela je aktuálne profesorkou dejín umenia na Indiana University Bloomington v USA. Venuje sa primárne estetike výtvarného umenia 18. a 19. storočia, so špeciálnou záľubou v tvorbe nemeckých Nazaréncov, predovšetkým maliara a literáta (neskoršieho riaditeľa düsseldorfskej maliarskej školy) F. W. Schadowa. Text, s ktorým sa tu stretávame, je prezentovaný ako zavŕšenie trilógie, ktorej prvými dvoma výstupmi boli knihy *Painting the Sacred in the Age of Romanticism* (2009) a *The Nazarenes: Romantic Avant-Garde and the Art of the Concept* (2015).<sup>2</sup> Grewe skromne priznáva, že kniha nie je prehľadným diachrónnym sledovaním uplatňovania arabesky vo vizuálnom umení, ale skôr arabeskovou, teda kľukatou cestou, ktorá v mantineloch časového rámca 1750 – 1900 vedie cez literatúru a literárnu kritiku, estetiku a umeleckú kritiku, fresku a maľbu až po knižnú ilustráciu a raný komiks.

Kniha je pre oblasť estetiky, teórie a dejín umenia vzácnym a origi-

<sup>1</sup> Poznámka k prekladu z anglického jazyka: text recenzie v slovenskom jazyku využíva vlastné, pracovné preklady autorky recenzie.

<sup>2</sup> Dávnejším a dôležitým predchodcom tejto knihy je tiež štúdia publikovaná v žurnále *Intellectual History Review*: Grewe, C., 2007. Portrait of the Artist as an Arabesque: Romantic Form and Social Practice in Wilhelm von Schadow's The Modern Vasari. *Intellectual History Review*, 17(2), s. 99–134. DOI 10.1080/17496970701383464.

nálnym počinom: dôležitosť „zdanlivo“ okrajového javu arabesky pre konštitúciu moderného umenia je tu nakreslená na pozadí estetických paradigiem I. Kanta, J. W. Goetheho, F. Schillera, K. W. F. Schlegela, K. P. Moritza.

Vyššie tristostranová kniha doplnená o súbor tridsiatich reprodukcí obsahuje sedem kľúčových kapitol: I. Tri počiatky; II. Arabesková revolúcia: obraz, scenár a kríza reprezentácie; III. Nápis na múre; IV. Obrátenie strany; V. Skrotenie arabesky; VI. Symfonické intermezzo; VII. Sati-  
rické finále. Jednotlivé kapitoly sú zoradené na línii vedúcej od nemeckej idealistickej filozofie až k počiatkom grafického románu; no ako Grewe deklaruje, kniha sa primárne lokalizuje v priestore estetiky a dejín vizuálneho umenia. Autorka sa priznáva k záľube v poézii a je zjavné, že tak koná aj voľbou jazyka, ktorému dominujú básnické figúry. Aj napriek extenzívnosti je kniha „šťastne členená“ na logicky organizované menšie myšlienkové celky, ktoré dovoľujú čitateľovi „vydýchnuť“ a „doručujú“ dobrú čitateľnosť.

Arabeska je abstraktná výtvarná forma, ktorej názov pochádza z novovekého Francúzska a slovo sa vzťahuje k islamskému spôsobu dekorácie, ktorý sa dá opísať ako systém lineárnych kriviek odvodený z (najčastejšie) rastlinných motívov, organizovaný v pravidelnej kompozícii, pokrývajúci väčšinou celú dekorovanú plochu a vyznačujúci sa dynamickým rytmom či hrou pravidelných zakrivení línie. Pojem arabesky síce historicky patrí do diskurzu exoticizmov, no príbuzenstvo možno dohľadať aj „doma“, už v antike, keď sa podobný koncept ornamentu využíval najmä vo freskovej výzdobe rímskych víl (napríklad Neronov *Domus Aurea*). Objasňujúc pôvod slova Grewe (s. 10–13) zdôrazňuje, že tento druh islamského rastlinného ornamentu sa rozvíjal od 10. do 15. storočia a na sklonku uvedeného obdobia ho v Európe začali renesanční umelci s obľubou uplatňovať pre zdobenie kníh.

Romantická transpozícia arabesky však asimilovala aj pôvodom talianske, groteskové vzory zdobenia (*grottesco*), ktoré predstavujú európsky typ ornamentu zložený z drobných, voľne spájaných motívov, vrátane architektonických prvkov, rozmarných ľudských postavičiek a fantastických zvierat – usporiadaných väčšinou podľa centrálnej vertikálnej osi. Romantické chápanie arabesky hybridne prepájalo obidve tradície – islamskú a európsku. Aj napriek pokusu zaviesť presnejší pojem groteskovej arabesky (*Groteskarabeske*) v myslení literárneho vedca Güntera Oesterla, romantici svoju hybridnú kreáciu jednoducho subsumovali pod jednotiaci pojem arabesky. Je podstatné, že francúzsky návrat k ara-

beske v 18. storočí začína znovuoobjavením Rafaelových ornamentálnych fresiek vo vatikánskych loggiách,<sup>3</sup> ktoré sa stali vizualizáciou morálneho princípu, a teda paradigmou zjednocovania veľkého množstva detailov a hravých fantázií [Obrázok 1].

V prostredí novovekého obrazu bol arabeskou dekorovaný najmä okraj – parergon knižnej stránky (predovšetkým frontispice), nástennej fresky alebo voľnej (najčastejšie monumentálnej) maľby. Takýto typ dekoratívneho doplnku bol chápaný a užívaný súčasne ako rám a zvýraznenie či dokonca legitimizácia jadra obrazu. Pojem arabesky sa z oblasti výtvarnej tvorby transponoval do rôznych kontextov a uplatnil sa najmä na poli tanečnej terminológie ako označenie baletnej figúry.

Cordula Grewe začína obrazovú časť knihy pôsobivou a metaforicky výstižnou obálkou [Obrázok 2] a arabeskovým medailónom na frontispice svojho obľúbeného diela *Der Modern Vasari* Wilhelma Schadowa (1854), ku ktorému sa opakovane v texte vracia [Obrázok 3].<sup>4</sup> Románom düsseldorfského maliara autorka ilustruje prepojenie arabeského literárneho štýlu textu s intervenciami maliarovho priateľa, grafika Júliusa Hübnera. Jeho ornamentálne medailóny (portréty umelcov) sú neoddeliteľnou súčasťou románu, predstavujú istý druh metadiskurzu a textu pridávajú prvok autoreferenčnosti (s. 24).

Aby Grewe (s. 12) vysvetlila záujem literárneho romantizmu o arabesku, evokuje Schlegelove postoje, v ktorých ornament chápe ako umne usporiadaný zmätok, ktorý svojou fantastickosťou a hravosťou narúša všetky praktické ciele a účelové dejové línie. Autorku zaujíma vyhmätávanie estetiky arabesky práve v medzipriestore literatúry a vizuálneho umenia, keďže hranice medzi týmito dvoma oblasťami tvorby boli v období romantizmu pozoruhodne priepustné. Ak bola v minulosti arabeska príkladom ohraničujúcej a nadbytočnej formy, pre romantického básnika sa stáva centrom záujmu, ba čo viac, kľúčovým poetickým princípom. Práve jednotlivé fazety arabesky ako jej hraničnosť, nekončnosť, hravosť, nepraktickosť, seba-referenčnosť, fragmentárnosť hľadá a nachádza autorka v romantickom literárnom texte, aby ich neskôr manifestovala vo vizuálnom umení smerujúcom k avantgarde.

<sup>3</sup> Autorka dokazuje, ako stúpol záujem o Raffaelove ornamenty prostredníctvom grafických kópií, ktoré sa v súboroch tlačili a v knihách sa dostávali k širokej verejnosti. Rástol tak záujem o cudzokrajné a exotické motívy.

<sup>4</sup> Pre viac náhľadov na celkovú grafickú úpravu knihy, grafické medailóny a ich arabesky odporúčam zdroj dostupný online: Schadow, W., 1854. *Der moderne Vasari: Erinnerungen aus dem Künstlerleben: Novelle*. Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz (Bessersche Buchhandlung). Dostupné z: <https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.62946>

Kapitola *Arabesková revolúcia (obraz, písmo a kríza reprezentácie)* ponúka rekonštrukciu dejinných zmien v médiu knihy, ktoré znamenali prílev inovácií v oblasti tlačových techník, ako aj širokú dostupnosť reprodukcií diel minulosti a súčasnosti. Takýto vývoj média vyvolal nadšenie novými formami dekoratívnej knižnej ilustrácie a podnecoval diskusie ohľadom ornamentu. Tieto diskusie autorka ilustruje teoretickými pozíciami 18. storočia, najmä argumentom K. Moritza (*Vorbegriffe zu einer Theorie der Ornamente*, 1793), ktorý chápe ornament ako výsledok primárneho ľudského inštinktu (a týmito myšlienkami pripravuje priestor pre nemimetické zobrazenia), ako výraz hravej prirodzenosti a pudeniu k tvorbe. Prechádzajúc pozície Moritza, Schillera, Winckelmannna, Lessinga a Goetheho završuje autorka filozofický fundus poznámkami ku Kantovej parergonalite.

Grewe (s. 77–84) sa opiera o tézu *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), aby vyhlásila, že Kant „oslobodil arabesku“ od akejkoľvek predpojatej funkčnosti alebo symboliky a celkom modernisticky postuloval ornament ako stelesnenie bezvýznamnosti a nereprezentatívnosti. Parergonalita ako kvalita marginálnosti a podradenosti sa santom dostáva do centra tvorby ako *modus operandi* artefaktu. Ústredným bodom argumentácie je Kantovo rozlíšenie medzi *pulchritudo vaga* a *pulchritudo adhaerens*, ktorým arabeska nadobúda identitu nezávislej krásy vyzývajúcej ku estetikej kontemplácii. Grewe uvádza výborný vizuálny pendant teórie prostredníctvom Botticelliho *Zrodenia Venuše* (*Nascita di Venere*, 1484 – 1486): ak odnímeme z obrazu všetky ľudské postavy, ostáva parergon – mušľa, spenené more a nebo. Mytológia mizne a prítomné sú len prírodniny ako niekdajší nositelia príbehu. Oslobodzujú sa v prospech čistej estetikej kontemplácie. Parergonalita sa podľa autorky čoskoro stala produktívnou kategóriou praxe a romantickí literáti vytvorili z arabesky paradigma svojho písania. „Parergon teraz štruktúruje ergon a teória romantizmu premieňa nekontrolovateľný rast arabesky na štruktúrny princíp samotného umeleckého diela“ (s. 83). Prchavosť a hravosť arabesky sa stali modelom pre súdobé umenie, ktoré si namiesto večnosti priznáva dočasnú a provizórnu.

Nasledujúce kapitoly (III. – VI.) dopĺňajú dobre známy príbeh dejín umenia o menej viditeľných postavách nemeckého výtvarného romantizmu, ktoré významne prispeli k „vítazstvu arabesky“, či už v médiu fresky alebo ilustrácie: Peter Cornelius, Wilhelm von Kaulbach, Moritz von Schwind, Philipp Otto Runge, Eugen Napoleon Neureuther, Adolph Schroedter a ďalší. Krásne a monumentálne dielo Petra Cornelia –



arabesková výmalba stien Alte Pinakothek v Mníchove (1826 – 1836) má špecifické miesto v autorkinej koncepcii. Predstavuje komplikovaný freskový parergon, ktorý sprevádza zbierku starých majstrov visiach na stenách obrazárne. Vďaka svojmu šifrovaniu a estetickému účinku má silný didaktický potenciál a schopnosť operovať v prospech koncepcie Bildung – osobného rastu, ktorého súčasťou je estetická sebakultivácia.

Na opačnom póle pojatia arabesky by z hľadiska škály a výrazu mohla byť tvorba Adolpha Schroedtera ako – podľa autorky – skutočného „kráľa arabesky“, jedného z najlepšie platených umelcov tej doby, ktorý sa však podľa kritérií klasicky pojmutej disciplíny do dejín umenia nedostal. Aj prostredníctvom obrazového sprievodu môže čitateľ vidieť Schroedterove ilustrácie ako príklady bravúrnych kresieb založených na anekdotálnych scénkach v nekonečnom množstve víriacich postáv a burlesknom humore (s. 195–198). Grewe teda naozaj píše dejiny nemeckého romantického obrazu nerešpektujúc staré rozdelenie „vysokého“ a „nízkeho“ žánru, čo završuje aj poslednou kapitolou venujúcou sa tzv. grafickému románu a satirickej kresbe, resp. počiatkom média, ktoré dnes nazývame komiks.

Na príklade diel Rodolpha Töpffera (ktorého nazýva otcom komisku) a Wilhelma Buscha ukazuje obrazový sprievod vtipných karikatúr komponovaných ako rady snímok v sekvenciách ironicky viažucich sa na komentáre pod nimi. Tieto sekvenčné kresby sa vyznačujú drsným humorom, poetikou absurdity, ba dokonca nerešpektujú ani zákony gravitácie: postavičky sa vznášajú v prázdnom priestore podľa vzoru arabesky. Autorka tu pripomína Töpfferov album *Monsieur Pencil* (1831) [Obrázok 4], ktorým kresliar vtipne komentoval práve vypuknutú epidémiu cholery a absolútny chaos, ktorý spôsobila rozšírením sa po Európe. Grewe touto kapitolou ponúka veľmi dôležitý pohľad na romantické vizuálne umenie či radšej vizuálnu kultúru, ktorá čoraz silnejšie pôsobila na široké masy a celkovú spoločnosť – nie prostredníctvom veľkolepých malieb Salónov, ale práve v intímnom procese obracania stránok kníh a časopisov, a to predovšetkým humoristických periodík, ktoré logicky v 19. a aj v 20. storočí čakal obrovský úspech. V záverečnej časti knihy teda autorka prezentuje, ako sa z marginálnych, groteskných a groteskových postáv „rodí“ subverzívna sila arabesky, prejavujúca sa naplno v satirických komiksoch.

*In sum*, Cordula Grewe si zvolila formu a ideu arabesky ako nečakane vhodný vehikel pre hlbkové pochopenie estetiky romantizmu, ktorá


sa rodí v dramatickom procese obratu perspektív vo filozofii umenia a premieňa arabesku z marginálie na tvárny princíp, z parergonu na ergon. Multimediálny výber manifestácií arabesky autorka skromne prezentuje ako voľný a asociatívny, takmer „arabeskový“. Napriek skromnému tvrdeniu však v skutočnosti ide o impozantnú sústavu príkladov umeleckých stratégií a ich starostlivé interpretácie so štedrou podporou literárnych referencií, metafor, obrazov, príbehov a poznámok.



Obrázok 1: Perrone, J. (reprodukované podľa Rafaela): *Arabesque decorations on pilaster in the Loggia of the Vatican* (Rafaelove arabeskové fresky na pilastri v loggiách Vatikánu), 1805, akvarel, 55 × 34 cm. Fotografia.

[Príklad groteskového ornamentu – pozn. aut.]

Dostupné z: <https://www.loc.gov/item/2015652303/>.



Obrázok 2: Reprodukcia na obálke knihy. Adolph Schroedter: *Humorná arabeska s Don Quijotom, ktorý útočí na stádo oviec* (*Humorous Arabesque with Don Quixote Attacking a Flock of Sheep*), 1839, rytina, 18,7 × 20,9 cm.

© Philadelphia Museum of Art, Philadelphia.



Obrázok 3: Hugo Bürkner, výtlačné podľa: Julius Hübner, *Starý muž (Der Alte)*, 1853.

Drevoryt, 15 × 23 cm. Frontispice.

Shadow, W., 1854. *Der moderne Vasari: Erinnerungen aus dem Künstlerleben: Novelle*. Berlin:

Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz (Bessersche Buchhandlung).

Dostupné z: <https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.62946>



Obrázok 4: Töpffer, R: *Monsieur Pencil* (list z albumu litografií).

Paris: Librairie d'Abm. Cherbuliez et Cie, 1840 [prvé vydanie]

In: Project Gutenberg Canada eBook no. 1062 [online].

Dostupné z: <https://gutenberg.ca/ebooks/toepfferr-monsieurpencil/toepfferr-monsieurpencil-00-h-dir/toepfferr-monsieurpencil-00-h.html>.

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
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**Unruh, Peter: *Kant und der Weltföderalismus. Zur Grundlegung und Aktualität von Kants global-politischer Philosophie*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2021, 125 s. ISBN 978-3-428-18368-5.**

Kniha *Kant a svetový federalizmus*. O základoch a aktuálnosti Kantovej globálno-politickej filozofie z pera profesora Petra Unruha vyšla v renomovanom vydavateľstve Duncker & Humblot v Berlíne. Peter Unruh študoval právo a svoju doktorskú prácu venoval téme Kantova filozofia štátu. Publikoval viaceré knihy z oblasti práva. V roku 2016 vydal prepracované vydanie svojej knihy *Die Herrschaft der Vernunft. Zur Staatsphilosophie Immanuel Kants* (Vláda rozumu. K filozofii štátu Immanuela Kanta). V roku 2021 sa prezentuje kantovskou filozofiou v podobe uvedenej monografie. Okrem iného je prezidentom Evanjelicko-luteránskej cirkvi Severného Nemecka. Obsah knihy pôsobí tak, že autorovi ide nielen o systematické filozofické reflexie analýzy, ale aj o dejinnofilozofický





kontext. Následne problém svetového federalizmu v Kantovej filozofii prenáša Peter Unruh do súčasnosti a snaží sa ho podrobiť argumentač-nému hodnoteniu. Vo svojej publikácii sa zaoberá Kantovým príspevkom k teórii svetového federalizmu ako istému svojbytnému filozofickému konceptu. Pri zacielení na Kanta vychádza z Kantových diel *Zum ewigen Frieden* (K večnému mieru), *Rechtslehre* (Učenie o práve) a z ďalších menších politických, dejinných a etických spisov. Identifikuje, vysvetľuje a hodnotí relevantné argumenty, ktoré Kant predložil. Kniha sa zaoberá aj aktuálnosťou Kantovho konceptu svetového federalizmu v súčasnej globálnej politike a realite.

Autor si monografiu rozdelil do niekoľkých segmentov. Segment A sa venuje globalizácii a svetovému federalizmu, pojmu a dimenziám globalizácie, dôsledkom globalizácie, globálnej politickej filozofii v nadväznosti na Kanta. Segment B má názov *Predchodcovia*, v ktorom nájdeme analýzu mierového projektu Abbé de Saint-Pierra. S otáznikom si nazval autor v tomto segmente podkapitolu *Federalizmus malých republík u Rousseaua*? Obsahový segment B končí špecifikáciou globálnopolitickej filozofie Kanta. Segment C vstupuje do jadra problému a autor ho nazval *Kantova politická filozofia svetového federalizmu*. Nájdeme tam ďalšie vysvetlenie súvislostí so spisom *K večnému mieru*, za ktorým nasleduje tretia kapitola uvedeného segmentu s názvom *Spolok národov a národný štát v Mierovom spise a v Učení o práve*. Táto kapitola obsahuje ďalšie podkapitoly postavené metodologicky i obsahovo na stratégii predstavovania argumentov k zmyslu a funkčnosti pojmov ako spolok národov, univerzálny štát alebo aj status spolku národov ako negatívny náhradník.

V časti nazvanej *Argument(y) proti univerzálnemu štátu* sa dočítame: „Historická skutočnosť rozdielu medzi štátmi týkajúca sa jazykov a náboženstiev sa teleologicky zaraďuje k prirodzenému nástroju odporu voči univerzálnemu štátu. Tento rozdiel zabezpečuje zachovanie národných identít; medzištátne ženie k najživšej konkurencii a bráni tak oslabovaniu všetkých síl. Tento reťazec argumentov úzko súvisí s Kantovou tézou, že antagonizmus tak medzi ľuďmi, ako aj medzi štátmi treba vnímať ako motor kultúry a pokroku.“<sup>1</sup> O pár strán ďalej je zaujímavé vysvetľovanie pojmu náhrady, Unruh píše: „Pojem náhradník (orig. *Surrogat* – pozn. MS) jasne naznačuje, že podľa Kanta je spolok národov náhradou, ktorá neposkytuje práve plnú účinnosť (orig. *Leistung* – pozn. MS) so zreteľom na pôvodný problém, a síce pre konkrétne prekonanie medzištátneho prí-

<sup>1</sup> Unruh, P.: *Kant und der Weltföderalismus. Zur Grundlegung und Aktualität von Kants global-politischer Philosophie*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2021, s. 65.

rodného stavu, tak spolok národov predstavuje len nedostatočné riešenie. Len národný štát možno považovať za tézu, t. j. ako riešenie predstavené bez rozporov. Realizáciu tejto pozitívnej idey svetovej republiky však Kant zjavne považuje za nereálnu, keďže štáty sú podľa svojej idey medzinárodného práva, ktorá neumožňuje nevyhnutné zrieknutie sa suverenity, stojace proti sebe.<sup>2</sup>

Uvedený segment C ďalej obsahuje kapitolu, ktorá sa nazýva *Svetový federalizmus u Kanta*, v ktorej autor problematizuje kontraktualistický a teoretickoprávny rozpor problému a vyjadruje sa k validite, resp. nevalidite kantovských argumentov. Následne filozofickú analýzu uzatvára krokom, ktorý nazval *K rozhodnutiu rozporu: politická evolúcia k svetovému federalizmu*, kde dáva do kontextu otázky časovej podmienenosti kontraktualistického dualizmu, politickej evolúcie a svetového federalizmu ako takého. V *Zhrnutí* spomenutej časti autor uvádza: „Svetový federalizmus bude výsledkom politickej evolúcie, ktorá prebieha v etapách od súčasného reálno-historického východiska cez tvorbu spolku národov až po vznik federálneho svetového štátu. Presvedčenie o tejto evolučnej nádeji sa Kant snaží podporiť hlavne svojou filozofiou dejín.“<sup>3</sup>

Predposledný obsahový segment D sa na dvanástich stranách venuje aktuálnosti kantovského federalizmu v dvoch rovinách, a síce v politickej filozofii a v politickej realite. V časti *Aktuálnosť v politickej realite* sa dočítame: „Európska únia je nadnárodná únia s legislatívnymi právomocami v obmedzených tematických oblastiach, ktoré však presahujú rámec obyčajného zabezpečenia vonkajšieho mieru. Je to spoločenstvo hodnôt a ako členské štáty sa v podstate pripúšťajú len demokratické ústavné štáty alebo – v Kantovej dikcii – republiky. Napokon to zodpovedá aj kantovskej myšlienke evolučného rozvoja, keďže podľa článku 1 Zmluvy o Európskej únii sa považuje za etapu v realizácii čoraz užšieho spojenia národov Európy.“<sup>4</sup>

Posledná časť knihy, v obsahu označená ako E, na necelých troch stranách predstavuje tézy, pred ktorými autor uvádza, že namiesto záverečných poznámok a výhľadu predkladá osem téz (našiel som ich deväť – pozn. MS), ktoré majú podnietiť priamu diskusiu. Môžem povedať, že sú to tézy, ktoré prehovárajú k permanentným diskusiám o usporiadaní vzťahov medzi štátmi sveta. Pozrime sa na znenie druhej: „Čo sa dá naučiť s Kantom a od Kanta, je, že pre trvalo udržateľné, t. j. právne bezpečné

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., s. 71.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., s. 91.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., s. 100.



zvládnutie problémov, ktoré nemajú hranice, je absolútne nevyhnutná nadnárodná organizácia s globálnym nastolením a právomocou vo veci práva, to znamená svetový štát.<sup>5</sup> Touto tézou Unruh čitateľom jasne naznačuje, že napriek tomu, že vo svojej práci sa veľmi často vyjadruje prostredníctvom Kanta k problematike Európskej únie, čo je oprávnené, Kanta nemožno chápať len ako filozofa kontinentálnych spolkov a medzinárodného práva či medzinárodnej spolupráce. Kant uvažuje kozmopoliticky, je planetárny filozof. Koniec koncov, Unruh to deklaruje názvom svojej knihy. Téza číslo osem hovorí toto: „Nastolenie globálneho federálneho politického systému neznamena koniec všetkých skutočných konfliktov, všetkých sporov o svetonázor a náboženstvo, o politiku a spoločenský poriadok. Svetový federalizmus neznamena mier v komplexnom zmysle, ktorý tomuto pojmu môžu dať iba náboženstvo a filozofia. Svetový federalizmus zahŕňa len podmienky možnosti prežitia ľudstva ako celku, pre globálne záväzný poriadok, ktorý udržiava spomínané spory v globálne akceptovateľnom rámci.“<sup>6</sup> Z uvedenej tézy mi vyplýva, že Unruh reflektuje, čo všetko je potrebné brať do úvahy, aby sa naplnila relevancia i explanácia situácie ľudstva organizovaného vo svetovom federálnom zoskupení, a aké sú ďalšie riešenia a výzvy pre ľudstvo v takto globálne organizovanom fungovaní pre naplnenie toho, čo Kant nazýva „úplné a účelné rozvinutie ľudstva.“<sup>7</sup> Tézy nie sú striktné pojmovo vyhranené kantovským slovníkom. Autor preukazuje veľmi dobrú orientáciu v sekundárnej, interpretačnej literatúre a veľmi intenzívne pracuje s prácami autorov (knihy je opatrená kontinuálne pomerne veľkým množstvom odkazov a poznámok), ktorí sa Kantom a zvlášť jeho dejinnými, politickými, sociálnymi a morálnymi úvahami zaoberajú dlhodobo a erudovane. Spomeniem z mnohých známych O. Höffeho k problematike politickej filozofie, P. Kleingeld a M. Nussbaum k problematike kozmopolitizmu, W. Kerstinga k medzinárodným vzťahom a spoločenskej zmluve, ale v práci sa odvoláva aj na mnohých ďalších autorov, ktorých publikácie vyšli dávnejšie i nedávno (veď hovoríme aj o klasikoch, akými sú J. Habermas, K. Jaspers, ale aj v Amerike pôsobiaci T. Pogge). Okrem iného oceňujem spracovanie súvislostí, ako aj prácu s textami filozofov Abbé de Saint-Pierre a J. J. Rousseau. Právnická erudícia P. Unruha je veľkou pridanou hodnotou jeho monografie, keď pracuje s pojmami a princípmi, ktoré

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., s. 102.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., s. 103.

<sup>7</sup> Pozri Kant, I.: *Idea ku všeobecným dejinám v svetoobčianskom zmysle*. Bratislava: Archa, 1996, s. 58.

majú význam nielen vo filozofii, ale aj v právnej vede. Nemecký akademický priestor má na takéto vedecké prístupy dobré predpoklady.

Autor vystavala vnútornú štruktúru textu, ale aj jeho vonkajší prejav ako súbor argumentov a protiargumentov a v nich predstavovanie rozporov a ich riešení z filozofického a právneho aspektu v konkrétnej logickej nadväznosti na základe kritérií filozofického a právneho významu. Text tak vyznieva ako pokus o vyčistenie predmetnej problematiky z hľadiska uvedených aspektov. Z knihy je cítiť snahu nájsť východisko, ponúkať riešenia alebo minimálne podnety na uvažovanie o riešení tak páľčivého problému ľudstva, ako je jeho kooperácia na svetovej úrovni. Do textu uvedenej knihy je votkaných veľa historických a dejinnofilozofických súvislostí, ktoré ozrejmuju okolnosti vzniku úvah nielen o svetovom federalizme. Viaceré vysvetlenia a problémy týkajúce sa združovania štátov, ako napríklad otázka konštelácie Európskej únie alebo otázka spoločného súhlasu. Sú to témy, ktoré nám pomáhajú zorientovať sa v probléme aj dnes.

Peter Unruh naznačuje súvislosti s dneškom nielen v poslednej časti svojej monografie, kde sa na to špecializuje, ale množstvo týchto podnetov a vysvetľujúcich súvislostí pre dnešok môžeme nájsť v knihe od začiatku. Monografia môže byť podnetnou nielen pre odborníkov z oblasti filozofie či politológie, ale aj z oblasti medzinárodných vzťahov a medzinárodného práva, čo iste vyplýva už zo samotnej povahy práce a odbornej profilácie autora. Ide o vážne témy posledných dekád našej doby, a to na globálnej úrovni. Dokonca môžeme povedať, že uvedené oblasti sú predmetom politických a vojenských konfliktov.

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
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## Kantova filozofia (nielen) deťom

Friedlaender, Salomo: *Kant for Children*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2024, 159 s. Edited and Translated by Bruce James Krajewski. ISBN 978-3-11-099183-3; e-ISBN 978-3-11-097986-2; DOI 10.1515/9783110979862.

Do filozofického knižného sveta vstúpila kniha Saloma Friedlaendera, ktorá svojím názvom môže ľuďom ználym Kantových prác, najmä jeho *kritík*, pripadať trochu zvlášťne. Friedlaenderova práca *Kant pre deti* v pôvodnom vydaní vyšla v roku 1924, k nám sa v anglickom preklade Brucea Jamesa Krajewského dostáva (až) teraz.

Ako napovedá už samotný názov, kniha má ambíciu slúžiť ako príručka, ktorá by deťom či skôr mladým ľuďom sprístupnila Kantovu filozofiu. Sám autor svoju prácu nazýva *katechizmom* (akýsi katechizmus Kantovej filozofie). Ako píše prekladateľ vo svojom úvode na strane 3, „Friedlaender uznával deti ako rovnocenné s dospelými v ich rozumových schopnostiach“. Bol presvedčený, že sa morálnemu konaniu môžu učiť od mladého veku, ak im bude poznanie sprístupnené. A tak to vzal do vlastných rúk.



Autor nepriamo znovuoživuje Kantovo tvrdenie z *Idey ku všeobecným dejinám v svetoobčianskom zmysle*, konkrétne tézu, že „sme až zaťažene civilizovaní vo všelijakej spoločenskej spôsobilosti a slušnosti. Ale aby sme sa mohli pokladať za *moralizovaných*, do toho chýba ešte veľmi veľa“,<sup>1</sup> a preto je cieľom jeho knihy predstaviť Kantovu morálnu filozofiu tak, aby ju pochopili aj deti, aby bolo možné ich od útleho veku vzdelávať a aby sme tak mohli postupne dospievať k stavu, kde v právnom štáte budú vládnuť zákony rozumu a morálky. Je však potrebné podotknúť, že napriek tomu, že kniha nesie názov *Kant pre deti*, je určená skôr mladým ľuďom a učiteľom, ktorí dokážu deťom sprostredkovať nielen obsah knihy, ale aj praktické príklady pre lepšie pochopenie.

Kniha je štruktúrovaná do troch kapitol nesúcich rovnaké názvy ako otázky, ktoré si kládol Kant: Čo máme robiť? V čo sme si veriť? a Čo môžeme vedieť? Môžeme si všimnúť, že vo Friedlaenderovom texte sú tieto otázky v inom poradí ako u Kanta; je to pravdepodobne preto, aby akcentoval dôležitosť praktickej zložky Kantovej filozofie, ktorej výsledkom by malo byť morálne konanie. Každá z týchto kapitol je písaná formou otázky a bezprostredne po nej nasledujúcej odpovede. Po týchto troch častiach nasleduje šesť štúdií, ktoré sa venujú témam prítomným v Kantovej a Friedlaenderovej tvorbe.

V prvej kapitole nachádzame motívy a témy, ako to už otázka v názve napovedá, týkajúce sa nášho konania, spadá teda do oblasti etiky. Obsahuje otázky ako napríklad *Ako máme konať?*, vysvetľuje, či je rozdiel medzi morálkou a užitočnosťou, objasňuje, či sa morálka vzťahuje aj na zvieratá, rastliny, či je všeobecnou záležitosťou, a nechýbajú ani otázky, ktoré sú charakteristické pre detské vypytovanie: začínajú totiž slovom *prečo?* (typické aj pre filozofov), napríklad *Prečo nemáme kraďnúť?*, a pod. Autor sa postupne dostáva k motívom právneho štátu, večného mieru a medzinárodného práva. Súčasťou tejto prvej časti je aj dodatok týkajúci sa vzťahu morálky a sexuality. Druhá kapitola, ktorej by sme mohli prisúdiť prívlastok metafyzická, rozoberá otázky týkajúce sa vzťahu rozumu a viery, napríklad *či sme morálne povinní veriť*, *Ako sa zvyčajná viera v Boha líši od viery v rozum?* či *Prečo existujú hranice nášho poznania?* Kapitola je uzatvorená pýtaním sa na to, čo je svedomie. Poslednú z troch kapitol – *Čo môžeme vedieť?* – otvára otázka *Čo sa usilujeme vedieť?*, za ktorou nasleduje jednoduchá odpoveď: *pravdu*. Celkovo je táto kapitola najrozsiahlejšia a najzložitejšia na čítanie i porozumenie. Autor sa tu venuje otázkam Kantovej epistemológie. *Ako získavame poznanie?* Nachádzame tu aj otáz-

<sup>1</sup> Kant, I., 1996. *K večnému mieru*. Bratislava: Archa, s. 67.

ky týkajúce sa princípu kauzality, apriórnych foriem – času a priestoru, dištinkcie medzi zmyslovým vnímaním a rozumom. V závere sa objavuje téma slobody človeka a realizácie jeho účelu v prírode a vracia nás tak k prvej kapitole zaoberajúcej sa tým, čo máme robiť. Autor si v celom texte dáva záležať na jasnom formulovaní otázok a do odpovedí vkladá príklady, aby boli zrozumiteľnejšie. Počas celého čítania možno badať, že mu nejde len o prerozprávanie teórie, znovuiinterpretovanie, ale kladie dôraz na praktickú využiteľnosť poznania v oblasti morálky.

Prvá zo štúdií nasledujúcich po Friedlaenderovom *Kantovi pre deti*, ktorej autorom je Paul Mendes-Flohr, nesie názov *Shlomo Friedlaender: Portrait of a Jewish Kantian*, ktorá približuje život Friedlandera ako židovského filozofa, ktorý prezentuje Kantovu politickú filozofiu ako etický základ štátu. Friedlaender podporoval inkluzívnu, kozmopolitnú koncepciu štátu založeného na racionálnom zákone, ako si predstavoval Kant. Vyzýval čitateľov, aby konali z úcty k zákonu vlastného rozumu, ktorý je zákonom rozumu pre všetky ľudské bytosti. Vo svojej dobe kritizoval uprednostňovanie rasy, pretože to považoval za zločin proti ľudstvu. Po nástupe Hitlera k moci bol Friedlaenderov *Kant pre deti* zničený spolu s ďalšími dielami židovských autorov. Text hovorí nielen o Friedlaenderovi, ale ponúka aj obraz doby a podmienok, za akých *Kant pre deti* vznikol, takže získavame aj obraz historického pozadia.

Druhá štúdia, *Kant, Philosophy, and the Public*, ktorej autorkou je Sarah Holtman, sa zameriava na Kantovu praktickú filozofiu, pričom uvažuje o tom, aký súvis má filozofia s verejnosťou. Pýta sa, ako Kantove diela oslovili čitateľov v jeho vlastnej dobe, širokú verejnosť v jeho dobe aj v našej súčasnosti, čo nám môže povedať Kantova praktická filozofia? Medzi motívy objavujúce sa v štúdii patrí napríklad aj Kantovo rozlišovanie medzi súkromným a verejným používaním rozumu či poukázanie na to, že Kantovým cieľom je rozvíjať morálnu teóriu, ktorá by mohla fungovať ako návod nielen pre profesionálnych filozofov a vzdelaných akademikov, ale aj pre bežného človeka. Štúdia zároveň poukazuje na to, že práve texty ako Friedlaenderov *Kant pre deti* môžu vďaka zrozumiteľnému filozofickému jazyku ponúknuť cestu k úvahám o každodenných morálnych otázkach a prispievať ku kritickému mysleniu. Filozofia prispôbená širšiemu publiku môže (v pozitívnom zmysle) zapríčiniť, že samotná disciplína či rôzne koncepcie filozofov budú zrozumiteľnejšie a atraktívnejšie.

Kate Moran dáva svojmu textu názov v podobe otázky: *Do Children Have Common Sense?* Rozlišuje tu medzi *common sense* and *common moral sense*, pričom podľa Kanta sa *common moral sense* vzťahuje aj na deti.

Skúma Kantove pedagogické spisy a načrtáva opis toho, čo Kant považuje za *common sense* medzi deťmi. Časť štúdie sa zaoberá tým, ktoré časti morálky je podľa Kanta potrebné učiť a aký charakter by mala táto morálna výchova mať. Autorka poukazuje aj na skúmania psychológov J. Piageta a L. Kohlberga, ktorí skúmali vývoj detí, a vytvára tak priestor na uvažovanie o *common moral sense* u detí aj z perspektívy inej disciplíny, ako je filozofia – psychológia.

Štvrtá štúdia, ktorej autorom je Robert B. Loudon s názvom “*If You Want to Write for Children*”: *Conflicting Advice from Kant and Friedlaender* je štruktúrovaná do dvoch častí. Prvá časť predstavuje prehľad a krátky komentár ku Kantovým spisom o výchove a poukazuje na to, že výchova a vzdelávanie tvorí podstatný motív Kantovej filozofie napriek tomu, že najväčšia pozornosť sa často venuje jeho *kritikám* a uvádza aj osobnosti, ktoré mali na Kantove uvažovanie o výchove a vzdelávaní veľký vplyv (Bassedow, Rousseau). Druhá časť je tvorená šiestimi poznámkami, v ktorých hovorí o rozdieloch medzi Kantovým a Friedlaenderovým pohľadom na vzdelávanie detí v ich tvorbe, napríklad aj prostredníctvom poukázania na iné usporiadanie Kantových otázok, Friedlaenderovu prezentáciu Kantovej etiky, a pod. V konečnom dôsledku však pri čítaní nachádzame nielen rozdiely, ktoré autor uvádza, ale uvedomujeme si najmä najdôležitejší spoločný bod pohľadu na vzdelávanie detí u oboch filozofov, ktorým je dôraz na rozvoj kritického myslenia v duchu osvietenského hesla *Sapere aude!*

Ústredným motívom v predposlednej štúdii Kristy K. Thomason – *Above All Things Human: Bestimmung in Salomo Friedlaender's Kant for Children* je, ako napovedá názov, motív *Bestimmung* (osud, určenie, cieľ). Autorka dáva do pozornosti uchopenie tohto pojmu u niektorých autorov, ktorí v Kantových spisoch nachádzajú problematické prvky toho, na koho sa *bestimmung* vzťahuje: v ich interpretácii sa týka iba určitej rasy (bielej). Do opozície stavia Friedlandera, podľa ktorého sa *Bestimmung* vzťahuje na celé ľudstvo – keďže je poslaním celého ľudstva, rasové rozdiely tu nehrajú žiadnu rolu. Poukazuje na Friedlaenderovo uchopenie významu tohto pojmu v *Kantovi pre deti*, ktoré predstavuje protiklad k týmto problémom súvisiacim s Kantovými rasistickými názormi. Fundamentálne pre Friedlaenderovo chápanie Kantovej koncepcie je téza, že rozum je to, čo spája ľudí a vďaka čomu sú si rovní. Ľudia by sa tak mali sami chápať ako morálne slobodné bytosti schopné uvažovania a nie ako príslušníci určitého etnika, národa, sociálnej skupiny. *Bestimmung* je pre Friedlaendera vedený rozumom a morálnym zákonom. Čítanie Kanta a problematických častí, v ktorých hovorí o barbaroch alebo divochoch by sa Friedlaendero-

vou optikou nevzťahovali na rasy, ale na ľudí, ktorí sa namiesto rozumu nechávajú viesť prírodnými pudmi a inštinktmí.

Knihu uzatvára štúdia Jensa Timmermanna – *Equality and Reciprocity, or: The Primacy of the Practical*. Autor považuje Friedlaendera a jeho knihu *Kant pre deti* ako jedného z tých, ktorí uvádzajú Kantovu etiku do praxe. Zdôrazňuje, že nestačí vedieť, čo máme robiť, podstatná je prax. V texte sa venuje aj problému pomoci a konania zo súcitu – na základe interpretácie Kantových spisov argumentuje, že takéto konanie vylučuje rovnosť medzi aktérmi, ktorá by mala byť zachovaná: keď konáme súcitne, chceme pomôcť, a teda nekonáme preto, že by sme mali pomáhať podľa princípu, zákona rozumu. Práve motív rovnosti je to, čo Friedlaender vo svojej knihe na viacerých miestach akcentuje.

Na záver možno konštatovať, že *Kant pre deti* napĺňa svoj cieľ – popularizovať, podnecovať záujem o Kanta nielen medzi mladými ľuďmi, v školách, ale aj medzi širšou verejnosťou. Štruktúra textu je prehľadná, s jasnými prechodmi medzi jednotlivými kapitolami, čo prispieva k jeho čitateľnosti. Kniha je napísaná zaujímavým štýlom, a preto nebudí hneď na začiatku dojem nudného čítania filozofických koncepcií písaných často komplikovaným, čisto akademickým spôsobom. Naopak, otázky, na ktoré vzápätí ponúka odpovede sú skutočne postavené tak, ako by sa autor pýtal z pozície školáka, pričom na mnohých miestach nachádzame aj príklady pre ľahšie pochopenie. Štúdie zahrnuté v knihe ponúkajú pohľad na podobnosti i rozdiely v tvorbe Friedlaendera a Kanta a sú zaujímavým a hodnotným prínosom k literatúre venujúcej sa filozofickej tvorbe I. Kanta.

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