



ANNALES SCIENTIA POLITICA

VOLUME 12, NUMBER 2, 2023



ANNALES SCIENTIA POLITICA

Vol. 12, No. 2, 2023

Annales Scientia Politica is a peer-reviewed scientific journal, issued semi-annually by the Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, University of Prešov, focused on reflection of discourse in political sciences. *Annales Scientia Politica* is indexed in EBSCO Publishing database, ERIH PLUS, CEJSH (The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities), ResearchBib - Academic Resource Index, Humanities - Sozial und Kulturgeschichte (H-Soz-u-Kult), CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library), ROAD (Directory of Open Access Scholarly Resources), DOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals), Index Copernicus International (ICI) Journals Master List

Address of Publisher:

Inštitút politológie, Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity, Ul. 17 novembra 1,
080 78 Prešov, asp@unipo.sk, <http://www.unipo.sk/filozoficka-fakulta/ipol/asp>

Editor in Chief:

Prof. PhDr. Alexander DULEBA, PhD.
Faculty of Arts, University of Prešov

Editorial Board:

Prof. Johann Pall ARNASON
Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague (Czech Republic)
Prof. Igor Spartakovich BAKLANOV, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences
Institute of Humanities, North Caucasus Federal University, Stavropol (Russian Federation)
Prof. PhDr. Vít HLOUŠEK, PhD.
Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno (Czech Republic)
Prof. Dr. Henk van HOUTUM
Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen (Netherlands)
Prof. PhDr. Jan KELLER, PhD.
Faculty of Social Studies, University of Ostrava, Ostrava (Czech Republic)
Prof. Jussi P. LAINE, DSocSci.
Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland (Finland)
Prof. Vitaliy Sergiovich LYTVYN, Doctor of Political Sciences
Faculty of Philosophy, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Lviv (Ukraine)
Prof. PhDr. Darina MALOVÁ, PhD.
Faculty of Arts, Comenius University, Bratislava (Slovak Republic)
Prof. Carlos J. McCADDEN, PhD.
Department of General Studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Mexico-City (Mexico)
Prof. Yuriy Olexandrovych OSTAPETS, Doctor of Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences, Uzhhorod National University, Uzhhorod (Ukraine)
Prof. nadzw. dr. hab. Agnieszka PAWŁOWSKA
Institute of Political Science, University of Rzeszow, Rzeszow (Poland)
Prof. Kathleen SCHERF, PhD.
Thomson Rivers University, Kamloops (Canada)
Prof. PaedDr. Jaroslav VENCÁLEK, PhD.
Faculty of Arts, University of Prešov, Prešov (Slovak Republic)
Assoc. Prof. PhDr. Irina DUDINSKÁ, PhD.
Faculty of Arts, University of Prešov, Prešov (Slovak Republic)
Assoc. Prof. PhDr. Vladislav DUDINSKÝ, PhD.
Faculty of Arts, University of Prešov, Prešov (Slovak Republic)
Assoc. Prof. PhDr. Jaromír FEBER, PhD.
VŠB, Technical University of Ostrava, Ostrava (Czech Republic)
Assoc. Prof. Francisco LARA-VALENCIA, PhD.
School of Transborder Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ (USA)
Assoc. Prof. Sergio PEÑA, PhD.
Urban and Environmental Studies Department, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana, Baja California (Mexico)
Assoc. Prof. PhDr. Jelena PETRUCIOVÁ, PhD.
Faculty of Social Studies, University of Ostrava, Ostrava (Czech Republic)
Assoc. Prof. Katarzyna STOKŁOSA, PhD.
Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark, Odense (Denmark)
Dr. Paulina SZELAĞ
Institute of International Relations and Political Science, East European State Higher School in Przemyśl, Przemyśl (Poland)

Editorial Committee:

Assoc. Prof. Ing. Martin LAČNÝ, PhD.
Mgr. Gabriel SZÉKELY, PhD.
PhDr. Matúš ŽAC, PhD.

Web administrator:

Assoc. Prof. Ing. Martin LAČNÝ, PhD.



This work is licensed under a *Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License*



LIST OF CONTENTS

STUDIES:

The dynamics of the party system in Spain in the light of the general elections in 2023	
PETRA MEŠTÁNKOVÁ	5

ARTICLES:

Emotions in the study of international relations	
MICHAELA ZEMANOVÁ	24
Foreign policy conditionality of the Slovak Republic	
KRZYSZTOF ŻARNA	34
Organisation of the crisis management system in Poland	
KAROL PIĘKOŚ	43

REVIEWS:

Digital fascism: social media as a driver of right-wing extremism	
<i>Fielitz, M. – Holger, M.</i>	
EMÍLIA MARIANČIKOVÁ	49

RESEARCH NOTES:

Presentation of the scientific outcomes of the Institute of Political Science at the international and domestic forum	
ANNA POLAČKOVÁ	52

OBSAH

ŠTÚDIE:

The dynamics of the party system in Spain in the light of the general elections in 2023 PETRA MEŠTÁNKOVÁ	5
--	---

ČLÁNKY:

Emócie v štúdiu medzinárodných vzťahov MICHAELA ZEMANOVÁ	24
Foreign policy conditionality of the Slovak Republic KRZYSZTOF ŻARNA	34
Organizacja systemu zarządzania kryzysowego w Polsce KAROL PIĘKOŚ	43

RECENZIE:

Digitálny fašizmus. Sociálne médiá ako motor pravicového extrémizmu <i>Fielitz, M. – Holger, M.</i> EMÍLIA MARIANČIKOVÁ	49
--	----

POZNÁMKY Z VÝSKUMU:

Prezentácia vedeckých výsledkov Inštitútu politológie na medzinárodnom a domácom fóre ANNA POLAČKOVÁ	52
--	----

THE DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN SPAIN IN THE LIGHT OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN 2023

PETRA MĚŠTÁNKOVÁ

Department of Political Science and Social Sciences
Faculty of Law
Palacky University in Olomouc
Czech Republic
E-mail: petra.mestankova@upol.cz

Abstract:

This study examines the transformation of the Spanish party system, particularly in the context of the July 2023 general elections. Over the last decade, the party system has become more fragmented and polarized. From a two-party format, the contest has gradually turned into a competition between two blocs: the right and the left. The July 2023 general elections showed that the party system has partially stabilized, with the mainstream parties (PP and PSOE) recovering, but not enough to form a single-party government. Support from regional parties remains essential for forming a central government. However, the possibilities for cooperation between political parties are limited by the nature of the party blocs, and the high degree of ideological and social polarization.

Keywords:

Elections, electoral volatility, government, party system, polarization, Spain.

For decades, Spain has been a case of imperfect bipartisanship, with two major parties at either end of the political spectrum. The Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP) represented the right and the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) the left. These two par-

ties differed mainly in their positions on socio-economic issues and the role of the state in implementing economic and social policies. This imperfect bipartisanship has fractured over the last decade, mainly due to austerity policies following the 2008 economic and financial crisis, corruption scandals and Catalan secessionism. Between 2015 and 2019, support for mainstream parties declined significantly and new parties gained parliamentary representation. The party system has not only become more fragmented but also more polarized. The far left, and later the far right, have gained ground on the political scene and have become indispensable in forming governments. This eventually led to the formation of the first coalition government at national level between the PSOE and the far-left Unidas Podemos (2020-2023). The last general elections were held in July 2023 and can therefore provide insights into the current degree of stabilisation of the party system and the way political parties interact.

To complete the picture, it is also necessary to consider the centre-periphery cleavage in Spanish politics. The regional parties gain parliamentary representation and, in the absence of a majority for the national parties, they are the ones who have the key to government formation. The most prominent of these come from Catalonia and the Basque Country, au-

onomous communities where strong regional nationalist parties compete alongside the national parties. There are also strong regional parties in Galicia, the Canary Islands and Navarre. It is worth noting that some of these parties have become radicalised and opposed to the existing political system, which is shaped by the 1978 constitution. This is most evident in the Catalan separatist parties (ERC, Junts per Catalunya), even when compared to similar Basque parties.

This study focuses on how the party system has changed in the context of July 2023 general elections and how parties interact, which is crucial for government formation. Particular attention is paid to the degree of institutionalisation of the Spanish party system. This is measured by electoral volatility (Pedersen index) and the effective number of parties (Laakso-Taagepera index). These data are complemented by an analysis of the polarization of the party system. It turns out that the strong polarization of the party system is one of its characteristics that affects the way political parties interact with each other. In particular, it makes communication and consensus-building between traditional, mainstream parties more difficult. The study also shows how the party system has been transformed into two competing blocs, one on the right and one on the left. The change in the interaction between political parties also makes it difficult to form a stable government. The mainstream parties are unable to form a government on their own, so the country has moved from single-party governments to coalition governments. But winning a parliamentary majority has not become easier, and elections have been repeated in the recent past.

The main data sources are the election results provided by the Ministry of the Interior and the opinion polls of the CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas). In the case of polarization, I used expert calculations (Simón, 2020b) and data from the EU Political Barometer of the Carlos III University of Madrid. I decided not to use the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and the Manifesto Project Database (MARPOR) because they are only available for Spain up to 2019 and therefore cannot be used to show the current situation.

The study draws on the literature on party systems (e.g. Sartori, 1976 (ed. 2005), Bardi and

Mair, 2008; Poguntke, 2014), the institutionalization of party systems (e.g. Bértoa Casal, 2014; Havlík, 2015) and political polarization (e.g. Dalton, 2008; Dalton, 2021; McCoy, Rahman and Somer, 2018; Borbáth, Hutter and Leiningner, 2023). There is also a rich literature on the Spanish party system and elections (e.g., Simón, 2020a; Simón, 2020b; Rodríguez-Teruel, 2020; Rama, Cordero and Zagorski, 2021; Orriols and Cordero, 2015).

The study will be structured as follows: first, I will present a theoretical discussion of the dimensions of party system change, such as electoral volatility, fragmentation, and polarization. I will then outline the main changes in the Spanish party system over the last decade, its increasing polarisation and transformation into two blocs. Finally, I analyse the July 2023 general elections along the dimensions of electoral volatility, effective number of parties and polarization, providing insights into the current interactions between political parties that are crucial for understanding the government formation in the current context.

Dimensions of party system change

To understand how party systems change, we first need to consider the parameters used to define them. The seminal work on party systems was provided by Sartori (1976), who considered the number of parties and the degree of party polarization to be the most important defining elements of party systems. Several other works (e.g. Bardi and Mair, 2008, Dalton, 2008, Poguntke, 2014, Havlík, 2015) have built on Sartori's work and reassessed which parameters define party systems and best explain their transformation. The consensus among scholars is that there are two basic approaches to studying party systems in pluralistic, democratic settings.

The first approach, in the words of Bardi and Mair (2008, p. 152), "sees party systems as little more than 'sets of parties' in which all of the individual parties jostle up against one another and may be juxtaposed to one another". The focus is upon individual political parties, especially the number of parties operating within the party system. The second approach is more concerned with how political parties interact within a given party system. The sheer number of political parties, or their description,

does not tell us much about the dynamics of the party system. Therefore, as Poguntke (2014, p. 952) states, “a combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators may be more instructive”. The dynamics of the party system reflects the stability of the interaction between political parties and is thus related to the institutionalisation of the party system.

Electoral volatility and fragmentation

Bértoa Casal (2014, p. 17) defines the party system institutionalisation as “the process by which the patterns of interaction among political parties become routine, predictable and stable over time”. Over the last decade, there has been a certain de-institutionalisation of party system competition in so far stable Western European countries, with the emergence of new parties, usually from the far right or the far left, but not exclusively. In contrast, party systems in many Central and Eastern European countries have never reached a high level of institutionalisation (Bértoa Casal, 2014). Those that were considered institutionalised (such as the Czech party system) have also undergone de-institutionalisation (Havlík, 2015).

The extent to which political parties are embedded in the electorate can be expressed by the volatility (Pedersen) index.¹ If the ties between voters and parties are close, the volatility index will be low (Cabada, Hloušek and Jurek, 2014, p. 72). Havlík (2015, p. 187) outlines three sources of electoral volatility: “1) change in electoral support due to the preferences of voters participating in both subsequent elections; 2) change in electorate composition (loss of electorate, new voters, changes in voter turnout); and 3) change in the supply of political parties standing for the election”. Electoral volatility affects the political strategies of political leaders. According to Moraes and Béjar (2023, p. 637) “higher electoral volatility lead to higher levels of ideological polarization, and particularly in cases where newcomers get into the electoral game”. For the sake of winning more votes, a party may make a rational decision in favour of a polarizing strategy in a context of increased instability. Electoral volatility may also influence politicians’ attitudes to-

wards dissolving a party or merging with other parties.

Another approach to the institutionalisation of the party system is the focus on the fragmentation of the party system. An index measuring the effective number of parties in terms of votes and seats was developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979).² The fragmentation index advanced the basic counting of parties in political systems. Maurice Duverger in the 1950s and later Jean Blondel in the 1960s developed basic criteria for the typology of party systems based on the number of parties. They defined a party system as a one-party, two-party, two-and-a-half-party or multi-party system. Sartori’s (1976) counting method was based on the criteria of the party relevancy in the party system. Only parties with coalition or blackmail potential were relevant. Laakso and Taagepera emphasised that their aim was to measure the effective number of parties operating in the political system. Their index uses either votes or mandates. Blau (2008) also extends the measurement of the effective number of parties to their legislative and governmental power. Regarding the stability of the party system, a high fragmentation index is associated with a lower degree of institutionalised party system (Cabada, Hloušek, and Jurek 2014, p. 78).

Ideological and affective polarization

The rise of extreme poles and populism has focused research on the party system on the phenomenon of polarization, already conceptualised by Sartori. Polarization reflects a second approach to understanding the party system, based on the quality of party competition and interaction between political parties. In words of Dalton (2008, p. 900), “party system polarization reflects the degree of ideological differentiation among political parties in a system”. It is therefore a polarization of party positions on policy issues (Hanretty, 2022, p. 2). In Sartori’s typology of the party system, ideo-

¹ The calculation of Pedersen index is as follows:

$$V = \sum |v_{i,t} - v_{i,t-1}| / 2$$

² The actual number of parties is calculated as follows $ENP = 1 / \sum p_i^2$. In the case of the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP), p is the proportion of votes that party i received in the election. The index can also be calculated by determining the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP). The share of votes is replaced by the share of seats won by each party.

logical distance is a key feature of polarized pluralism, which has a centrifugal dynamic and thus differs from the category of moderate pluralism, which has a centripetal dynamic.

Both categories share other characteristics. In the case of polarized pluralism, it is primarily the presence of an anti-system party/parties, while in a broader sense they adopt a delegitimising attitude towards the existing political system. Thus, the political spectrum includes parties that disagree with the basic principles of the existing political regime and behave irresponsibly. The political centre faces opposition from both the right and the left (Sartori, 2005, p. 135-146). Reaching consensus in such a system is therefore very difficult. Moderate pluralism is mainly characterised by coalition governments and the existence of alternative coalitions. According to Sartori, it is very similar to the logic of a two-party system because it is essentially bipolar. There are no major anti-system parties and overall politics is moderate (Sartori, 2005, p. 190-192). Specific cases may not fit all the characteristics of these categories. There are borderline cases. In the case of Spain, it is certainly debatable whether it is a borderline case of polarized pluralism or whether the logic of the party system still corresponds to moderate pluralism.

Now let's see how we can measure polarization. Ideological polarization is usually measured by the Dalton (polarization) index (Dalton, 2008; Dalton, 2021). Ideological polarization is independent of the number of parties. Therefore, there may be only a few parties and the party system may be highly polarized (Dalton, 2008, p. 908). Data from several databases can be used to calculate ideological polarization. The Dalton index can be calculated using data from mass opinion polls in which respondents rank parties on a left-right scale from 0 to 10, with 0 representing the far left and 10 representing the far right. Thus, the measurement of ideological polarization is based on voters' perceptions of the parties' positions (e.g. Comparative Study of Electoral Systems). It is also possible to rely on the quantitative content analysis of the Manifesto Research Project (MARPOR). In contrast to other methods, the higher impartiality of this method is emphasized (Dinas and Gemenis, 2009, p. 428). One of the most used indices that MARPOR produces is the RILE (Right-Left In-

dex). In a similar vein, the EU Political Barometer analyses the social media posts of political parties (here on Facebook).

Parties are usually positioned on the left-right dimension of the political spectrum. The left-right divide encompasses differing party positions on socio-economic as well as valence and cultural issues. Dalton (2008, p. 910) points out that the left-right scale can reflect any political issue relevant to a country. For example, the RILE index uses economic, social, and cultural categories. For a long time, party competition in institutionalised party systems (such as in Western Europe) has centred on socio-economic issues. The left-right divide was mainly associated with the parties' different positions on economic and social policy (e.g. social democratic parties vs. liberal-conservative parties). In the last decade, however, this has changed, and cultural issues have become more prominent. In addition to socio-economic issues, other issues such as immigration, national identity and minority rights have come to the fore. Several scholars point out that the left-right scale does not capture well the cleavages associated with the cultural dimension, such as traditional vs. modern cultural values or cosmopolitan vs. nationalist cleavages (e.g. McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, 2018; Borbáth, Hutter, and Leininger, 2023). The importance of the cultural dimension of political conflict may vary from country to country. In some, it may exist alongside an already existing socio-economic dimension, while in others, it may replace it (as is the case in Hungary, for example) (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, 2018, p. 26). It is therefore necessary to consider what the left-right scale says about political party attitudes in each country context.

Recent studies on polarization (e.g. McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, 2018; Borbáth, Hutter, and Leininger, 2023; Rodríguez-Teruel, 2020) work with the distinction between ideological polarization (at the level of elites) and affective polarization (at the level of society). Affective polarization highlights the divisions in contemporary society, the existence of closed groups with strong in-group attitudes that limit cooperation at the social and political level (Borbáth, Hutter, and Leininger, 2023, p. 633). A certain degree of polarization is considered beneficial for democracy as it can positively influence participation, voter decision-making

and strengthen political parties (Dalton, 2008; McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, 2018). However, extreme polarization has a negative impact on democratic politics in terms of consensus building and governance. This is already well known from historical examples such as the German Weimar Republic (1920s-1930s) or the French Fourth Republic (1940s-1950s), where extreme polarization of party systems negatively affected the governance of the country.

In contemporary societies McCoy, Rahman and Somer (2018, p. 18) define the extreme (also severe) polarization “as a process whereby the normal multiplicity of differences in a society increasingly aligns along a single dimension, cross-cutting differences become instead reinforcing, and people increasingly perceive and describe politics and society in terms of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’”. The political and social life is marked by “strong emotions of antipathy and distrust toward opposing parties, candidates and social groups” (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, p. 19). A highly polarized political environment negatively affects citizens’ trust in political institutions, which can lead to a decline in support for democracy. In such a context, polarization is associated with the erosion of liberal democracy. Party leaders themselves can exacerbate polarization by deciding to adopt a polarizing electoral strategy to gain more votes (Moraes, Béjar, 2023, p. 638).

Affective polarization can be measured by opinion polls in which respondents are placed on a left-right scale. One can also rely on expert surveys, which are the basis of, for example, the V-dem project. Its index of political polarization can be used, which asks a question “Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps?”. The scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (Yes, to a large extent) is used. Another distinction of polarization is between horizontal polarization,

i.e. ideological polarization, and vertical polarization, which captures “the distance between voters and parties, that is the voters’ perceptions of how far party elites are from the voters’ own positions” (Rodríguez-Teruel, 2020, p. 384).

The following analysis captures the changes in the Spanish party system, particularly between the 2019 and 2023 general elections. However, it is necessary to go deeper into the recent past, when the party system was de-institutionalised, but soon two political blocs gradually emerged. The 2023 general elections brought signs of consolidation of the party system, but also a deepening of political polarization between the competing party blocs.

The decline of imperfect bipartisanship over the last decade

The Spanish party system has been very stable for decades, with two mainstream parties – the PSOE on the centre-left and the PP on the centre-right. Both parties won more than two-thirds of the vote in every general election from 1982 to 2015 (see table 1), and more than three-quarters of the vote between 1996 and 2011. In terms of seats, their dominance was even more remarkable, with more than 80 % of parliamentary seats. The PP was considered “one of the strongest conservative parties in Europe” (Rodríguez-Teruel, 2020, p. 381). Its support peaked in 2011, when it won 44,6 % of the vote (Ministerio del Interior, not dated). Despite these facts, by this time the Spanish party system was already showing a high degree of polarization, 4,33 in the 2004 parliamentary elections (Dalton, 2008, p. 905-906). According to Dalton, the Spanish case confirmed that a bipartisan system does not have to be less polarized than multi-party systems.

Table 1 Vote and seat share of PP and PSOE from 1982 to 2023

PP+PSOE share/Electoral year	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004
Vote Share in %	74,47	70,03	65,39	73,54	76,42	78,68	80,3
Seat Share in %	88,29	82,57	80,57	85,71	84,86	88,00	89,14
PP+PSOE share/Electoral year	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019 (April)	2019 (November)	2023
Vote Share in %	83,81	73,39	50,71	55,64	45,36	48,81	64,75
Seat Share in %	92,29	84,57	60,86	63,43	54,00	59,71	73,71

Source: Author based on data on general elections and results to the lower chamber of parliament (Congreso de los Diputados). Data are provided by the Ministry of the Interior (not dated, 2023b).

At the national level, single-party governments either had an absolute majority in parliament or were supported by regional parties. The Spanish party system was highly institutionalised. One of the most important factors influencing the stability of the party system was the electoral system, which imposed high constraints on achieving parliamentary representation. Even though it is a proportional system, it has a strong majoritarian effect due to the different sizes of constituencies (52 constituencies with sizes between 37 and 1, many of which are small constituencies) and the D'Hondt method for the conversion of votes into seats (Rama, Cordero, and Zagórski, 2021). The most common constituency size is 4 seats (10 out of 52) and 5 seats (8 out of 52) in the 2023 parliamentary elections. This type of electoral system favours large parties with support evenly distributed across constituencies and regional parties, usually representing nationalist sentiments, with concentrated support in a limited number of constituencies. Conversely, third parties with support evenly distributed across constituencies are disadvantaged (for a detailed analysis, see Penadés and Santiuste, 2013, p. 100-113).

De-institutionalisation of the party system between the 2015 and 2019 general elections

Over the last decade, the Spanish party system has undergone a significant transformation. In the 2015 and 2016 general elections, two new parties were able to overcome the constraints of the electoral system and gained significant parliamentary representation. The 2015 parliamentary elections can be seen as an "earthquake" in the political system. The mainstream parties lost around 23 % of the vote and 24 % of parliamentary seats, and despite some recovery in the 2016 parliamentary elections, their dominance came to an end. The third and fourth political forces were new parties - the far-left Podemos and the liberal Ciudadanos (C's) (see annex 1).

Looking at the new parties, Podemos emerged from popular protests against austerity. The so-called anti-austerity movement 15-M (Indignados) was at the forefront of these protests. From its inception, the party built on a populist anti-establishment discourse against

the political and economic elites, which it referred to as "la casta" (Rama, Cordero, and Zagórski, 2021). It also adopted a delegitimising stance, speaking of the "crisis of the 1978 regime", accompanied by the political and moral decline of the traditional elites (Podemos, not dated, p. 5-7). Podemos became a strong competitor to the PSOE in the 2015 and 2016 general elections but did not overcome the PSOE among left-wing voters. In the 2015 general election it won 12,67 % (42 seats), but together with other left-wing parties (often in coalition with Podemos)¹ it won 20,66 % (69 seats). Before the 2016 general election, Podemos joined forces with the traditional left-wing party United Left (Izquierda Unida) to form a party called Unidos Podemos (United We Can).² Together they won 13,37 % (45 seats), but with other left parties 21,3 % (71 seats). C's³ began to win more votes thanks to its anti-corruption campaign and its strong opposition to the Catalan secessionist movement. The party initially positioned itself as a centrist party, claiming to be able to negotiate with both the PP and the PSOE for government support. However, it has moved much further to the right of the political spectrum. After the 2015 regional and local elections, the C's had already supported most PP candidates (Rama, Cordero, and Zagórski, 2021). In the 2015 general elections the C's won 13,93 % (40 seats) and in the 2016 general elections 13,05 % (32 seats).

¹ These parties were En Comú Podem (Catalonia), En Marea (Galicia) and Compromís-Podemos-És el moment (Valencia) in the 2015 elections. Before the 2016 general election, Compromís regrouped to become Compromís-Podemos-EUPV.

² Ahead of the April 2019 general elections, Unidos Podemos has renamed itself Unidas Podemos to emphasise its feminist appeal. Its leader was Pablo Iglesias Turrión, a university political science teacher. He was second deputy prime minister of Spain from 2020 to 2021. He left politics in 2021.

³ Ciudadanos was founded in Catalonia in 2006 by Albert Rivera Díaz. The party's main aim was to oppose the secessionist tendencies that were already growing. At the same time, it presented itself as a new centrist party that represented a new politics, as a "clean" party without corruption scandals. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, the party overcame its regional entrenchment. However, after the November 2019 parliamentary elections, Albert Rivera resigned and left politics. Since then, the party has been in steady decline.

What factors influenced the broad support for the new parties? First, the financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 hit the country hard due to the simultaneous bursting of the housing bubble (Orriols and Cordero, 2016). It was accompanied by a crisis in the banking sector, which had a negative impact on the growth of public debt. The PSOE, which was in power between 2008 and 2011, had to adopt austerity measures, which were continued by the PP government (2011-2015). The austerity policies at that time were strongly supported by the EU institutions and several key EU member states, such as Germany. The party in power had to respond to international commitments and to put off the demands of the electorate. Their governmental responsibility was more important than their responsiveness to the electorate (Měšťánková, 2019). Economic factors explain the support for Podemos and C's, but they are not the only ones (Bosch and Durán, 2019).

Second, political factors played a role. In the aftermath of the 2011 parliamentary elections, the main political parties faced several corruption trials. Trust in political parties and political institutions, such as parliament, fell sharply. Orriols and Cordero (2016, p. 476) note that "The concept of 'old politics' was popularised in Spanish political discourse and lack of confidence increased among the population, especially among those who had been more critical of the political elites: young, urban and/or politically sophisticated citizens from the wealthiest regions". The general political crisis contributed to a final, notable factor, the rise of the Catalan secessionist movement, which led to the holding of two illegal independence referendums (2014 and 2017) (Dowling, 2018). The Catalan political scene has undergone turbulent changes, with the de facto demise of CiU (Convergència i Unió), long the main regional party seeking greater autonomy. Catalonia has been governed by the ERC and the Junts per Catalunya, which have adopted an anti-systemic stance, in clear opposition to the existing political system. The C's remained strongly opposed to the secessionist forces and was the main anti-secessionist party in Catalonia between 2015 and 2021. The salience of the territorial conflict was not as pronounced in the 2015 general election (Orriols and Cordero,

2016), but its salience increased over time as the conflict escalated.

The repetition of the 2015 and 2016 elections showed not only that bipartisanship is on the decline, but also that forming a government will be a more difficult task than in the past. It was only after the second general election that the PP formed a single-party government because the main opposition party, the PSOE, abstained. Until then, the informal rule had been that the winning party formed the government. However, the PP government faced serious problems in 2017 and 2018. One of them was the escalation of the conflict in Catalonia, the result of which was the unilateral declaration of independence in October 2017 by a narrow majority in the Catalan parliament. In response, the national government of Mariano Rajoy (PP) dissolved the regional parliament and government with the approval of the Senate. It established direct government administration over the autonomous community and called new elections for the regional parliament (Simón, 2020a). The PP has adopted a more repressive strategy towards Catalan secessionism. However, this has also had the effect of distancing it from other regional parties that have been able so far to cooperate with the PP (e.g. EAJ-PNV).

The second was a court decision in a major corruption case involving the PP. The National Court (Audiencia Nacional) ruled that the PP had been illegally financed and had created an effective institutional system of corruption. The court also did not find some of the testimonies credible, which had a negative impact on the credibility of Mariano Rajoy (Prime Minister), who also testified at the court (Gil, 2018, Simón, 2020a). This was the final straw that prompted the opposition to trigger a vote of no confidence in the government. A constitutional provision called for a constructive vote of no confidence, which meant that Mariano Rajoy's government could only be replaced if another parliamentary majority was formed. For the first time in Spanish history, this succeeded, and Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) was supported not only by the left but also by regional, nationalist political parties. From that moment on, a new majority was formed including the left parties and a large part of the nationalist forces. This was the moment of the emergence of a new left-wing bloc in Spanish politics.

Overall, this period has seen the de-institutionalisation of the existing party system and its greater fragmentation. The ideological distance between political parties has increased and attitudes have become more radicalised. The attitude of the far left towards the political system can be described as delegitimising, but the regional, nationalist parties in Catalonia have adopted an anti-system stance. Despite the radicalisation, the logic of the Spanish party system has been one of moderate pluralism, as the traditional, mainstream political parties have still been able to find consensus and have not faced bilateral opposition.

Formation of a two-block party competition between the 2019 and 2023 general elections

In the general elections of April 2019, the PP reached its lowest level of electoral support, winning only 16,7 % of the vote. The PSOE has begun to recover from the setbacks it suffered in the 2015 and 2016 general elections (see annex 1). The PSOE won the April 2019 parliamentary elections but was unable to form a centre-left government with the C's, where the swing to right-wing parties was confirmed (on government formation between the April and November 2019 parliamentary elections, see Simón, 2020b). The repeated inability to form a government led to an elections' repetition in November 2019. The most important change came with the unexpected rise of the far-right party Vox, which based its programme on defending Spain's territorial integrity against separatist parties and on defending conservative values. Its strong questioning of Catalan secessionism was the main reason why voters voted for the party (Rodríguez-Teruel, 2020, Rama, Cordero, and Zagórski, 2021). On the other hand, the liberal C's suffered an electoral defeat in the November elections (see annex 1). The right wing of the political scene has been radicalised by the strong position of Vox.

The party system has become more polarized and the ideological distance between political parties has increased. On either side of the spectrum, two major parties have established themselves - Unidas Podemos on the left and Vox on the right. The left bloc has been composed of the moderate PSOE and the far-left Unidas Podemos, as well as several region-

al parties, often in a coalition with Podemos (such as En Comú Podem in Catalonia or En Común-Unidas Podemos in Galicia). After the successful constructive vote of no confidence, the PSOE has moved further to the left. The regional, nationalist parties (such as the ERC in Catalonia) have begun to work more closely with the left-wing governmental parties.

Right-wing voters split their votes. In addition to the PP, they voted for the liberal C's and the far-right Vox, which managed to win over 50 % of former PP voters (Rodríguez-Teruel, 2020, p. 385). The C's wanted to replace the PP among right-wing voters. This was a risky strategy, but the shift to the right was evident both in the refusal to cooperate with the PSOE on the formation of national government, which had a sufficient parliamentary majority after the April 2019 elections, and at the regional level, where C's only cooperated with the PP in regional government coalitions (Azpitarte Sánchez, 2020, p. 145-149). The C's suffered an electoral defeat in the November 2019 general elections. The PP and C's tried to distance themselves from the far-right Vox, but on the other hand they needed its support for right-wing regional governments (Simón, 2020b, p. 537-538). They were careful not to make this collaboration too visible, because they did not want to be associated too closely with Vox's radical positions.

The differences between the left and right politics have traditionally been based on different attitudes to socio-economic issues and redistribution (e.g. fiscal policy, housing, health care). They have also involved issues of values and identity (Simón, 2020b, p. 535), in particular the approach to different national identities within the Spanish state and to the concept of the state of autonomies. Traditionally, left-wing parties have taken a much more inclusive stance towards regional, nationalist parties than right-wing parties, which are more associated with Spanish nationalism. The most striking manifestation of this difference was the divergent approach to the territorial conflict in Catalonia, which culminated in Catalonia's unilateral declaration of independence in October 2017. The PP government adopted a strategy of suppression, while the Sánchez government sought rapprochement with separatist parties.

Regarding the degree of political polarization, Simón (2020b, p. 536) shows that the degree of polarization has been steadily increasing over the last two decades, exceeding 5 on a 10-point scale in the November 2019 parliamentary elections. The increase in polarization is attributed to the polarizing political strategies of new parties, rather than to the radicalisation of voters' attitudes. The polarization contest "has blurred the differences between moderate and radical parties in the eyes of the voters" (Rodríguez-Teruel, 2020, p. 382). In the 2015 general elections, it was Podemos with its anti-establishment appeal against the political and economic elites. In the November 2019 general elections, it was the far-right Vox party that surfed the wave of rising nationalism (Simón, 2020b, p. 537). Spanish nationalism had long been negatively associated with the Franco regime, but the rise of Catalan nationalism, which led to separatist politics, opened the door to Spanish nationalism. Shortly before the November 2019 parliamentary elections, the Supreme Court sentenced Catalan separatist leaders to prison. There were mass demonstrations and eventually riots in Catalonia. These events played a role for those who voted for Vox. The exhumation and reburial of Francisco Franco in October 2019 also had a positive impact on the vote for Vox (Simón, 2020b, p. 547-549).

The two-bloc competition was confirmed by the formation of a coalition government between the PSOE and Unidas Podemos (Azpitarte Sánchez, 2020, p. 151-158). An act that the PSOE refused to do between the 2015 and 2016 elections, when it wanted to form a government with the C's. The coalition government legitimised the close cooperation between the moderate left and the far left. This coalition was also repeated at regional and local level. The PP strongly criticised this move and portrayed the UP as an undemocratic party close to undemocratic leftist regimes in Latin America (e.g. Venezuela). The government was also supported by regional parties, including separatists such as ERC and EH Bildu, which decided to abstain. The right-wing parties then began to associate the PSOE, led by Pedro Sánchez, with the radicals. They subsequently referred to his government pejoratively as 'Sanchism' (sanchismo) (PP, 2021).

Political situation ahead of the parliamentary elections in July 2023

Pedro Sánchez has called early general elections for July 2023. They were called in the context of the exhaustion of the left-wing coalition government of PSOE and UP. This government focused mainly on issues such as unemployment, social policies for low-income groups and economic recovery after the health crisis caused by COVID-19, which completely shut down the country in the first phase of the pandemic (see, for example, OECD, 2020, Rodríguez Teruel, del Pino, and Real-Dato, 2023). However, it has also pushed through reforms aimed at extending the protection of minority rights, which have particularly clashed with the far right, such as the law on transgender persons (ley "trans").

After the formation of the first coalition government, tackling unemployment became a key government priority. In the 2019 general election, unemployment was one of the top issues in Spain (see annex 2). The problem has persisted since the economic and financial crisis, reaching its peak in 2013 with 26,1 % of the population unemployed. Unemployment remained above the EU average in the following years (Eurostat, 2023a). The government has negotiated a reform of the labour code, aimed at reducing precarious employment and seasonality. Contracts of an indefinite duration have become a common way of employing workers. As a result, the problems of seasonality and contract duration have improved in the country (Flores, 2023). The overall level of unemployment has also fallen, and its importance has diminished in the run-up to the July 2023 elections (see annex 2). Other notable socioeconomic measures include the introduction of a minimum subsistence income, the taxation of bank and energy company profits, the regulation of energy prices during the energy crisis and the first regulation of housing (Flores, 2023).

Legal reforms aimed at strengthening the rights of minorities have led to disputes and clashes with right-wing parties, especially the far right. These included the extension of the right to abortion, which was extended in time (to 14 weeks), and the abolition of parental consent for girls over the age of 16. The rights of the LGBTI community were extended by the

law on transgender persons, introduced gender self-determination. This provision completely relaxed the conditions for gender change in the civil registry (Flores, 2023). The most controversial reform was the reform of the penal code in the area of sexual abuse (ley “solo sí es sí”), which aimed to provide greater protection for victims of sexual abuse. However, once it was put into practice, prisoners began to ask for their sentences to be reviewed. According to the General Council of the Judiciary in July 2023, 31,7 % of the reviews resulted in a reduction of the sentence and 117 prisoners were released (Iustel, 2023). This caused friction in the government, and the PSOE, along with the main opposition party (PP), voted for further reform of the penal code against the opposition of the Unidas Podemos, which was the author of the first reform of the penal code.


The last reform that caused serious tensions between the government and the opposition was the law on democratic memory, which introduced the obligation to find all those who disappeared during the civil war (1936-1939). The Franco regime was declared illegal, and the commission of inquiry on human rights violations between 1978 and 1983 was created. It means during the consolidation of the democratic regime which led to strong opposition from right-wing parties (Flores, 2023).

The territorial conflict over the secession of Catalonia, which was still very much alive before the 2019 parliamentary elections, completes the picture of the situation in the coun-

try. The government has adopted a strategy of rapprochement with separatist parties, especially the ERC. Following the Supreme Court ruling that sent a number of Catalan politicians to prison for years, the government granted them pardons. However, their exclusion from public office remained in force. To calm the conflict, the government reformed the penal code and removed the crime of sedition (Camut, 2022). The intensity of the territorial conflict was definitively reduced, which was reflected in a decrease in support for Catalan independence (CEO, 2023, p. 68) and an increase in support for the non-independent Catalan Socialist Party (PSC).

The views of the Spanish voters have also changed between 2019 and 2023, as captured by the CIS barometers. These barometers ask, among other things, what citizens think are the most important problems facing the country (see Figure 1). In 2019, unemployment was the most important issue. However, valence issues such as the country's political problems, corruption and fraud, and the territorial conflict in Catalonia were also important (see annex 2). This has to be seen in the context of the general political crisis that accompanied the fall of Mariano Rajoy's government in 2018. It was also the time when the territorial conflict in Catalonia reached its peak. However, the severity of the conflict was perceived much more strongly by voters on the right than by voters on the left. For the far left, social and economic issues were more important than Catalan separatism.

Figure 1 The most important problems in Spain in 2019 and 2023 general elections (voters' perceptions)



Source: Author based on CIS data (2019b, 2023b). The figure captures those topics that gained more than 10 % of the total in given time periods.

The state of economy was seen as the most important issue ahead of the 2023 elections, especially among right-wing voters. Unemployment has declined in importance but remains an important cross-party issue. The importance of valence issues has declined but remains prominent especially among right-wing voters. In addition to political problems in general, they emphasised the bad behaviour of politicians. The importance of the territorial conflict in Catalonia has fallen sharply among voters of different political parties. Finally, left-wing voters were much more concerned about the impact of climate change than right-wing voters. Immigration, a typical socio-cultural issue, was only important for Vox voters (Castro Martínez, Mo Groba, 2020), but even they were less concerned about this issue in the 2023 general elections.


Regarding the party system, several changes could be observed in the run-up to the elections. The PP, as the main opposition party, increased its preferences among voters. Vox remained an option for right-wing voters, but the C's became a party without the possibility of winning a mandate at national, regional or local level. In the regional and municipal elections in May 2023, the PP won, and Vox improved its results, while Unidas Podemos and C's lost ground among voters (Ministerio del Interior, 2023a). The PP also won a majority in the elections for the autonomous communities, and in several of them it formed a coalition government with the far-right Vox (Aragon, Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Murcia). In doing so, the PP openly legitimised the extreme right participation in the government. This raised legitimate expectations that this right-wing coalition could be repeated at national level, at least in the form of tacit support for the PP's government by Vox. The right-wing bloc was thus radicalised, as the liberal C's almost disappeared and decided not to participate in the 2023 general elections (Chislett, 2023). On the left, the sharp decline in support for the far-left Unidas Podemos and its regional partners led to a realignment. The left-wing parties came together in an electoral coalition - Sumar - led by popular Minister of Labour Yolanda Díaz.

Party system change after July 2023 general elections

Changes in the party system in the context of the July 2023 parliamentary elections were observed through several parameters: electoral volatility, effective number of parties (electoral and parliamentary) and degree of political polarization. The first indicator, electoral volatility, can be used to show the degree of instability within the party system (see figure 2). As electoral volatility figures can vary depending on measurement (Bertóla Casal, Deegan-Krause, and Haughton, 2017), the measure presented here uses inclusive aggregation to capture predecessor/successor party links. In this case, this is particularly relevant for the new left-wing coalition Sumar, which was formed just before the general election in July 2023. Therefore, all the gains of the parties forming this coalition were used in the calculation, and name changes were ignored. The issue of the threshold was problematic because in Spain, parties can win a mandate with a very low total number of votes but concentrated in a single constituency. However, using a zero threshold would have meant including all parties with a very low percentage of votes. In the end, a threshold of 0,5 % was used because it is still relatively accurate in terms of providing information on overall volatility. All shares below this threshold were excluded, as the exclusion method is considered more reliable (Bertóla Casal, Deegan-Krause, and Haughton, 2017, p. 153). If a party exceeded the threshold once, all data points were included (blanket inclusion).

Figure 2 shows that the level of electoral volatility has declined steadily since the 'earthquake' of the 2015 general election. The decline in electoral volatility in the second and fourth cycles is due to the repeat elections, which brought little change.

Figure 2 Electoral volatility between 2011 and 2023 general elections



Source: Author; calculations based on data from the Ministry of the Interior (not dated, 2023b).

In the last elections, the traditional mainstream parties largely regained their position among the Spanish electorate (see table 2). For 2019, their share of the vote was only 48,81 %, but for 2023, 64,75 % (+15.94 %). Converted into seats in 2023, they have 258 seats (out of

350), that is, 49 more than after the November 2019 election results and 73,71 % overall. The newcomers to the political contest – C's, Unidas Podemos, Vox – have generally lost ground, but with differences. C's did not participate in the contest, as the party has been in decline since the November 2019 general elections. Unidas Podemos joined Sumar to cushion its decline. Vox remained, but also lost around a third of its parliamentary seats compared to the previous 2019 general elections. Regional parties, including the separatist ones, are also generally losing ground in terms of electoral support and seats. In Catalonia, the PSC, the regional branch of the PSOE, won and the separatist parties (ERC, CUP, and Junts) lost around 40 % of their seats. In the Basque Country, both nationalist parties maintained their support, but the far-left separatist EH Bildu overtook the more moderate EAJ-PNV.

Table 2 Comparison of 2019 November and 2023 July general elections (in % of votes and number of seats)


Party	2019 N/votes	2023/votes	Difference	2019 N/seats	2023/seats	Difference
PP	20,99	33,05	+12,06	89	136	+47
PSOE	28,25	31,7	+2,82	120	122	+2
Unidas Podemos	9,91			26		
En Comú Podem	2,28			7		
Más País-EQUO	1,37			2		
En Común-Unidas Podemos	0,78			2		
Compromís	0,73			1		
Sumar		12,31	-2,76		31	-7
Ciudadanos	6,86		-6,86	10	0	-10
Vox	15,21	12,39	-2,82	52	33	-19
Junts per Catalunya	2,21	1,6	-0,61	8	7	-1
Esquerra (ERC)	3,64	1,89	-1,75	13	7	-6
EH Bildu	1,15	1,36	+0,21	5	6	+1
EAJ-PNV	1,58	1,12	-0,46	6	5	-1
BNG	0,5	0,62	+0,12	1	1	=
CC-NC-PNC	0,52	0,46	-0,06	2	1	-1
CUP	1,03	0,4	-0,63	2	0	-2

Source: Author, based on data from the Ministry of the Interior (not dated, 2023b).

The revival of mainstream parties and a certain return of political competition to its original contours was confirmed by the calculation of the effective number of parties in terms of votes and seats (Laakso-Taagepera index). All parties were included in the calculation of the effective number of electoral parties unless they had less than 0,1 % of the vote (i.e. very

small and regional parties were included). The final decision was arbitrary but was based on the fact that even parties with very low vote totals can win a parliamentary seat if their support is concentrated in a constituency. For example, in both 2019 parliamentary elections, the Teruel Existe party won one seat with only 0,08 % of the total vote.

Figure 3 Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) and Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) between 2011 and 2023




Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Ministry of the Interior (not dated, 2023b).

Figure 3 shows a decline in both the effective number of electoral parties, confirming the place of four leading parties/movements - two on the right (PP and Vox), two on the left (PSOE, Sumar) and the decline of regional parties. This has also affected the effective number of parliamentary parties, where a disproportionate effect of the electoral system must be considered. The system over-represents the largest parties, while third and fourth parties lose out. The effective number of parliamentary parties fell to 3,4, but in fact two-bloc politics was strengthened after these elections.


The polarization index on the level of the party system has steadily increased in recent decades, as captured by expert analysis (see figure 4). In the November 2019 general elections, the polarization index was 5,3, making Spain one of the countries with the highest polarization index in the EU, along with France and Cyprus (EU Political Barometer, not dated). In the following years, the polarization index remained high (see Figure 5).

Figure 4 Polarization index from 2000 to 2019 November general elections



Source: Simón 2020b.

Figure 5 Polarization index between 2019 and 2022



Source: EU Political Barometer (Universidad Carlos III of Madrid).

Polarization manifests itself not only at the level of elites, but also at the level of society as a whole. If we look at the V-dem index of political polarization, Spain went from a value of 1 (mostly no) before 2011, to a value of 2 (to some extent) between 2011 and 2019, to a value of 3 after 2019, which means that “supporters of opposing camps communicate with each other more often in a hostile way than in a friendly one” (V-dem, 2023).

The general elections in July 2023 confirmed the division of the party spectrum into two antagonistic blocs: the right (PP, Vox) and the left (PSOE, Sumar). The electoral gains of both blocs were almost equal, as shown in table 3. Thus, the 2023 general elections did not confirm the dominance of the right-wing bloc.

Table 3 Changes in electoral support for political blocs between 2019 and 2023 general elections

	2019 in %	2023 in %	Difference in %
Right-wing bloc	43,06	45,44	2,38
Left-wing bloc	41,04	44,01	2,97
Regionalist bloc	10,63	7,45	-3,18

Source: Author based on data from the Ministry of the Interior.

However, the composition of the right-wing bloc (PP, Vox) significantly limits cooperation with other parties across the political spectrum. Relations between the PP and the PSOE have long been strained. The PP has personalised its electoral strategy directly against Prime Minister Sánchez, making cooperation even more difficult. However, the PP’s alliance with Vox also limits cooperation with regional parties, which is a typical feature of Spanish politics. Regional parties are key to forming a government when the winning party in an election does not have an absolute majority. Agreements with regional parties have secured the necessary parliamentary majority for minority

governments (e.g. Field, 2014). However, the PP cannot rely on this political tradition because only some of the regional parties (such as Coalición Canaria) are still part of it, while for others (such as EAJ-PNV) the link between the PP and Vox is not acceptable. The Vox defends the unity of the Spanish state and calls for the suspension of the autonomy of those autonomous communities whose governments work against the unity of the state (Vox, 2023, p. 16).

As a result, the regional parties are tending to work with the left-wing bloc. In particular, the PSOE and Sumar need the votes of the separatist parties (ERC and Junts), which are demanding further concessions as they lose elec-

toral support. The first is an amnesty law for Catalan politicians who were behind the illegal referendums and the declaration of independence. If the amnesty law passes, those currently abroad could return from abroad. Similarly, those who were convicted but pardoned could return to politics. Another issue is the financing of Catalonia and the transfer of further powers in the management of transport networks (Rovira, 2023). However, the ERC and Junts have pushed through a resolution in the Catalan parliament demanding an agreement with the central government on the terms of a referendum on self-determination, which the PSOE has rejected.

The continuation of the coalition government of the PSOE and Sumar, led by Pedro Sánchez, was finally confirmed in a vote of confidence in November 2023. Regional parties, including separatist parties, ultimately supported the left-wing government. However, this support could prove very fragile. Especially if Sánchez's government fails to meet the expectations of the Catalan separatists.

Conclusions

Over the past decade, the Spanish party system has undergone several important changes. In the aftermath of the 2008 economic and financial crisis, imperfect bipartisanship ended as voters distanced themselves from the traditional mainstream parties. The new parties overcame the limitations of the electoral system and gained strong parliamentary representation. Between 2015 and 2019, the far left and the far right gained significant electoral support. The liberal C's also became a significant parliamentary party during this period, but steadily lost ground after November 2019 general elections and currently has no parliamentary representation.

After 2015, in a context of growing political and social polarization, a two-bloc political competition gradually took shape. The PP, C's and Vox formed a right-wing bloc and the PSOE and Unidas Podemos a left-wing bloc. The main differences between them remained mainly on socio-economic issues. On cultural issues, there were differences between the extreme poles of the party spectrum (Unidas Podemos and Vox) regarding the extension of minority rights. The political blocs also di-

verged in their approach to Catalan secessionism, with left-wing parties in favour of concessions to Catalan separatist parties and right-wing parties in favour of a strategy of suppression (with certain differences between them). Nevertheless, the regional parties remained key to the formation of the government, and the different positions of the national parties on the territorial conflict influenced how they allied with them.

The parliamentary elections of July 2023 showed signs of some stabilisation in the party system, as electoral volatility was not as high as in previous elections. Mainstream parties were able to regain some of their positions, while newcomers suffered losses. This opens the possibility of further research into the factors influencing party survival in the political arena. The effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties has also decreased. On the other hand, polarization has remained high. The two blocs now consist of a moderate (PP, PSOE) and a radical party (Vox, Sumar), which severely limits their cooperation. This has implications for government formation, as both blocs need either an absolute majority or a result close to an absolute majority, which reduces their dependence on regional parties. In the absence of the necessary parliamentary majority, regional parties are crucial for government formation. As they are also fighting for their votes at the regional level, they have no hesitation in putting pressure on the national parties to push through their issues. The options for forming a government at national level are now limited. The territorial conflict in Catalonia and the harsh discourse of the far right have distanced most regional parties from the right-wing bloc. As a result, most regional parties are inclined to support the left-wing bloc, which could make more concessions in terms of greater powers for the regional government and the de-judicialization of the Catalan independence conflict.

In conclusion, Spain provides an interesting case in which Sartori's categories of moderate and polarized pluralism can be discussed. The existence of a coalition government and the perspective of an alternative coalition are still key features of moderate pluralism. On the other hand, the high degree of polarization and the ideological distance between political parties tend towards polarized pluralism. To this

must be added the delegitimising attitudes of certain political parties. The Catalan separatist parties have also not abandoned their goals and their current support for the government may be very shaky. Although the traditional political parties have regained some of their strength, consensus politics has not returned. On the contrary, confrontation, both between party blocs and between the traditional parties that shaped democracy after the fall of the Franco regime, has persisted as a characteristic feature of Spanish politics.

References

- Azpitarte Sánchez, M. (2020). Formar Gobierno. Crónica política y legislativa de 2019. *Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional*, 118, 141-165.
- Blau, A. (2008). The Effective Number of Parties at four Scales. Votes, Seats, Legislative Power and Cabinet Power. *Party Politics*, 4(2), 167-187.
- Borbáth, E., Hutter, S., & Leininger, A. (2023). Cleavage politics, polarisation and participation in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 46(4), 631-651.
- Bosch, A., & Durán, I. (2019). How does economic crisis impel emerging parties on the road to elections? The case of the Spanish Podemos and Ciudadanos. *Party Politics*, 25(2), 257-267.
- Cabada, L., Hloušek, V., & Jurek, P. (2014). *Party Systems in East Central Europe*. Lexington Books.
- Camut, N. (2022, December 22). Spain's Senate backs penal code reform which helps Catalan leaders. *Politico.eu*. <https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-catalonia-senate-penal-code-reform-beneficial-to-catalan-independence-leaders-approved/>
- Casal Bértoa, F. (2014). Party systems and cleavage structures revisited: A sociological explanation of party system institutionalization in East Central Europe. *Party Politics*, 20(1), 16-36.
- Casal Bértoa, F., Deegan-Krause, K., & Haughton, T. (2017). The volatility of volatility: Measuring change in party vote shares. *Electoral Studies*, 50, 142-156.
- Castro Martínéz, P., & Mo Groba, D. (2019). El issue de la inmigración en los votantes de VOX en las Elecciones Generales de noviembre de 2019. *Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas*, 19(1), 39-58.
- CEO (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió). (2023). *Baròmetre d'Opinió Política*, 2/2023. https://upceo.ceo.gencat.cat/wsceop/8848/Dossier%20de%20premsa_1061.pdf
- CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas). 2019a. *Macrobarómetro de Octubre 2019. Preelectoral Elecciones Generales 2019, Avance de resultados*, Estudio n° 3263. https://datos.cis.es/pdf/Es3263marMT_A.pdf
- CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas). (2019b). *Barómetro de Diciembre 2019. Preelectoral Elecciones Generales 2019, Avance de resultados, Tabulación por recuerdo de voto y escala de ideología política*, Estudio n° 3269. https://www.cis.es/documents/d/cis/es3269rei_a
- CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas). (2023a). *Preelectoral Elecciones Generales 2023, Tabulación por recuerdo de voto elecciones generales 2019*, Estudio n° 3411. https://www.cis.es/documents/d/cis/es3411vpmt_a
- CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas). (2023b). *Barómetro de Septiembre 2023. Preelectoral Elecciones Generales 2023, Avance de resultados, Tabulación por variables políticas*, Estudio n° 3420. https://www.cis.es/documents/d/cis/es3420vpMT_a
- Dalton, R. J. (2021). Modeling ideological polarization in democratic party systems. *Electoral Studies*, 72, 1-10.
- Dalston, R. J. (2008). The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party System Polarization, Its Measurement, and Its Consequences. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(7), 899-920.
- Dinas, E., & Gemenis, K. (2009). Measuring Parties' Ideological Positions with Manifesto Data. A Critical Evaluation of the Competing Methods. *Party Politics*, 16(4), 427-450.
- Dowling, A. (2018). *The Rise of Catalan Independence. Spain's Territorial Crisis*. Routledge.
- EAJ-PNV. (2023, September 29). EAJ-PNV rechaza "con más razones aún" la investidura de Núñez Feijóo en segunda votación. EAJ-PNV. <https://congreso.eaj-pnv.eus/es/noticias/54939/eaj-pnv->

- rechaza-con-mas-razones-aun-la-investidura
- Eurostat. (2023a, June 20). *Total unemployment rate*.
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowse/view/tps00203/default/table?lang=en>
- Eurostat. (2023b, October 2023b). *Unemployment by sex - age group 15-24*.
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowse/product/view/teilm021>
- Field, B. (2014). Minority Parliamentary Government and Multilevel Politics: Spain's System of Mutual Back Scratching. *Comparative Politics*, 46(3), 293-312.
- Flores, D. (2023, June 27). De la reforma laboral al 'solo sí es sí': la legislatura del primer Gobierno de coalición en diez leyes. *RTVE*.
<https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20230627/reforma-laboral-solo-si-si-legislatura-del-primer-gobierno-coalicion-diez-leyes/2449673.shtml>
- Gil, T. (2018, June 1). Rajoy: qué es el caso Gürtel, la trama de corrupción que tumbó al presidente de España. *BBC News*.
<https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-44337117>
- Hanretty, C. (2022). Party system polarization and the effective number of parties. *Electoral Studies*, 76, 1-12.
- Havlík, V. (2015). Stable or not? Patterns of party system dynamics and the rise of the new political parties in the Czech Republic. *Romanian Journal of Political Science*, 15(1), 180-202.
- Chislett, W. (2023, June 20). What May's local and regional elections tell us about politics in Spain ahead of July's snap general election. *Real Instituto Elcano*.
<https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/blog/what-mays-local-and-regional-elections-tell-us-about-politics-in-spain/>
- Iustel. (2023). El CGPJ eleva a 1.155 las rebajas de pena y a 117 las excarcelaciones en aplicación de la 'ley del solo sí es sí'. *Iustel. Diario de Derecho*.
https://www.iustel.com/diario_del_derecho/noticia.asp?ref_iustel=1235052
- Mccoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Politics. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 62(1), 16-42.
- Měšťánková, P. (2019). Party Responsiveness and Governmental Responsibility: The Conflicting Roles of Spanish Socialist Workers' Party Between 2008 and 2011. *Slovak Journal of Political Sciences*, 19(2), 5-31.
- Ministerio del Interior. (n.d.). Infoelectoral. Resultados electorales.
<https://infoelectoral.interior.gob.es/opencms/es/elecciones-celebradas/resultados-electorales/>
- Ministerio del Interior. (2023a). 28M. Elecciones Locales.
<https://elecciones.locales2023.es/>
- Ministerio del Interior (2023b). 23J. Elecciones Generales.
<https://elecciones.generales23j.es/>
- Moraes, J. A., & Béjar, S. (2023). Electoral volatility and political polarization in developing democracies: Evidence from Latin America, 1993-2016. *Party Politics*, 29(4), 636-647.
- OECD. (2020). The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government. OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19).
<https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-territorial-impact-of-covid-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-of-government-d3e314e1/#section-d1e2449>
- Orriols, L., & Cordero, G. (2016). The Breakdown of the Spanish Two-Party System: The Upsurge of Podemos and Ciudadanos in the 2015 General Election. *South European Society and Politics*, 21(4), 469-492.
- Penadés, A., & Santiuste, S. (2013). La desigualdad en el sistema electoral español y el premio a la localización del voto. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, 32, 89-116.
- Podemos (n.d.). Principios Políticos. Podemos.
<https://podemos.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Documento-politico.pdf>
- Poguntke, T. (2014). Towards a new party system: The vanishing hold of the catch-all parties in Germany. *Party Politics*, 20(6), 950-963.
- PP (2023). Es el momento. Programa electoral. Un proyecto al servicio de un gran país.
https://www.pp.es/sites/default/files/documentos/programa_electoral_pp_23j_feijoo_2023.pdf

- PP (2021). Pablo Casado: "El sanchismo está perdiendo el alma con las víctimas del terrorismo y eso hiela la sangre". <https://www.pp.es/actualidad-noticia/pablo-casado-sanchismo-esta-perdiendo-alma-las-victimas-terrorismo-eso-hiela>
- PSOE (2023). Adelante. Programa electoral elecciones generales 23 julio 2023. https://xn--espaaavanza-4db.es/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/PROGRAMA_ELECTORAL-GENERALES-2023.pdf
- Rama, J., Cordero, G., & Zagórski, P. (2021). Three Is a Crowd? Podemos, Ciudadanos, and Vox: The End of Bipartisanship in Spain. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 3, 1-16.
- Rodríguez-Teruel, J. (2020). Polarisation and Electoral Realignment: The Case of the Right-Wing Parties in Spain. *South European Society and Politics*, 25(3-4), 381-410.
- Rodríguez Teruel, J., Del Pino, E., & Real-Dato, J. (2023). The Limits of Power Concentration and Expert Knowledge in Emergency Management: Spain's Government Response during the First Phase of the Covid-19 Pandemic. *South European Society and Politics*, 1-33.
- Rovira, M. (2023, October 25). Aragonès avisa al PSOE que si quiere la investidura tiene que acelerar en materia de financiación, trenes y caso Pegasus. *El País*. <https://elpais.com/espana/catalunya/2023-10-25/aragones-avisa-al-psoe-que-si-quiere-la-investidura-tiene-que-acelerar-en-materia-de-financiacion-trenes-y-caso-pegasus.html>
- Sartori, G. (2005). *Strany a stranické systémy: schéma pro analýzu*. Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury.
- Simón, P. (2020a). The Multiple Spanish Elections of April and May 2019: The Impact of Territorial and Left-right Polarisation. *South European Society and Politics*, 25(3-4), 441-474.
- Simón, P. (2020b). Two-bloc Logic, Polarisation and Coalition Government: The November 2019 General Election in Spain. *South European Society and Politics*, 25(3-4), 533-563.
- Universidad Carlos III of Madrid. (n.d.). EU Political Barometer. *uc3m*. <https://eupoliticalbarometer.uc3m.es/>
- V-Dem. (2023). Political polarization. *V-dem*. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/
- Vox (2023). Un programa para lo que importa. *Vox*. <https://www.voxespana.es/programa/programa-electoral-vox>

Annex 1 Electoral results from 2011 to 2023 general elections (only parties that got the parliamentary seat)

	2011	2015	2016	2019 A	2019 N	2023
PP	44,62	28,72	33,03	16,82	20,99	33,05
PSOE	28,73	22,01	22,66	28,89	28,25	31,7
IU-LV	6,92					
Unidad Popular (IU)		3,67				
Podemos		12,67				
Podemos-IU-EQUO/Unidas Podemos			13,37	11,14	9,91	
En Comú Podem		3,69	3,55	2,37	2,28	
Más País-EQUO					1,37	
En Común-Unidas Podemos				0,92	0,78	
En Marea		1,63	1,64			
Compromís Q/Compromís	0,51			0,67	0,73	
Compromís-Podemos-És el moment		2,67				
Compromís-Podemos-EUPV:A la Valenciana			2,74			
Sumar						12,31
UPyD	4,69	0,61	0,21			
Ciudadanos		13,93	13,05	15,98	6,86	
Vox		0,23	0,2	10,34	15,21	12,39
CiU	4,17					
DEMOCRÀCIA I LLIBERTAT (CDC, DC, RI.cat)		2,25				
CDC			2,01			
Junts per Catalunya				1,93	2,21	1,6
Esquerra Republicana (ERC)	1,05	2,39	2,63	3,92	3,64	1,89
AMAIUR/EH Bildu	1,37	0,87	0,77	1	1,15	1,36
EAJ-PNV	1,33	1,2	1,2	1,52	1,58	1,12
BNG	0,75	0,28	0,19	0,36	0,5	0,62
CC-NC-PNC	0,59	0,33	0,33	0,53	0,52	0,46
Navarra Suma (UPN, C's, PP)				0,41	0,41	
UPN						0,21
FAC	0,4					
GBAI	0,17	0,12	0,06	0,09		
PRC	0,18			0,2	0,29	
CUP					1,03	0,4
Más País					0,22	
Teruel Existe					0,08	

Source: Ministerio del Interior (not dated, 2023b).

Annex 2 Top five most important problems for party voters in 2019 and 2023 general elections

PP 2019	PP 2023	PSOE 2019	PSOE 2023
Health Care Political problems in general Unemployment Economic crisis Catalan independence Corruption and fraud	Unemployment Economic crisis Bad behaviour of politicians Political problems in general Quality of employment	Corruption and fraud Economic crisis Unemployment Political problems in general Health Care	Health Care Economic crisis Unemployment Climate Change Political problems in general
Vox 2019	Vox 2023	Unidas Podemos 2019	Sumar 2023
Immigration Unemployment Political problems in general Economic crisis Corruption and fraud	Economic crisis Political problems in general Unemployment Immigration Bad behaviour of politicians	Political problems in general Economic crisis Unemployment Quality of employment Social problems	Quality of employment Climate Change Economic crisis Unemployment Political problems in general

Source: Author based on the data from CIS (2019b, 2023b). Font size reflects the importance of the issue. As for PP, the topics "Health Care" and "Corruption and Fraud" had the same percentage of responses in 2019.

EMÓCIE V ŠTÚDIU MEDZINÁRODNÝCH VZŤAHOV

MICHAELA ZEMANOVÁ

Faculty of International Relations
Prague University of Economics and Business
Czech Republic
E-mail: michaela.zemanova@vse.cz

Abstract:

The article discusses the debate about emotions in the study of international relations. Traditional theories such as realism and liberalism are built upon fear or, conversely, empathy. However, these theories lack a systematic examination of emotions. Emotions influence actors both in world politics and on the domestic stage. The article explains why it is important to incorporate emotions into the research of various phenomena in international relations. It also offers readers an insight into the debate about how to investigate emotions not only of individuals but also of entire groups through changes in discursive dynamics.

Keywords:

Emotions, emotional turn, group emotions, international relations.

Úvod

Cieľom článku je predstaviť čitateľovi súčasnú debatu o emóciách v štúdiu medzinárodných vzťahov. Konkrétne v časti s názvom „Debata o emóciách“ si kladie za cieľ zodpovedať na otázku ako sa vyvíjala debata o chápaní a definovaní emócií, z ktorej vychádzajú súčasní autori venujúci sa emóciám v medzinárodných vzťahoch. Poukazuje na širší kontext uplatnenia emócií vo výskume. Ná-

sledne časť s názvom „Debata o emóciách v medzinárodných vzťahoch“ zodpovedá na otázky prečo je dôležité skúmať emócie a ako je možné ich uplatniť vo výskume medzinárodných vzťahov. Zároveň predstavuje vývoj debaty o emóciách, ktorá sa najskôr sústredila na obhajobu dôležitosti zapojenia emócií do štúdia medzinárodných vzťahov a ich definície na skupinovej úrovni. Ďalej predstavuje ako sa po prvotnom vymedzení základných pojmov a teoretického ukotvenia emócií presunula debata k otázke akými vhodnými metódami emócie skúmať.

Debata o emóciách

Rozum a cit, láska a nenávisť, radosť a smútok. Odborná ale i každodenná rozprava o emóciách sa takmer vždy nesie v duchu ontologickej a epistemologickej dichotómie. Emócie sú chápané ako racionálne/neracionálne, biologické/kultúrne, personálne/sociálne, alebo spontánne/strategické (Koschut, 2018, s. 277). Nasledujúce odstavce približujú vývoj odborného diskurzu o emóciách, ktorý bol primárne založený na ich duálnom charaktere racionality a emocionality, a vnímaniu emócií ako racionálnych alebo neracionálnych.

Racionalita a emocionalita sú od nepamäti vnímané ako navzájom sa ovplyvňujúce, obmedzujúce a dopĺňajúce. Emocionalita je častokrát predstavovaná ako protipól racionality. Je vnímaná ako synonymum iracionality, keďže

silný afekt, nálada či emócie zastierajú zdravý úsudok. Rozum je stavaný nad emócie. Kde zlyhal rozum, tam prevládli emócie. Racionalita je stavaná na piedestál, keďže len vďaka nej sme schopní napredovania a oslobodenia sa od nedokonalosti, ktorá je podmienená našou biologickou podstatou a ktorej súčasťou cez fyziologické procesy sú brané i emócie (Zemanová, 2021). Takéto chápanie ich vzťahu vychádza z osvietenských premís, ktoré spolu s antickou a kresťanskou filozofickou tradíciou postavili základy hodnotového systému súčasnej západoeurópskej kultúry. Európska novoveká filozofia prijíma „axióm, že podstata naplnenia ľudského poslania vo svete, ktorý ho obklopuje, tkvie v schopnosti racionálneho poznania“ (Lehmannová, 2010, s. 66). Cieľ takéhoto racionálneho poznania formulovaný už v Antike bol dvojaký, a to „poznanie sveta a poznanie seba samého a na jeho základe mravné zdokonalenie človeka“ (Lehmannová, 2010, s. 67). Teda z pohľadu druhého cieľa poznania, snahu o dosiahnutie absolútnej racionality, možno definovať ako neustály vnútorný boj jednotlivca s vlastnou nedokonalosťou, ktorá ovplyvňuje jeho konanie a postavenie vo svete. Ide o takzvaný etický racionalizmus, kedy „duchovné a mravné zdokonalenie človeka je procesom jeho oslobodzovania a rozvojom jeho ľudskej podstaty“ (Lehmannová, 2010, s. 67).

Osvietenské premisy racionalizmu založené na dualizme Reného Descarta prešli dlhou cestou prehodnocovania a kritiky romantickými a realistickými prúdmi v 19. storočí a kritickými teóriami sociálnych vied, ako napr. frankfurtská škola v 20. storočí. Táto kritika vzišla najmä z krízy, do ktorej sa dostal hodnotový systém európskej spoločnosti. Racionalita sa stala samoúčelnou. Sloboda dosiahnutá cez racionalitu bola tou samou racionalitou zviazaná. Človek sa v tomto zmysle sám stáva prostriedkom vo svojom technologickom a inštitucionálnom pokroku. Racionalizmus sa stáva technokratickým a inštrumentálnym. Zuzana Lehmannová v knihe *Paradigma kultúr* zhrnula kritiku technokratickej racionality nasledovne: „racionalita sama o sebe je chápaná ako prirodzená tendencia historického vývoja ľudstva. V Európe však došlo k tomu, že racionalita stratila svoju hodnotovú reguláciu a vyvíja sa ako racionalita inštrumentálna, ako účelová formálna racionalita“ (2010, s. 73).

Racionalitu nemožno ale chápať iba v medziach jej inštrumentálneho charakteru, teda v kontexte racionálneho konania. Racionalita môže mať i epistemicú stránku. Epistemicá, taktiež zvaná i teoretická racionalita sa viaže k racionálnemu zmýšľaniu, ktoré formuje presvedčenia v súlade s dostupnými informáciami. Teórie racionálnej voľby vychádzajú z inštrumentálnej a epistemickej racionality jednotlivca, ktorý je následne definovaný ako racionálny aktér. Aj napriek kritike osvietenského pohľadu na človeka ako racionálneho aktéra, tento model pretrváva vo viacerých vedných disciplínach až dodnes. Racionálny aktér sa usiluje o čo najefektívnejšie a najrozumnejšie dosiahnutie cieľa, pričom jeho snaha je ohraničená pevne stanovenými preferenciami a presvedčeniami. V ekonomickej terminológii je táto snaha definovaná ako racionálny egoizmus jednotlivca, ktorý sa usiluje o maximalizáciu svojich očakávaných úžitkov. Konkrétne klasická a neoklasická ekonómia sú príkladmi, kde iná forma usudzovania a rozhodovania jednotlivca je považovaná ako striktne iracionálna. Takto definovaný racionálny aktér býva označovaný ako homo economicus (Markwica, 2018).

V 50. rokoch minulého storočia nositeľ Nobelovej ceny za ekonómiu Herbert Simon navrhol pojem ohraničená (limitovaná) racionalita. Takáto racionalita akceptovala, že aktér je limitovaný jeho vlastnými kognitívnymi schopnosťami. Aktér si nevyberá optimálnu alternatívu, ale takú, ktorá je pre neho uspokojivá (Simon, 1957). Takéto zmýšľanie o racionalite sa vyvinulo vďaka kognitívnej revolúcii v psychológii, ktorá významne ovplyvnila i iné disciplíny a dala vzniknúť napríklad behaviorálnej ekonómii.

To, že si aktér uvedomuje svoju kognitívnu kapacitu a reflektuje ju s vonkajším prostredím, podľa ktorého následne reflektuje svoje presvedčenia, preferencie a správanie možno definovať ako reflexívnu racionalitu. Ďalší nositeľ Nobelovej ceny za ekonómiu Amartya Sen pomenoval tento proces ako seba-kontrola rozumu, ktorá môže viesť aktéra k zmene usudzovania, z ktorého vyplynú nové rozhodnutia (Sen, 2009, s. 195). Vlastný záujem a sebeckosť prisudzované racionálnemu aktérovi sú konfrontované širšími skutočnosťami a pluralitou racionálneho konania a zmýšľania iných. Príkladom teórie, ktorá vníma racionalitu cez jej

reflexívnosť je konštruktivizmus. Človek v tomto ponímaní je označovaný tiež ako homo sociologicus (Dahrendorf, 1973).

S ohraničenou racionalitou sa do pozornosti výskumníkov dostali i emócie. V kontexte ohraničenej racionality „emócie obmedzujú veľkosť množiny alternatív a zameriavajú rozhodovateľa na určité relevantné aspekty možností. Emócie prisudzujú hodnotu objektom, pomáhajú pri učení, ako získať tieto objekty a poskytujú pre to motiváciu“ (Zeelenberg a kol., 2008, s. 18). Vzťah racionality a emocionality mal naďalej duálny charakter. Emócie začali byť skúmané ako heuristiky pomáhajúce prekonať kognitívne obmedzenia. To znamenalo, že emócie nespôsobujú len neracionálne rozhodovanie, ale pomáhajú i k racionálnemu rozhodnutiu aktéra v danej situácii a za daných podmienok. Takéto vnímanie emócií je od 80. rokov 20. storočia vyzdvihované i evolučnou psychológiou, pre ktorú emócie predstavujú adaptívnu výchovu jednotlivca v komplexnom a nebezpečnom svete (Slovic a kol., 2002). Do povedomia sa dostala afektívna racionalita.

Od 90. rokov zistenia z výskumov v oblasti neurovedy prekonávajú duálny charakter emócií a rozumu. Emócie prestávajú byť chápané ako faktor ovplyvňujúci negatívne či pozitívne racionálne zmýšľanie, ale stávajú sa „dôležitými komponentmi racionality“ (Mellers a kol., 1999, s. 343). Autori zastávajúci tento názor sa vo veľkom odvolávajú najmä na neuroveda Antonia Damasia a jeho kolegov, ktorí skúmali ľudí s poškodením ventromediálnej prefrontálnej kôry mozgu. Takéto poškodenie u ľudí „vymaže“ ich emocionalitu, zároveň ale nevykazujú žiadne nedostatky v ich uvažovaní. Z tradičného pohľadu by sa mohlo usúdiť, že takíto ľudia budú schopní čistého logického myslenia a vysoko efektívnych rozhodnutí. Výskum však ukázal opak. Výskum pozostával z experimentu pozostávajúceho z hazardnej hry (tzv. Iowa gambling task), ktorej sa ľudia s takýmto poškodením mozgu zúčastnili. Ich výkon bol ale podpriemerný, ľudia vykazovali zlý úsudok a nerozhodnosť (Markwica, 2018, s. 23). Na základe opísaného experimentu Damasio (1994) vypracoval hypotézu somatických markerov, ktorú postuloval v diele „*Descartesov Omyl: emócie, rozum a ľudský mozog*“. Somatické markery ako podmienené telesné stavy sú spájané s obrazmi, z ktorých pozostáva myslenie, a

ktoré si človek za svoj život vytvára a priraduje k nim pozitívne alebo negatívne pocity. Ich súhra vytvára naše usudzovanie a rozhodovanie. „Láska, nenávisť a úzkosť, vlastnosti láskavosti a krutosti, plánované riešenia vedeckého problému alebo vytvorenie nového artefaktu. Toto všetko je založené na nervových aktivitách v mozgu za predpokladu, že mozog interagoval so svojím telom. Duša dýcha skrz telo, a utrpenie, či už začína na koži alebo mentálnou predstavou, sa odohráva v tele“ (Damasio, 1994, s. xvii).

Vďaka hypotéze somatických markerov sa emócie dostali do povedomia mnohých vedných disciplín. Napriek jej popularite však možno nájsť i kritiku najmä na jej metodologickú slabinu. Barnaby D. Dunn a kolektív (2005) kriticky hodnotia zistenia z hazardnej hry, keďže ich interpretácia je podmienená kognitívnymi prienikmi pozitívnych a negatívnych pocitov v kontexte odmienu a trestov, nejasnosťami vzťahujúcich sa k interpretácii psycho-fyziologických dát, a nedostatkom kauzálnych dôkazov spájajúcich spätnú väzbu s výkonom v hre, čo môže mať príčiny i v iných ako napríklad hormonálnych odozvách tela. Nech budú ďalšie výskumy upravovať alebo vyvracať tieto neurologické zistenia akokoľvek, afektívna skúsenosť sa stáva podmienkou inštrumentálnej racionality. Z človeka sa na prelome tisícročí stáva homo emotionalis (Markwica, 2018, s. 25-26).

Emócie si prešli viacerými obdobiami, boli vnímané ako epifenomény,¹ ako zdroj iracionality, ako nástroj pre dôvtipne strategicky zmýšľajúcich aktérov a najnovšie ako nevyhnutný aspekt racionality (Mercer, 2006). Nedá sa ale povedať, že by v súčasnosti bol uplatňovaný len posledný prístup chápania emócií. Mnohé najmä tradičné teórie stále uplatňujú postoj k emóciám ako epifenoménoch či iracionálnych. Teórie vzišlé v druhej polovici 20. storočia potom zavádzajú emócie ako príklad heuristiky a zasadzujú ich do širšieho kontextu. V novších prácach i Damasio a jeho kolektív (1999, 2000, 2005, 2007) skúmajú negatívnu stránku emócií a dopĺňajú svoje pôvodné zistenia prepojenia emócií a rozumu. Post-revizionistická verzia emocionálnej teórie výberu vysvetľuje nielen ako emócie prispievajú optimálnemu rozhod-

¹ Epifenomén – vedľajší alebo sprievodný jav, nepodstatná okolnosť.

vaniu, ale i ako spôsobujú odchýlky od racionality. Teda emócie „môžu podkopať racionalitu, aj keď sú nevyhnutné pre racionalitu“ (Mercer, 2006, s. 299). Robin Markwica porovnal dva akčné modely a zastrelil ich názvami homo economicus a homo sociologicus. K nim

doplnil model založený na pluralizme a definoval ho ako homo emotionalis. Podľa neho vníma vzťah racionality a neracionality emócií. Nasledujúca tabuľka vypracovaná R. Markwicom poskytuje prehľadné porovnanie troch akčných modelov (2018, s. 20-28).

Tabuľka 1 Tri akčné modely

	Homo economicus	Homo sociologicus	Homo emotionalis
Teoretická perspektíva	racionalistická	sociálne konštruktivistická	socio-emocionálne konštruktivistická
Logika výberu	logika dôsledkov	logika vhodnosti	logika afektu
Hlavné hnacie sily	sledovanie úžitku, kalkulácia nákladov a výnosov	normy, identity a iné intersubjektívne predstavy a praktiky	afekt a emócie v kombinácii s kultúrou
Postoj k racionalite	instrumentálna, epistemická	reflexívna	instrumentálna, epistemická, reflexívna a afektívna
Vnímanie aktéra	autonómna bytosť	sociálna bytosť	emocionálna, sociálna a fyziologická bytosť
Pohľad na sebakontrolu	predpokladaná	predpokladaná	obmedzená
Postoj k štruktúre	všeobecne materialistická	všeobecne ideová	biologická a fyziologická ako aj kognitívna a kultúrna
Forma vysvetlenia	kauzálna analýza	konštitutívna analýza	analýza procesov

Zdroj: Markwica, 2018, s. 28.

Podľa Ivana Slaměníka sú v súčasnosti emócie skúmané najmä skrz snahu o pochopenie ich funkcií. Slaměník následne sumarizuje funkcie emócií takto: „emócie signalizujú ohrozenie jedinca, ovplyvňujú priebeh kognitívnych procesov, presmerovávajú pozornosť, slúžia komunikácií, regulujú sociálne interakcie, vďaka fyziologickej aktivácii navodzujú pohotovosť ku konaniu, k sexuálnej aktivite, udržiavajú romantické vzťahy, ochraňujú najbližšie a najdôležitejšie osoby, napomáhajú zachovať sociálne hodnoty a normy, posilňujú sociálne role, skupinovú kohéziu, sú nositeľmi medziskupinovej nenávisti atď.“ (Slaměník, 2011, s. 12).

Podľa takéhoto výpočtu funkcií emócií možno následne tvrdiť, že emócie sú ako biologické tak i kultúrne, ako personálne tak i sociálne. Posledné členenie na spontánnosť a strategickosť emócií možno vysvetliť v kontexte ich vzťahu s racionalitou. Konkrétnejšie napríklad hypotéza somatických markerov tvrdí, že emócie, aj keď sa môžu zdať spontánne, pre rozhodovanie aktérov majú strategickú funkciu, keďže im pomáhajú sa rozhodnúť v danom momente pre nich čo najuspokojivejšie na základe ich minulej skúsenosti, aj keď v konečnom dôsledku nemusí toto rozhodnutie viesť k pozitívnemu výsledku.

Debata o racionalite a emocionalite v sebe niesla i rozpravu nad ontologickými otázkami odkiaľ emócie pochádzajú a ako vznikajú, či sú

emócie primárne kognitívne a myšlienkové alebo telesné a materiálne. Dichotómne členenie debaty bolo ale takmer úplne zavrnuté. Začal byť uplatňovaný názor, že „emócie nie sú ani fixné bioprogramy, ani kognitívne sprostredkované scenáre“ (Prinz, 2004, s. 12). V súčasnom odbornom diskurze prevláda názor, že emócie sú prepojením kognitívnej a fyziologickej stránky ľudí.

Otázkou ale zostáva – nakoľko sú emócie biologické alebo kultúrne, personálne alebo sociálne. Tu je najskôr vhodné si vysvetliť pojmy – emócie, afekty, nálady, pocity a sentiment. Tradične emócie delia podľa evolučného prístupu na nižšie, vlastné ako ľuďom tak i zvieratám, a na vyššie emócie, vlastné len ľuďom. Nižšie emócie zastrešujú jednoduché emócie, nálady a afekty či sentiment.

Nálada má trvalejší charakter, nižšiu intenzitu prežívania a môže sa navzájom ovplyvňovať s aktuálne prežívanými emóciami. Naopak afekt je vnímaný ako náhla intenzívna emočná reakcia voči určitému objektu či okoliu s tým, že reakcia má spravidla negatívny dopad na okolie (Slaměník, 2011, s. 10). Pri afekte je vhodné upozorniť na rozdielny význam v anglickom jazyku. Anglická terminológia definuje afekt ako trvácný prežitok, pri ktorom máme nešpecifikované pocity. Afekt v tomto kontexte zastrešuje pojmy emócie, nálady a iné emočne nabitú vlastnosti (Lerner a kol., 2014). Taktiež sa často používa ako synonymum k emóciám.

Sentiment sa definuje ako citovosť, precitlivosť. Sentimentálny človek je vnímaný ako podliehajúci svojej nálahe a citovému rozpoloženiu. Pocit v psychologickom slovníku predstavuje najelementárnejší zmyslový a citový zážitok, ktorý býva často opisovaný neurčito.

Jednoduché alebo základné emócie sú podľa viacerých výskumov kultúrne univerzálne a vrodené. V druhej polovici 20. storočia bolo definovaných šesť (Tomkins, 1962) a osem (Plutchik, 1980) takýchto emócií, ako radosť/šťastie, smútok, hnev, strach, znechutenie, prekvapenie, očakávanie a akceptácia. I pri tomto delení nastala ale polemika v odborných kruhoch, keďže viaceré výskumy vyvrátili ich univerzálnosť, keď pri antropologických výskumoch zistili, že niektoré skupiny nepoznali napr. smútok. Táto debata, známa ako druhá debata o emóciách, vytvorila dva tábory. Na jednej strane boli univerzalisti/evolucionisti zastávajúci názor univerzálneho charakteru aspoň základných emócií. Na strane druhej boli kulturalisti/konstruktivisti, ktorí presadzovali názor, že emócie sú viazané na sociokultúrne prostredie (Ekman, 1992, s. 170-171). Jesse Prinz v závere článku s názvom „Ktoré emócie sú základné“ výstižne zosumarizoval vyvrcholenie druhej debaty o emóciách. „Evolucionisti majú pravdu, keď si myslia, že emócie vznikajú v našich génoch, konstruktivisti majú pravdu, keď vyzdvihujú enkulturáciu, a obhajcovia hybridného pohľadu majú pravdu, že môžeme mať oboje“ (Prinz, 2004, s. 17).

Vyššie emócie sú taktiež známe ako zložitejšie alebo sociálne emócie. Takéto sociologické chápanie emócií argumentuje, že „emóciám sa ľudia ako aktívni aktéri sociálneho priestoru učia počas socializácie, učia sa reflektovať a pomenovávať to, čo cítia a prežívajú. Na základe toho je možné identifikovať a pomenovávať psychologický stav tak, aby bol pochopiteľný ako pre človeka samotného, tak v komunikácii s okolím“ (Vysekalová a kol., 2014, s. 19). Podľa tejto definície vyššie emócie možno zaradiť do terminológie tábora konstruktivistov. Z tohto pohľadu môžu byť emócie nie len personálne, prežívané jednotlivcom, ale i sociálne, prežívané v spoločnosti a spoločnosťou. Nielen to ako myslíme, ale i to ako cítime definuje a predurčuje našu identifikáciu seba samých, seba v rámci skupiny alebo naopak ako nás identifikujú druhí.

Debata o emóciách v medzinárodných vzťahoch

Tradičné teórie medzinárodných vzťahov vznikajúce v medzivojnovom období 20. storočia, kedy prejavenie emócií bolo považované za prejav slabosti alebo precitlivenosti, postavili svoje ontologické ponímanie jednotlivca na osvietenských premisách racionality. Obdobie po druhej svetovej vojne tento postoj len umocnilo, keďže zvýšená emocionalita či nebudaj afekt mohli spôsobiť celosvetovú katastrofu v podobe nukleárnej zimy. Emócie v tomto období boli chápané ako prejav iracionality, na ktorú v dobe vzájomného zaručeného zničenia nebol pre dobro celého ľudstva rozhodne priestor.⁷

Aj keď boli emócie opomínané v teoretických či empirických štúdiách, nedá sa povedať, že by emócie nehrali dôležitú úlohu v tejto i dávnejšej dobe. Láska i nenávisť, hrdosť i hanba, strach i odvaha a iné boli prítomné pri viac i menej významných historických míľnikoch, počas ktorých sa budovali impériá, ríše, národy či štáty. Emócie boli prítomné i u významných autorov, z ktorých diel vychádzajú realistické teórie.⁸ Strach hral dôležitú úlohu napríklad u Thúkydída, Machiavelliho a Hobbesa. Z evolučného hľadiska má strach ochrannú funkciu. Táto funkcia bola vyzdvihnutá i Hobbesom, podľa ktorého ľudia zo strachu, aby prežili, opustili prirodzený stav a zanechali svoju absolútnu slobodu v prospech vyššej moci, ktorá im mala poskytnúť ochranu. Hobbes vysvetlil ľudskú podstatu spoločnosti takto: „Pôvod rozsiahlych a stálych spoločností nevychádzal zo vzájomnej dobrej vôle ľudí, ktorú prechovávali jeden k druhému, ale zo vzájomného prechovávaného strachu jeden voči druhému“ (Hobbes, 1998 s. 113). Na rozdiel od Hobbesa, ktorý strach chápal ako centrálny aspekt spoločnosti, Thúkydídés a Machiavelli videli v strachu skôr politickú motiváciu

⁷ Vid'. napr. Robin Markwica (2018), v knihe *Emotional Choices, How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy*, kde autor analýzou sentimentu poukazuje na emócie a rozhodovanie vodcov počas kubánskej krízy a vojny v zálive.

⁸ Strach ako premisu realizmu skúma napr. Andrew A. G. Ross v knihe *Realism, emotion, and dynamic allegiances in global politics*, 2013. Afektívne koncepty ako dôvera a empatia a ich prepojenie s liberálnymi predpokladmi možno nájsť napr. u Johnatana Mercera v článku *Emotional Beliefs*, 2010.

(Corey, 2004, s. 31). Strach voči vonkajšiemu nepriateľovi i v dnešnej dobe slúži na udržanie pocitu súdržnosti a poriadku. Pocit hanby a poníženia v prípade prehry či zlyhania motivuje, ale i odrádza od neistých rozhodnutí v časoch krízy.⁹

Emócie ako celospoločenský fenomén a predmet záujmu sa dostávajú do pozornosti teoretikom a výskumníkom z oblasti medzinárodných vzťahov vďaka konštruktivistickým a neskôr postštrukturalistickým prístupom, ktorých ontologické a epistemologické postoje umožnili vznik a metodologické prístupy skúmania človeka – homo emocionalis. Racionálny, autonómny a egoistický jednotlivec sa z takéhoto pohľadu, ako poznamenal Richard Ned Lebow, stáva „fikciou osvietenstva“ (Lebow, 2005, s. 283). Priekopníkmi štúdia emócií v medzinárodných vzťahoch sa na prelome tisícročí stávajú Jonathan Mercer (1996) a Neta Crawford (2000), ktorí obhajovali dôležitosť emócií a ich vhodnosť zapojenia do výskumu o svetovej politike. Prvé roky tzv. emocionálneho obratu¹⁰ v medzinárodných vzťahoch sa diskutovalo najmä o význame štúdia emócií, a aký majú vplyv na medzinárodné vzťahy.

Avšak už Friedrich Kratochwil upozornil na potrebu zmeny skúmania politických fenoménov len cez kognitívnu optiku. Jeho kritika bola mierená najmä na opomínanie úlohy emócií

v tvorbe sociálneho a morálneho sveta. V roku 1994 Kratochwil v závere článku poznamenal, „neanalyzovať pocity za myšlienkami, otázky sympatie a prijatia, solidarity, a nanešťastie i nenávisti nie je jednoducho opomenutie: to je zlyhanie v samotnom úsilí poskytnúť súvislý význam sociálnej reality“ (s. 503). Cez optiku emócií začala byť preskúmaná celá rada globálnych problémov a otázok napríklad zo zahraničnej politiky a diplomacie (Schilling 2014; Hall a Ross, 2019; Heller, 2018), nukleárnej proliferácie (Hymans, 2006), spojenectiev (Eznack, 2011), alebo ozbrojených konfliktov, vojny (Coicaud, 2014; Mitzen a Schweller, 2011) a iných.¹¹ Debata o ontológii a epistemológii emócií v medzinárodných vzťahoch predstavovala hlavnú tému tzv. prvej vlny emocionálneho obratu.

Bolo by však chybné tvrdiť, že emócie boli úplne opomínané pred druhou polovicou 90. rokov. Od 70. rokov pod vplyvom kognitívnej psychológie sa autori ako Irving Janis a Leon Mann (1977, s. 46) začali zaoberať rozhodovaním jednotlivcov, najmä lídrov počas krízy, v zahraničnej politike. Ďalšími významnými autormi tejto problematiky boli napríklad Robert Jervis (1976), Richard Ned Lebow (1984), Janice Gross Stein (1988) či Ralph White (1984). Treba brať na vedomie, že emocionalita bola vtedy stále chápaná ako skresľujúca a obmedzujúca zdravý úsudok a následné rozhodovanie.

Emocionálny obrat v medzinárodných vzťahoch bol významný najmä z ohľadu na sociálno-kultúrny aspekt emócií. Aj keď mnohí autori akceptujú, že emócie sú vlastné človeku, teda že sú jeho subjektívnym prežívaním, vychádzajú z tvrdení, že i samotné subjektívne prežívanie je podmienené socializáciou každého z nás už od ranného detstva. Neta Crawford toto tvrdenie vysvetľuje takto, „emócie sú subjektívne skúsenosti, ktoré taktiež majú fyziologické, intersubjektívne, a kultúrne komponenty“ (2014, s. 537). Čo konkrétnejšie znamená, že „kým pocity sú vnútorne prežívané, význam priradený k týmto pocitom, k nim pridružené správanie a rozpoznanie emócií u druhých sú kognitívne a kultúrne vykladané a konštruované“ (Crawford, 2014, s. 537). Crawford tak-

⁹ Keďže realizmus vníma sebeckosť ako základ všetkých vzťahov, priradujú sa k nemu najmä tzv. negatívne vnímané emócie. Naopak, podpora rozvoja empatie, sympatií alebo pocitu súdržnosti je nevyhnutná pre udržiavanie a dodržiavanie ľudských práv, demokracie a mieru, ako ich vyzdvihujú liberálne teórie. Avšak členenie emócií na negatívne a pozitívne je veľmi zjednodušené, keďže každá emócia má pre človeka i spoločnosť svoju funkciu a záleží na jej spracovaní ako je prijímaná, či v negatívnom, pozitívnom alebo neutrálnom smere. Napríklad hnev môže mať deštruktívne následky, ale môže i vyburcovať k pozitívnej zmene.

¹⁰ Anglicky sa používa termín „emotional turn“. V slovenskej odbornej literatúre nie je zatiaľ zaužívaný jednotný preklad. Ďalším vhodným prekladom by mohol byť tzv. „obrat k emóciám“. Aj keď možno nájsť práce písané v slovenčine, ktoré do určitej miery spomínajú emócie v oblasti medzinárodných vzťahov, doteraz neboli publikované odborné práce, ktoré by explicitne uvádzali a pracovali s týmto termínom. Výnimkou je diplomová práca s názvom „Emócia resentmentu v zahraničnej politike Donalda Trumpa voči EÚ“ obhájená v roku 2021 na FMV VŠE v Prahe, ktorej autorom je Ing. Adam Pall.

¹¹ Rozsiahlejší zoznam tém a odbornej literatúry možno nájsť napríklad u autora Robina Markwica (2018) v knihe *Emotional Choices, How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy* na stranách 39-45.

tiež ponúka jasnú odpoveď na dichotómiu biologického alebo kultúrneho a následne personálneho alebo sociálneho charakteru emócií. Vychádzajúc z poznatkov neurovedy, Crawford argumentuje, že „pretrvávajúci strach, alebo iba jedna traumatická udalosť, môžu pozmeniť mozog na biochemickej úrovni. Opakovaný stres spôsobený bezprostredným alebo anticipovaným ohrozením môže pretvoriť naše mozgy, keď stresový hormón kortizol zanechá chemickú traumatickú stopu; výchova sa stáva prírodou (nurture becomes nature)“ (Crawford, 2014, s. 539). Teda dichotómia o biologickosti alebo kultúrnosti emócií je bezpredmetná. Taktiež sociálny kontext emócií je zasadený do ich intersubjektivity, a teda ich presahu do interaktívnych procesov spoločnosti. Takéto chápanie umožňuje skúmať emócie na vyšších úrovniach analýzy ako len na úrovni jednotlivca.

Debata o tom ako skúmať emócie v medzinárodných vzťahoch predstavuje hlavnú tému druhej vlny emocionálneho obratu. Po prvej vlne bolo zrejmé, že emócie majú svoje opodstatnenie pri štúdiu svetovej politiky a globálnych problémov. Otázka bola, ako ich systematicky skúmať? Prvými ucelenými monografiami, ktoré sa snažia zodpovedať túto otázku, sú knihy s názvom *Methodology and Emotion in International Relations: Parsing the Passions* (Van Rythoven a Sucharov, 2019) a *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotion Turn* (Clément a Sangar, 2018). Kolektív autorov ponúka, ako možno emócie multidisciplinárne a s použitím rôznych metód vhodne skúmať. V úvodnej kapitole druhej uvedenej knihy autori Clément a Sangar (2018) rozdelili tieto príklady do troch zastrešujúcich výskumných otázok, ktoré určujú analytickú pozíciu emócií v rámci výskumu, takto:

1. Aký vplyv majú emócie na empirický fenomén, ako vnímanie a správanie? Aký je vplyv emócií na aktérov a politiku?
2. Prečo a ako sú špecifické emócie používané politickými lídrami a inštitúciami?
3. Ako zistiť neoddeliteľnú a čiastočne skrytú úlohu emócií v rámci väčšej diskurzívnej dynamiky?

Odborné práce venujúce sa výskumu emócií v medzinárodne politických témach vychádzajú z týchto otázok a uplatňujú metódy, ako napríklad kritická diskurzívna analýza, emočná

diskurzívna analýza, analýza sentimentu, obsahová analýza, psychoanalýza s fenomenológiou, analýza naratív, auto-etnografia, účastnícke pozorovanie, rozhovory a iné. Zároveň, hoci prevládajú práce s kvalitatívnymi metódami výskumu, možno uplatniť i kvantitatívne metódy. Medzi autorov, ktorí sa zapojili do debaty o metódach skúmania emócií v medzinárodných vzťahoch sú napríklad Simon Koschut, Amir Lupovici, Andrew A. G. Ross, Ty Solomon, Maéva Clément, Eric Sangar a iní.

Emócie, pocity, nálady, afekty, sentiment ale i podnety pre ne a reakcie na ne predstavujú ako samotný predmet skúmania, tak i jednotlivé kategórie analýzy. Jednotlivé emócie sú bližšie analyzované napríklad v práci o empatii (Crawford, 2014), o radošti (Penttinen, 2013), nostalgii (Sucharov, 2013), vine a sympatii (Hall, 2016), dôvere (Wong, 2015), hneve (Eznack, 2013), strachu (Van Rythoven, 2015) ale i priateľstve (Koschut a Oelsner, 2014).

Ďalej môžu byť skúmané na rôznych úrovniach analýzy od jednotlivca po medzinárodnú úroveň. Zároveň sa nemusí jednať iba o skúmanie štátnikov, štátov a ich inštitúcií, alebo medzinárodných organizácií či korporácií. Pohyb emócií vo svetovej politike sa nevzťahuje len na týchto aktérov. Presahuje do širších oblastí odbornej a verejnej debaty (Eberle a Daniel, 2019). Taktiež ich vplyv možno vidieť v súčasnej kultúre a médiách, ako v prípade sociálnych médií (Duncombe, 2019), reklám (Sucharov, 2013), rozprávok (Danjoux, 2012), filmu a rádia (Ross, 2014) alebo hudby (Ó Tuathail, 2003). Rôznorodosť tém a prepojenie viacerých disciplín vytvára priestor na formulovanie nových teoreticko-metodologických prístupov.

Záver

Cieľom článku bolo predstaviť čitateľovi vývoj a aktuálne trendy výskumu emócií v medzinárodných vzťahoch. Emócie ako predmet výskumu sa v tejto vednej disciplíne etablovali v druhej polovici 90. rokov 20. storočia. Skúmajú sa z pohľadu jednotlivca. Ako a prečo ich používa. Následne aký je vplyv použitých emócií na iných aktérov a politiku. Zároveň, sociálna psychológia a konštruktivistické a postštrukturalistické teoretické prístupy rozšírili koncepty skupinovej identity a kultúry o aspekt emócií. To umožnilo skúmať emócie

i na skupinovej úrovni. Cez prizmu emócií a afektívnych skúseností sú interpretované a vysvetľované diskurzívne dynamiky na národnej i medzinárodnej úrovni. Definícia racionálneho aktéra, z ktorej vychádzajú tradičné teórie medzinárodných vzťahov ako realizmus a liberalizmus, je spochybnená a upravená o priame napojenie emociality jednotlivca i celej spoločnosti. Široký záber tém a multidisciplinárny charakter emócií otvára stále nové a neprebádané oblasti ľudského poznania. Hoci boli formulované viaceré nové metódy a teoretické ukotvenia emócií v medzinárodných vzťahoch, stále je priestor na overenie týchto poznatkov, vylepšenie metód ich reprodukciou a pripojenie sa do debaty, ktorá stále nemá jednotné závery.

Literatúra

- Clément, M., & Sangar, E. (2018). *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Coicaud, J. M. (2014). Emotions and Passions in the Discipline of International Relations. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 3(15), 485-513.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109914000206>
- Corey, R. (2004). *FEAR: The History of a Political Idea*. Oxford University Press.
- Crawford, N. C. (2000). The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships. *International Security*, 24(4), 116-156.
<https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560327>
- Crawford, N. C. (2014). Institutionalizing passion in world politics: Fear and empathy. *International Theory*, 6, 535-557.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971914000256>
- Dahrendorf, R. (1973). *Homo Sociologicus*. Routledge & K. Paul.
- Damasio, A. R. (1994). *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. Avon Books.
- Damasio, A. R. (1999). How the Brain Creates the Mind. *Scientific American*, 281(6), 112-117.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/26058529>
- Damasio, A. R. (2007). Neuroscience and Ethics: Intersections. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, 7(1), 3-7.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160601063910>
- Damasio, A. R. et al. (2000). Subcortical and cortical brain activity during the feeling of self-generated emotions. *Nat Neurosci*, 3, 1049-1056. <https://doi.org/10.1038/79871>
- Damasio, A. R. et al. (2005). The Iowa Gambling Task and the somatic marker hypothesis: some questions and answers. *Research Focus*, 9(4), 159-162.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.02.002>
- Danjoux, I. (2012). *Political Cartoons and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Oxford University Press.
- Duncombe, C. (2019). The Politics of Twitter: Emotions and the Power of Social Media. *International Political Sociology*, 13(4), 409-429.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olz013>
- Dunn, B. D. et al. (2005). The somatic marker hypothesis: A critical evaluation. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, 30(2), 239-271.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.07.001>
- Ekman, P. (1992). An Argument for Basic Emotions. *Cognition and Emotion*, 6(3,4), 169-200.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02699939208411068>
- Eznack, L. (2011). Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies' Relationships. *Security Studies*, 20(2), 238-265.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2011.572687>
- Eznack, L. (2013). The mood was grave: affective dispositions and states' anger-related behaviour. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 34(3), 552-580.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2013.839256>
- Hall, T. (2016). *Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage*. Cornell University Press.
- Hall, T. H., & Ross, A. A. G. (2019). Rethinking Affective Experience and Popular Emotion: World War I and the Construction of Group Emotion in International Relations. *Political Psychology*, 1-16.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12608>
- Heller, R. (2018). More Rigor to Emotions! A Comparative, Qualitative Content Analysis of Anger in Russian Foreign Policy. In *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn*. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Hobbes, T. (1998). *Thomas Hobbes: Man and Citizen*. Hackett Publishing.
- Hymans, J. E. C. (2006). *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment*. The Free Press.
- Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Koschut, S. (2018). Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations. In *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Koschut, S., & Oelsner, A. (2014). *Friendship and International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kratochwil, F. (1994). Citizenship: On the Border of Order. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 19(4), 485-506.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754940190040>
- Lebow, R. N. (1984). *Between Peace and War*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lehmannová, Z. a kol. (2010). *Paradigma kultur*. Aleš Čeněk.
- Lerner, J. S. a kol. (2014). Emotion and Decision Making. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 66, 799-823. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115043>
- Markwica, R. (2018). *Emotional Choices: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy*. Oxford University Press.
- Mellers, B. et al. (1999). Emotion-Based Choice. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 128(3), 332-345.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.128.3.332>
- Mercer, J. (1996). *Approaching Emotion in International Politics*. International Studies Association Conference, San Diego.
- Mercer, J. (2006). Human nature and the first image: Emotion in international politics. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9, 288-303.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800091>
- Mercer, J. (2010). Emotional Beliefs. *International Organization*, 65(1), 1-31.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309990221>
- Mitzen, J., & Schweller, R. L. (2011). Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War. *Security Studies*, 1(20), 2-35.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2011.549023>
- Ó Tuathail, G. (2003). "Just out looking for a fight": American affect and the invasion of Iraq. *Antipode*, 35(5), 856-870.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2003.00361.x>
- Penttinen, E. (2013). *Joy and International Relations: A New Methodology*. Routledge.
- Plutchik, R. (1980). A general psychoevolutionary theory of emotion. In: *Emotion: Theory, research, and experience: Vol. 1. Theories of emotion*. Academic.
- Prinz, J. (2004). Which Emotions Are Basic? In *Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality*. Oxford University Press.
- Ross, A. A. G. (2014). *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict*. University of Chicago Press.
- Schilling, C. L. (2014). *Emotional State Theory: Friendship and Fear in Israeli Foreign Policy*. Lexington Books.
- Sen, A. (2009). *The Idea of Justice*. Harvard University Press.
- Simon, H. A. (1957). *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*. Macmillan.
- Slaměník, I. (2011). *Emoce a interpersonální vztahy*. Grada Publishing.
- Slovic, P. et al. (2002). Rational actors or rational fools? Implications of the affect heuristic for behavior economics. *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 31(4), 329-342.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-5357\(02\)00174-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-5357(02)00174-9)
- Stein, J. G. (1988). Buiding Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat. *Political Psychology*, 9(2), 245-271.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/3790955>
- Sucharov, M. (2013). Imagining ourselves then and now: Nostalgia and Canadian multiculturalism. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 16(4), 539-565.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2012.23>
- Tomkins, S. S. (1962). *Affect, imagery, consciousness, Vol. 1. The positive affects*. Springer Publishing.
- Van Rythoven, E. (2015). Learning to feel, learning to fear? Emotions, imaginaries, and limits in the politics of securitization. *Security Dialogue*, 46(5), 458-475.

- <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010615574766>
Van Rythoven, E., & Sucharov, M. (2019). *Methodology and Emotions in International Relations: Parsing the Passions*. Routledge.
- Vysekalová, J., a kol. (2014). *Emoce v marketingu: Jak oslovit srdce zákazníka*. Grada Publishing.
- White, R. K. (1984). *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations*. Free Press of Macmillan.
- Wong, S. S. (2015). Emotions and the communication of intentions in face-to-face diplomacy. *European Journal of International Relations*, 22(1), 144-167.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115581059>
- Zeelenberg, M. et al. (2008). On emotion specificity in decision making: Why feeling is for doing. *Judgement and Decision Making*, 3(1), 18-27. <https://journal.sjdm.org/bb2.pdf>
- Zemanová, M. (2021). Rola emocí v rozhodovacím procese. *Scientia et Societas*, 17(1), 14-22. https://a1cb08f9a7.clvaw-cdn-wnd.com/69f200991000431e558c5cdb934f67d4/200000315-7be507be52/Scientia%201_2021%20web.pdf

FOREIGN POLICY CONDITIONALITY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

KRZYSZTOF ŻARNA

Institute of Political Science
University of Rzeszów
Poland
E-mail: kzarna@ur.edu.pl

Abstract:

On January 1, 1993, as a result of the breakup of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republics, a new state was created on the political map of Europe: the Slovak Republic. The article deals with the foreign policy determinants of this state at the threshold of its establishment. An analysis is made of those determinants that had a key impact on the shape of foreign policy: the geographical environment, historical factors, the population factor, foreign service and diplomacy, and external conditions. Of greatest importance were historical factors, especially in the context of relations with Hungary, the deficit in foreign service and diplomatic personnel, which was of great significance in the context of creating foreign policy from scratch, and the multinational nature of the country. The article uses a comparative method and factor analysis.

Keywords:

Diplomacy, foreign policy, the first Czechoslovak Republic, Slovak Republic.

Introduction

On January 1, 1993, a new state appeared on the political map of Europe: The Slovak Republic, one of whose most important challenges was to define its foreign policy priorities and

implement them. The aim of the article is to present its determinants and the author has chosen those which, in his opinion, have had a key influence on the shape of foreign policy: the geographical environment, historical factors, the population factor, foreign service and diplomacy. The period of Slovakia's inception is analysed.

The article critically verifies the following research hypotheses: among the determinants of Slovakia's foreign policy, historical factors seemed to be decisive, especially in the context of relations with Hungary. The second decisive determinant was the deficit in foreign service and diplomatic personnel, which was of great importance in the context of creating foreign policy from scratch. Finally, the third decisive factor was the multinational character of the country. Comparative analysis, which involves detecting similarities and differences between phenomena, processes and systems, was applied in the article. It was used to compare individual conditions. Foreign policy determinants are a system of contingent premises that cause a specific, concrete effect and sufficient for a given effect to occur. The issue is complex because it must consider factors that affect foreign policy directly and indirectly in the wider international environment or setting.

Geographical environment

The Slovak Republic is a country located in Central Europe with an area of 49 036 km², which classifies it among small countries from both a European and global perspective (Bajda, 2018). It has five neighbours: Poland to the north, Ukraine to the east, Austria and Hungary to the south and the Czech Republic to the west. It does not neighbour any state that would be a regional power, which in turn could determine its foreign policy. The geopolitical position from the beginning of the country's existence influenced the political line of the government in Bratislava. Slovakia, which was still under the influence of the USSR for several decades as part of Czechoslovakia, had to search for a new concept of security policy in the face of new political realities. Consequently, two options seemed viable: orientation towards Moscow or integration into the North Atlantic Alliance. Slovakia's location between Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, i.e. countries which listed Euro-Atlantic integration among their foreign policy priorities, created a situation in which Slovakia, if it found itself in the orbit of influence of the Russian Federation, could be something of a wedge in the compact area of NATO member states. Hence, as Robert Łoś notes, interest in the country was disproportionately high in relation to its size (Łoś, 2007, p. 13).

Slovakia is not a country with rich deposits of natural resources. Lignite, manganese ores, small amounts of iron ore, copper, mercury, antimony, magnesite, building stone, oil are mined here (this represents about 2 % of demand). There are significant deposits of uranium ore in eastern Slovakia. Slovakia also has resources of alginite (unique in the world). This mineral has particularly high potential for use in agriculture, environmental regeneration and in cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, thanks in part to its ability to retain water (Žarna, 2015, p. 39). The above-mentioned natural resources that occur in Slovakia are not strategic for the Slovak economy, which is why it is dependent on external supplies especially when it comes to energy resources.

Historical determinants

Historical determinants seem to be key. It is difficult to define unequivocally the moment from which we can speak of a Slovak nation. Many Slovaks emphasise the fact that the Great Moravian Empire was the first form of organisation of their nation. However, it is possible to risk the thesis that the manifestations of the formation of the Slovak nation appeared during the reign of the Austrian Empress Maria Theresa. As noted by Andrzej J. Madera, the struggle of the Slovaks to preserve their national identity in the 18th and 19th centuries was not an easy one. The small number of educated and informed Slovak intelligentsia was an obstacle (Madera, 2001, p. 15). In the mid-nineteenth century, as Rafał Kniotek points out, it began to be accepted that the Slovak nation existed because its distinct language functioned and the national group referred to as Slovaks had distinct cultural characteristics (Kniotek, 2008, p. 62). In nations that do not have a very rich tradition of statehood, nationalistic tendencies are more prevalent. The common denominator between Slovaks and the Balkan nations can be seen here, and this is at the same time a very different element between Slovaks and Czechs, with whom they formed a common state for many years and who have rich traditions of statehood.

At the beginning of the 10th century, the territory of Slovakia became an object of rivalry between Bohemia, Poland and Hungary. Eventually, the Slovak lands fell under Hungarian influence for nearly a thousand years. From the beginning of the 19th century, the Hungarians intensified the process of Magyarization of the Slovak lands, which culminated in the establishment of the dualistic Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The policy of the Hungarian authorities towards the Slovaks at that time greatly influenced bilateral Slovak-Hungarian relations. Between 1918 and 1939, and 1945 and 1992, Slovaks formed a joint state with the Czechs. On the threshold of the First World War, mainly due to the efforts of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, the idea of Czechoslovakism and the creation of a common state of Czechs and Slovaks began to be promoted. The Pittsburgh Agreement brought this idea to fruition. A new state appeared on the political map of Europe – The First Czechoslovak Republic.

In terms of population potential, Slovaks were only the third nation in the country after the Czechs and Germans. A major problem was the deficit of intellectual and clerical elites. The lack of qualified personnel, which the Hungarians had been producing for years, resulted in a situation where Czechs came in their place. Over time, Czech-Slovak antagonism began to emerge. Most Czech politicians, including Tomáš G. Masaryk, rejected the idea of realising autonomy for Slovakia. In May 1919, Milan R. Štefánik was killed in an airplane accident and thus the chance of bringing the Pittsburgh Agreement to fruition diminished almost to zero (Mervart, 2000). Unexpectedly, an opportunity opened up for the Slovaks in 1938. The May and September crisis in Czechoslovakia led to the collapse of the First Republic. The determinant that contributed most to this fact was the activity of the German minority centred around the Sudeten German Party, which acted on the explicit instructions of the Third Reich and, as a consequence of the escalation of the demands put forward by the Sudeten Germans, there was international tension which ended with the conference Czechoslovakia was forced to cede to Germany the border areas where the defensive fortifications and large industrial plants of the First Republic had been accumulated and large industrial plants of the First Republic. In this situation, in the event of any conflict, the fate of Czechoslovakia was a foregone conclusion (Žarna, 2011, p. 129). The Slovaks took advantage of the situation by gaining autonomy. The name of the state was also changed to the Czech-Slovak Republic (the Second Republic) (Ústavný zákon 1938).

In March 1939, events took place that led to the collapse of the Second Republic on the one hand and the creation of the first Slovak state on the other. On 14th March, the members of the Sejm of the Slovak State took the decision to establish the Slovak State, which took place under explicit pressure from Adolf Hitler. It was a buffer state under the influence of the Third Reich. In 1940, it covered an area of 38 004 km² with a population of 2.6 million. Jozef Tiso served as president and Vojtech Tuka as prime minister. This, the only period before 1993 when Slovaks had their own state, raises extreme assessments. These range from explicit classification as a totalitarian and crim-

inal state to near-apologeticism (Bobák, 2000; Lacko 2012).

According to the 1939 census, Slovakia was inhabited by 136 000 Jews. Even during the period of autonomy, a number of regulations were introduced to marginalise them. Adolf Eichmann was in Slovakia at the time and, meeting with Slovak politicians and advised them on how to solve the Jewish question (Žarna, 2009, pp. 131-135). At first, they were deprived of the possibility to hold any positions in the public administration, army, hospitals, they could not practice professions such as pharmacist or lawyer. Their property was confiscated and, in 1940, they were subject to forced labour for the state. Access to education was also restricted. The rest of the rights were stripped from the people of this community by the Jewish Code. Shortly afterwards, the Jews were placed in concentration camps and in April 1942, the Slovak authorities launched a deportation action code-named "David", whereby they were sent to Terezín (Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) or to extermination camps in the General Government. The action was financed by the Slovak authorities, who paid 500 German marks to the Third Reich for each Jew deported, which was met with protests at home and the intervention of the Holy See (Kamenec, 1999, pp. 139-146).

After the end of the Second World War, the creation of a common state of Czechs and Slovaks took place again. President Edvard Beneš adopted an anti-Hungarian line in politics, resulting in decrees that restricted the rights of Hungarians. Beneš's decrees also included Germans, who were expelled (Šutaj, Mosný, Olejník, 2002, pp. 93-158).

The population factor

An extremely important determinant of foreign policy is the population factor. Whether a state is homogeneous or multinational in character can influence its shape. The Slovak Republic is one of the countries with a relatively high proportion of national minorities in Europe (Podolák, 1998, p. 12). In terms of foreign policy, it is especially the stance of Vladimír Mečiar's government towards minorities, mainly Roma and Hungarian, that has affected Slovakia's negative image on the international

arena and slowed down the country's accession to Euro-Atlantic structures.

The 1992 Constitution of the Slovak Republic contains a number of provisions that regulate the rights and freedoms of representatives of national and ethnic minorities. According to Article 6, the state official language is Slovak and the use of minority languages in official dealings is subject to further legal regulation. Article 33 prohibits discrimination on the basis of origin (*Ústava Slovenskej republiky*, 1992). The most rights are contained in Article 34. National and ethnic minorities are guaranteed development, especially the right to develop their own culture together with other members of the minority; the right to disseminate and receive information in the mother tongue; the right of association; the right to establish educational and cultural institutions; the right to receive education in the mother tongue; the right to use it in official contacts (*Ústava Slovenskej republiky*, 1992).

Analysing the results of the 1991 census (the next one was in 2001), it was the Hungarians who inhabited the southern areas of Slovakia, directly neighbouring the Republic of Hungary. The largest concentrations of the Hungarian population were in the Banská Bystrica; Bratislava; Košice; Nitra; Trnava regions. This nationality was declared by 567 296 people. The Roma population is estimated to be around 300 000 or even 500 000, although the 1991 census showed that 75 802 persons declared their membership of this minority (Davidová, 2011; Jakoubek, 2008; Krekovičová, 1999; Kwadrans, 2008; Salner, 2004; Vašečka, 2002). Many Roma declared Slovak or Hungarian nationality for fear of persecution. Roma mostly live in the eastern part of Slovakia. It is an economically underdeveloped region with a relatively high unemployment rate. The reasons for this can be traced back to the Austro-Hungarian era. Hungarians in the 19th century resettled Roma in what is now the eastern part of Slovakia (Podolák, 1998, pp. 30-42).

As Juraj Mesik noted, Slovakia is the country with the highest concentration of Roma in Europe (the Roma population in Romania is larger, but they are dispersed). They are not a static population - about 55 % of Slovak Roma are under 18 years of age. This age structure indicates that the Roma population will

grow more and more, and they will be a majority in some regions (Mesik, 1999, p. 16).

The Czech minority resided throughout the country; it is not possible to clearly identify the region of Slovakia where its representatives were in the majority. In the 1991 census, Czech nationality was declared by 52 884 inhabitants. As for the Ruthenians, who never had their own state, they inhabited a dense border area between Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Vojvodina and Hungary. A significant diaspora of them can be found in North America. The largest concentrations of the Ruthenian minority in Slovakia were located in the Prešov region. In the 1991 census, 17 197 people declared this nationality. It is worth mentioning the demands of part of this community aimed at reviving the Ruthenian identity. In the United States United States and Western Europe, the American artist Andy Warhol became immensely popular. His parents were Ruthenians who emigrated to the USA (Bruski, 2003, pp. 109-129; Gajdoš, Konečný, 2005; Garton Ash, 2000; pp. 408-414; Magocsi, 2022).

As Jan Jacek Bruski noted, a section of Carpathian Ruthenians aspires to become an independent nation. The leaders of this trend claim that the fourth nation of Eastern Slavs, alongside the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, has been born, or rather has finally matured, in the Carpathians. Diaspora communities also occupy an important place in this concept - above all, the so-called Bačvans, descendants of 18th-century emigrants who settled in the Vojvodina area, as well as a group of several hundred thousand Americans of Carpathian ancestry. J. J. Bruski adds that a group of nationally conscious Ruthenians advocate their belonging to the Ukrainian community, treating the Carpathian concept as a manifestation of an unhealthy and most likely artificially instilled separatism (Magocsi, 2022).

Representatives of the Ukrainian minority resided mainly in the Prešov region. In 1991, 13 281 people declared this nationality (Gajdoš, Konečný, 2005; Podolák, 1998, pp. 48-62). As already mentioned, analysing the censuses one can see a gradually decreasing number of Ukrainians, which is mainly related to the increasing awareness of Ruthenians. The 1991 census showed 5414 people declaring German nationality. This is only 3 % of the number of inhabitants of this nationality living in the Slo-

vak State at the time of its establishment in 1939. In the analysed period, larger concentrations of Germans were located in the districts of: Gelnica, Košice-urbs and Prievidza (Žarna, 2011, pp. 27-30).

Poles formed larger concentrations in the Prešov region, mainly in the districts of Kežmarok and Poprad. In 1991, 2659 persons declared Polish nationality (Podolák, 1998, pp. 69-73).

A Jewish minority lived in dispersion. In the census, Jewish nationality was declared by 134 persons (Podolák, 1998, p. 74). In the census, 6442 persons declared themselves as Moravians. Marek Waldenberg points out that there is often a reference to the crystallisation of the national distinctiveness of communities considered to be part of existing nations or with no consciousness of a national character so far, with the Moravians and Silesians in mind (Waldenberg, 2000, p. 25).

Foreign service and diplomacy

The newly formed state, as already mentioned, both in terms of area and population potential and population potential, it ranks among the small European states. As Alexander Duleba, Pavol Lukáč and Miroslav Wlachovský of the Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association point out – a small state in the international environment is characterised by several factors: low military strength; a relatively weak international position; regional interests; a narrow internal market; and weak domestic economic resources that are dependent on the economic climate (Duleba, Lukáč, Wlachovský, 1998, pp. 9-10).

These factors necessitate a considered strategy to be adopted in the foreign policy of such a state. In this situation, the main objective should be to belong to international political, economic and military organisations and to achieve through them the most important interests of the state. Foreign policy should be realistic – it must be based on facts and not be subject to illusions, especially the one concerning the belief in one's greatness. The Slovak Republic is the smallest state among its neighbours. Its policy must therefore be active – it is forced to pursue its interests in agreement with other states. Foreign policy must be coordinated – implemented in agreement between the

Office of the President, the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and individual ministries. The most important goals of the Slovak Republic should be of a long-term nature above the short-term interests of small groups.

Between 1990 and 1992, the Ministry of International Relations of the Slovak Republic was in operation, whose primary task in the reality of the federal state was to present Slovak culture and to establish and develop international cooperation, mainly at the regional level. This institution was renamed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the January 1, 1993. From the very beginning of its activities in the newly formed state, this ministry had to overcome many difficulties and one of the most important was the lack of human resources. The situation was hampered both by the fact that most of the employees of the foreign diplomatic service had taken up employment in the Czech MFA and by the lack of prospects for quickly recruiting reasonably experienced staff. Moreover, the process of setting up this ministry, which was so important and strategic for the newly established state, was not free from political influence, especially from Prime Minister V. Mečiar, who from the very beginning effectively sought to control the work of the ministry and Slovak foreign policy as a whole (Duleba, Lukáč, Wlachovský, 1998, pp. 9-10).

The extent of ties and applicable international law is also an important determinant of foreign policy. In the case of Slovakia in its first period of existence, the bilateral agreements in force with individual states, which regulated mutual relations, were of great importance. This was indispensable due to the fact that it was a new state on the international scene, which had to build its position based on the normalisation of relations with its neighbours. The international organisations to which Slovakia wanted to be a party also played an extremely important role. However, it had to fulfil a number of requirements in the form of modifications to its laws. In turn, the signing and ratification of a number of international conventions and covenants forced the authorities to respect the obligations assumed. Conventions protecting human rights were important in this respect, which in the case of Slovakia was of particular importance during

the government of Vladimír Mečiar between 1994 and 1998. Slovakia, unlike its neighbours (with the exception of Ukraine), did not have a rich tradition of its own statehood and thus experience of conducting foreign policy. At the time of its establishment, therefore, it had to achieve three main objectives in terms of foreign policy: to gain international recognition; to create institutions capable of conducting an efficient foreign policy; and to formulate its programme. The peaceful process of separation of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republics played an important role for the image of the newly formed state. This process took a different course from that of the break-up of Yugoslavia. The special diplomatic note that the Slovak government sent to other countries of the world and the declaration of the Slovak parliament of the December 3, 1992, emphasised the will to accept the principles governing international relations, including those concerning the disarmament process, the building of a democratic system and the observance of human rights (Vyhlásenie, 86/1992).

By the May 1, 1993, the Slovak Republic was recognised by 99 countries worldwide. From its inception it became a member of the CSCE (then OSCE). On January 19, it was accepted into the ranks of the UN and on June 30 it became a member of the Council of Europe. On October 4 it signed an Association Agreement with the European Communities (Vyhlásenie, 85/1992).

By gaining international recognition and becoming a member of many international organisations, Slovakia has achieved a similar status to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary - countries with a much richer foreign policy experience.

Since Slovakia's inception, it has been difficult to clearly identify where the centre is, and which people formulate foreign policy directions. This was not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was headed by as many as six ministers between 1993 and 1997. With such a high turnover, it is hard to speak of any continuity. The weak position of the foreign minister in the government had its serious consequences. Firstly, with such frequent changes, foreign partners had no one to talk to about the long-term foreign policy plans of the Slovak Republic. Secondly, there was also the problem of coordinating cooperation with other ministries

and parliament Duleba, Lukáč, Wlachovský, 1998, p. 13).

As mentioned, the MFA was established on the basis of the Ministry of International Relations of the Slovak Republic, which in turn was still active in 1990. Its activity was focused in 1990-1992 on developing international cultural relations and representing Slovakia in cooperation with regions of other countries. In addition, its activities were coordinated through the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague. Eventually, the MFA was operational from January 1, 1993. The principle of a 2:1 division of the Federation's assets between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic also applied to assets abroad. As a result, Slovakia was already in a position at the beginning of January 1993 to open representations in 53 countries of the world and four permanent missions to international organisations.

Compared to their neighbours, the Slovaks had a major problem with a shortage of diplomatic staff. The quality of the foreign and diplomatic service, which was created practically from scratch, is highlighted by Bogusław Pytlik. It was formed by cadres without much experience and that the basic criterion for recruitment was often not skills but political views and preferences (Pytlik, 2010, p. 228).

On the other hand, the preparation of qualified cadres and the establishment of a system for their training required many years, which the Slovaks did not have time for. The diplomats who started their professional path in socialist Czechoslovakia were mostly graduates of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and were forced to leave the ministry after November 1989. In Bratislava, the Institute of International Relations was established at the Faculty of Law of Comenius University, which organised a postgraduate course to prepare future MFA staff. The Faculty of Political Science and International Relations was established at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, where a postgraduate course was launched and International Relations, where a full-time four-year master's programme in international relations was launched. Students were offered internships at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic and the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The government undertook to develop a scholarship programme for those willing to

study international relations and diplomacy in EU member states and the USA (Duleba, Lukáč, Wlachovský, 1998, pp. 25-26).

Another important issue was the creation of a solid base of experts who would produce foreign policy analyses and reports. The Slovak Foreign Policy Association, mentioned earlier, played such a role, as did the Institute of Public Affairs (IVO)¹ or the Slovak Academy of Sciences (SAV). In the case of NGOs like IVO or SFPA, they were funded by grants.

One of the main external factors that influenced the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic was the "autumn of nations" - the decomposition of the political system that had been in place in Central Europe for several decades. The events that took place at the turn of 1989 and 1990 in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic influenced each other. However, there would not have been an "autumn of nations" if Mikhail Gorbachev had not come to power in the USSR. He departed from the Brezhnev doctrine, allowed for liberalisation in domestic politics and, above all, fundamentally changed the approach to the Eastern Bloc countries in which reformist wings could carry out reforms without fear of Soviet intervention (Dobek-Ostrowska, 1998, p. 18).

One result of the end of the Cold War was the emergence of prospects for cross-border cooperation. The hitherto closely guarded borders opened up, with the consequence that there was an opportunity to establish contacts between regions. The development of cooperation within Euroregions was also an important factor. In the case of Slovakia, this cooperation was realised within the Euroregion Beskidy (with Poland and the Czech Republic), the White Carpathian Euroregion (with the Czech Republic), the Carpathian Euroregion (with Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Hungary), Euroregion Pomoraví-Záhorie-Weinviertel (with Austria and the Czech Republic), Euroregion Tatry (with Poland). An important external factor was also the development of regional coop-

eration through participation in the numerous international organizations that were formed in Central and Eastern Europe. The Visegrad Triangle / Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative or the Central European Free Trade Agreement can be mentioned in particular. A factor that contributed to the positive perception of Slovakia was the peaceful breakup of the joint state with the Czech Republic. This had a special dimension in the context of the events that unfolded in the first half of the 1990s in the Balkans. Hence there was little controversy over Slovakia's rapid accession to a number of international organizations. Back in 1993, it became a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (January 1), the World Bank (January 16), the UN (January 19) and the Council of Europe (June 30).

Finally, an extremely important external factor was the clear declaration by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe of their desire for Euro-Atlantic integration. Most of the countries of the region emphasized in their foreign policy their desire to join the EC/EU and NATO.

Summary

In conclusion, among the determinants of the Slovak Republic's foreign policy, historical factors seemed to be decisive. Nearly a thousand years of dependence on Hungary and, above all, the process aimed at the nationalization of the Slovaks, largely influenced the bilateral relations between the two countries after 1993. The differences in the context of Czech-Slovak relations are noticeable here. Despite the fact that the two nations formed a common state between 1918-1939 and 1945-1992, and it was rather the Czechs who had a privileged position, this did not impinge on mutual relations between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. At the time of the Slovak Republic's founding, a clear shortage of foreign service and diplomatic personnel, which was of great importance in the context of creating foreign policy from scratch. The main factor was the fact that most of the Czechoslovak diplomatic staff had been recruited into the Czech diplomatic corps. The Slovaks were thus faced with building their foreign service practically from scratch, which had its consequences in the first years of Slovakia's existence.

¹ The Institute of Public Affairs is a non-governmental organization grouping experts in various fields. It was created with the aim of building civil society. It is also an important think-tank tasked with organizing conferences and seminars on both major domestic and foreign policy issues of the Slovak Republic.

A third important determinant was the multinational character of the Slovak Republic. Of particular importance was the Hungarian minority, accounting for nearly 10 % of the population, living in the Slovak-Hungarian borderland. When the rights of the said minority were violated, it became an important instrument of the foreign policy of the Republic of Hungary and its status repeatedly affected bilateral relations between the two countries. In the early years of the Slovak Republic, there were repeated violations of the rights of the Roma minority, whose population on the basis of the official census in 1991 was certainly underestimated. Many Roma, out of fear of persecution, declared Slovak or Hungarian nationality. The policy of the Slovak authorities toward the Roma and Hungarian minorities, in addition to the deterioration of Slovak-Hungarian bilateral relations, affected the delay of Slovakia's accession to the EU and NATO in subsequent years.

References

- Bajda, P. (2018). *Małe państwo europejskie na arenie międzynarodowej. Polityka zagraniczna Republiki słowackiej w latach 1993-2016*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe UKSW.
- Bobák, J. (Ed.) (2000). *Slovenská republika (1939-1945)*. Matica slovenská.
- Bruski, J. J. (2003). Rusini w Polsce i na Słowacji. Meandry świadomości narodowej. In S. Bednarek, *Świadomość narodowa w Polsce i Słowacji w XIX i XX wieku. Národné vedomie v Pol'sku a na Slovensku v XIX. a XX. storočí*. (pp. 109-129). Centrum Badań Śląskoznawczych i Bohemistycznych Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
- Davidová, E. (2011). *Kvalita života a sociální determinanty zdraví u Romů v České a Slovenské republice*. Triton.
- Dobek-Ostrowska, B. (1998). Proces demokratyzacji Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej – przesłanki i przebieg. In Antoszewski, A. & Herbut, R. (Eds.). *Demokracje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej* (pp. 12-33). Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
- Duleba, A., Lukáč, P. & Wlachovský, M. (1998). *Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky. Východiská, stav a perspektívy*. Výskumné centrum slovenskej spoločnosti pre zahraničnú politiku.
- Gajdoš, M. & Konečný, S. (2005). *Rusíni a Ukrajinci na Slovensku v procesoch transformácie (1989-1995). Výber z dokumentov I*. Univerzum.
- Garton Ash, T. (2000). *Historia na gorąco. Eseje i reportaże z Europy lat 90*. Wydawnictwo Znak.
- Jakoubek, M. (2008). *Cikáni a etnicita*. Triton.
- Kamenec, I. (1999). Židovská otázka na Slovensku v čase druhej svetovej vojny In Hoensch, J. K., Birman, S. & Liptak, L. (Eds.). *Emancipácia Židov – antisemitizmus – prenasledovanie v Nemecku, Rakúsko-Uhorsku, v českých zemiach a na Slovensku* (pp. 139-146). Veda vydavateľstvo SAV.
- Kniotek, R. (2008). Tożsamość narodowa Słowaków. *Forum Europejskie*, 15, 51-75.
- Krekovičová, E. (1999). *Medzi toleranciou a barierami. Obraz Rómov a Židov v slovenskom folklóre*. AEP – Academic Electronic Press.
- Kwadrans, Ł. (2008). Edukacja Romów. Studium porównawcze na przykładzie Czech, Polski i Słowacji. Wydawnictwo Państwowej Wyższej Szkoły Zawodowej im. Angelusa Silesiusa.
- Lacko, M. (2012). Dwuramienny krzyż w cieniu swastyki. *Republika Słowacka 1939-1945*. Oficyna Wydawnicza El-Press.
- Łoś, R. (2007). *Polityka zagraniczna Słowacji*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.
- Madera, A. J. (2001). *Na drodze do niepodległości, Słowacki system polityczny w okresie transformacji*. Firma „SAS” Wanda Tarnawska.
- Magocsi, P. R. (2022). *Pod osłoną gór. Dzieje Rusi Karpackiej i Karpatorusinów*. Libra.
- Mervart, J. (2020). *Čechoslovakismus*. NLN - Nakladatelství Lidové noviny.
- Mesik, J. (1999). Jacy gadżowie, tacy Romowie. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16.
- Podolák, P. (1998). *Národnostné menšiny v Slovenskej republike. Z hľadiska demografického vývoja*. Matica slovenská.
- Pytlík, B. (2010). Polityka zagraniczna Republiki Słowackiej w latach 1993-1998. In J. Osiński, *Administracja publiczna. Między polityką, prawem i ekonomią. Jubileusz 10-lecia Katedry Administracji Publicznej Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego SGH* (pp. 227-267). Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH.
- Salner, A. (2004). *Rómske deti v slovenskom školstve*. SGI.

- Šutaj, Š., Mosný, P. & Olejník, M. (2002). *Prezidentské dekrety Edvarda Beneša v povojnovom Slovensku*. Veda vydavateľstvo SAV.
- Ústava Slovenskej republiky, Z. z. 460/1992.
- Ústavný zákon zo dňa 22. novembra 1938 o autonomii Slovenskej krajiny, Z. z. 1938, č. 299.
- Vašečka, M. (2002). *Rómske hlasy. Rómovia a ich politická participácia v transformačnom období*. Inštitút pre verejné otázky.
- Vyhlásenie Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky k parlamentom a národom sveta. Schválené Národnou radou Slovenskej republiky uznesením z 3. decembra 1992, číslo 86, http://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/sk-SK/NRSR/Doc/v_k-parlamentom.htm
- Vyhlásenie Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky o členstve Slovenskej republiky v Rade Európy a prevzatí záväzkov z medzinárodných zmlúv. Schválené Národnou radou Slovenskej republiky uznesením z 3. decembra 1992, číslo 85, http://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/sk-SK/NRSR/Doc/v_k-prevzatiu-zavazkov.htm
- Waldenberg, M. (2000). *Narody zależne i mniejszości narodowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
- Žarna, K. (2009). *Hitler-Henlein-Karmasin. Mniejszość niemiecka na Słowacji w polityce III Rzeszy*. Przemyska Biblioteka Publiczna im. Ignacego Krasickiego.
- Žarna, K. (2011). *Między Berlinem a Budapesztem. Sytuacja polityczna Niemców karpackich w latach 1918-1939*. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
- Žarna, K. (2015). *Od Mečiara do Dzurindy. Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Republiki Słowackiej w latach 1993-2002*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego.

ORGANIZACJA SYSTEMU ZARZĄDZANIA KRYZYSOWEGO W POLSCE

KAROL PIĘKOŚ

Institute of Political Science
University of Rzeszów
Poland
E-mail: kpiekos@ur.edu.pl

Abstract:

Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) influenced the shape of the crisis management system in Poland. In view of the numerous problems highlighted during dangerous events, several initiatives were taken to build a modern crisis management system. The draft law developed by Józef Płoskonka and Professor Mirosław Stec at the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) provided the foundation for the current solutions. The Crisis Management Act, which was finally adopted in 2007, draws heavily on the principles found in the draft created at the ISP.

Keywords:

Crisis management, crisis management system, natural disaster, response, risk.

Wstęp

System zarządzania kryzysowego w Polsce został uregulowany w ustawie o zarządzaniu kryzysowym z 26 kwietnia 2007 r. (Ustawa o zarządzaniu kryzysowym). Prace nad przyjęciem przepisów dotyczących zarządzania kryzysowego, podejmowano już na początku XXI w., natomiast przed 2007 r. nie przyjęto właściwych przepisów. Obecnie obo-

wiązująca ustawa nawiązuje do rozwiązań zawartych w projekcie opracowanym w ISP w 2001 r. ale i zamierzeń zamieszczonych w propozycji rządu Marka Belki, który zakładał utworzenie podporządkowanej premierowi centralnej jednostki, obecnie funkcjonującej pod nazwą Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa (RCB). Przyjęcie ustawy nie stanowiło zwieńczenia procesu formowania systemu zarządzania kryzysowego. Konieczne było podjęcie kolejnych działań legislacyjnych oraz organizacyjnych. Istotny problem, który stanowił fundamentalne znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa państwa wynikał z niepodejmowania działań w zakresie tworzenia raportu z zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Przeciwdziałanie im jest niemożliwe bez sporządzenia diagnozy dotychczasowych problemów i niebezpieczeństw (Skomra, 2010, s. 12-17).

Ustawodawca w art. 2 ustawy o zarządzaniu kryzysowym zdefiniował zarządzanie kryzysowe jako „działalność organów administracji publicznej będącą elementem kierowania bezpieczeństwem narodowym, która polega na zapobieganiu sytuacjom kryzysowym, przygotowaniu do przejmowania nad nimi kontroli w drodze zaplanowanych działań, reagowaniu w przypadku wystąpienia sytuacji kryzysowych, usuwaniu ich skutków oraz odtwarzaniu zasobów i infrastruktury krytycznej” (Ustawa o zarządzaniu kryzysowym).

Zarządzanie kryzysowe jest realizowane na podstawie określonych reguł. Podstawowe zasady dotyczą: 1) jednoosobowego kierownictwa; 2) kategoryzacji zagrożeń; 3) odpowiedzialności organów władzy publicznej; 4) zespolenia; 5) powszechności (Ciekanowski-Nowicka-Wyrębek, 2017, s. 10). Zagrożenia, które są przyczyną wystąpienia sytuacji kryzysowych można podzielić na zagrożenia militarne i niemilitarne. Ze względu na kryterium źródła pochodzenia można wyróżnić cztery kategorie zagrożeń: 1) zagrożenia naturalne, które są wynikiem działań sił natury; 2) zagrożenia techniczne posiadające swoje źródło w szybkim tempie rozwoju cywilizacyjnego i gospodarczego państw oraz społeczeństw; 3) terroryzm; 4) inne zagrożenia np. przestępczość zorganizowana (Lidwa, 2015, s. 35). Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie głównych założeń i elementów systemu zarządzania kryzysowego w Polsce.

System zarządzania kryzysowego w Polsce

Na obszarze Polski zarządzanie kryzysowe realizuje Rada Ministrów. W niektórych sytuacjach, które wymagają natychmiastowego działania zarządzanie kryzysowe może być pełnione przez ministra właściwego do spraw wewnętrznych przy niezwłocznym zawiadomieniu premiera o podjętych działaniach (Lidwa, 2015, s. 56). W Polsce zarządzanie kryzysowe jest wieloszczeblowe, na każdym poziomie składa się z organów zarządzania

kryzysowego, organów opiniodawczo-doradczych i centrów zarządzania kryzysowego. Organy opiniodawczo-doradcze inicjują i koordynują działania podejmowane w sprawach zarządzania kryzysowego. W przypadku centrów zarządzania kryzysowego kluczowe jest utrzymywanie stałej gotowości do realizowania działań (RCB, 2021). Funkcjonowanie systemu zarządzania kryzysowego w Polsce zostało usankcjonowane w wielu aktach prawnych. Ustawa o zarządzaniu kryzysowym nie normuje wszystkich zagadnień. Taki stan rzeczy może utrudniać działanie organów decyzyjnych, sposób postępowania w przypadku niektórych zagrożeń tj. epidemii, która została uregulowana w ustawie z dnia 5 grudnia 2008 r. o zapobieganiu oraz zwalczaniu zakażeń i chorób zakaźnych u ludzi (Ustawa o zapobieganiu oraz zwalczaniu zakażeń i chorób). Światowa pandemia COVID-19 wywarła wpływ na polski system zarządzania kryzysowego. Sejm RP 2 marca 2020 r. przyjął ustawę o szczególnych rozwiązaniach związanych z zapobieganiem, przeciwdziałaniem i zwalczaniem COVID-19, innych chorób zakaźnych oraz wywołanych nimi sytuacji kryzysowych. Za sprawą tego aktu prawnego uregulowano liczne kwestie i określono sposób funkcjonowania systemu w obliczu zagrożenia spowodowanego przez wirusa SARS-CoV-2 (Ustawa o szczególnych rozwiązaniach).

Tabela 1 System zarządzania kryzysowego w Polsce

Szczebel administracyjny	Organ zarządzania kryzysowego	Organ opiniodawczo-doradczy	Centrum Zarządzania Kryzysowego
Krajowy	Rada Ministrów, Prezes Rady Ministrów	Rządowy Zespół Zarządzania Kryzysowego	Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa
Resortowy	Minister kierujący działem administracji rządowej, Kierownik organu centralnego	Zespół Zarządzania Kryzysowego (ministerstwa, urzędu centralnego)	Centrum Zarządzania Kryzysowego (ministerstwa, urzędu centralnego)
Wojewódzki	Wojewoda	Wojewódzki Zespół Zarządzania Kryzysowego	Wojewódzkie Centrum Zarządzania Kryzysowego
Powiatowy	Starosta powiatu	Powiatowy Zespół Zarządzania Kryzysowego	Powiatowe Centrum Zarządzania Kryzysowego
Gminny	Wójt, Burmistrz, Prezydent miasta	Gminny Zespół Zarządzania Kryzysowego	Gminne (miejskie) centra zarządzania kryzysowego ¹

Źródło: Opracowanie własne na podstawie: <https://www.gov.pl/web/rcb/zarządzanie-kryzysowe>.

¹ W przypadku gminnych centrów zarządzania kryzysowego nie ma obowiązku ich tworzenia.

Na mocy ustawy o zarządzaniu kryzysowym RCB zapewnia obsługę Rady Ministrów, Prezesa Rady Ministrów, Rządowego Zespołu Zarządzania Kryzysowego i ministra właściwego do spraw wewnętrznych w sprawach zarządzania kryzysowego oraz pełni funkcję krajowego centrum zarządzania kryzysowego (Ustawa o zarządzaniu kryzysowym). Zadania RCB wiążą się m.in. z zapewnieniem obiegu informacji pomiędzy krajowymi oraz zagranicznymi strukturami zarządzania kryzysowego. Zapobieganie sytuacjom kryzysowym oraz szybkie usuwanie ich skutków wymaga niezawodnego systemu przepływu informacji (Wojciechowska-Filipek - Mazurek-Kucharska, 2021, s. 76).


Na każdym szczeblu struktury zarządzania kryzysowego w Polsce do dyspozycji właściwych organów pozostaje Państwowa Straż Pożarna, Policja oraz służby ratowniczo-medyczne (Wojciechowska-Filipek - Mazurek-Kucharska, 2021, s. 77). W niektórych sytuacjach wykorzystywane mogą być również siły

zbrojne, które posiadają zasoby przydatne w fazie reagowania oraz likwidacji skutków sytuacji kryzysowych czego przykładem mogą być wojska inżynieryjne. W ostatnich latach wzrosła rola Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej (WOT), które często były angażowane w działania związane z usuwaniem skutków sytuacji kryzysowych. Użycie Sił Zbrojnych RP w tym przypadku następuje na wniosek wojewody, skierowany do Ministra Obrony Narodowej (Zakrzewski, 2015, s. 128 a s. 133).

Fazy zarządzania kryzysowego

W ramach kompleksowego procesu zarządzania kryzysowego wyróżnia się cztery fazy: 1) zapobiegania; 2) przygotowania; 3) reagowania 4) odbudowy. Podejmowane działania ukierunkowane są na eliminację zagrożeń, przygotowanie się na ich wystąpienie, odpowiednią reakcję na zaistnienie niekorzystnych zdarzeń oraz przedsięwzięcia zmierzające do przywrócenia stanu sprzed zagrożenia (Skomra, 2010, s. 35).

Schemat 1 Fazy zarządzania kryzysowego



Źródło: Opracowanie własne na podstawie: W. Skomra, *Zarządzanie kryzysowe – praktyczny przewodnik po nowelizacji ustawy*, Wrocław 2010, s. 35.

Sytuacje kryzysowe, do których doszło powinny stanowić impuls do podjęcia działań nastawionych na zapobieganie oraz usprawnianie dotychczasowych rozwiązań. Ustawodawca zobowiązał organy administracji publicznej do tworzenia planów zarządzania kryzysowego w art. 5 ustawy o zarządzaniu kryzysowym. Na mocy tego przepisu tworzy się krajowy plan zarządzania kryzysowego oraz odpowiednie dokumenty na poziomie województwa, powiatu oraz gminy. Plany te powinny być systematycznie aktualizowane. Ustawodawca określił, że cykl planowania nie może być dłuższy niż 2 lata (Ustawa o zarządzaniu kryzysowym). Należy nadmienić, że tworzone są również inne dokumenty o

charakterze planistycznym np. plan działania na wypadek wystąpienia epidemii, który jest opracowywany na poziomie województwa, co reguluje art. 44 ustawy z dnia 5 grudnia 2008 r. o zapobieganiu oraz zwalczaniu zakażeń i chorób zakaźnych u ludzi. W tym przypadku ustawodawca określił, że plan jest tworzony na okres 3 lat z możliwością aktualizacji (Ustawa o zapobieganiu oraz zwalczaniu zakażeń i chorób).

Poszczególne fazy zarządzania kryzysowego nie muszą następować po sobie co przedstawiono w Schemacie 1. Jak słusznie zauważa Witold Skomra nie wszystkie działania spoczywają na administracji publicznej. Część ryzyka może być osadzona np. na firmach ubezpieczeniowych, które mogą pokryć

w określonym stopniu koszty związane z odbudową jednocześnie odciążając budżet państwa oraz poszkodowanych obywateli (Skomra, 2010, s. 36).

Przepisy ustawy o zarządzaniu kryzysowym w art. 21 precyzują, że obowiązek podjęcia działań w zakresie zarządzania kryzysowego spoczywa na organie właściwym, który jako pierwszy uzyskał informację o wystąpieniu zagrożenia. Zgodnie z przepisem przedmiotowej ustawy organ ten powinien niezwłocznie powiadomić instytucje wyższego i niższego szczebla o zaistniałym zdarzeniu załączając informacje o własnej ocenie sytuacji i podjętych działaniach (Ustawa o zarządzaniu kryzysowym).

Na etapie zapobiegania możliwe jest podjęcie działań, które zniwelują prawdopodobieństwo wystąpienia określonej sytuacji kryzysowej lub ograniczą jej potencjalne skutki. W trakcie fazy zapobiegania realizowane są przedsięwzięcia ukierunkowane m.in. na monitorowanie zagrożeń, podejmowanie działań legislacyjnych, zaplanowanie wydatków, modernizację infrastruktury oraz tworzenie strategicznych planów działania (Otwinowski, 2015, s. 50).

Faza przygotowania wiąże się z podjęciem działań planistycznych, które mają za zadanie wypracowanie odpowiednich procedur reagowania na wypadek wystąpienia sytuacji kryzysowej. Ważne jest stałe aktualizowanie zagrożeń oraz monitorowanie sytuacji i uruchomienie procedur wczesnego ostrzegania. Faza reagowania charakteryzuje się działaniami ukierunkowanymi na sprawne opanowanie kryzysu. Kluczową rolę pełnią odpowiednie rozdysponowanie sił i środków, które skierowane są do podejmowania odpowiednich czynności (Kurkiewicz, 2008, s. 20).

Faza odbudowy niekiedy stanowi największe wyzwanie dla samorządów oraz państwa ze względu na długi czas trwania oraz wysokie nakłady finansowe. Przywrócenie stanu sprzed kryzysu jest trudnym zadaniem, które niekiedy jest niemożliwe do zrealizowania. Działania ukierunkowane na osiągnięcie pierwotnego stanu związane są z: odtworzeniem zdolności reagowania, odbudową infrastruktury krytycznej i przywróceniem zdolności operacyjnych służb. Realizowane w fazie odbudowy przedsięwzięcia wiążą się również z wypłatą odszkodowań, leczeniem ludności, zmianami

legislacyjnymi, aktualizacją planów i podsumowaniem działań, a także wyciąganiem wniosków (Otwinowski, 2015, s. 52).

W trakcie sytuacji kryzysowej organy zarządzania kryzysowego podejmują wspólne działania, które powinny się uzupełniać i zapewniać skuteczne ograniczanie negatywnych konsekwencji. Wojewoda, który jest przedstawicielem administracji rządowej w terenie, ma za zadanie zapewnić współpracę wszystkich organów administracji rządowej oraz samorządowej na terenie województwa. Na etapie odbudowy wojewoda odpowiada za likwidację skutków sytuacji kryzysowej, może w tym celu wnioskować o wsparcie Sił Zbrojnych RP (Skomra, 2010, s. 42).

Do zadań starosty należy wydawanie poleceń zgodnie z jego właściwościami oraz zarządzanie realizowanymi przy udziale powiatowej administracji zespolonej przedsięwzięciami. Starosta zapewnia łączność konieczną do koordynowania działań. Organ wykonawczy w gminie odpowiada za prewencyjną ewakuację ludności oraz pomoc socjalną dla osób poszkodowanych i ewakuowanych. Zarówno Wojewoda jak i Starosta odpowiadają za uruchomienie podległych im sił Krajowego Systemu Ratowniczo-Gaśniczego (KSRG) do działań wykraczających poza obszar prowadzonej akcji ratowniczej. Organ wykonawczy w gminie może skierować gminne jednostki Ochotniczej Straży Pożarnej (OSP) do udzielania wsparcia poza obszarem akcji ratowniczej (Skomra, 2010, s. 42).

Skuteczne realizowanie zadań z zakresu zarządzania kryzysowego nie byłoby możliwe bez Systemu Powiadamiania Ratunkowego (SPR). W ramach SPR przyjmowane są zgłoszenia alarmowe z numeru 112, co pozwala na zainicjowanie działań właściwych służb ratowniczych. Operatorzy 17 Centrów Powiadamiania Ratunkowego przyjmują zgłoszenia, które są przekazywane właściwym służbom ratowniczym. Konieczne informacje pozyskiwane są w zautomatyzowany sposób. W przypadku dzwoniących z telefonu komórkowego są to m.in. dane dotyczące lokalizacji (Piwowarski-Rozwadowski, 2016, s. 352).

Integralną częścią organizacji bezpieczeństwa państwa jest również KSRG, który ma na celu ratowanie życia, mienia lub środowiska. Ważnym aspektem działań realizowanych w ramach tego systemu jest również

prognozowanie, rozpoznawanie oraz zwalczanie pożarów. Realizowane w ramach KSRG zadania dotyczą także udzielania wsparcia poszkodowanym w wyniku klęsk żywiołowych i innych miejscowych zagrożeń. W ramach systemu skupione są jednostki ochrony przeciwpożarowej, inspekcje, straże i instytucje wraz z podmiotami, które za sprawą umów cywilnoprawnych zadeklarowały wsparcie przy działaniach ratowniczych oraz inne służby. W ramach KSRG realizowane są zadania z zakresu: 1) gaszenia pożarów; 2) ratownictwa technicznego; 3) likwidacji miejscowych zagrożeń; 4) ratownictwa chemicznego i ekologicznego; 5) ratownictwa medycznego z zakresu udzielania kwalifikowanej pierwszej pomocy (Komenda Główna Państwowej Straży Pożarnej).

Organizacja KSRG osadzona jest na trzech poziomach administracyjnych: 1) krajowym; 2) wojewódzkim; 3) powiatowym. Komendant Główny Państwowej Straży Pożarnej (PSP) jest centralnym organem administracji rządowej właściwym do spraw organizacji KSRG oraz ochrony przeciwpożarowej. Nadzór nad funkcjonowaniem KSRG pełni minister właściwy do spraw wewnętrznych, któremu podlega Komendant Główny PSP. Potencjał KSRG stanowią 504 jednostki ratowniczo-gaśnicze, 5 025 jednostek OSP włączonych do systemu, 3 zakładowe straże pożarne, 2 lotniskowe służby ratowniczo-gaśnicze, 23 jednostki Wojskowych Straży Pożarnych. Według danych z 2023 r. w przypadku ponad 85,01 % interwencji jednostki KSRG dotarły na miejsce zdarzenia w ciągu 15 minut (Komenda Główna Państwowej Straży Pożarnej).

Działania z zakresu wykrywania skażeń realizuje Krajowy System Wykrywania Skażeń i Alarmowania (KSWiA), który stanowi źródło informacji i tworzy integralną część systemu zarządzania kryzysowego. W ramach powierzonych kompetencji KSWiA realizuje następujące zadania: 1) melduje o skażeniach; 2) wykonuje specjalistyczne analizy laboratoryjne; 3) prowadzi bazę danych na temat możliwych źródeł skażeń oraz gromadzi informacje na temat zdarzeń, które spowodowały skażenia; 4) przeprowadza oznakowanie obszarów skażonych i określa rejony zastrzeżone; 5) prognozuje rozprzestrzenianie się skażeń i prowadzi ich monitoring; 6) ostrzega wojska własne oraz sojusznice o skażeniach

wynikających m.in. z użycia broni masowego rażenia (Kleszcz, 2017, s. 101).

Zakończenie

Polski system zarządzania kryzysowego w dużej mierze działa w oparciu o regulacje ustawy o zarządzaniu kryzysowym, natomiast część kwestii dotyczących zarządzania kryzysowego została określona w innych przepisach. Ciągłe udoskonalanie systemu jest konieczne ze względu na postęp techniczny oraz nowe rodzaje zagrożeń. W ostatnich latach RCB wprowadziło system ostrzegania o zagrożeniach za pomocą wiadomości SMS, co pozwoliło na szybkie informowanie ludności o niebezpieczeństwach. Zdarzenia zagrażające bezpieczeństwu narodowemu w XXI w. nie są rzadkością, efektywne im przeciwdziałanie nie jest możliwe bez skutecznego systemu zarządzania kryzysowego. Światowa pandemia COVID-19 ukazała wiele niedoskonałości obowiązujących rozwiązań nie tylko w Polsce, ale i w innych państwach. Walkę z zagrożeniem spowodowanym przez wirusa SARS-CoV-2 inicjowano na poziomie krajowym oraz wszystkich szczeblach samorządu terytorialnego angażując wiele sił i środków. Konieczne jest podejmowanie dalszych działań, które pozwolą na ulepszanie obecnych rozwiązań za sprawą których, możliwe będzie uniknięcie sytuacji kryzysowych lub maksymalne zniwelowanie ich negatywnych konsekwencji.

Bibliografia

- Ciekanowski, Z., Nowicka, J., & Wyrębek, H. (2017). *Zarządzanie zasobami ludzkimi w sytuacjach kryzysowych*. CeDeWu.
- Kleszcz, S. (2017). Rola krajowego systemu wykrywania skażeń i alarmowania w systemie obronnym państwa w dobie aktualnych zagrożeń. *Przegląd Nauk o Obronności*, 2(4), 91-109.
- Kurkiewicz, A. (2008). *Zarządzanie kryzysowe w samorządzie. Podstawy organizacyjno-prawne*. Municipium.
- Lidwa, W. (2015). *Zarządzanie kryzysowe*. Akademia Obrony Narodowej.
- Organizacja KSRG (2023). Komenda Główna Państwowej Straży Pożarnej. Retrieved September 1, 2023, from

- <https://www.gov.pl/web/kgpsp/organizacja-ksrg>
- Otwinowski, W. (2015). *Podstawy zarządzania kryzysowego i systemu obronnego*. Wyższa Szkoła Handlu i Usług.
- Piwowski, J., & Rozwadowski, M. (2016). System zarządzania kryzysowego jako element bezpieczeństwa narodowego. *Acta Scientifica Academiae Ostroviensis. Sectio A, Nauki Humanistyczne, Społeczne i Techniczne*, 7(1), 344-368.
- Skomira, W. (2010). *Zarządzanie kryzysowe – praktyczny przewodnik po nowelizacji ustawy*. Presscom.
- Ustawa z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 r. o zarządzaniu kryzysowym (Dz. U. z 2023 r. poz. 122).
- Ustawa z dnia 5 grudnia 2008 r. o zapobieganiu oraz zwalczaniu zakażeń i chorób zakaźnych u ludzi (Dz. U. z 2023 r. poz. 1284, 909, 1938).
- Ustawa z dnia 2 marca 2020 r. o szczególnych rozwiązaniach związanych z zapobieganiem, przeciwdziałaniem i zwalczaniem COVID-19, innych chorób zakaźnych oraz wywołanych nimi sytuacji kryzysowych (Dz. U. z 2023 r. poz. 1327, 1429).
- Wojciechowska-Filipek, S., & Mazurek-Kucharska, B. (2021). *Zarządzanie w kryzysie. Aspekty organizacyjne i psychologiczne wydanie II*. CeDeWu.
- Zakrzewski, W. (2015). Wojska inżynieryjne w zintegrowanym systemie bezpieczeństwa, *OBRONNOŚĆ. Zeszyty Naukowe*, 2(14), 125-138.
- Zarządzanie kryzysowe (2023). Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa. Retrieved September 1, 2023 from <https://archiwum.rcb.gov.pl/zarzadzanie-kryzysowe/>

DIGITÁLNY FAŠIZMUS. SOCIÁLNE MÉDIÁ AKO MOTOR PRAVICOVÉHO EXTRÉMIZMU.

Fielitz, M. – Holger, M.

Bratislava: HADART Publishing, 2022. 214 s.

ISBN 978-80-99941-61-9

EMÍLIA MARIANČIKOVÁ

Institute of Political Science

Faculty of Arts

University of Prešov

Slovak Republic

E-mail: emilia.mariancikova@smail.unipo.sk

Vedecko-výskumný pracovník zameriavajúci sa na pravicový extrémizmus Maik Fielitz a sociológ Holger Marcks sú autormi publikácie *Digitálny fašizmus*, ktorá sa zaoberá vplyvom sociálnych médií na vývoj pravicového extrémizmu. Internet, ktorý bol považovaný začiatkom 90. rokov za nástroj na rozširovanie slobody slova, dnes možno vnímať ako útočisko nenávisťi a intolerancie. Sociálne médiá poskytli nové prvky interakcie v kombinácii s možnosťami masovej komunikácie, z ktorých v súčasnosti významne profituje aj krajná pravica.

Autori v úvode publikácie poukazujú na samotnú definíciu pravicového extrémizmu zahŕňajúcu postoje znevažujúce skupiny iných osôb, nezodpovedajúcich predstavám o homogénnom národe. Cieľom je dosiahnutie etnicko-kultúrne čistej pospolitosti, čo je v rozpore s demokratickými zásadami zdôrazňujúcimi ochranu menšín, právo na rovnosť a pod. Vnímanie hranice medzi radikalizmom a extrémizmom považujú za problematické. Subjekty krajnej pravice sa na verejnosti označia skôr ako národno-konzervatívna a patriotická, či národná opozícia, aby sa vyhli prílišnej dramatizácii. Úspech pravicových extrémistov, či už

v Nemecku, Maďarsku, Brazílii, Taliansku alebo iných (nielen) európskych krajinách je však udivujúci a žiada si vysvetlenie. Publikácia preto hľadá odpoveď, do akej miery sú úspechy krajnej pravice spojené s digitalizáciou a sociálnymi médiami, a to v súvislosti s informáciami, ktoré sa v rámci digitalizácie rozšírili a umožnili zmenu vo vnímaní reality.

Druhá kapitola prispieva k pochopeniu toho, prečo autori hovoria o digitálnom fašizme. Vo všeobecnosti možno konštatovať, že sa pojem fašizmus v súčasných politických debatách spomína s rozličnou motiváciou. Fašizmus sa často chápe ako uzavretá epocha, ktorá sa skončila druhou svetovou vojnou. Keďže bol fašizmus medzinárodným fenoménom, existoval aj v rozličných variantoch, ktoré sa odlišovali intenzitou vylučovania spoločenských skupín a uskutočňovania fyzických čistiek. Vychádzajúc z definícií odborníkov na fašizmus, a to Roberta A. Paxtona a Rogera Griffina približujú tzv. fašistické minimum, zahŕňajúce posadnutosť úpadkom národa, ktorému hrozí zánik, a preto musí dosiahnuť vlastnú obrodu, t. j. vykompenzovať si tento pociťovaný stav kultom jednoty, sily a čistoty. Pre pochopenie dynamiky fašizmu je taktiež rozhodujúca otáz-

ka, ako dokážu ultranacionalistické sily vykonštruovať realitu, kde ľudia uveria v nutnosť národného prebudenia. Významná podobnosť je autormi zaznamenaná medzi propagandou fašizmu a politickou komunikáciou pravicových extrémistov. „Klasický fašizmus patril medzi najzapálenejších užívateľov nových technológií ako denná tlač, film a rozhlas. A aj dnes je neprehliadnuteľné, že extrémna pravica veľmi šikovne využíva digitálne mediálne technológie ako sociálne médiá, chaty a vizuálne fóra, aby mohla šíriť mýty o národnom ohrození a navzájom sa v nich utvrdzovať. Ale nielen to: ukazuje sa, že mediálne možnosti, vďaka ktorým sa tieto mýty dokážu prezentovať nanajvýš pôsobivo, určujú dokonca formy fašistického organizovania“ (Fielitz, Marcks 2022, s. 20). Stierajú sa hranice medzi organizovanými aktivistami a individuálnymi podporovateľmi. Manipuláciou a riadením roja niektorí pravicoví extrémisti usmerňujú zdánlivo rozptýlený hnev jednotlivcov v rámci rôznych rovin sociálnych médií. Zároveň však vyvstáva otázka, do akej miery je táto fašistická dynamika podmienená pravicovými extrémistami a do akej miery je výsledkom impulzov, ktoré vysielajú samotné sociálne médiá. Úvahy autorov o digitálnom fašizme vychádzajú z teoretického argumentu, že „súčasný rozmach pravicového extrémizmu treba chápať ako sociálny jav, ktorý je síce usmerňovaný strategickým konaním organizovaného pravicového extrémizmu, ale jeho dynamika sa živí vnímaním podporovaným sociálnymi médiami. [...] V klasickom fašizme bolo úlohou autoritatívne vedenej strany, aby presvedčila masy o blížiacom sa zániku národa. Vo veku sociálnych médií však masy, ktoré sú náchylné veriť mýtom o ohrození, v oveľa väčšej miere samy manipulujú vlastné vnímanie, takže fašistické strany ako hybná sila fašistickej dynamiky sa prinajmenšom sčasti stávajú zbytočnými“ (Fielitz, Marcks 2022, s. 44). Z tohto dôvodu je potrebné pochopiť samotné pôsobenie pravicových extrémistov na internete s tým, ako svojou činnosťou vstupujú do interakcií so štruktúrami sociálnych médií.

V tretej až piatej kapitole autori poukazujú na aktivity krajnej pravice v sociálnych médiách, ktoré zodpovedajú ich samotnej štruktúre a odhaľujú tak základy digitálneho fašizmu. Predstavujú viaceré manipulačné techniky ako je technika dramatického rozprávania, digitál-

ne sprostredkovanie strachu prostredníctvom sociálnych médií, ktoré zmenili vnímanie reality, ale aj samotnej bezpečnosti. Objasňujú techniku gaslightingu ako manipulatívneho správania využívaného na dezorientovanie ľudí, narušenie dôvery vo vlastné vnímanie, čo vplýva na mieru závislosti od iných osôb, ktoré sú v pozícii manipulátora. Poukazujú aj na techniku manipulovania s metrikou s cieľom prezentovať naratív krajnej pravice ako to, čo stelesňuje vôľu ľudu. V praxi na sociálnych médiách to znamená získanie dôveryhodnosti na základe častého, pravidelného a mnohohlasného opakovania svojich názorov a postojov vo verejnej diskusii. Autori však hovoria o tom, že pre krajnú pravicu nie je v konečnom dôsledku rozhodujúce, či sa jej tvrdenia opierajú o vôľu ľudu, ale skôr to, či sa pomocou jej naratívov dokáže sformovať masa kritikov a dokáže sa dostať do povedomia čo najväčšieho počtu ľudí. Reprodukcia obsahov, formou zdieľania a lajkovania rozhoduje o metrickej sile internetovej propagandy krajnej pravice, pretože vplýva na silnejšiu dynamiku šírenia obsahov.

Fielitz a Marcks v šiestej kapitole poukazujú na samotné formovanie digitálneho fašizmu. Fašistická logika sa na základe ich tvrdení rozvíja v digitálnom veku v podobe interakcií medzi konaním pravicových extrémistov v sociálnych médiách a vlastnou štruktúrou týchto médií. Digitálny fašizmus predstavuje hybridnú formu fašizmu, ktorá sa neviaže na tradičné modely politiky. „Lemujú ju skôr digitálne subkultúry, ktorých často neformálne štruktúry živí jej dynamiku. [...] Krajná pravica pri tom zároveň profituje z distribučnej logiky sociálnych médií, v dôsledku čoho krajne pravicové naratívy ohrozenia a konšpiračné teórie naberajú rýchlosť, takže fašistická logika si už takmer žije vlastným životom“ (Fielitz, Marcks 2022, s. 143). V komparácii s fašizmom v medzivojnovom období, kedy boli strany organizované hierarchicky a komunikačné prostriedky boli sústredené v orgánoch strany, digitálny fašizmus sa formuje úplne inak. Politická manipulácia si už v dôsledku digitalizácie nevyžaduje centralizovanú a formálnu koordináciu. Horizontálne štruktúry sociálnych médií vytvárajú decentralizovanú formu fašizmu, ktorá má napriek tomu autoritársky charakter. Digitálny fašizmus však nenahrádza krajne pravicové organizácie. Digitálne komunikačné mé-

diá umožňujú nové formy združovania a artikulácie. Zvláštnosťou rojov, ktoré sú ovplyvnené digitálnou kultúrou nenávisti je ich spontánny a voľný výskyt s časovo obmedzenou účasťou jednotlivcov, neuvedomujúcich si skutočnosť, že sú súčasťou väčšej dynamiky. Stiera sa hranica medzi nevinnými vyhláseniami a politickou propagandou, ale aj zodpovednosť za kolektívne konanie. Do týchto virtuálnych bojových spoločenstiev sa môže zapojiť ktokoľvek, a pritom nik nenesie zodpovednosť za následky. Aj napriek tomu, že priamo nevolajú po násilí, šíria príbehy o hrozbe a ohlasujú nevyhnutnosť jeho eliminácie. Prostredníctvom nariekania opakovane oslovujú jednotlivcov s cieľom interpretovať mýtus obete a jeho vedľajšie účinky (sprisahanie a zrada) vyvolávajú potrebu heroického pokračovania. „Zatiaľ čo klasickí fašisti sa dali rozpoznať podľa čiernej alebo hnej košeľe, digitálny fašizmus sa prezlieka do pestrého trička internetovej kultúry, ktorá je produktom toho, akým spôsobom fungujú sociálne médiá. To z neho robí mimoriadnu výzvu, pretože sa stáva premenlivým a ambivalentným, nemá jasné organizačné centrum, na ktoré by sa dali zamerať ciele protipatrenia“ (Fielitz, Marcks 2022, s. 172).

V závere publikácie sa autori zaoberajú výzvami, ktoré tento variant fašizmu predstavuje pre otvorenú spoločnosť a načrtávajú spôsoby ako možno eliminovať negatívny vplyv sociálnych médií. V prípade digitálneho fašizmu totiž nestačí upriamiť pozornosť len na aktérov šíriacich kultúru nenávisti, je potrebné zaoberať sa aj štruktúrou, z ktorých čerpá dynamiku. Krajná pravica sa spolieha na súbor manipulačných techník, dobre korešpondujúcich so spôsobom fungovania sociálnych médií. Profituje tak z novej organizácie vnímania. Tá je čiastočne kompatibilná s fašistickou logikou a poháňa extrémnu pravicu.

Aj napriek tomu, že publikácia v mnohých aspektoch predstavuje zhrnutie už známych poznatkov o sociálnych médiách a postfaktuálnej dobe, výstižne definuje sociálne médiá ako motor pravicového extrémizmu. Digitálny fašizmus už nefunguje výlučne prostredníctvom ideologizácie mäs, ale skôr podnecuje jednotlivca k radikalizácii, široké masy k rasizmu a do skepsy voči demokracii, pričom čoraz viac polarizuje spoločnosť. Na základe tvrdení autorov sa digitálny fašizmus rodí tam, kde so-

ciálne médiá prispievajú k lepšiemu ukotveniu krajne pravicových mýtov o ohrození.

Publikáciu možno hodnotiť ako obsahovo zaujímavú, keďže autori objasňujú vzťah krajnej pravice a sociálnych médií a definujú nový, hybridný variant fašizmu, ktorým je potrebné sa vo vedecko-výskumnej oblasti podrobnejšie zaoberať.

PREZENTÁCIA VEDECKÝCH VÝSLEDKOV INŠTITÚTU POLITOLÓGIE NA MEDZINÁRODNOM A DOMÁCOM FÓRE

ANNA POLAČKOVÁ

Institute of Political Science
Faculty of Arts
University of Prešov
Slovak Republic
E-mail: anna.polackova@unipo.sk

Zástupcovia Inštitútu politológie (IPOL) Filozofickej fakulty (FF) Prešovskej univerzity (PU) v Prešove v septembri prezentovali výsledky svojej vedecko-výskumnej činnosti na medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencii v Poľsku, ktorá sa zaoberala globálnou polykrízou a jej vplyvom na cezhraničné vzťahy. Nemenej dôležitá bola aj medzinárodná konferencia, ktorá sa pri príležitosti 30. výročia vzniku Slovenskej republiky uskutočnila v októbri na pôde Prešovskej univerzity.

Pohraničné územia, ktoré sa nachádzajú na priesečníku minimálne dvoch národných území, politických systémov, spoločností a kultúr, boli zasiahnuté mnohými vplyvmi narúšajúcimi ich stabilitu a pocit bezpečia. Tzv. migračná kríza, Brexit, pandémia COVID-19, poľsko-bieloruská humanitárna kríza na hraniciach a vojna na Ukrajine ovplyvnili funkciu hraníc a zmenili pohľad na ich samotné vnímanie. Politické authority, ale aj vedecko-výskumní pracovníci tak stoja pred novými výzvami a snažia sa pochopiť dynamicky sa meniacu spoločenskú realitu a aktuálne verejné diskurzy. O tom, aké krátkodobé a dlhodobé dôsledky vyplývajú z týchto zmien a ako zvládnuť rôznorodé a multikauzálne krízy sa diskutovalo v priebehu 10 – 13. septembra 2023 na univerzitách v poľských mestách Opole a Vroclav, kde sa

uskutočnila konferencia s názvom “*Borderlands facing a polycrisis in the 21st century. Resilience and future perspectives of cross-border relations*”. Konferencia sa začala plenárnym zasadnutím v historickej prednáškovej sále Vroclavskej univerzity, následne sa presunula na dva dni do Opole, kde sa konalo dvadsať tematických panelov. Ukončená bola prehliadkami niekoľkých významných miest v Poľsku.

Vzhľadom na to, že sa IPOL vo svojej výskumnej činnosti dlhodobo orientuje na výskum hraníc a cezhraničnej spolupráce, na konferencii aktívne participovali aj siedmi zástupcovia IPOL FF PU, a to doc. Martin Lačný, dr. Anna Polačková, dr. Matúš Žac, dr. Gabriel Székely, dr. Michal Cirner, doc. Nataliya Maradyk a Mgr. Emília Mariančíková. Prezentovali témy ako cezhraničná spolupráca medzi regionálnymi a lokálnymi aktérmi prihraničných oblastí Slovenska a Ukrajiny, migračné trendy a výzvy v Európskej únii, naratív hraníc v jazyku pravicových extrémistov na Slovensku, a tiež pomoc Prešovskej univerzity poskytnutá odídencom z Ukrajiny. Predstavená bola aj metodológia výskumu pohraničných regiónov Slovenska a Ukrajiny, a pohraničných komunít. Konferenčné príspevky boli parciálnymi výstupmi výskumu slovensko-ukrajinských hraníc v rámci projektu APVV-21-0057 *Slovensko-*

Ukrajinská cezhraničná spolupráca počas a po pandémii COVID-19: faktory a perspektívy, dopad na politiky.

Pre všetkých účastníkov a široké spektrum zúčastnených partnerov predstavovala táto konferencia príležitosť nielen prehliť si vedomosti v oblasti *border studies*, no tiež sa kultúrne obohatiť. Na tejto medzinárodnej konferencii sa stretli účastníci z celého sveta, čo bolo príležitosťou na nadviazanie novej spolupráce v akademickej a vedecko-výskumnej oblasti.

Ďalším z podujatí, na ktorom boli prezentované výsledky vedecko-výskumnej činnosti IPOL, bola medzinárodná vedecká konferencia pod názvom *30 rokov Slovenskej republiky*, ktorú zorganizoval IPOL FF PU pri príležitosti tretej dekády slovenskej štátnosti. Podujatie sa za účasti domácich a zahraničných odborníkov uskutočnilo v rámci Prešovských politologických dní.

Slovenská hymna slávnostne otvorila 11. októbra plenárne zasadnutie podujatia, ktorým sa Prešovská univerzita pripojila k inštitúciám oslavujúcim výročie vzniku Slovenskej republiky. *„Vstup samostatného Slovenska do rodiny slobodných a rovných národov bol sprevádzaný nielen radosťou z dosiahnutia zvrchovanosti, ale aj obavami, do akej miery sme pripravení zoládnúť výzvy vo všetkých oblastiach spoločenského života, vrátane ukotvenia na medzinárodnej scéne. Napriek stále pokračujúcim sporom o naplnení vízií to bol pozitívny krok a Slovenská republika už tridsať rokov píše svoj úspešný príbeh,“* uviedol vo svojom úvodnom príhovore Vladislav Dudinský z Inštitútu politológie FF PU.

Jedným z hlavných referujúcich bol bývalý minister zahraničných vecí SR Ján Kubiš, ktorého diplomatické pôsobenie bolo bezprostredne prepojené nielen s procesmi konštituovania samostatnej SR, ale aj s jej ukotvením v medzinárodnom prostredí. *„Tridsiate výročie samostatnosti Slovenskej republiky je určite udalosť, ktorú je nevyhnutné si pripomínať. Som veľmi rád, že sa Inštitút politológie pustil do zorganizovania takéhoto podujatia, o to viac sa teším, že je to za účasti študentov - budúcnosti našej krajiny. Sú to mladí ľudia, ktorí nezažili mnohé dilemy, výzvy a otázky, na ktoré sme my museli hľadať odpovede, a ktoré formovali náš vzťah k Slovenskej republike. O to viac považujem túto konferenciu za prínosnú,“* vyzdvihol Kubiš, ktorý predniesol referát na

tému *„Diplomacia a medzinárodné vzťahy od vzniku samostatnej Slovenskej republiky“*.

Po plenárnom zasadnutí, ktorého sa zúčastnili okrem študentov a odborníkov aj zástupcovia vedenia univerzity, Filozofickej fakulty, mesta Prešov či Prešovského samosprávneho kraja, nasledovalo rokovanie v sekciách. Odborníci z rôznych univerzít a vedeckých pracovísk z domova i zahraničia diskutovali o štyroch tematických kruhoch: 30 rokov SR, zahraničná politika SR, cezhraničná spolupráca SR a Slovenská republika v kontexte vývoja Európskej únie. V rámci referátov odzneli zaujímavosti napríklad z oblasti histórie, ekonomiky, filozofie, médií, religiozity, politického systému či medzinárodného práva.