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Ondrej
Marchevský

Prešovská univerzita
v Prešove

P. I. Novgorodcev o prínose Immanuela Kanta v oblasti morálnej a sociálnej filozofie¹

*„Kant objavil zázraky a tajomstvá, ktoré nie sú
menšie než tajomstvá nekonečného vonkajšieho sveta.“*

P. I. Novgorodcev

*„Obsah politickej teórie mu bol v značnej miere
našepkaný dominantnými učeniami epochy.“*

P. I. Novgorodcev

Byť pomyselnou spojnicou medzi našimi skúmaniami realizovanými už v minulosti a bádateľským zámerom v horizonte budúcnosti by bolo možné určiť ako prvý zo zámerov predkladanej štúdie. S minulosťou spája prácu niekoľkoročný záujem o štúdium ruských reflexií o tvorbe Immanuela Kanta. Do budúcnosti hľadáme so zámerom pokračovať v kritickom štúdiu týchto vzťahov, vzťahov plných inšpirácií, no aj silných tenzií, často prerastajúcich aj do otvoreného odporu.

Mimoriadne podnetným materiálom pre toto kritické štúdium v uvedenom horizonte budúcnosti je jeden z výstupov vydateľského projektu „Russkij put“ („Ruská cesta“), venovaný práve Immanuelovi Kantovi. Ten vystupuje vo vzťahu ku Kantovi, no aj iným mysliteľom, spisovateľom a spoločenským dejateľom optikou *pro et contra*.²

¹ Príspevok je súčasťou riešenia grantovej úlohy VEGA 1/0880/17 „Filozofia dejín v osvietenstve: Dejiny ako fundamentálny moment sebainterpretácie človeka v kontexte filozofie 18. storočia“.

² Samotnú optiku *pro et contra* by bolo možné v krátkosti predstaviť takto: pre moment *pro* by bolo možné povedať, že by šlo o názory vzťahujúce sa na autora a odkaz jeho persóny, ktoré by označovali jeho tvorbu za hodnú nasledovania, inšpiratívnu; moment *contra* by poukazoval na dôvody kritizovateľnosti tvorivých výsledkov, ide o snahu identifikovať nedostatky tvorby či dokonca dôvody zatratenia určitého tvorivého výkonu. Osnovateľom koncepčných východísk tohto projektu je D. K. Burlaka. Bližšie pozri Burlaka, D. K.: Serija «Russkij put: pro et contra» kak metod sistematizacii i rasprostraneniia gumanitarnogo znanija. In *Vestnik Rossijskogo gumanitarnogo naučnogo fonda*, 2012, 17, (3), s. 212-218; Burlaka, D. K.: Russkij Put: ot sovokupnosti fragmentov k sisteme. *Vestnik Rossijskogo gumanitarnogo naučnogo fonda*, 5, (3), 1999, s. 5-10; Burlaka, D. K.: Russkij put. In D. K. Burlaka – A. A. Grjkanov – A. A. Jermičev (Eds.). *N. A. Berdjaev: pro et contra*. Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatelstvo Russkoj Chrištianskoj gumanitarnoj akademii, 1994, s. 5.

Naším zámerom je predstaviť intencie tohto vydavateľského projektu v širších rámcoch, následne ho predstaviť v kontexte ruských reflexií o Kantovi a v ťažiskovej miere predstaviť jeden z prejavov takýchto reflexií prostredníctvom Pavla Ivanoviča Novgorodceva.³

Vydavateľský projekt *Russkij put'* je od svojho počiatku v roku 1994 realizovaný v niekoľkých fázach. Jeho spoločným menovateľom je snaha predstaviť vybrané osobnosti, ich tvorbu a vybrané problematiky ruskou optikou a v zornom poli intelektuálnej tradície tejto proveniencie. V prvej fáze išlo o zachytenie tenzií v ruskej filozofickej kultúre a filozofickom myslení. Problematicizovaný bol napr. N. A. Berďajev. Veľké postavy umeleckej kultúry a spoločenského života ako Puškin, Lermontov či Nabokov boli spracované v druhej fáze.

Následnou tretou fázou boli podchytení veľkí štátnici, cári od Petra I. po Mikulaša II. V štvrtej fáze sa predmetom záujmu stávajú západní myslitelia, počínajúc pomerne netradične od F. Nietzscheho. Práve do tejto fázy spadá aj záujem o spracovanie antológie venovanej Kantovi. V podobe vízie je formulovaná piata fáza, ktorej zámerom je venovať sa témam ako osud, smrť, sloboda ako osobitým filozofickým problémom v ruských reflexiách.

V nasledujúcom kroku považujeme za vhodné stručne predstaviť štruktúru skoro tisícstranovej antológie prác, ktoré spomínanou optikou *pro et contra* nazerajú na Kantovu tvorbu. Je pozoruhodné, že antológia zámerne neobsahuje mimoriadne známe práce venované Kantovi. Nemožno tu nájsť napríklad práce B. N. Čičerina, jedného z najvýznamnejších komentátorov Kanta v 19. storočí (nosne jeho praktickej filozofie). Antológia je zostavená so zámerom predstaviť názory tých autorov, ktorých tvorba nie je veľmi známa či je skoro úplne zabudnutá, no je mimoriadne podnetná a aktuálna. Medzi takýchto autorov patrí aj ruský symbolista začiatku 20. storočia Andrej Belyj.⁴

Ak hovoríme o výbere a tvorbe obsahu tejto antológie, ktorá bola zostavená A. I. Abramovom a V. A. Žučkovom, považujeme za potrebné poznamenať, že istou výnimkou sú tu prednášky prednesené pri príležitosti 100. výročia úmrtia Kanta v decembri 1904 pred Moskovskou psychologickou spoločnosťou a publikované v prvom čísle *Voprosy filosofii i psichologii* v roku 1905. Sú výnimkou v tom zmysle, že sú známe a ich významnosť nie je nikým spochybňovaná. Sú natoľko

³ Rus. Павел Иванович Новгородцев (1866 – 1924), právny vedec a filozof, profesor Katedry encyklopédie práva a dejín filozofie práva Moskovskej univerzity. Bol členom strany tzv. kadetov (rus. Конституционная Демократическая партия – Konštitučná demokratická strana alebo tiež Strana ľudovej slobody). V emigrácii v rokoch 1922 – 1924 viedol Ruskú právnickú fakultu pri pražskej univerzite. Počas pražského exilu zomiera.

⁴ Podrobnejšie pozri: Belyj, A.: Kriticism i simvolizm. Po povodu stoletija so dnja smerti Kanta. In A. I. Abramov – V. A. Žučkov (Eds.). *Kant: pro et contra*. Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel'stvo Russkoj Christianskoj gumanitarnoj akademii, 2005, s. 555–564.

zásadné pre formovanie ruského štúdia Kanta, ako to vo vstupnom slove k tejto antológii uvádza Žučkov,⁵ že ich nebolo možné nezaraďiť. Ide o prednášky L. M. Lopatina, V. I. Vernadského a o prednášku P. I. Novgorodceva *Kant ako moralista*, ktorej sa budeme podrobnejšie venovať v ďalšom slede tejto práce.

Domnievame sa, že pridruženým dôvodom tohto uverejnenia bolo aj to, že antológia prináša uvedené prednášky prispôsobené súčasnému ruskému jazyku, ktorý je pre dnešnú ruskú verejnosť aj lepšie čitateľný ako pôvodný text v tzv. „cárskej ruštine“.

K jubileu Kanta, ale aj k jeho oveľa širšie koncipovanej tvorbe prehovoril vo svojej prednáške profesor práva Pavel Ivanovič Novgorodcev. Okrem samotnej prednášky *Kant ako moralista* vychádzame pri hodnotení taktiež z vôbec prvého diela Novgorodceva (1901), ktoré venoval Kantovej sociálnej filozofii, a to z diela *Kantovo učenie o práve a štáte*. Nami vybrané diela je možné nazvať hraničnými. *Kantovo učenie o práve a štáte* totiž vychádza niekoľko mesiacov pred obhajobou jeho doktorskej dizertácie *Kant a Hegel* v ich učeniach o práve⁶ a druhé nami spracované dielo – jubilejná prednáška – je záverečným dielom vzťahujúcim sa na Kantovu tvorbu. Vychádza totiž rok po Novgorodcevovom rozsiahlom článku s názvom *Morálne problémy vo filozofii Kanta*.⁷

Z nášho pohľadu je Novgorodcev zaujímavý aj tým, že sa snaží dôsledne pracovať s pôvodnou tvorbou Kanta a jasne pritom deklarovať svoje zdroje a východiská. Tu istý „prešľap“ predstavuje „krádež“ Kantovho textu, presnejšie fragmentu *Idey k všeobecným dejinám vo svetoobčianskom zmysle*, približujúceho občiansku spoločnosť prostredníctvom podobenstva o ohrade. Novgorodcev odkazuje na zdroj, no len v podobe akoby parafrázy, pričom samotné znenie je doslovným prekladom pôvodných Kantových myšlienok do ruského jazyka. Vynímajúc tento prehešok vidíme, že Novgorodcev pracuje s *Kritikou čistého rozumu*, *Kritikou praktického rozumu*, s *Metafyzikou mravov*, s už spomínanou *Ideou k všeobecným dejinám vo svetoobčianskom zmysle*, s dielom *Spor fakúlt a K večnému mieru* na úrovni toho, čo dnes nazývame etikou práce s textom.

Dlhodobý výskum Kanta bezpochyby vychádza aj z presvedčenia Novgorodceva o tom, že tvorba tohto mysliteľa je zásadným medzníkom v dejinách svetovej filozofie. Ako uvádza:

Tak ako v minulosti, aj dnes je Kant veľkou školou filozofie, cez ktorú je potrebné prejsť. No prečo táto škola a nie akákoľvek iná? Čo je v nej oso-

⁵ Podrobnejšie o tom pozri Žučkov, V. A.: Vvodnaja statija. In A. I. Abramov – V. A. Žučkov (Eds.). *Kant: pro et contra*. Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatelstvo Russkoj Christianskoj humanitarnoj akademii, 2005, s. 7-10.

⁶ Rus. Кант и Гегель в их учениях о праве (1902)

⁷ Rus. Нравственные проблемы в философии Канта (1903)

bité a dôležité? Odpoveď na to získame zo všeobecných názorov Kanta. Význam Kanta spočíva v tom, že spoločne so zachovaním samostatnosti a nezávislosti vedy dokázal poskytnúť silnú oporu pre samostatnosť náboženského, morálneho, estetického prežívania, ktoré sú neoddeliteľnými životnými elementmi nášho vedomia.⁸

Novgorodcevov obdiv ku Kantovi je poňatý vskutku široko, no záujem o štúdium Kantovho filozofického dedičstva je úzko vymedzený. Z názvu tejto štúdie sa dostávajú do popredia motívy morálnej a sociálnej filozofie. Pri pohľade optikou *pro et contra* by sme mohli pokračovať tvrdením, že u Novgorodceva by práve morálna filozofia predstavovala pomyselné *pro* a sociálna filozofia zasa *contra* vo vzťahu k hodnoteniu Kantovej tvorby. Bližšiemu rozpracovaniu týchto pozícií by sme sa chceli venovať v ďalšom slede štúdie.

Pre lepšie pochopenie jeho náhľadu, a z neho vychádzajúceho hodnotenia v stanovených intenciách, považujeme za dôležité priblížiť toto jeho stanovisko:

Vždy, keď hodnotíme akýkoľvek morálno-filozofický systém, ktorý nám chce vysvetliť určujúce princípy života, pýtame sa samých seba, či táto filozofia pozná, či dokáže cítiť život, či si uvedomuje všetky tragické proti-rečenia, všetok nesúlad a boj protikladov, z ktorých pozostáva tento svet. Nezriedka aj v našich dňoch, v dňoch napätej a zložitej doby, počúvame učenia, ktoré nás nabádajú k dobrému, neúnavnému životu s veselým úsmevom a radostnou prácou. Podobná optimistická filozofia môže byť mimoriadne príjemná, ako všetko radostné a mladé, no nie je možné nepoznamenať, že ešte nenazrela do hĺbky života, nezakúsila konflikty, ktoré prináša život, a nepremýšľa o nich, a preto je skôr produktom nálad, než niečím premysleným, a jej význam nemôže byť hlboký a trvácny [...]. Iná vec je, keď morálna filozofia odvodzuje potvrdenie svojich princípov z jasného pochopenia celej zložitosti života.⁹

Život, životná skúsenosť, a z toho plynúce poučenie rovnako pre život samotný, je tým kritériom, ktoré sa stáva pre Novgorodceva určujúcim.

Pre lepšie pochopenie kritérií či optiky, ktorou pristupuje k hodnoteniu filozofických koncepcií a názorov, môže pomôcť aj nasledujúca poznámka, vzťahujúca sa na ich poslanie a miesto: „V duchovnom kolobehu zohrávajú úlohu drahocenných pochodní, ktoré by mali večne horieť na zložitej a trnistej ceste ľudského života.“¹⁰

Novgorodcev rovnako zdôrazňuje, že jeho doba, teda doba rodiaceho sa 20. storočia, nepotrebuje ani tak ucelené metafyzické systémy, ako skôr ponaučenia

⁸ Novgorodcev, P. I.: Kant kak moralist. *Voprosy filosofii i psichologii*, 16, (76), 1905, s. 34.

⁹ Ibid., s. 20.

¹⁰ Ibid., s. 35.

pre vedenie života, pre orientáciu vo svete, pre dobré konanie a hodnotné vzájomné spolunažívanie. Na svojej ceste potrebuje predovšetkým „májak“.¹¹ Táto požiadavka doby vrhá podľa ruského autora úplne iné svetlo na Kantovu tvorbu a dostáva ju do úplne iných, nových súvislostí. Kant dokáže uspokojiť požiadavky Novgorodceva, ako sme to už raz naznačili v oblasti morálnej filozofie, no nie v prípade sociálnej filozofie.

V nasledujúcich riadkoch by sme si dovolili priblížiť, v čom presnejšie vidí Novgorodcev Kanta v podobe *pro*.

V prvom rade, ako to ruský filozof práva niekoľkokrát zdôrazňuje, Kant originálnym spôsobom saturuje večnú potrebu ľudí po poriadku, po vytýčení princípov, rámcov, ako viesť svoj život dobre a dôstojne.

Novgorodcev identifikuje zásadnú a permanentnú potrebu ľudí zosúladiť všetky tie protirečenia, antagonizmy, ktoré skrýva naše správanie k sebe samým, k iným ľuďom a k svetu ako takému. Kant to nerobí cestou veľkého jednotiacieho konceptu, ktorý má záujem objasniť všetko dianie a nivelizovať všetky protirečenia či jasne určiť ich miesto. Stelesnením takejto snahy je pre Novgorodceva hlavne Hegel. Ten svojím výkladom a filozofickou koncepciou radšej vytesnil z ľudského života všetky možné záhady, zložité premenné, spiritualitu a mystickosť, než by navrhol, ako sa s ich prítomnosťou vyrovnáť. Z pohľadu ruského mysliteľa je Hegelova koncepcia skôr zdrojom otázok než funkčnou snahou odpovedať na otázky života. Okrem Hegela spomína tiež Fichteho a Schellinga. Tí oplývajú rovnakými intelektuálnymi neduhmi. Na margo tejto témy nech o ich filozofických snahách prehovorí samotný autor: „Skôr formulujú otázky, než by ich riešili“.¹²

Kant je iný; napĺňa požiadavku orientácie v živote a snaží sa poskytnúť návod na správne vedenie života. Poskytuje to, čo je také potrebné pre dobu Kanta ako aj Novgorodceva, hoci stále existujú otázky, na ktoré Kantova koncepcia odpovedať nedokáže.

Novgorodcev ho považuje za hodného nasledovania aj preto, že odhaľuje hranice, ktoré sú neprekonateľné akokoľvek ambicióznym myslením. Dáva priestor na protirečenie a tenzie v spoločnosti a individuálnom živote, no zároveň určuje spôsoby, ako sa so životom vyrovnáť, ako ho dobre viesť. Využívajúc tvrdenia samotného ruského autora, dovoľujeme si k vymedzenému motívu uviesť jeho nasledovnú myšlienku: „Inštinktívna nespokojnosť človeka, prirodzený nesúlad medzi ním a svetom sa prehlbuje, naberá úroveň svetovej tragédie, charakter osudu svetového rozumu v jeho časovom a historickom vývoji. V jasnom určení tejto hĺbky svetových protikladov sa nachádza sila Kantovej filozofie; a ešte väčšia moc filozofického ducha sa odhaľuje v tom, že je nezlomný, neupadá pod ťarchou

¹¹ Rus. путеводный знак

¹² Ibid., s. 21.

týchto protikladov, ale naopak, nachádza východisko. Ak je potrebné vysvetliť, čo je to za východisko, je to východisko nie vymyslené, ale do hĺbky prežitú, precítené s osobitým filozofickým entuziazmom, plné inšpirácie a morálneho apelu¹³.

Novgorodcev oceňuje mimoriadnu „striedmosť“ Kantových úvah a odporúčaní, v tomto duchu o ňom tiež píše: „Ukázal, že nevyhnutnosť, príčinnosť, zákonitosť, teda všetko to, na čom lipne vedecké myslenie, to všetko je náležité a správne, no zároveň nie je vyčerpávajúcím určením podstaty“¹⁴.

Imponujú mu určenia vedomých obmedzení, Kant ho zaujíma ako ten, kto dokáže vystríhať pred príliš ambicióznymi myšlienkovými experimentmi. K limitom, ktoré Kant odhaľuje, uvádza:

Rozum akoby tu oslavoval svoje víťazstvo nad vonkajším svetom, vytváral a upevňoval vládu svojich vlastných noriem a zákonov; no zároveň ukazuje, že pred ním, okolo neho i v ňom samom ostáva niečo tajomné, neuchopiteľné, akýsi materiál, ktorý mu je cudzí, daný zvonka. Naše ja, náš rozum určuje svoje zákony a normy, no okolo neho a – čo je priam desivé – v ňom samom pôsobia akési temné sily, hrozné príznaky, nepochopiteľné pudy. Jasná rozpoltenosť ducha a majestát jeho vlády sa javí byť úlohou, ktorú je nevyhnutné vyriešiť, nie je výsledkom, ktorý je už odhalený.¹⁵

Naznačili sme, že v hodnotiacich úvahách Novgorodceva predstavuje Kant a jeho učenie veľkú školu pre ľudstvo. Zároveň si Novgorodcev uvedomuje, že na túto školu nie sú všetci pripravení: „V skutočnosti dnes neexistujú pravoverní kantovci, takí raritní aj v minulosti“¹⁶. Nie všetci sú pripravení na to, aby sa zmierili s postojom, ktorý vyjadruje Novgorodcev v tejto myšlienke: „Kdeže je konečný cieľ, kde prístav, pevnina? Niet ich a nemôže byť. Sila nespočíva v dosiahnutí cieľa, ale v snahe dosiahnuť ho stálym vynakladaním mravného úsilia. Hlavné je neprestať, chcieť a snažiť sa [...]“¹⁷. Neskôr Novgorodcev dodáva: „Samozrejme, Kantov systém v celej jeho hĺbke a zložitosti sa nikdy nestane všeobecne prijatým, či hoci len výrazne rozšíreným učením“¹⁸. Kantovo učenie nie je pre všetkých, lebo tento návod na život je príliš záväzujúci a záväzujúci natrvalo, na celý život, ide o záväzok, ktorého sa nezobavíme akýmsi zdanlivým rozvodom, je v ňom možné len podvádzať.

Na dokreslenie hodnotenia pozície *pro* uvedieme ešte jeden z argumentov, v ktorom Novgorodcev zdôrazňuje, že u Kanta „hĺbka ideálneho snaženia, sila

¹³ Ibid., s. 26-27.

¹⁴ Na tomto mieste by sme zdôraznili, že ak Novgorodcev používa výraz podstaty, tak ten je možné vnímať ako snahu poukázať na úplnú podstatu sveta.

¹⁵ Ibid., s. 23.

¹⁶ Ibid., s. 34.

¹⁷ Ibid., s. 33.

¹⁸ Ibid., s. 34.

morálneho vzostupu naruša povrch vonkajších prechodných javov, aby sa za nimi odhalil svet slobodných tvorivých princípov¹⁹. Nazdávame sa, že uvedená poznámka Novgorodceva by nám v tomto texte mohla poslúžiť ako vhodný záver naznačenej pozície, teda pozície *pro*.

Mali sme možnosť vidieť, ako citlivo vníma Novgorodcev hodnotu uvedomeľých a jasne stanovených limitov. Zastávame názor, že Novgorodcev považoval za potrebné zohľadniť príležitosť a atmosféru, v ktorej tieto hodnotiace stanoviská formuloval, najprv verbálne pred auditoriom, a následne ich adresovať aj čitateľom. Nazdávame sa, že aj preto si vybral tie časti praktickej filozofie Immanuela Kanta, ktoré považoval za najprínosnejšie, a preto je tiež rezervovaný voči jeho kritike. Imponuje mu, že existujú vymedzené hranice, ktoré určujú priestor prípustného, slobodného, a naopak, dokážu určiť momenty, ktoré sú nebezpečné, vytvárajú priestor pre konflikty a spoločenský nesúlad.

Ruský profesor práva citlivo vníma okolnosti, a možno aj preto kritické poznámky necháva na inú príležitosť. Umožňuje nám to sledovať a priblížiť druhú z pozícií Novgorodcevovho čítania Kanta, pozíciu *contra*.

Predstavuje to presun do roviny sociálnej filozofie. Úvahy o prirodzenom práve, zákonoch, občianskej spoločnosti a funkcii štátu by boli tým, čo by Novgorodcev chápal ako sociálnu filozofiu Kanta; sústreďuje sa na vzťah morálky a práva.

Ak by sme si položili otázku, v čom presnejšie by Novgorodcev videl nedostatky Kantovej filozofickej tvorby, tak by sme na úvod mohli povedať, že odpoveď môžeme hľadať na stránkach druhej z avizovaných prác, teda v diele *Kantovo učenie o práve a štáte*. Aj na tomto mieste Novgorodcev zdôrazňuje význam Kanta ako morálneho filozofa, no s obdivom sa zároveň spája aj istá pochybnosť. Novgorodcev je sklamaný z toho, že takýto veľký morálny filozof nedokázal jasne predstaviť prepojenie morálky a práva. Tu je preňho Kant dôkazom zlyhania veľkého tvorivého potenciálu a zároveň sa Kant stáva ústredným motívom Novgorodcevovej rozpravy.

V základe Kantovej právnej a sociálnej teórie totiž podľa Novgorodceva stojí učenie o vzťahu morálky a práva. O povahe týchto úvah píše, že „rozdiel medzi morálkou a právom naznačil správne, no ich prepojenie nemohol ustanoviť“²⁰. Dôvodom tejto nemohúcnosti bolo Kantovo etické učenie. Novgorodcev niekoľkokrát zdôrazňuje, že Kant dokonale vymedzuje tieto oblasti, no súvis a prepojenie nedokáže uspokojivo nájsť.

Úvaha, ktorá odhaľuje postoje Novgorodceva ku Kantovi, v zásade zasahuje

¹⁹ Ibid., s. 22.

²⁰ Novgorodcev, P. I.: Učenie Kanta o práve i gosudarstve. In *Kant: pro et contra*. In A. I. Abramov – V. A. Žučkov (Eds.). *Kant: pro et contra*. Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel'stvo Russkoj Christianskoj gumanitarnoj akademii, 2005, s. 505.

do pomerne aktuálneho diskurzu skúmaní kantovskej praktickej filozofie či presnejšie kontextu filozofie práva. O povahe týchto skúmaní zaujímavým spôsobom referuje v jednej zo svojich prác venovaných Kantovej filozofii práva Eva Zelizňaková. Na základe lektúry diel autorov ako Ch. Korsgaardová, A. Ripstein, A. Wood, M. Willaschek, T. Pogge dospieva autorka k takémuto úsudku:

Súčasná filozofická interpretácia vzťahu Kantovej morálnej a právnej filozofie oscilujú medzi chápaním právnych povinností ako podmnožiny povinností morálnych a ponímaním práva ako od morálky celkom odtrhnutej časti Kantovej praktickej filozofie²¹;

a ďalej dodáva: „Hranica, ktorú sa Kant pokúša naznačiť medzi morálkou a právom, je však napriek tomu nejasná a existuje množstvo literatúry, ktorá sa daný problém pokúša riešiť“.²² Pri zohľadnení postoja, ktorý naznačujú tvrdenia Zelizňakovej, by sa úvahy Novgorodceva mohli javiť zaujímavými práve preto, že on je presvedčený o dokonalom vymedzení osobitostí týchto rovín u Kanta, no absentuje uňho schopnosť vzájomne ich prepojiť. Spomínaná autorka vstupuje do tejto odbornej diskusie pokusom o komplementárne vymedzenie existujúceho stavu, v ktorom sa uvažuje, ako to už bolo naznačené, o právnych povinnostiach ako o podmnožine povinností morálnych a o chápaní práva ako od morálky celkom odtrhnutej časti. Pri svojom pokuse vychádza Zelizňaková z takto chápaných pozícií:

Kategóriu komplementarity ako základný princíp kvantovej mechaniky sformuloval Niels Bohr začiatkom 20. storočia. Dnes predstavuje komplementarita všeobecné filozofické hľadisko, rešpektuje dualitu sveta, podľa ktorej bezprostredne pozorovateľné a zdanlivo vzájomne sa vylučujúce javy sa pri systémovom pohľade stanú rovnocennými, obojstranne podmieňujúcimi a recipročne doplnujúcimi.²³

Autorka teda v danej problematike ponúka jasné stanovisko a zároveň prácou naplnený zámer. Ako by však do tejto aktuálnej diskusie mohli prispieť myšlienky Novgorodceva? Je možné povedať, že jeho úvahy a hodnotenia Kanta sa zaoberajú identickými otázkami. Novgorodcevove úvahy sú vskutku zaujímavé, sú totiž formulované, formálne či žánrovo, ako úvahy o tomto probléme, o možnostiach prepojenia morálky a práva. Na atraktivnosti Novgorodcevovým úvahám pridáva aj snaha ruského autora istým spôsobom dopĺňať nedostatky Kantovej argu-

²¹ Zelizňaková, E.: Kantovo Učenie o práve (Rechtslehre). In L. Belás – P. Kyslan – S. Zákutná (Eds.). *10. kantovský vedecký zborník. Acta Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Prešovensis. Filozofický zborník 54*. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove, 2013, s. 99.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

mentácie tak, aby sa stala pochopiteľnejšou. Novgorodcevov výklad predstavuje zvláštny príklad snahy *pomôcť* Kantovi v tom, čo Kant sám údajne nedokázal. V tejto intelektuálnej „výpomoci“ sa však akosi stráca. Hoci sám v pozícii radcu, Novgorodcev nedokáže byť dôsledný pri prezentovaní svojich postojov. Na ilustráciu si dovoľíme uviesť tvrdenie zahŕňajúce východiská Novgorodcevovej kritiky a tiež predpoklady jeho pohľadu na danú otázku:

A zatiaľ práve v oblasti filozofie práva bolo dôležité chápať morálku nie ako abstraktnú normu, ale ako živú silu, ktorá preniká súperením záujmov a vášní, aby ich zmiernila a zušľachtila. Čím je právo, ak nie výsledkom tohto zmiernenia, ktoré je spôsobené spojením morálnych princípov so životom? Predstavujeme si právny poriadok predovšetkým ako poriadok skutočných vzťahov, ako prax života, ako taký súhrn základných a elementárnych požiadaviek, bez ktorého by samotná existencia jednotlivcov v spoločnosti bola nemysliteľná.²⁴

Táto myšlienka vystupuje s ambíciou pomôcť dovysvetlením, no mienime, že v tomto Kantova pozícia a jeho vlastné názory nie sú v rozpore.

Zdá sa, že samotný Novgorodcev túto úvahu nedokáže uzavrieť. Jeho myšlienky tak oscilujú v rámcoch, ktorých povahu výstižne zachytáva tvrdenie Heinera Klemmeho:

Etika a právo sa k sebe majú ako priestor a čas: tak ako každá predstava v priestore je aj v čase, ale nie všetky predstavy v čase sú aj v priestore, tak sú všetky právne povinnosti nakoniec mravnými povinnosťami, ale nie všetky mravné povinnosti sú tiež právnymi povinnosťami.²⁵

Klemmeho pozícia určuje priestor, v ktorom by sa dal mapovať živelný pohyb Novgorodceva. Nazdávame sa, že snaha vyrovnáť sa s naznačeným vzťahom najvýraznejšie vystihuje intencie Novgorodcevovho prístupu.

Aj napriek tomu, že Novgorodcev nedokáže prijať všetky Kantove názory a je často kritický, jeho výklad je vždy sprevádzaný veľkou úctou ku Kantovi, čo dobre ilustruje aj nasledujúce tvrdenie:

Často sa poukazuje na to, že *Učenie o práve*, ako práca starnúceho filozofa, vykazuje prvky nedostatočného rozpracovania a tvorivej únavy. To by bolo možné akceptovať vo vzťahu k podrobnostiam či všeobecne ku kompozícii diela; no vo svojich základných pozíciách toto dielo nálezite odráža morálnu filozofiu Kanta so všetkými jej špecifikami. To je dôvod, prečo je

²⁴ Novgorodcev, P. I.: *Učenie Kanta o prave i gosudarstve*, ibid., s. 506.

²⁵ Cit. podľa Mácha, J.: Kantův striktní zákaz lži. In L. Belás (Ed.). *Sociálně-politická, etická, kulturno-civilizačná a humanistická relevantnosť Kantovej filozofickej iniciatívy*. Filozofický zborník 16. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove, 2006, s. 149.

poučné aj svojou protirečivosťou, ktorá pramení z jeho všeobecných názorových pozícií a slúži na odhalenie jeho jednostranností.²⁶

Kritika s polemickým rozmerom, ako sme ju videli v doterajšom slede našej práce, sa svojou povahou kvalitatívne mení, mohli by sme povedať vyostruje v úvahách o štáte, jeho funkcii a poslaní. Z Novgorodcevovho pohľadu tu nie je Kant ničím viac než mimoriadne pozorne čítajúcim a nezrozumiteľne, odťažito píšucim epigónom, ktorý myšlienkovy vykráda Hobbesa, Rousseaua a Montesquieuho. Na tento moment sa vzťahuje aj druhá z myšlienok uvádzajúcich našu úvahu o Novgorodcevej reflexii filozofie Immanuela Kanta.

Na toto Novgorodcevovo tvrdenie, formulované v diele *Kantovo učenie o práve a štáte*, je potrebné zareagovať otázkou, ktorú je v texte možné odhaliť, no otvorene formulovaná nebola. A tak je potrebné opýtať sa, do akej miery je Novgorodceva kritika relevantná, do akej miery sa zakladá na odhalení skutočných nedostatkov Kantovej tvorby a do akej miery je výsledkom intelektuálneho súperenia samotného Novgorodceva s touto filozofiou nemeckej proveniencie. Myslíme si, že označenie Kanta za epigóna spomenutých autorov je dôkazom práve druhej z možných tendencií. Chceli by sme zdôrazniť, že samotný Kant priznáva vplyv týchto autorov. Zároveň je ale potrebné dodať, že v porovnaní s tvorbou Novgorodcevom uvedených autorov Kant okrem republikanizmu intenzívnejšiu systematickú pozornosť konkrétnej podobe štátu nevenuje.

To vidí Novgorodcev ako jeden z hlavných problémov Kanta:

Odlíšenie morálky od práva v zmysle nezávislosti morálneho vedomia od vonkajších donucovacích zákonov malo mať u Kanta mimoriadne jasné vyjadrenie. Lebo nikdy, ani pred ním, ani po ňom, sa morálka tak výrazne nestotožňovala s vnútornou slobodou jednotlivca od akýchkoľvek vonkajších obmedzení.²⁷

Táto myšlienka zachytáva, ako sa nazdávame, jednu z určujúcich pozícií, jeden z predpokladov kritických poznámok ruského autora. Morálka ako výraz vnútornej, od ničoho nezávislej slobody. Ak Novgorodcev takto pristupuje k povahe morálky, tak akoby nepracoval s tým rozmerom, ktorý ale sám naznačil, teda s tým, že Kantovo vnímanie morálky má aj zásadný regulatívny rozmer vo vzťahu k ľudskému správaniu a konaniu; vo vzťahu k správaniu, ktoré je reakciou na vonkajšie podnety. Táto pozícia Novgorodceva môže byť dobrým východiskom pre pochopenie jeho lavírovania v hodnotiacich pozíciách tvorby Kanta. Novgorodcev pripúšťa, ako sme mali možnosť vidieť, morálku ako mediátora

²⁶ Novgorodcev, P. I.: *Učenie Kanta o práve i gosudarstve*, ibid., s. 511.

²⁷ Ibid., s. 505.

medzi povahou ľudského konania a vonkajšími stimulmi.

Zároveň – podľa Novgorodceva – je morálka u Kanta postavená na nedosiahnuteľnú výšinu čistej služby povinnosti. Ak k tejto službe nemôžeme pripájať žiadne iné motívy, tak sa úplne vytráca spojenie medzi morálkou a právom. Z takýchto predpokladov následne Novgorodcev pristupuje k tvrdeniu, že v Kantovej tvorbe „predstavuje právo vonkajší poriadok ľudských vzťahov, malo by byť, podľa jeho názoru, za tou hranicou, ktorú určuje oblasť morálky“.²⁸

Ruský filozof vníma ako problém v Kantových názoroch fakt, že nechce brať do úvahy tie prirodzené záujmy a sklony človeka, ktorým sa zákon a práca musia prispôbiť, teda musia ich zohľadňovať, aby boli funkčné a nemali len charakter nerealizovateľných ideálov. Tu je možné v podobe kritickej reakcie na Novgorodcevove postoje postaviť Kantovo podobenstvo o ohrade. Človek je ako krivé drevo, ktoré nie je nikdy dokonalé, no môže byť dobrými spoločenskými a právnymi rámcami občianskeho života kultivované natoľko, že rozvíja svoj potenciál k najlepším možným dosiahnuteľným výsledkom. Ako sme spomenuli, Novgorodcev preukázateľne pozná toto podobenstvo. Na jednej zo stránok svojho diela²⁹ Novgorodcev dielo priamo spomína a dokonca aj samotné podobenstvo uvádza ako voľnú parafrázu, ktorá je ale navlas identická s ruským znením prekladu danej Kantovej formulácie.

Problematickosť Novgorodcevovho kritického výkladu Kanta sa prehlbuje v konfrontácii s kategorickým imperatívom. Ožíva obdivovaný, ale aj nedostatočný súvis Kantovho učenia s realitou ľudského života:

Morálne východisko je možné zlúčiť s vonkajšími motívmi už len preto, aby boli navzájom podriadené. No to Kant nepripúšťa. Jeho kategorický imperatív sa obáva spojenia s vonkajším svetom a uzatvára morálny život do oblasti čistej vôle.³⁰

Myslíme si, že ide o vcelku nekorektné hodnotenie zo strany Novgorodceva. Ako problém sa mu javí to, že Kant hľadá pôvod morálky v človeku ako niečo dané, čo sa Novgorodcevovi ukazuje ako dôvod odtrhnutia od reality. Na margo kategorického imperatívu taktiež poznamenáva: „Idea kategorického imperatívu v takom vyjadrení, aké získala od Kanta, sa nedala zosúladiť so skutočnosťou“.³¹ Deklamovanie skutočnosti nás v tomto momente privádza k pochybnosti, k otázke, či Novgorodcev nenarába s príliš širokým obsahom pojmu skutočnosť, t. j. či sa skutočnosť ľudských životných potrieb v spoločnosti a spoločenských inte-

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., s. 518.

³⁰ Ibid., s. 506.

³¹ Ibid., s. 517.

rakciách nedopľňa o skutočnosť v zmysle striktnnej procesuálnej stránky právnej praxe. Naše uvažovanie v tomto smere iniciuje aj nasledujúce tvrdenie:

Musela nastať jedna z možností: alebo zniesť túto ideu z jej piedestálu s cieľom zbližiť ju s politickými záujmami, alebo odmietat tieto záujmy v mene vyššieho ideálu³². A dodáva: „U Kanta nachádzame i jedno, i druhé: jeho mravná idea bledne pod vplyvom politických príčin a konkrétne politické snahy pod vplyvom požiadaviek čistého rozumu strácajú na svojej hodnote. Práve preto jeho teória predstavuje spojenie vysokých ideí s úbohým politickým programom, kategorické požiadavky s miernymi rozhodnutiami.³³

Ak by mal byť Kant posudzovaný ako tvorca politického programu a konkrétneho znenia právnych noriem, kritike a odsúdeniu by sa vyhnúť nemohol. Bolo by ale nenáležité odsudzovať akéhokoľvek autora za nedostatky, ktoré sa programovo nenachádzajú v jeho tvorivom odkaze či nie sú zámerom jeho práce. Kritické poznámky Novgorodceva, s ktorými sme aktuálne konfrontovaní, podľa nás naberajú práve takéto ráz. Je možné povedať, že predmetom Novgorodcevovho nesúhlasu je to, že Kant nedostatočne narába s tým, čo by bolo možné nazvať praktická stránka práva, výkon právnej praxe.

Novgorodcev vychádza z toho, že vo svojej tvorbe Kant formuluje východiská o práve a morálke v *Kritike praktického rozumu* pri formulácii rozdielov medzi morálkou a legitimitou. Na margo tohto diela Novgorodcev píše (a tým aj charakterizuje Kantove východiská):

V súlade s hlavnou myšlienkou tohto diela je morálka určená čistou úctou k zákonu rozumu a zákon je napĺňaný na základe nejakého vonkajšieho podnetu. V takom prípade je možné posúdiť iba legálnosť skutku. Z takýchto určení vychádza Kant, keď sa snaží určiť vzťah morálky a práva.³⁴

Aj v tomto momente sa nám javia hodnotenia Novgorodceva ako nie úplne náležité. Legálnosť, resp. nelegálnosť konania je posudzovaná Kantom ako súlad, resp. nesúlad konania s existujúcimi právnymi normami, zákonmi, kde motív konania nie je zásadným kritériom posudzovania. Avšak morálnosť, resp. nemorálnosť konania je u Kanta, ak s jeho odkazom narábame korektne, posudzovaná na základe vzťahu k povinnosti. Ak zámerná činnosť človeka vychádza z povinnosti konať v súlade so zákonom a to sa stáva hlavným motívom konania, toto konanie je posudzované ako morálne.

Novgorodcev pristupuje k posúdeniu Kantových myšlienok, zdôrazňujúc, že

³² Ibid., s. 517-518.

³³ Ibid., s. 518.

³⁴ Ibid., s. 506.

hľadané spojenie medzi morálkou a právom je prípustné hľadať u Kanta prostredníctvom dvoch prístupov. Zákonmi rozumu na jednej strane a na strane druhej prostredníctvom povinnosti. Novgorodcev je presvedčený o využívaní oboch prístupov samotným Kantom.

Pokus o prvý spôsob identifikuje Novgorodcev v Kantovom *Učení o práve*, kde sa Kant snaží zahrnúť právne zákony pod všeobecnú kategóriu morálnych zákonov, ktoré vychádzajú z podmienok čistého rozumu. Stávajú sa tak spoločne morálnymi zákonmi, zákonmi etickými, ktoré majú apriórny pôvod. Nezakladajú sa na tom, čo je, ale čo by malo byť, zohľadňujúc požiadavky rozumu. Z toho je možné odvodzovať podstatu práva ako ideálnu a morálne založenú. Ak by sme aj prijali, že takto je možné vymedziť vzťah morálky a práva, podľa Novgorodceva to nijako nevysvetlí vlastnú prirodzenú povahu práva:

Pripustíme, že toto vymedzenie nemá iný cieľ než poukázanie na morálne základy práva. Dosahuje to ale stanovený cieľ? Na to je možné dať jedine negatívnu odpoveď. Ak morálny základ práva nachádza svoj pôvod v princípoch čistého rozumu, tak ostáva nezodpovedané, ako takýto základ súvisí s vlastnou podstatou práva. Zákon rozumu je výlučne vnútorným zákonom, no právne normy, ako to vysvetľuje samotný Kant, sa opierajú o vonkajšie motívy a majú vonkajší charakter.³⁵

V ďalšom slede úvah k tomuto prvému kroku či prístupu vidíme, že sám sa snaží vyriešiť vzniknutý problém, ergo vykompenzovať nedostatky Kantovho prístupu. Ponúka úvahu o tom, že tak morálny, ako aj právny zákon sa vzťahuje na vnútornú podstatu človeka, oba sú nasmerované k jeho vôli. Rozdiel je v tom, že morálny zákon sa vzťahuje na vôľu v celku jej rozsahu. Celok rozsahu pozostáva z jej morálnych snažení a právny zákon sa vzťahuje len na jej vonkajšie prejavy. V takomto slede úvah Novgorodcev píše: „Takto je možné pokračovať v precho-
de medzi morálkou a právom. Existencia vonkajších záujmov a podnetov v právnej oblasti nijako nevylučuje to, že svoje vyššie princípy nachádza v morálke.“³⁶

Ako záverečné tvrdenie k tomuto prvému prístupu uvádza: „V prvom pokuse, ktorý sme práve preskúmali, sa väzba ukázala vo všeobecnom zákonodarstve rozumu, z ktorého, ako z jediného zdroja, pramení právo a morálka.“³⁷

Pri úvahách o druhom prístupe, teda prístupe prostredníctvom motívu povinnosti, sa opäť objavuje prítomnosť tohto motívu v oboch rovinách chápania zákona a zákonnosti, teda v morálnej, ale aj právnej rovine. Novgorodcev aj v tomto kontexte, pri druhom prístupe, uvažuje, že ako jeden, tak aj druhý zákon môže byť naplňovaný podľa čistej idey povinnosti. Píše, že morálne zákony sú

³⁵ Ibid., s. 507.

³⁶ Ibid., s. 508.

³⁷ Ibid.

širšie ako právne; morálne zákony v sebe zahŕňajú oveľa viac usmernení ako tie právne. Objavuje sa myšlienka, v ktorej je možné opäť identifikovať Novgorodcevov zámer nachádzať istý nedostatok u Kanta. Ruský mysliteľ zdôrazňuje, že Kant predsa akceptuje existenciu takých právnych požiadaviek, ktoré vyplývajú len a výlučne z vymedzení zákonodarcu. Z tejto pozície akoby Novgorodcev vylučoval, že zákonodarca pri tvorbe právnych noriem, predpisov procesného charakteru môže vychádzať z morálnych zákonov, ktoré sú dané čistým rozumom. Je možné kriticky posudzovať výhradu Novgorodceva o nespôsobilosti rozumu rozhodovať o tom, čo nevychádza z jeho požiadaviek. Novgorodcev má možno na mysli praktickú stránku právnickej činnosti, procesné úkony vychádzajúce z potrieb právnej praxe. Ako sme už uviedli, vnímame to ako príklad kritiky, ktorá nemôže reflektovať priamo na intencie Kantovej tvorby.

Novgorodcevo úvahy sa nám javia ako hlbavá práca nad závažnými otázkami právnej teórie a dejín štátu a práva. Právny základ ruského čitateľa v osobe Novgorodceva sa podpisuje na prístupe k tvorbe Kanta, ktorá sa nám ukazuje ako dobrý materiál na vyjadrenie sa k týmto otázkam. Dokážeme pochopiť to, čo Novgorodcev považuje za nedostatky či chýbajúce pasáže, nedovysvetlené miesta v Kantovej koncepcii. Myslíme, že Novgorodcev bol v stálom procese hľadania jasného stanoviska, jeho koncepcia sa nám v predmetnej oblasti javí ako otvorená. Deklarovaným záverom je pre nás aj tento návrh možného riešenia z pera Novgorodceva:

Bolo by prirodzenejšie jasne vymedziť oblasti morálnych požiadaviek, rozdeliť ich na dobrosrdečnosť a spravodlivosť, ako to robí napríklad Schopenhauer. Takýmto spôsobom by bol uspokojivo určený prechod morálnych princípov do právnej oblasti. Bola by zdôvodnená ochrana právnych nárokov zo strany morálky.³⁸

Formulovaný návrh v kontexte rozpracovaných úvah je stále pracovnou tézou, horizontom nenaplneného smerovania.

Pri naznačení Novgorodcevových názorov na Kanta považujeme za potrebné bližšie zhodnotiť to, čo sme už čiastočne naznačili, teda jeho názor na Kantov spôsob vyjadrovania. Novgorodcev využíva tvrdenie, ktoré formuloval nemec ký filozof Julius Hermann von Kirchmann: „Schwer verständlich und schwülstig.“ Novgorodcev na viacerých miestach vyjadruje názor, že práve ťažká zrozumiteľnosť a komplikovanosť je tým, čo charakterizuje Kantov písomný prejav a spôsob vyjadrovania. Miestami je badateľné, že Novgorodcev sa pohráva s myšlienkou umelej snahy o odborný prejav zo strany Kanta, teda že Kant pod rúskom prílišnej odbornosti a za pomoci náročného pojmoslovía prechováva

³⁸ Ibid., s. 510.

zámer kamuflovať istú bezmocnosť vyrovnáť sa s problémami, ktoré si vo svojej filozofickej koncepcii uvedomuje, no nedokáže si ich niekedy priznať.

Uzatvárajúc príspevok, dovoľíme si tvrdiť, že Novgorodcev a jeho reflexia Kanta, hoci zjavne vykazuje isté nedostatky a zjednodušenia, predstavuje zaujímavý počín.

Z nášho pohľadu je zaujímavý tiež tým, že v jeho tvorbe sa absolútne nenachádza kritika Kanta determinovaná náboženskými ideami, takými populárnymi v ruskom prostredí. Na rozdiel od iných ruských mysliteľov svoje kritické názory nesituuje totiž do oblasti pôvodu morálky. Ruské religiózne myslenie často kritizuje nejasný pôvod morálky. Jej danosť je často braná ako absurdum, bez akéhokoľvek obsahu a predstaviteľných súvislostí.

V kontexte súčasnej práce s Kantom a jeho filozofickým dedičstvom nám rezonuje myšlienka ruského filozofa práva, ktorou by sme naše uvažovanie uzavreli. Nazdávame sa, že Novgorodcevovi sa darí v tejto myšlienke citlivo a precízne formulovať nielen svoj vlastný postoj ku Kantovi, no tiež názor, ku ktorému by sa priklonila asi väčšina tých, ktorí boli ochotní bez predpojatosti a s príslušnou dávkou pochopenia pristúpiť k lektúre Kantovej tvorby: „Kantov systém má tú vlastnosť, že každý, kto prenikne jeho duchom, zároveň prenikne k snahe ísť ďalej. Ponúka nám nielen hlboké ponaučenie, no spoločne s tým aj mohutný impulz pre ďalšie uvažovanie“.³⁹

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³⁹ Novgorodcev, P. I.: Kant kak moralist, ibid., s. 34.

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Abstract

P. I. Novgorodtsev on the Contribution of Immanuel Kant in the Field of Moral and Social Philosophy

The paper focuses on the Russian reflection of the work of Immanuel Kant at the beginning of the 20th century. More specifically, it examines assessments made on the occasion of the centenary of the death of this prominent German philosopher in the journal *Questions of Philosophy and Psychology* (1905, Issue 1). The authors who contributed in the form of lectures were e. g. L. M. Lopatin, V. I. Vernadsky or P. I. Novgorodtsev. The paper focuses on the views of P. I. Novgorodtsev, a prominent lawyer, philosopher of law, historian and politically active man and it aims to understand the key ideas of Novgorodtsev's arguments addressed to Kant and, especially, his evaluation of Kant's practical philosophy. The paper is based on the belief that Pavel Ivanovich Novgorodtsev and his intellectual heritage represent a remarkable example of the resonances of the legacy of Kant's work in the Russian intellectual environment of the epoch. This thinker considers Kant's work to be one of the most important creative achievements in the history that is current at all times. The paper seeks to bring Novgorodtsev's interest in Kant's work closer on two levels: the level of social philosophy and the level of moral philosophy. Novgorodtsev pays attention to these thoughts primarily in his journal work *Kant as a Moralist* as well as in the work *Kant's Teaching on Law and State*.

Keywords: P. I. Novgorodtsev, I. Kant, social philosophy, morality, philosophy of law

Abstrakt

P. I. Novgorodcev o prínose Immanuela Kanta v oblasti morálnej a sociálnej filozofie

Štúdia sa orientuje na ruskú reflexiu tvorby Immanuela Kanta na začiatku 20. storočia. Konkrétnejšie skúma hodnotenia, ktoré boli formulované pri príležitosti stého výročia úmrtia tohto významného nemeckého filozofa na stránkach časopisu *Otázky filozofie a psychológie*, v čísle 1 v roku 1905. Svojimi prácami, publikovanými prednáškami, prispievajú takí autori ako L. M. Lopatin, V. I. Vernadskij či P. I. Novgorodcev. Práve názory posledného z menovaných, významného právnika, filozofa práva, historika a politického dejateľa, skúma predkladaný text. Štúdia je pokusom preniknúť k východiskám a nosným myšlienkam v argumentácii Novgorodceva, ktoré sú adresované Kantovi, a predovšetkým k hod-

noteniu jeho praktickej filozofie. Príspevok vychádza z presvedčenia, že Pavel Ivanovič Novgorodcev a jeho intelektuálne dedičstvo predstavujú pozoruhodný príklad rezonancií odkazu tvorby I. Kanta v ruskom intelektuálnom prostredí danej epochy. Tento mysliteľ považuje Kantovu tvorbu za jeden z najvýznamnejších tvorivých počinov v dejinách ľudstva, ktorý je aktuálny v každej dobe. Štúdia sa snaží o priblíženie Novgorodcevovho záujmu o Kantovu tvorbu v dvoch rovinách: v rovine sociálnej filozofie a v rovine morálnej filozofie. Týmto úvahám venuje Novgorodcev svoju pozornosť predovšetkým v časopiseckej práci *Kant ako moralista* a tiež v práci *Učenie Kanta o práve a štáte*.

Kľúčové slová: P. I. Novgorodcev, I. Kant, sociálna filozofia, morálka, filozofia práva

doc. Mgr. Ondrej Marchevský, PhD.

Inštitút politológie

Filozofická fakulta, Prešovská univerzita v Prešove

Prešov, Slovenská republika

ondrej.marchevsky@unipo.sk

INTRODUCTION

Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* begins with the discussion of the notion of sympathy. This issue is central to the philosopher's moral considerations and it is present not only in his major ethical work, but also plays a role in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, as well as in *Of the Affinity between Music, Dancing, and Poetry* and *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*. Describing sympathy properly is a challenge itself, as Smith provides the readers with numerous examples in which sympathy operates and the definition he assumes is quite wide and vague. Moreover, the Scottish thinker mentions natural sympathy and discusses the role fellow-feeling plays in moral judgments and building social harmony. One of the aims of this paper is to present a summary of the ways of understanding sympathy within the framework of Smith's philosophy. I shall also address a question concerning the roots of sympathy and whether they need to be searched for within the framework of Smith's thought.

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SYMPATHY

Adam Smith commences his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* with a chapter devoted to sympathy, focusing on one of the most important notions of his moral theory from the very beginning. He uses the terms *sympathy* and *fellow-feeling* interchangeably, providing the reader with a statement saying that:

Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.²

¹ The research was financed from the assets awarded by The National Science Centre, Poland, for the post-doctoral internship upon the decision no. 2016/20/S/HS1/00071

² Smith, A.: *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (TMS). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982, p. 10.

Such a wide definition suggests a spectrum of feelings that one can sympathise with. English language suggests that sympathy would be mostly directed towards sadness and pain, close in its meaning to compassion. Yet, in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* it refers to all kinds of feelings (though there are limitations³). One of the important factors is also intensity of the feeling: the thinker mentions that the fellow-feeling is stronger when concerning small joy or great sadness than small sadness or great joy⁴.

It might seem that sympathy in its meaning is close to today's understanding of empathy. However, such an interpretation is controversial, although there are scholars who argue in favour of such a view⁵. Contrary, T.D. Campbell understands empathy rather as an almost automatic transfer of feelings, in which what an observer and an agent feel is almost identical. He considers therefore the notion of empathy to describe Hume's theory of sympathy better than Smith's.⁶

It would be worth noting that the author of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* mentions that

Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion spring up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator.⁷

Such a statement would suggest that this analogous, automatic response towards agent's feeling is one of the basic meanings of sympathy. Especially that this sympathy is directed, in the examples Smith gives us, towards quite physical experience:

When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer. The mob, when they are gazing at the dancer on the slack

³ Smith notes that it is hard to sympathize with physical pains (we rather admire those who suffer and do not show their suffering, according to Smith we rather sympathize with the fear of someone who is in pain than with the pain itself, he even mentions that people tend to quickly forget the pain they have suffered) and pleasures, passion, hunger (we rather sympathize with sadness and fear who accompany hunger) or even with someone who is in love (TMS, pp. 27-34). According to the Scottish philosopher fellow-feeling is much easier when it concerns feelings that come from our imagination. Moreover, people who experience e.g. love tend to be exaggerating, therefore, although it is pleasurable to us to look at a couple in love, their delight and admiration towards each other may even seem ridiculous, especially that love is in fact a mixture of different feelings and, according to Smith, may have numerous negative consequences for people in love.

⁴ TMS, pp. 40-44.

⁵ e.g.: Zabieglik, S.: *Adam Smith*, Warszawa: PW "Wiedza Powszechna", 2003, p. 42.

⁶ Campbell, T. D.: *Adam Smith's Science of Morals*, New York: Routledge, 2012, p. 95.

⁷ TMS, p. 10.

rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies, as they see him do, and as they feel that that they themselves must do if in his situation.⁸

It seems that an observer automatically reacts to the events with feelings that are, in fact, adequate to those of an agent. In context of Smith's thought it is an interesting case in which sympathy would equal empathy, even in Campbell's understanding of the term. Moreover, the Scottish philosopher seems to be partly contradicting himself, as he states that delicate people, when looking at beggars who expose their illnesses, "feel an itching or uneasy sensation" in their own bodies⁹. Yet, such an inconsistency can be easily explained with the fact, that such people sympathise rather with the feelings the agent experiences and the image of themselves if they were suffering as well as with outcomes of such a situation than with the physical pain itself.

However, such a transfer of feelings is not the only, and definitely not the most important, way of understanding sympathy in Smith's writings. The philosopher frequently underlines the role of knowledge of circumstances and imagination. The latter one is crucial, as he provides us with a very interesting account of fellow-feeling with those who, in fact, do not experience what the observer sympathizes with. Smith states that

Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned [...] This, however, does not hold universally, or with regard to every passion.¹⁰

Fellow-feeling does not mean feeling exactly what the other person does, nor does it mean to project one's own feelings on to somebody else. The person who sympathises does not need to have feelings that are analogous to the agent's ones and does not need to base on remembering how he acted in a similar situation¹¹. The feelings of the agent might in fact be unimportant¹² and "...knowledge of the spectator's sympathy does not imply knowledge of spectator's feeling but, rather, knowledge of the way he came by the feeling"¹³. Smith illustrates the thesis that ac-

⁸ TMS, p. 10.

⁹ TMS, p. 10.

¹⁰ TMS, p. 11.

¹¹ Griswold, Ch. L., Jr.: *Imagination*. In K. Haakonssen (Ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith*, Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 33.

¹² Broadie, A.: *Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator*. In K. Haakonssen (Ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith*, p. 167.

¹³ Broadie, A.: *Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator*, p. 165.

cordance of feelings and experience is not necessary to sympathize two significant examples: sympathy with infants or other people who do not understand their situation and sympathy with the dead.

In the latter case we are sad, being sorry for the dead, as we think that being deprived of things they could experience in their life is a great loss. Moreover, our feelings are enhanced by the image of a body decomposing in a grave, a perspective of the fact that the dead will, after some time, be forgotten and by imagining that we will die someday and how bad it would be¹⁴. There is no need for the dead to feel the same way, in order to allow us to experience the fellow-feeling and the fear of death. It is worth noting though that this fear can serve the society, as in case of murder we sympathize with the victim and, subsequently, with the resentment that person could experience – such feelings are prior to the idea of the utility of punishments.¹⁵

The philosopher also mentions those who are unaware of their own situation. These are not only individuals who act in an improper way, but also those mentally ill or little infants, unaware of their serious condition. Even though these people themselves might be happy and have no knowledge of how miserable their situation is, others, who are able to understand their situation, sympathize with what should be felt in such circumstances. Or – as in case of a child and the mother – mother's suffering, apart from sympathy with her child's feelings, is also based on the knowledge of consequences of the illness and from being helpless, whereas the child feels the pain.

There are situations in which Smith describes sympathy in a way close in its meaning to benevolence¹⁶. It is not exactly the benevolence in the sense that we can find in Francis Hutcheson's philosophy, yet, it can be noticed that sympathy is connected to positive, binding feelings. He mentions that our good deeds are usually directed towards our family, friends and members of the same community, yet our benevolence, good will, goes far beyond that, as we desire happiness for all sensible innocent beings.¹⁷ The philosopher uses the notion of natural sympathy which we feel towards the people who are closest to us (family, friends, and, most of all, the children) as well as towards the wealthy (which allows to enforce social harmony¹⁸). We care more about the people with whom we spend more time and about those

¹⁴ TMS, pp. 12-13.

¹⁵ TMS, pp. 72-73.

¹⁶ Ossowska, M.: *Motywy postępowania. Z zagadnień psychologii moralności*. Warszawa: Książka i wiedza, 2002, p. 176.

¹⁷ TMS, p. 235.

¹⁸ Although Smith mentions also negative effects of such a situation. It can be noticed in the *Wealth of Nations* and later editions of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* that Smith's views have evolved and the philosopher pays more attention to drawbacks of such a respect: the wealthy do not have to be moral, social position can be obtained without no merit and the effects of respecting crooks could be devastating for the morality.

who we love or like. We strive to make not only ours, but also their lives better and more comfortable. However, there is also another factor that plays a role: when we spend a lot of time with certain people, we know them better, therefore it is easier for us to sympathise with them¹⁹.

Adam Smith discussed the respect towards the wealthy and the great both in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and the *Wealth of Nations*. People tend to have positive feelings towards the rich and the aristocrats, idealise their situation and experience fellow-feeling, imagining their wonderful lives: “We could even wish them immortal; and it seems hard to us, that death should at last put an end to such perfect enjoyment”²⁰. People transfer the pleasure caused by beautiful objects, thanks to the power of imagination, on to the owner of the goods, yet the fact we adore the great does not come from our expectation of them to help us, but from natural admiration.²¹

The key role played by fellow-feeling is its importance for learning morality and giving moral judgements. John McHugh even states that “Unlike Hume, who employs his sympathy theory to explain the concern for others that makes moral judgement possible, Smith employs his sympathy theory as his theory of moral judgment”²². Both sympathy and imagination are crucial in the process. Using those two faculties we need to place ourselves in the shoes of an agent and, getting to know the circumstances, imagine how one should have acted in such a situation. When judging our own actions, we need to go even a step further and try to understand how an observer would have judged us if he had placed himself in our situation. As argues Jack Russell Weinstein:

‘Sympathy’ is the term Smith uses to denote the means by which moral actors consider normative rules and empirical facts to determine propriety. It is a complicated process, involving both inborn faculties and learned skills. It is fostered and impaired by cultural norms and practices, and Smith himself emphasizes that both sympathy’s accuracy and motivational power diminish as cultural and physical distance between individuals increases.²³

Sympathy is therefore a basis for individuals’ morality.

¹⁹ TMS, p. 219.

²⁰ TMS, p. 52.

²¹ TMS, p. 52.

²² McHugh J. W., Relaxing a Tension in Adam Smith’s Account of Sympathy. *Journal of Scottish Philosophy*, 9, (2), 2011, p. 191.

²³ Weinstein, J. R.: *Adam Smith’s Pluralism. Rationality, Education and the Moral Sentiments*. New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2013, p. 68.

WHY IS SYMPATHY UNIVERSAL?

At the very end of the XVIII century Sophie de Grouchy marquise de Condorcet translated the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* into French. To her translation, she enclosed the *Letters on Sympathy* where she developed her concept of sympathy. At the starting point of her considerations a significant criticism towards Smith can be found – addressing C*** (the recipient of the *Letters*) she writes:

You know that the subject of the opening chapters of Smith's book is sympathy. Smith limited himself to noting its existence and to showing its principal effects. I regretted that he did not dare go further, to penetrate its first cause, and ultimately to show to how sympathy must belong to every sensible being capable of reflection. You will see how I had the temerity to fill in these omissions.²⁴

Therefore she presents her own views, stating that "Sympathy is the disposition we have to feel as others do"²⁵ and explains how sympathy is developed, basing on experience coming from physical pain.

Sophie de Grouchy's claim cannot be easily dismissed. It is true that Smith neither provides us with a proper explanation of the sources of sympathy nor does he attempt to give arguments proving that it is in fact a universal feature. Yet, Smith explains that sympathy can be perfected by individuals within the society and he does seem to treat it as common to all human beings, "a universal human capacity"²⁶ as Jerry Evensky phrased it. I believe Smith supposes it was obvious that people do sympathize with each other. What is more – we do find sympathizing pleasurable and seek others to sympathize with us.

Adam Smith assumes the existence of feelings common to all people, as already in the first paragraph of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* he states that:

That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.²⁷

Unlike his translator into French, Smith feels no need to investigate the roots

²⁴ de Grouchy, S.: *Letters on Sympathy*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2008, p. 108.

²⁵ de Grouchy, S.: *Letters on Sympathy*, p. 108.

²⁶ Evensky, J.: *Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy. A Historical and Contemporary Perspective on Markets, Law, Ethics and Culture*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 39

²⁷ TMS, p. 9.

or mechanisms leading to using sympathy. His great predecessors²⁸ have mentioned the subject, yet, the author of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* seems to be concerning this feeling that underlies his whole moral theory as so obvious and universal, that it requires no explanation of how it exactly appears or where does it come from.

The investigation could stop at this point, yet, I believe, we are able to find a couple of arguments explaining why sympathy needs to be treated as an inborn universal faculty within the framework of Smith's philosophy. Fonna Forman-Barzilai notices that "On Smith's account, sympathy was not an innate human disposition that discharges mindlessly and spontaneously..."²⁹, however, such a statement seems quite controversial in the light of the philosopher's discussion of an automatic response in case of certain events – as in the example of the dancer on the slack rope. In case of such a danger, the audience reacts without thinking, their bodies respond automatically – which can serve as a prove of an inborn sympathy operating in this case. It seems to be a rather spontaneous reaction based on innate sympathy. Yet, in the context of Smith's theory of moral judgement, reflection and imagination play a significant role and sole fellow-feeling is not enough.

Another situation is the case of natural sympathy (that itself is natural, therefore should be common to all people) in which it is close in its meaning to benevolence and love: care for one's children – Smith mentions that it even did not need to be listed within ten commandments³⁰ (unlike respect for parents). The philosopher assumes that the closest and most intensive feelings we have for our family and friends. Yet, people care the most about the children, who require assistance of the adults for the first years of their lives. Even to those who have no relation to a child, child's suffering and death appears as an extreme tragedy. As another argument may serve the assumption that, although most people rather follow general rules of morality, we are able to construct the impartial spectator. And in order to do that sympathy and imagination are necessary.

It is worth mentioning that although Adam Smith, as well as some other Scottish philosophers, was an inspiration for Immanuel Kant (Smith was even considered to be one of Kant's favourite philosophers³¹). Their influence on Kant's understanding of sympathy was quite substantial³². Yet, in terms of the abovementioned

²⁸ Francis Hutcheson presented his theory of moral sense showing its mechanisms, David Hume when describing his views on sympathy also provided us with a mechanism thanks to which it operates.

²⁹ Forman-Barzilai, F.: *Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy. Cosmopolitanism and Moral Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 62.

³⁰ TMS, pp. 142-143.

³¹ Frazer, M. L.: *The Enlightenment of Sympathy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 112.

³² Hanley, R. P.: *Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 72.

tioned general rules of morality, Smith and Kant had quite opposite views. One of the two thinkers' starting points is similar: general rules exist, because they are effective and limit the probability of self-deceit. Yet, "...in emphasizing that general rules are the product of experience and not reason, Smith reiterates his distance from Kant's a priori mandates. Second, Smith reveals his distance from even non-Kantian forms of deontology in insisting that general rules, however derived, are not unto themselves the principal standards of morality".³³

If proper usage of sympathy, as I understand Smith's theory, requires an effort, a question "why bother?" appears. An interesting answer is given by Alexander Broadie. He emphasizes that "...sympathy always gives pleasure"³⁴. Fellow-feeling with somebody's happiness or pleasure is pleasant. If an agent experiences pain – someone sympathizing brings a partial consolation. Any accordance of feelings brings pleasure therefore we are motivated to make an effort, seeing additional positive feelings as an effect of the process. Moreover, we want to do the right thing, so we are even ready to sympathize with our enemy or with someone we dislike, especially that soothing a conflict might end up in mutual sympathy that brings them satisfaction³⁵.

I believe that as sympathy seems to be a universal, inborn faculty – it can serve as one of the bases for discussing similarities between Smith's works, together with other aspects of man's nature and it cannot be treated as non-existent in other works. This way it also affects the discussion concerning the famous *Adam Smith Problem*³⁶. There are numerous arguments undermining the validity of the *Problem*, out of which one is the critique of the fact that it assumes that Smith must have changed his views somewhere between writing the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and the *Wealth of Nations* (1776). There were suppositions that Smith's visit to France (1763-1766, as a tutor of duke Buccleuch) and influence of the French physiocrats changed his philosophical views. First of all, such an assumption does not take into account later editions of the *Theory* in which Smith introduced changes up to the last one – published in the year of his death³⁷.

³³ Hanley, R. P.: *Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue*, p. 73-74.

³⁴ Broadie, A.: *Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator*, p. 170.

³⁵ Broadie, A.: *Agreeable Connexions: Scottish Enlightenment Links with France*. Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2012, p. 137.

³⁶ The *Adam Smith Problem* was formulated by German thinkers – Buckle and Skarzynski. Its primary formulation assumed that a description of a man in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* is based on a feeling of sympathy, quite similar to benevolence, whereas in the *Wealth of Nations* people are primarily motivated by self-interest and egoism.

³⁷ An interesting account of the *Adam Smith Problem* understood as the *TMS 1759 vs Wealth of Nations 1776 vs TMS 1790* was presented by Maria Pia Paganelli in her paper (*Theory of Moral Sentiments 1759 vs. Theory of Moral Sentiments 1790: A Change of Mind or a Change in Constraint* In W. L. Robison – D. B. Suits (Eds.). *New Essays on Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy*, Rochester – New

Moreover, discovery of Smith's students' notes, later published as *Lectures on Jurisprudence* proved that his ideas presented in the *Wealth of Nations* were already shaping when he gave his lectures – at the same time preparing the third edition of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*³⁸.

Defining sympathy is quite important in terms of discussing the *Adam Smith Problem*. Stating that it is simply fellow-feeling is not enough. Being aware of the full spectrum of meanings of the notion of sympathy can help us not only understand why the initial definition that underlines the problem is too narrow, but also to discuss it going beyond the opposition of altruism versus egoism. Moreover, it allows us to reach towards other Smith's works: e.g. when discussing instrumental music, the Scottish philosopher mentions that it sometimes can cause effects similar to sympathy. Skilful composers and musicians are able to show a wide range of feelings through music and even cause the listener to have original emotions that are excited by the music, but are not an effect of imitation or sympathy³⁹. Those feelings enforce social harmony and relations between people⁴⁰. In Smith's philosophy people are considered to be social beings and the roots of sociability and social harmony can be found in sympathy – this way it is present in all Smith's writings. The only people that would be deprived of sympathy – if such an interpretation was correct – were psychopaths, who would be, this way, unsocial and it would be difficult for them to give moral judgements (though they could follow the general rules of morality, as learned by heart).

It needs to be remembered that although people are social beings in Smith's philosophy, neither sociability nor benevolence or altruism are necessary in creating an operating society. The philosopher mentions the possibility of a society of villains, thieves or murderers who could function as a group, if only they obeyed the laws – just as merchants, cooperating not because of benevolence but for mutual benefits⁴¹. Although sympathy generates social harmony, it is rather justice that plays here a crucial role.

Sympathy itself, even treated as an inborn universal faculty, is not just simply used the same way by all the people. It is a kind of a social process, fellow-feeling is developed within social framework, established and perfected within society⁴².

York: Rit Press, 2012) where she focuses on three “motivating centers”, the role of the wealthy and approbation that unifies all three mentioned books.

³⁸ Broadie, A.: *Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator*, pp. 164-165.

³⁹ Smith, A.: *Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are called The Imitative Arts* (IA). In W. P. D. Wightman – J. C. Bryce – I. S. Ross (Eds.). *Essays on Philosophical Subjects with Dugald Stewart's Account of Adam Smith*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982, p. 198.

⁴⁰ IA, p. 192.

⁴¹ TMS, pp. 85-87.

⁴² Forman-Barzilai, F.: *Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy*, p. 63.

We learn how to be moral beings through observation and experience (we look at the reactions of other people to certain deeds and infer rules on that basis) as well as through feelings we experience (Smith mentions cases in which we feel that given rules are wrong, even though they are established and accepted within a group⁴³). We in fact learn how to be moral beings and how to judge other people's actions. Experience allows us to make this process easier. Moreover, natural sympathy towards our family and friends results with the fact that it is easier for us to fellow-feel with them. Not because we love them, but because we know them better, we are better rooted in their situation and it is easier for us to understand their motivations. Therefore sympathy acts in a more refined way when it is not only perfected and reflected on, but also when it concerns people close to us. Obviously such a situation has also drawbacks – an eye of an external observer is also precious, as we tend to be more favourable towards those we love. On the other hand, we tend to expect more sympathy from the closest ones than from strangers⁴⁴.

Stating that in Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, sympathy is in fact universal, common to all people and inborn does not answer fully the question how does the mechanism work. Yet, unlike in Sophie de Grouchy's considerations, it does not have to be derived from a different power, feeling or state (as it is based on experience of pain in her philosophy), as it seems to be one of the basic characteristics of human nature. What we need to remember though is that sympathy, as a feeling (or, possibly, an actualisation of a disposition)⁴⁵, is closely bound with imagination, as the two play together a crucial role in forming moral judgements, learning morality and creating an impartial spectator.

CONCLUSIONS

The notion of sympathy in Adam Smith's philosophy is nuanced. It refers to a wide range of situations and can be understood not only as benevolence, natural attachment to our family and friends or compassion. It is usually used by the philosopher within the context of giving moral judgments or considering the moral value of certain actions. In fact, sympathy tends to coexist with imagination, since together the two allow us to place ourselves in the agent's shoes and approve or disapprove of the action in question. Both sympathy and imagination

⁴³ Smith provides us with an example of little children being left to die, a practice which was acceptable in ancient Athens (TMS, pp. 209-211).

⁴⁴ Zúñiga y Postigo, G.: Adam Smith on Sympathy: From Self-Interest to Empathy. In D. Hardwick – L. Marsh (eds.), *Propriety and Prosperity. New Studies on the Philosophy of Adam Smith*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 144.

⁴⁵ Broadie, A.: *Agreeable Connexions*, p. 142.

are also crucial for constructing the impartial spectator who plays an important role in Smith's moral theory. Sympathy also helps us build social harmony and plays a role when we read books, watch plays and even listen to the music. It also makes us feel better – as the concordance of feelings brings pleasure and having someone sympathize with us when we hurt brings solace. Being aware of the whole spectrum of sympathy's roles is necessary in understanding Smith's moral philosophy. It also is crucial for participating in discussion concerning the *Adam Smith Problem*. It would be impossible to understand Smith's philosophy without being aware of the role and significance of sympathy.

Smith never provides us with a detailed account of the roots of sympathy, nor does he describe the metaphysics of the process of sympathising. He uses the notion extensively, but does not bother to trace the origins of fellow-feeling. He rather treats it as common to all people and assumes as obvious that we are able to sympathise with each other. There are certain remarks in his writings that let us accept such an interpretation.

However, another important question needs to be asked at this point: is it really necessary for Smith to explain the roots of sympathy, as suggests Sophie de Grouchy? I believe it is not – a metaphysical or genetic search for the metaphysical roots of sympathy would not contribute significantly to the description of the way people constitute moral judgments nor would it help in developing his arguments. De Grouchy's description of how, basing on experiences of physical pain, we learn to sympathize, would not smoothly fit within the framework of Smith's theory. Searching for a different genesis of fellow-feeling would also indicate that he would have needed to explain why people are sometimes self-interested, sometimes altruistic, why do they seek for praise and for being praiseworthy, as well as what are the origins of all the above. That would mean an extensive description of human nature and a metaphysical theory in creating which Smith seems not to have been interested. P. B. Mehta points out that:

From his earliest lectures, Smith is hostile to the idea that human nature, especially human motivation, can be treated like an object in the physical world whose qualities could be exhaustively described [...] He is not asking: is human nature benevolent or malign?, or is human nature self-interested or benevolent? Smith's questions are rather, what in human nature makes virtue possible?, what in human nature makes morality possible?, and what in human nature makes pursuit of wealth and honor possible? This inquiry does not yield a description of human nature in terms of a singular motive but charts some of its complex movements⁴⁶.

⁴⁶ Mehta, P. B.: Self-Interest and Other Interests. In K. Haakonssen (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith*, 2006, pp. 247-248.

We can infer that, in terms of Smith's theory, there is no point in focusing on just one aspect of human nature, nor it makes sense to try to achieve a complex list of features characterising all human beings. I believe that the Scottish philosopher was aiming at a different kind of theory.

Moreover, it is to be remembered that Smith's moral thought is deeply rooted in the Scottish Enlightenment sentimental tradition, where we can find preceding Hume's definition of sympathy as well as Hutcheson's theory of moral sense. Those philosophers provide us with accounts of sympathy and its origins that the author of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* knew. Adam Smith presents us a rather descriptive theory of individuals existing within society. Searching for what underlies sympathy would, in fact, give us an interesting account, but on a different level of analysis. However, it probably would not have changed much in the theory of sentiments and their role in morality that he actually leaves us with.

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Abstract

Adam Smith and the Roots of Sympathy

The aim of this paper is to characterise Adam Smith's notion of sympathy. The Scottish philosopher provides the reader of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* with a very wide definition, subsequently introducing numerous examples and situations in which fellow-feeling plays an important role. However, he does not seek to explain the roots of sympathy. The paper addresses a question of whether search for a genesis of sympathy is required in case of Smith's philosophy. It mentions the idea of general rules of morality and the fact that Smith and Kant regarded them in different ways. It also enlists arguments that back up an assumption that sympathy is an inborn feeling common to all people.

Keywords: Adam Smith, sympathy, fellow-feeling

Abstrakt

Adam Smith a korene náklonnosti

Cieľom príspevku je charakterizovať pojem náklonnosti u Adama Smitha. Škótsky filozof dáva čitateľovi *Teórie mravných citov* veľmi širokú definíciu a následne

uvádza množstvo príkladov a situácií, v ktorých dôležitú úlohu zohráva pocit spolupatričnosti. Nesnaží sa však vysvetliť korene náklonnosti. Článok sa zaoberá otázkou, či je potrebné v prípade Smithovej filozofie hľadať genézu náklonnosti. Poukazuje na ideu všeobecných pravidiel morálky a na skutočnosť, že ich Smith a Kant posudzovali rôznymi spôsobmi. Rovnako prezentuje argumenty, ktoré podporujú predpoklad, že náklonnosť je vrozený pocit spoločný pre všetkých ľudí.

Kľúčové slová: Adam Smith, náklonnosť, pocit spolupatričnosti

Dr Anna Markwart

Instytut Filozofii UMK

Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

Toruń, Polska

markwart.anna@gmail.com

“History is not an external subject given to us in complete form, but it is an uninterrupted existence created through human actions and intentions. Therefore, man confronts not only history, but he also stands in it. This is the area in which its moral goals and practical interests are expected to be realized, making it relevant to ask about the meaning of history in terms of these goals and interests and to try to make them understandable. We can therefore say that history does not confront man merely as an intellectual but also as an existential problem. His need to provide meaningful interpretation stems from the immediate reality of his life and not only from the needs of archaeological research.”

Y. Yovel: Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 169.

I.

The question how to define and understand philosophy of history is not simple. Johannes Rohbeck has characterized it as a problem child of modernity and adds that it has always been one of the most controversial philosophical disciplines.² A general overview of various definitions of philosophy of history deals with a meaning referring to philosophical reflections on historical events and historical

¹ The paper is an outcome of the research project VEGA 1/0880/17 *Filozofia dejín v osvietenstve: Dejiny ako fundamentálny moment sebainterpretácie človeka v kontexte filozofie 18. storočia* [Philosophy of History in the Enlightenment: History as a Fundamental Moment of Human Self-Interpretation in the Context of 18th Century Philosophy] supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic.

² Rohbeck, J.: Rehabilitating the Philosophy of History. In P. Koslowski (Ed.). *The Discovery of Historicity in German Idealism and Historism*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2005, p. 187.

processes. A more specific meaning of the term philosophy of history refers to the philosophical theory of history as a whole process. Here, it is assumed that an image of nature, origin, purpose and course of the overall process, known as history, can be obtained. It is the latter meaning of the philosophy of history that is essential in understanding of the interpretation of history by philosophers of the 18th century when philosophy of history became one of the prevailing tendencies in philosophy. Hans Michael Baumgartner explains this fact in a way that during this period the world's image suffered from certain crack when the underlying assumptions and opinions were lost and suitable substitutes had to be found instead. According to him, at the time of the Enlightenment, God could no longer be the foundation of all, man could not rely on the idea of the theological interpretation of creation, and even the order of nature was not enough as an absolute law. Therefore, it was necessary to find substitutes for God as well as for nature and it was the idea of history that was offered because people could understand themselves in their own "autonomy, absoluteness, and, as it seems, in a reasonable way"³. Baumgartner calls it a final step of the change of perspective and the change of the style of thinking. "History is becoming the main concept that can take place of the divine cosmos as well as of the absolute God. By this, history becomes a new symbol of the salvation of mankind with a new positive view towards the future associated with the vision of progress, new energy and sometimes a more or less cautious optimism."⁴ Emil Angehrn mentions another assumption according to which philosophy of history appeared thanks to a modern assessment of the subject. It means that philosophy no longer had to rely on cosmos and nature, the time of which was described as cyclical, nor on the history of salvation, but rather was represented by a new positive change in attitude to history and the associated optimism of progress.⁵

However, there is no firm, stable, bindingly accepted definition of the philosophy of history. In a systematic interpretation, this discipline represents a variety of problems, examining history as a form of consciousness, cultural value or science, analysing nature and mode of history, examining history as a cultural-historical value, fulfilling certain functions in the lives of individuals and society, and discussing forms of construction, interpretation and explanation of history.

According to J. Rohbeck establishing the idea of evolution in enlightenment carries with it two essential changes that illustrate the penetration of nature and his-

³ Baumgartner, H. M.: Philosophie der Geschichte nach dem Ende der Geschichtsphilosophie. Bemerkungen zum gegenwärtigen Stand des geschichtsphilosophischen Denkens. In H. Nagl-Docekal (Ed.): *Der Sinn des Historischen. Geschichtsphilosophie Debatten*. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996, pp. 152–153.

⁴ Ibid, pp. 166–167.

⁵ Angehrn, E.: *Geschichtsphilosophie*. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1991, p. 15.

tory, namely, the historization of nature and the naturalization of history and there were also new topics of philosophy of history presented in connection with the events in Europe. Rohbeck describes philosophy of the mid-18th century through the theory of progress when society experienced certain transformation, human work became its central area and progress represented an image of a continuous gradual and targeted movement. This understanding of progress has become a key concept of the theory of the history of French and Scottish Enlightenment and has been the general principle of clarifying the overall course of history.⁶ Rohbeck explains that progress is not an aim, it is a process and the concept of progress is the universal category of movement of history which is resembling more a circle than a linear movement. The process of history is evolving and changing in particular by the consequence of a person who, through his reason, is able to participate on the progress and thus makes his own history. Compared to the changes made by man and his reason, nature does not develop so much, but only lives its eternal cycle. The research of the history of nature and the beginning of the theory of progress have taken place concurrently, and thus, according to Rohbeck, it is possible to speak of parallels in the historical thinking of natural sciences and in the theory of society.⁷ A fundamental problem in 18th century historical theories is the rationale for progress. We can ask whether the history of nature could also be used in interpreting human history. These thinkers relied on the principle of improvement, which is a common criterion for both types of history, but at the same time draw attention to the importance of man as a natural being incorporated into the history of nature.⁸ Man has the ability to improve just like animals, but there are two significant differences between them – freedom and ability to use reason. Of particular importance is also the direction of progress, which is to establish civil society as a necessary human goal. In the enlightenment philosophy, civil society becomes a new concept and an indispensable institution that would be synonymous with a just social establishment. In order to ensure the stability of this right of constituent civil society, social behaviour of people was also included in the scientific analysis.

II.

One of the first complex studies on Kant's philosophy of history is E. Fackenheim's *Kant's Concept of History* published in *Kant-Studien* in 1956/1957. Facken-

⁶ Rohbeck, J.: *Die Fortschrittstheorie der Aufklärung. Französische und englische Geschichtsphilosophie in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 1985, p. 32.

⁷ Ibid., p. 46.

⁸ Ibid., p. 57.

heim opens his paper with a statement that many “treat Kant’s philosophy of history; but few treat it seriously” and continues with a question what makes Kant’s views on history so attractive.⁹ He continues with other questions, e.g. if he sets up a division between the realms of nature and morality, how can he allow a special realm for history or if he teaches a doctrine of unqualified moral freedom, how can he also teach a historical determinism.¹⁰ Fackenheim answers that Kant was well-aware of the fact that he is no professional in the field of history, nevertheless, he did involve in this issue with the greatest caution and care and if there are any contradictions between Kant’s system as a whole and his philosophy of history it is highly improbable that Kant was not aware of them, especially when some of his main works were written at the same time as the works on history. According to Fackenheim, we are obliged to take Kant’s philosophy of history seriously in the way that we “treat it as a systematic whole, and as systematic part of a larger systematic whole, – the Kantian system”.¹¹

Today, it is possible to say that scholars have responded to Fackenheim’s appeal. Kant’s philosophy of history has become a matter of serious philosophical interest. The fact that Kant’s philosophy of history cannot be found in a complex form, as for example, Hegel’s, could be another reason why it was overlooked, if not forgotten, for such a long time and the first reflections of Kant – as a philosopher of history – appear only in the second half of the twentieth century. The decades since then have proven that philosophy of history is a relevant part of Kant’s philosophy and it is necessary to deal with it as an important element of his practical philosophising. Y. Yovel writes in his work *Kant and the Philosophy of History* that he thinks it is both necessary and possible to reintegrate Kant’s philosophy of history into his critical system¹².

In the work *Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History* Kant explains the position of man cosmologically – man lives on this planet and should be proud of it. However, he must be able to escape the state of nature and enter the state of society. This was done in small steps through instinct of food, sexual instinct, anticipation of the future and, finally, realisation that he is the true end of nature (MAM, AA 08: 114)¹³. Man was able to overcome everything on earth thanks to his capacity of reason that caused human progress and development of mankind as such. In the *Second Proposition* of the work *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* he writes that “[r]eason, in a creature, is a faculty which

⁹ Fackenheim, E. L.: Kant’s Concept of History. *Kant-Studien*, 48, 1956/1957, p. 381.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 382.

¹² Yovel, Y.: *Kant and the Philosophy of History*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 127.

¹³ Kant, I.: *Political Writings: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*. 2nd Edition, transl. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 225.

enables that creature to extend far beyond the limits of natural instinct, the rules and intentions it follows in using its various powers, and the range of its projects is unbounded" (IaG, AA 08: 18–19)¹⁴. Later he introduces the idea that a human being "should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason" (IaG, AA 08: 19)¹⁵.

The fact that people were endowed with the faculty of reason means that human being is not dependent on instinct any longer. It is a gradual process and people can come to the full development of their predispositions at its end. In *Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History* Kant describes the moment of understanding man's own capacity of reason by the understanding that man himself is the end of nature – because his reason enabled him to overcome instincts and he understood that he could use what nature gave him for his own prospect. However, an individual never lives alone and all his natural predispositions can be developed only in a social institution in which all his qualities – good or bad – are being present. Kant writes

[t]he means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society [...] By antagonism, I mean in this context the *unsocial sociability* of men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up (IaG, AA 08: 20)¹⁶.

Kant describes tendency of people with two opposite verbs – to *associate* with one another (to live in society) and to *isolate* from one another (to live as an individual) (IaG, AA 08: 20–21)¹⁷. People are social beings, they like and need society for full-valued life, but at the same time, an individual wants to be an outstanding personality and is driven by "the desire for honour, power, or property, [...] to seek status among his fellows, whom he cannot *bear* yet cannot *bear to leave*" (IaG, AA 08: 21)¹⁸. This is an idea that has been brought to the philosophy of history by Rousseau and Kant develops it further. In fact, it is conflict that becomes an active principle which motivates people to make progress. The idea of progress is a common motive for Kant and Scottish Enlightenment philosophers that is being fulfilled by establishing civil society. History is therefore for Kant and other philosophers of the 18th century characterized also by the process and means of

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

social change that one stands for. Yovel gives a very convincing assessment of Kant's understanding of history when he says that Kant is suggesting that a "reasonable person can no longer escape his private morals or just react to some moral problems that occur in life but must also initiate global changes in the world – ethical, political and educational reforms – the subject of which is not only that it should become good, but, ultimately, a good world order as a whole"¹⁹.

Civil society becomes a new term and at the same time a necessary institution representing human natural environment and the progress to civil society is a key condition for social and civil life of people. Kant says that an inevitable step in human progress and the highest intent of mankind is when people achieve civil society "which can administer justice universally" (IaG, AA 08: 22)²⁰. It is a just society based on antagonism, and at the same time, on freedom. This freedom – "*freedom under external laws* [...]" combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly *just civil constitution*" (IaG, AA 08: 22)²¹.

One of the basic conditions of civil society, which human beings should be aware of, is to be a good citizen and "active citizenship" is one of the key moments of progress. It was only thanks to reason that people were able to introduce law and every step in history was based on development of public law and later progress towards international commonwealth. The last step of development of human nature is the federation of states without which the mission of nature could not be finished. In *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* Kant claims that everything should be subordinated to the goal – "externally perfect political constitution, as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely" (IaG, AA 08: 27)²². Everything will be subordinated to the idea of perfect constitution which will be able to last forever. Firstly, it is the evil that motivates mankind to move forward and secondly, the enlightenment that influences the government. In the state of enlightenment states should realize that instead of permanent preparations for war it is necessary to set laws which would guarantee cosmopolitan state with free and equal citizens and state's security. States must gradually realize that wars are extremely dangerous and expensive and that the only way how to avoid the risk is to "prepare the way for a great political body of the future, without precedent in the past" (IaG, AA 08:28)²³ and he expresses a hope that humankind is able to enter a phase where all the conditions for the highest aim of nature,

¹⁹ Yovel, *ibid.*, p. 269.

²⁰ Kant, *ibid.*, p. 45.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

“a universal *cosmopolitan existence*” (IaG, AA 08: 28)²⁴ would be fulfilled.

Even though history is focused on a political development, the aim of Kant’s philosophical history is to support the conditions for the formation of cosmopolitanism.²⁵ Preceding political history was characterized by the frustration of human development caused by ceaseless deflecting from economic and human sources towards wars and preparations for them. *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Purpose* suggests that states have to do the same as people did: renounce their “brutish freedom and seek calm and security within a law-governed constitution” (IaG, AA 08: 24)²⁶. Kant says that the final stage will be possible only after people become citizens of the world.

III.

Although today philosophy of history is a problematic discipline, in 18th century it was a dynamic concept closely linked to the search what man is. History in the Enlightenment philosophy became a means of answering this question – history became the place where people could identify themselves and their place. Through human natural capacity for progress, man could be called the goal of history, by the words of Kant.

The philosophy of history in the Enlightenment represented a new historical force that the thinkers believed in and thought it could be institutionalized through practice and embodied in historical reality. This view is consistent not only with the general optimism of the period, but also with Kant’s theory of rationality that understands reason as a real, self-sufficient, practical motive. Nature is no longer the area that dominates history; new categories of society, such as freedom, law and morality, are in its place. Philosophers offer an explanation of history as a process that is no longer the result of nature, but man is responsible for its progress – starting with an active individual and ending with a human species, who, by realizing their own power, can create their history and transform the world.

Man, on the one hand, a part of nature, on the other, with own dispositions, is able to shape nature, for example in the form of ownership relations or social relations in the form of legal institutions. According to Kant, the condition for achieving legal status at all levels must be a moral policy as an effective legal profession, i.e., it cannot be based on the well-known but dishonest political prac-

²⁴ Ibid., p. 51.

²⁵ Kyslan, P.: Kantovo svetoobčianstvo ako výzva pre súčasnosť. *Studia Philosophica Kantiana: filozofický časopis pre kriticko-rekonštrukčné uvažovanie*, 6, (1), 2017, p. 37.

²⁶ Kant, *ibid.*, p. 48.

tices that are commonly used, but it must be based on the principles of practical reason – freedom and equality. In Kant's philosophy of history, the final step is represented by the idea of cosmopolitanism. By eliminating wars, ensuring equal opportunities for all people and all nations, as well as developing trade, man, as part of history, has a chance to move towards the goal. Kant understands it as the end result we can certainly hope for, and he believes that we are getting closer to it. His reflections on politics, morality, law and duty form an integral part of his philosophical-historical project, in which man's self-consciousness takes place to the extent that his principles become the basis of the systems of states – the federal union and ultimately the cosmopolitan state.

Thinkers of the 18th century tried to imagine the philosophy of history as a type of science that, according to the pattern of natural laws, aimed to find some regularity in history. The issue of the theory of progress is not unambiguously based on linear improvement because even if one is in both processes of history – both natural and social, there is uncertainty based on the fact that the nature of people and his tendency to coexistence cause complications that need to be solved. The philosophy of the 18th century undoubtedly brought new ideas into the field of philosophy of history. In addition to the idea of human progress, it was an enrichment of thinking about the direction of man, the relationship between the natural and social sphere of people, the evaluation of the socio-political reality of the time, and the rationale for the importance of morality and laws while guaranteeing freedom. History, therefore, is a new challenge, a task of reason and self-interpretation of a person who can explain their history, but also recognizes their responsibility in the field of morality – not only theirs, but also the moral progress of the world to become a better place. The natural state is progressively transformed by human power into a complex social system in which people perform themselves. The themes of self-reflection and self-assessment have persisted in philosophy to this day, and while they are part of different philosophical reasoning, they do not lose their importance. Of course, interpreting ways of writing and evaluating history brings questions about their exactness, on the other hand, the idea of cosmopolitanism, introduced by I. Kant, poses a challenge for contemporary thought. Kant has shown two, by free human will interconnected worlds, world of nature and world of man (world of freedom), and although contemporary concepts of cosmopolitanism elaborate their own thoughts, the reference to Kant remains valid.

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²⁷ Kant's works are cited in accordance with Akademie-Ausgabe (AA), Berlin 1900ff.

Abstract

Kant in the Context of 18th Century Philosophy of History

The paper concentrates on Kant's ideas on history in the context of philosophy of history of the 18th century. It firstly focuses on the philosophy of history, which became one of the leading tendencies in the Enlightenment philosophy, and points out how this discipline aimed to interpret man and their place in history from a new perspective. Secondly, the paper deals with Kant's model of philosophy of history focusing on the issue of progress in history represented by formation and development of civil society, the role citizens in it, and the portrayal of possible future history.

Keywords: Enlightenment, history, Kant, nature, reason

Abstrakt

Kant v kontexte filozofie dejín 18. storočia

Príspevok sa sústreďuje na Kantove úvahy o dejinách v kontexte filozofie dejín 18. storočia. V úvodnej časti sa zameriava na filozofiu dejín, ktorá sa v osvietenскеj filozofii stala jednou z dominantných tendencií, a poukazuje na to, ako sa táto disciplína pokúša interpretovať človeka a jeho miesto v dejinách z novej perspektívy. Následne sa príspevok zaoberá Kantovým modelom filozofie dejín so zameraním na problematiku pokroku v dejinách, reprezentovanú vytvorením a rozvojom občianskej spoločnosti, na úlohu občanov v nej a zobrazenie možných budúcich dejín.

Kľúčové slová: dejiny, Kant, osvietenstvo, príroda, rozum

doc. Mgr. Sandra Zákutná, PhD.

Inštitút filozofie

Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove

Prešov, Slovenská republika

sandra.zakutna@unipo.sk

Salomon Maimon, or Szlomo Ben Jehoszua¹, was born in 1753 in Lithuania, in an orthodox Jewish family. He studied in Berlin, where he was active in Mendelssohn's friends and the Haskalah movement circles². The philosopher belonged to three cultures: German, Jewish and Polish. He wrote in German and Hebrew. Being an intellectual of his time, he perceived himself as a European belonging to the cultural circle of Berlin.

The articles entitled *Versuch über den Geschmack* (one written as a commentary on Marcus Herz's *Versuch über den Geschmack*, a dissertation of 1776, and the other, *Über den Geschmack*, as a polemic with Lessing's *Laokoon*) are the basis for the reconstruction of the aesthetic concept of Maimon. The first one was published in 1791 in Moritz's journal: "Annalen der Akademie der Künste und mechanischen Wissenschaften", whilst the other in the "Deutsche Monatsschrift" journal, in 1792, vol. 2. Both articles were later published together entitled *Über die Aesthetik*, in: Salomon Maimon's *Streifereien im Gebiete der Philosophie*, 1. Theil, in 1793 in Berlin. The last of Maimon's important articles on aesthetics, *Das Genie und der methodische Erfinder*, appeared in "Berlinische Monatsschrift" in 1795, vol. 26.

Aesthetic considerations of Salomon Maimon are very much inscribed in associative philosophy³. Their basis consists in thinking about the creation of imagination and the way in which aesthetic phenomena are experienced by man. The basis of aesthetics are feelings that accompany us in the assessment of beautiful objects and phenomena. We may deal here with the direct reception of stimuli, as is the case with pleasure derived from eating a tasty dish or sensing of some sweet scent. Such a sensation, however, can also be evoked indirectly and result from the association of ideas.

Already in the first pages of the essay, *Versuch über den Geschmack*, he explicitly states:

¹ Woleński, J.: *O Salomonie Majmonie*, In Maimon, S.: *Autobiografia*. vol. 1., Warszawa 2007, p. 9.

² Ochman, J.: *Filozofia oświecenia żydowskiego*. Kraków 2000, pp. 64-65.

³ D'Aprile, I.-W.: *Die Schöne Republik*. Tübingen 2006, pp. 126-136.

A sense of beauty in the latter sense can again be considered either as a direct result of sensations in the first meaning, such as the sensation of good taste, nice smell, etc., or as a direct result of a judgment that an object is consistent with a certain concept, principle or purpose. Finally, it may not be about some kind of direct sensation, but simply about the effects of subjective conditions – according to the common laws of association of ideas. Everything that in the representations of the subject in a random way according to the common laws of association of ideas is connected with a pleasant feeling, evokes the feeling of pleasure.⁴

The problem is, of course, that we cannot prove which relations between ideas always evoke pleasure in us. Maimon, however, has no doubt that such rules do exist; the problem is only that we cannot create a specific science systematising the knowledge on this subject, and at best we may show what these relations between ideas are like and when they occur. He concludes: “Real taste, in my opinion, rests in the ability, acquired through reflection, to get to know all kinds of charms that do not fall under the concept of beauty, and to distinguish them from beauty.”⁵

In this context, the Jewish philosopher also places his thinking about taste. To him, taste is an ability allowing us to judge the unanimity of a given phenomenon or an object with its perfection. In this respect, he refers to the theory developed by Baumgarten and Sulzer⁶, while at the same time he remains close to Aloys Hirt’s deliberations on the notion of specificity. Referring to Baumgarten’s philosophy, he establishes the following: “The right of judgment holds that when the diversity of a thing is recognized as either compatible or incompatible, we then recognise either the perfection or imperfection [of the thing]. The ability of sensory judgment (vague) in the broadest sense is taste.” In accordance with this explanation, taste depends on the ability to judge objects in the aspect of their perfection, i.e. their consistency with a concept.⁷

Maimon has no doubts that the ability to judge aesthetic phenomena is common to all people. In his polemic with the English aesthetician Hugo Blair he writes: “The ability to judge is common to all people. And it varies in individuals only in a level of proficiency.”⁸

⁴ Maimon, S.: *Pisma estetyczne*. Toruń 2018, p. 12. There are no English translations of aesthetic writings by Maimon to which I refer in this paper. The quotations of his writings used here are my own translations from Polish. The Polish version was translated from original, German editions.

⁵ Ibid, p. 16.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 12-17.

⁷ Ibid, p. 13.

⁸ Ibid, pp. 13-14.

The only thing that distinguishes us from each other is the degree of “training” within this skill. Lack of the ability to make a judgement about the beauty of an object results solely from the lack of suitable proficiency, and thus simply from the lack of practice. Thus, taste can be learned and developed. Therefore, our ability to evaluate beauty may increase. As part of reflections on the ability to develop taste, the Jewish philosopher critically evaluates the concept of Hugo Blair⁹. He accuses him of seeing taste as an ability allowing us to be moved (agitated) by what is beautiful in nature and art. Thus, Blair brings taste to the level of passion. He does not understand it as a form of a certain reflection¹⁰. Taste in Blair’s description is more like an ability to passively react to a stimulus rather than to make a conscious and active reflection. To Maimon, taste belongs to the cognitive abilities associated with the skilful use of imagination, memory and the ability to associate ideas.

When one considers as beautiful something that is simply directly pleasant or indirectly useful, one does not consider as true false beauty, but as beautiful something that is not at all beautiful, in other words, one recognizes as beauty a certain kind of a pleasant sensation.¹¹

The same perceptions, as Maimon notes, may induce varying judgements among different people. Therefore, making a judgment of taste requires the recipient to link the observations with one another. And this ability to make an association between observations may and should be learned. The more ideas we can connect with each other, the longer the association chain we can build and the better judgement of taste we are able to formulate. Therefore, the judgement of taste is a cognitive type of judgment which is learned through practice and gathering new experience. In Maimon’s opinion, what Blair writes about refers merely to a very simple experience of beauty. But in the case of such a simple experience, we may only talk about the feeling of passion and not about a reflection.

Every man has the ability to judge beauty, but his upbringing, habits and hallucinations of imagination sometimes lead him in the wrong direction. All this should be opposed in reflection and then natural taste will not encounter any obstacles [...]. If one were to ask: how do I achieve good taste, I would not be able to give him any positive rule. On the contrary, I would draw his attention to all kinds of predilections that

⁹ Most probably he got acquainted with H. Blair’s theory thanks to Markus Herz. See also. D’Aprile, I.-W.: *Die Schöne Republik*, p. 120.

¹⁰ Maimon, S.: *Pisma estetyczne*, p. 14 footnote.

¹¹ Ibid.

do not belong to taste, but are considered as such, e.g. certain fashions which are underlaid by bad trends in imagination and, therefore, reveal bad taste. And then good taste will manifest itself [...].¹²

To Maimon, taste also operates in another way. Its task is to distinguish beauty from all other charms and pleasures that do not constitute beauty. This function of taste can be described as “delicacy of taste” or its “sublimation”. “Delicate taste relies on the ability, also most delicate, to distinguish between types of charms that belong neither to beauty nor to the exploration of beauty.”¹³

Salomon Maimon points to the fact that taste training also has a hazardous aspect. Our education and habits that we acquire can set imagination in a wrong direction. For this reason, he explicitly accentuates: “The basic principle of taste is expressed through induction and the commonly accepted law of sensory predilection in the form of an object itself, regardless of any interest.”¹⁴ This is when natural, uneducated taste begins to distort. The result of such inappropriate development of taste are all the fashions and trends that arise and, seemingly for a certain amount of time, take over the direction of our assessment of beauty. In that case, we should talk about “bad taste”¹⁵. The Jewish philosopher refers to the observations made by Mandeville, Rochefoucauld and Helvétius¹⁶ by claiming:

As long as such a state remains intact, pleasant sensations will be evidence for the ability of the actions that evoke them to support survival, while unpleasant ones will be evidence for the ability to destroy. In turn, if the state of simple awareness has already been breached, then pleasurable feelings are not any evidence of actions for the purpose of survival, similarly as unpleasant feelings are not any evidence for the destruction of the said state of undisturbed awareness.¹⁷

The Jewish philosopher positively assumes that as soon as the accumulated, erroneous tendencies subside, good taste will manifest itself. For this reason, the task of aesthetics is not so much to show what the principles of good taste are based on, but rather to discover all the falsities and distortions of taste. In this manner, aesthetics purifies the field for our imagination so that good taste itself can develop naturally. As an example of a negative attitude that changes the sense of taste, he gives an example of a person for whom material goods constitute the most important value and where desire appears in place of selfless feeling:

¹² Ibid, pp. 17-18.

¹³ Ibid, p. 17.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 19.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 18.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 21.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 20.

Speak to a money holder as long as you want trying to convince him that his pleasure in possessing money is unfounded. He will only laugh at you. He will say: perhaps the mere possession of money does not bring joy to you, but I am going to follow my own taste. I would like to show him that there are other kinds of pleasures, more perfect than that one, but he will not believe me. He will not agree that his pleasures are worse for him. All that he thinks is better consists in the fact that money is not an object of simple pleasure, but in a social context it becomes a means to achieve all kinds of pleasures. The long practice of using [money] as a means ultimately changes imagination so that one imagines it as a means of achieving the end: thus, it is considered as an object that in itself gives pleasure. However, a great deal of effort will be needed before a situation develops in which such an influence will destroy conflicting habits and one will be able to act in accordance with their own imagination, which may never happen here.¹⁸

Taste is therefore a natural disposition of our cognitive powers. It can be compared to a physiological taste which allows wild animals to instinctively avoid poisonous plants. It is not until they are introduced to the world of agriculture that their original, instinctive ability slowly becomes distorted and causes that farm animals lose their natural taste. The question is whether such original taste is lost forever, or whether the return to nature allows animals to “restore” their instinctive behaviours? Maimon has no doubt that, in the case of aesthetic taste, its natural tendency remains intact. Aesthetics as a field of science dealing with taste should determine the area within which taste can function safely; therefore, it should discover all the causes of distortions of taste and eliminate possible deviations. Hence, it is to protect taste, rather than establish definitions and conditions for the existence of beauty; that is why the Jewish philosopher so emphatically points out:

People can think of everything as subjective, but their judgments about beautiful works must be different according to certain rules that define their judgments. These works must always be judged correctly in relation to the rules that everyone holds before their eyes.

However, it is possible to judge in an absolutely correct way if we define a large sum of rules observed simultaneously in one work with a single word. But since this maximum is more difficult to determine because of the great variety of rules and the degree of usefulness, in many cases the dispute over taste is also difficult to resolve.¹⁹

A few paragraphs further on, he stresses:

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 20-21.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 56.

In horticultural art, one is a proponent of French taste and the other of English. Some people perceive beauty in regularity, while others perceive it in imitation of (beautiful) nature. In all these cases, it is easy to explain the diversity of taste judgments without denying someone being right.²⁰

In the footnote to this fragment of his considerations, Maimon – deliberating on the difference between philosophical and esthetic taste – adds some important remarks; unfortunately, they are barely outlined and not developed. Above all, he points to the fact that teachers and educators of aesthetics do not usually distinguish the formal and the material aspects of the judgement of beauty. This distinction in Maimon's concept is the result of inspiration in Kant's philosophy:

The communicativeness of thoughts does not refer to their specific matter, but to their universal form. Empirical judgment: sugar is sweet, is communicable. Those who understand my language also understand what I want to say by such a judgment. But do I mean that I experience the sweetness of sugar through the organ of taste, just as I experience its white colour through the organ of sight? Not at all. Someone else may experience the bitterness of sugar through the organ of taste instead of sweetness, and through the organ of vision its black and not white colour, and yet, they will understand me well if I say: sugar is sweet, sugar is white, except that they need to translate this statement into their own language. [...] The material side of the subject and the predicate are completely ignored in this judgment. Attention is paid only to the formal side (relation to certain organs). However, beauty is not a quality of an object that results from its connection with other qualities. It is not merely a formal property.²¹

Although Maimon does not refer directly to the philosopher from Königsberg, there is no doubt about it. The confusion of the formal and the material side²² causes a confusion with regard to the diversity of taste in different eras and cultures. The criticism of fashions and trends is not a critique of a subjective feeling; nor is it any kind of coercion to adopt an objective judgment of taste, as Maimon notes. These disputes usually relate to the material aspects of beauty which from the time perspective prove to be relative. Therefore, the Jewish philosopher notes that he is interested only in the formal side of aesthetic considerations.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 57.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 33-34.

²² Separating the material from the formal side appears mainly in Maimon's considerations on transcendental logic. Maimon, S.: *Versuch einer neuen Logik oder Theorie des Denkens. Nebst angehängten Briefen des Philaletes an Änesidemus*. Berlin 1794. See also: Kozłowski, R.: *Salomon Maimon jako krytyk i kontynuator filozofii Kanta*. Poznań 1969, pp. 142-143.

Beauty does not signify here something real in a series of sensations (such as, for instance, red colour), because in this sense it is not communicable and in effect cannot be a predicate of any common judgment.²³

He draws attention, above all, to the unselfishness of judgment of taste, its universality, the sensually captured unity in diversity, and the fact that by making the judgment of taste, we refer to the transcendental properties of our cognition.

The material aspects of our judgments of taste apply not so much to the assessment of beauty, but rather to judging certain sensory preferences. Salomon Maimon pays particular attention to this when criticising the aesthetics of Karl Heinrich Heydenreich (in *System der Ästhetik*²⁴). When establishing the classification of beauty, Heydenreich notes that the fondness of colours and sounds arises solely on the basis of sensory stimulation; in their assessment, it is not necessary to refer to the judgment of taste. Nevertheless, Maimon points out that Heydenreich makes the mistake of recognising our sensory preferences as beauty. In the case of sensory preferences, we do not really need to refer to the judgment of taste, the sensation itself is enough. However, this experience is only sensual; it is not an aesthetic reception. Heydenreich regarded material things (sounds, colours) as beauty whereas in Maimon's opinion the latter occurs only when we are able to see the intentional connections between material experiences. This, in turn, requires a reflection on our part.

Beauty in the broadest sense is not, of course, a pleasure [resulting] from any particular property of the object, but from the autogeny [of the subject] caused by it. The criterion according to which we recognize that this pleasure is not a pleasure caused by a particular object but by autogeny constituting an affect of its particular characteristics, is that we recognize that not only this object, but also every other that induces pleasure in us if we treat it in precisely that manner.²⁵

To illustrate the difference between the feeling of pleasure and the experience of beauty, Maimon refers not only to Kant's philosophy²⁶ but also to Aristotle's reflections on the relationship between matter and form in a work of art. The sensual stimuli that make up a piece of work are a raw matter which only through the artist's activity takes on the form of a work of art. This is an obvious statement; however, the Jewish philosopher does not stop there. He notes that

²³ Maimon, S.: *Pisma estetyczne*, p. 34.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 35 and following.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 38.

²⁶ Por. D'Aprile, I.-W.: *Die Schöne Republik*, p. 128.

the more forms an artist can create from a particular matter of sensory stimuli, the more perfect work of art will be achieved. Thus, music is not the sounds we play or hear but the harmony that our imagination is able to create from them. The more intentional structures an artist can create from the matter of sounds, the better an effect it has on his work. The longer it keeps our imagination in active operation, the more associations and memories it stimulates, the more established it is in our memory and may continuously evoke various pleasures.

In music, in the aspect of rhythm, there occurs only a formal unity of rules, but in the aspect of melody and harmony also a unity of concepts or, perhaps, of goals. Music is a language of sensations in which one can experience not only the grammatical but also the rhetorical and logical.²⁷

An attempt to understand the principles taste is based on is an important part of aesthetic considerations. However, it is not about taste itself, as Maimon notes. Taste, as an ability to judge, is not an intellectual skill but a work of genius that simply perceives beauty. Such a capability of expressing an aesthetic judgement is for the Jewish philosopher equal to the genius needed to create a work of art. In order to be able to judge the works by Raphael or Shakespeare, one must have the same genius as the creators of these works²⁸. Critics, of course, can notice and explain mistakes made by authors of works. However, critics do not disturb the natural ability of taste to see the beauty in them. To Maimon, genius and taste are similar to instinct as they instantly and infallibly capture the “purposefulness without purpose”. The ability to perceive purposefulness where it does not objectively exist or to bring imagination to such a state as to capture and combine into a sensible whole the most essential of the multiplicity of sensations is, according to Maimon, typical of genius and taste. The difference lies in the fact that this unity of diversity is brought out by the genius of a creator, whereas the role of taste is to judge. At this point, the Jewish philosopher still remains within the field of Kant’s aesthetics. This relationship can be particularly seen when he writes:

The unity of the diversity that genius brings out and taste judges is as little sensual (meaningless) as it is intellectual (or intellectually limited). But it is, if I may say so, more than intellectual. It is an idea that genius continuously approaches but never achieves. Reflections on antique and, yet more, Italian ideals of beauty will teach the artist more than any critical rules.²⁹

²⁷ Maimon, S.: *Pisma estetyczne*, p. 61.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

Since every man has some taste, each of us must also be endowed with genius. Maimon has no doubt about it. Although he adds that by the concept of genius he understands natural, theoretical (cognitive) ability and not the knowledge of rules and a practical artistic skill. Thus, genius is only a potential ability thanks to which one may but does not have to become an artist.

Maimon notes that his concept of good taste, non-imposed and natural, is a kind of chimera, an idea shaped for the needs of philosophical considerations. While considering taste, we refer to the existence of a perfect primitive man who is only a model idea and not a real, actually existing person³⁰. In real, concrete situations, we can only demonstrate examples of taste spoiled by the habits or particular individuals. It is possible to prove the existence of “natural taste” only through some indirect proof. Maimon attempts to justify the existence of natural taste in the following manner. The repair of a badly shaped taste is possible by showing to a given person the conditions underlying their habits; it is therefore a presentation of how far and in what way the taste has been changed. By tracking these changes and transformations, man will gradually be able to retreat to the state of original taste. For this reason, Maimon writes:

The simplest human state, which in the eyes of philosophers is a chimera, has a very important (*richtig*) meaning and as an idea must be established at the foundation of practical philosophy. The science of morality (ethics) together with what is subject to it (legislation, politics, etc.), aesthetics, the science of happiness, etc. - all this must be embedded in the same idea, as long as the diversity of [these disciplines] is not to be only random and subjective, but is to be a necessary, commonly valid reality. All these disciplines recognize one and the same basic principle, which is not positively established, but is being continuously negatively defined.³¹

In this context, Maimon shows specifically the task faced by an artist. Indeed, the artist is responsible for shaping the taste of the recipient. For this reason, he should not create works consistent with the prevailing fashion, nor flatter the tastes of recipients. His task is to improve the audience's taste. Therefore, the task of art is understood by Maimon in accordance with the classical, Aristotelian definition – art should not present things as they are but as they should be. Similarly to art, taste should not refer to people as they are but as they should be. Here, Maimon refers to Lessing's concept presented in *Laokoon*³².

In the article *Das Genie und der methodische Erfinder* Maimon discusses, inter alia, the diversity of tastes. He criticises the approach according to which

³⁰ D'Aprile, I.-W.: *Die Schöne Republik*, p. 127.

³¹ Maimon, S.: *Pisma estetyczne*, p. 20.

³² Ibid, p. 27.

differences in taste result from accidental and subjective factors such as climate, education, tastes, etc. In his opinion these differences result from the objective principles of beauty, to which we refer while making an aesthetic judgement.

The diversity of the judgment of taste does not have to, as is commonly believed, result from random and subjective factors, from education, climate, etc., but above all from the necessary, objective rules of beauty (to which the judgement refers). These first factors do not give us any satisfactory explanation for the differences in taste.³³

The classic approach of the Jewish philosopher to the issue of beauty is clearly evident here. The problem with the evaluation of works of art and nature lies in the fact that in the same subject or phenomenon we may see different principles and rules of beauty. To illustrate this, Maimon refers to two examples. The first concerns the discussion whether music should be based on harmony or melody. The Jewish philosopher rejects the position of Rousseau, who points to the priority of melody in musical art³⁴. Obviously, Rousseau's view is justified on the basis of his assumptions. Because he considers music as an expression of feelings, he highlights melody and not harmony. If, however, contrary to Rousseau's approach, music is considered as a means of extracting and modifying feelings, we will recognise harmony as the most important element of this sort of art. The same is true in the case of a dispute between supporters of French gardens and supporters of English parks. In both cases, the initial assumption defining what art should be like is different. Therefore, the principles used in the evaluation of this art are different, as are the differences in judgments of tastes.

What is interesting, however, is that Maimon clearly distinguishes taste from the correctness of rules used in art. Hence, he states:

I believe that the subtlety of the outlines, the inner tension of muscles and the pleasant setting actually belong to being correct; for what else does the outline signify if not the exact correctness of the representation? The only difference is that the correctness is determined simply by taste, as opposed to the correctness in the proper sense by the rules for relations.³⁵

These are the sensations of taste that cause an artist to choose and apply particular rules, and not vice versa. The same applies to the reception of a work of art. We admire not so much the good or correct application of rules but rather

³³ Ibid, p. 56.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 59.

certain regularities that are captured by our taste, as the instinctive rather than the conceptual power. Beauty is not the mutual relations between particular parts, as Maimon puts it, nor on correct proportions between the parts and the whole, but results from the fact that these proportions are easy to grasp for imagination. The artist needs to encourage our cognitive powers to look for purposefulness between particular elements of a work of art. Our imagination must be able to enjoy the continuous discovery of new patterns. The obviousness (schematism) of systems imposing particular rules must disappear as to enable us to find them in the work by ourselves. And it is the role of taste to judge whether this happens. It sounds remarkably up-to-date when Maimon observes: "The correctness of a judgment of taste is not based on a majority of votes or authority, but on the agility in solving these questions each time and the capacity to distinguish pure beauty from the associated beauty of a different kind of pleasure"³⁶.

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³⁶ Ibid, p. 70.

Abstract

Taste as a Cognitive Ability Shared by all People in the Concept of Salomon Maimon

The subject of the paper is the concept of taste in Salomon Maimon's philosophy. In his view, taste constitutes an ability to judge the perfection of surrounding phenomena. It is a skill shared by all people, although developed to a different degree. Maimon deals with the issues of development of taste, the relationship between taste and imagination, the acquisition of habits, the difference between usability and beauty. The concept of the Jewish philosopher is presented against the background of the aesthetic thought of Lessing and Kant, as well as French intellectuals of the Enlightenment era, whom Maimon himself cites. It appears that taste is not only the power of an aesthetic evaluation that refers to art, but it is also used as a tool for understanding the world by man as a social being, capable of creating and understanding culture.

Keywords: Salomon Maimon, taste, education, human cognitive abilities, imagination, community

Abstrakt

Vkus ako kognitívna schopnosť všetkých ľudí v koncepcii Salomona Maimona

Témou príspevku je poňatie vkusu vo filozofii Salomona Maimona. Podľa jeho názoru predstavuje vkus schopnosť posúdiť dokonalosť okolitých javov. Je to zručnosť, ktorú síce majú všetci ľudia, ale je u nich rozvinutá v rôznej miere. Maimon sa zaoberá vývojom vkusu, vzťahom medzi vkusom a predstavivosťou, získavaním návykov, rozdielom medzi použiteľnosťou a krásou. Koncepcia tohto židovského filozofa je predstavená v protiklade k estetickému mysleniu Lessinga a Kanta, ako aj francúzskych intelektuálov obdobia osvietenstva, ktorých cituje samotný Maimon. Zdá sa, že vkus nie je iba silou estetického hodnotenia, ktoré odkazuje na umenie, ale používa sa aj ako nástroj na pochopenie sveta človekom, ktorý je spoločenskou bytosťou schopnou vytvárať a chápať kultúru.

Kľúčové slová: Salomon Maimon, vkus, vzdelávanie, ľudské kognitívne schopnosti, predstavivosť, komunita

Dr hab. Kinga Kaśkiewicz, prof. UMK

Instytut Filozofii UMK

Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

Toruń, Polska

kinga.kaskiewicz@umk.pl


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The Possibility of Culture: Pleasure and Moral Development in Kant's Aesthetics

Bradley Murray: *The Possibility of Culture: Pleasure and Moral Development in Kant's Aesthetics*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015, 160 s. ISBN 978-1-118-95065-4.

V roku 2015 vyšla vo vydavateľstve Wiley kniha autora Bradleyho Murraya s názvom *The Possibility of Culture: Pleasure and Moral Development in Kant's Aesthetics* (Možnosť kultúry: Pôžitok a morálny rozvoj v Kantovej estetike). Z hľadiska rozsahu ide o stošesťdesiatstranové dielo, ktoré je písané pomerne prístupným spôsobom. Táto skutočnosť je istotne v súlade s intenciami edície *New Directions in Aesthetics* (Nové smery v estetike), v rámci ktorej Murrayova kniha vyšla. Uvedená edícia si totiž okrem iného kladie za cieľ publikovať knihy, ktoré by mali oslovať nielen úzko zameraných profesionálov, ale aj študentov a širší okruh čitateľov. Intencie uvedenej



edície Murray nasledoval tým, že sa vo svojej knihe snažil vyhnúť „*zdĺhavým diskusiam o rozličných interpretáciách Kantových názorov, ktoré sa v priebehu rokov vyskytli*“ (s. 6) a sústredil sa len na problém, ktorý korešponduje s názvom jeho knihy. To je dôvod, pre ktorý považujeme za vhodné upozorniť na Murrayovu knihu naše domáce (nielen kantovsky vzdelané) intelektuálne prostredie, ktoré môže mať z čítania Murrayovej knihy úžitok.

Ako napovedá aj názov edície, v ktorej bola Murrayova kniha publikovaná, mali by v nej vychádzať najmä také knihy, ktoré sa zaoberajú problémami súčasnej estetiky a filozofie umenia, ale aj knihy, ktoré prichádzajú s novými pohľadmi na vybrané estetické problémy. Murrayova kniha sa však venuje Kantovej estetike. Téma, ktorá je síce nepochybne filozoficky relevantná, ktorá však na druhej strane vôbec nie je nová; téma, ktorá je síce perpetuálnym generátorom neutíchajúcich filozofických diskusií a polemík, ale otázne ostáva, či je zároveň témou, ktorá má čo povedať súčasnému čitateľovi, ktorý sa témam Kantovej estetiky dejinnofilozoficky nevenuje.

Už samotné názvy niektorých kapitol Murrayovej knihy (ktorých je spolu so záverom sedem) napovedajú, že čitateľ sa v knihe stretne s viacerými klasickými pojmami Kantovej estetiky. Neprekvapuje, že sa v nich vyskytujú pojmy ako „krása“, „nezaujatosť“, „umenie“, „génus“ či „vznešenosť“. Je totiž celkom zrejmé, že pri tematizovaní Kantovej estetiky od týchto tém nemožno nikdy abstrahovať a ani by to zrejme nebolo žiaduce, keďže tvoria jej nosný skelet. Napriek ich prítomnosti sa však nemožno nechať zviešťať na cesty prvého dojmu a predpokladať, že Murrayova kniha je len ďalším z nespočetného množstva deskriptívnych príspevkov ku Kantovej estetike a pokusom o jej neoriginálnu interpretáciu či učebnicové spracovanie.

Murrayova kniha totiž môže svojich čitateľov zaujať tou skutočnosťou, že hoci sa týka Kantovej estetiky, nevzťahuje sa výlučne na Kantovu *Kritiku súdnosti*. Skôr by sa dalo povedať, že intencie Murrayovej knihy sa orientujú na tému, ktorá v našom domácom filozofickom prostredí rezonuje pomerne silno, a to je Kantova filozofia kultúry.¹ Autor sa totiž okrem iného koncentruje na tému kultúrneho pokroku, ktorý podľa neho úzko súvisí s rastom morálky. Ak je však predpokladom kultúrneho progresu postupný rast morálky, preňho to znamená, že sa musíme pýtať, čo môže prispievať k tomu, aby sa jednotlivec stával morálnym aktérom. S formálnou aplikáciou princípov kantovskej etiky si celkom evidentne nevystačíme. A tu sa ukazuje, že Murrayova kniha má ambíciu tento problém riešiť tak, že sa na Kantovu filozofiu zameriava synteticky. Táto syntetizujúca snaha sa uka-

¹ Jedným z najnovších príspevkov ku Kantovej filozofii kultúry na domácej filozofickej scéne je monografia Petra Kyslana: Kyslan, P.: *Fenomén kultúry vo filozofii Immanuela Kanta*. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove, 2018.

zuje v tom, že autor má ambíciu prepojiť Kantovu filozofiu kultúry s jeho etikou a estetikou.

Toto podujatie možno na jednej strane vyhodnotiť ako riskantné. Kantova systematická filozofia (vrátane etiky a estetiky) je totiž spracovaná v jeho slávnych kritikách, kým jeho filozofia kultúry je roztrúsená skôr v malých spisoch. Predpokladá to teda nachádzanie explicitne nevyjadrených spojení medzi filozofiou, ktorú Kant spracoval systematicky, a tou filozofiou, ktorú skôr iba nesystematicky načrtával. Na druhej strane však tomuto počinu nemožno uprieť ambicióznosť. Autor si pritom uvedomuje, že pri svojom pokuse prepojiť tieto oblasti Kantovej filozofie si nevystačí napríklad s interpretáciou estetickej súdnosti či formálno-racionálnej etiky. Pracuje preto aj s takými Kantovými prácami, ako je *Antropológia z pragmatického hľadiska* či *Metafyzika mravov*, ale aj s menšími prácami, ako napríklad *K večnému mieru*, a inými, ktoré podľa neho dovedna dokážu objasniť implicitné spojenia medzi problémom kultúry, etikou a estetikou, o ktoré autorovi v konečnom dôsledku ide.

Leitmotívom Murrayovej knihy je v rámci naznačených spojení myšlienka, podľa ktorej môže byť morálny vývoj jednotlivca, od ktorého závisí kultúrny progres, podmienený esteticky. Za všetky príklady možno uviesť myšlienku, že eticky produktívne v tomto kontexte podľa Murraya vystupuje estetický atribút nezaujatosti alebo nezainteresovanosti. Sama nezaujatosť nás síce ešte nerobí morálnymi subjektmi, avšak estetický pôžitok, založený na nezaujatom vnímaní krásy, nás môže naučiť abstrahovať od našich individuálnych a egoistických sklonov. To je dôležité aj pri internalizácii morálneho zákona, a tým aj pri progrese kultúry ako takej.

Zváženie toho, ako sa autorovi knihy darí prepojiť kultúrno-filozofické, etické a estetické témy Kantovej filozofie, ponecháme na jeho potenciálnom čitateľovi. V našej perspektíve je však nepochybne pridatou hodnotou Murrayovej knihy to, že disponuje potenciálom osloviť nielen kantovských filozofov, ale naozaj aj širší okruh čitateľov. Napríklad aj filozofov venujúcich sa téme, ktorá v postmodernom filozofickom diskurze vystupuje ako „estetizácia etického“. Je teda hodnotným príspevkom nielen do dejinnofilozofických, ale aj súčasných diskusií na poli filozofických skúmaní. A to nielen v oblasti estetiky, ale aj etiky a filozofie kultúry.

Mgr. Lukáš Švihura, PhD.

Inštitút filozofie

Filozofická fakulta, Prešovská univerzita v Prešove

Prešov, Slovenská republika

lukas.svihura@unipo.sk

Doz. Mag. Dr. Georg Cavallar – Universität Wien

Mgr. Adrián Kvokačka, PhD. – Prešovská univerzita v Prešove

prof. PhDr. František Mihina, CSc. – Prešovská univerzita v Prešove

Alexey Salikov, PhD. – National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow

prof. PhDr. Oľga Sisáková, CSc. – Prešovská univerzita v Prešove

prof. PhDr. Jana Sošková, CSc. – Prešovská univerzita v Prešove

Dr. Margit Ruffing – Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

JUDr. Eva Zelizňaková, MSc., PhD. – Prešovská univerzita v Prešove

Mgr. Peter Kyslan, PhD. – Prešovská univerzita v Prešove