

Kant and Consequentialism (Reflections on Cummiskey's Kantian Consequentialism)

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It is noteworthy that, in general, a certain similarity between Kant's ethics and utilitarianism or consequentialism is, especially, considered by some utilitarians or consequentialists (such as David Cummiskey and Richard M. Hare)¹, while many neo-Kantians (such as Warner A. Wick or Christine M. Korsgaard)² refuse such reasoning. Other neo-Kantians, who admit the existence of this aspect in Kant's ethics, tried to mitigate the impracticability of its ethical concepts and eliminate criticism for its lack of interest in the real moral problems of man (Otfried Höffe, Jeffrie G. Murphy, Andreas Reath, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., etc.)³.

I think that Kant's moral ideal expressed through the Categorical Imperative has all the features of the enlightened maximalist and perfectionist moral ideal,⁴ despite the fact that, in principle, it cannot be equated with Kant's motives towards perfectionism and, for example, utilitarian motives leading to the principle of maximization. Both theories seek to maximize but are based on different criteria and different themes. Utilitarianism seeks to maximize the happiness of the maximum number of people (Bentham, the Greatest Happiness Principle) on the basis of the assessment of the chances of achieving the maximum possible utility, pleasure or satisfaction of desires. Kant seeks to achieve this enlightened ideal based on good (moral) motives that lie in accepting, *a priori*, moral law and the maxims that it entails.⁵ Maxims are

¹ Hare, R. M.: *Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981; Cummiskey, D.: *Kantian Consequentialism*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

² Wick, W. A.: Kant's Moral Philosophy. In: Kant, I.: *Ethical Philosophy*. Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett, 1983, pp. xi–lxii; Korsgaard, Ch. M.: Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason: Reply to Arroyo, Cummiskey, Moland, and Bird-Pollan. In: *Metaphilosophy*, 2011, 42/4, pp. 387–394.

³ Hill, T. E. Jr.: Kant on Responsibility for Consequences. In: *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics*, 1994, 2, pp. 159–176; Höffe, O.: *Immanuel Kant*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994; Murphy, J. G.: *Kant: The Philosophy of Right*. London & Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1970; Reath, A.: Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant's Ethics. In: *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics*, 1994, 2, pp. 259–281.

⁴ Kant, I.: *Ethical Philosophy*. Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett, 1983.

⁵ Nizhnikov, S. A.: The Foundation Of Moral Policy: I. Kant, F. Dostoevsky And Others. In: *Studia*

expressed in the form of rules, i.e. in the form of Categorical Imperative.⁶

According to Kant, it is only moral action that is consistent with ethical principles and it is conducted on the basis of moral motives.⁷ Despite the fact that utilitarianism and Kant differ in how to understand the role and motives of rules for assessing moral or right action they can be considered as formal analogous approaches since they set strict formal criteria for determining moral or right action. It can, therefore, be concluded that an almost identical goal (moving towards a perfectionist ideal) is achieved in different ways. It is undoubtedly true that the content of Kant's ethical theory and utilitarianism is substantially different because Kant's ethics is focused on the inner nature of the moral agent's action that understands the action as implementation his/her obligations and the result is not primarily important in this context of action. In utilitarianism, however, emphasis is placed mainly outside of moral agents, to actions primarily aimed at achieving the maximum possible utility or pleasure of their actions.

The topic of consequences is central to consequentialism in general. That is why it is important to be familiar with the opinions of those who dealt primarily with consequences from a non-consequentialist viewpoint, such as Kant. When studying this issue, attention should be paid to three areas. Firstly, what the true character of Kant's ethics is. Secondly, what the position and role of consequences in Kant's ethics are. Thirdly, how the relationship of Kant's ethics to consequentialism is classified. To summarise the first area regarding the character of Kant's ethics: Kant considers accepting *a priori* moral law (as the initial motif for actions) as the criterion which determines the moral character of actions and the fulfillment of moral obligation resulting from this law.⁸ It emphasizes the intentional character of Kant's ethics.⁹ It, naturally, does not contradict the well-known fact that Kant's ethics also has a significant teleological dimension provided by the realm of ends. However, this is a different aspect of the issue which the studied area of Kant's relationship to consequences is not concerned with.

In summary of the second area, i.e. the position and role of consequences in Kant's ethical theory, it could be said that Kant considers such actions that are performed in accordance with requirements resulting from moral obligations

Philosophica Kantiana, 2012, 1/2, pp. 70–71.

⁶ Belás, L.: Sociálne dôsledky Kantovej etiky. In: *Filozofia*, 2005, 60/4, p. 260.

⁷ Belás, L.: Kant's ethics as practical philosophy: On philosophy of freedom. In: *Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)*, 2017, 7/1–2, pp. 27, 31.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁹ Bendik-Keymer, J. D.: "Goodness itself must change" – Anthroponomy in an age of socially-caused, planetary environmental change. In: *Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)*, 2016, 6/3–4, p. 190; Cico-vacki, P.: Philosophy as the wisdom of love. In: *Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)*, 2017, 7/1–2, p. 77.

as good, regardless the consequences. In the case of different actions, i.e. those that are not based on meeting moral obligations but merely on legal obligations or even actions contradictory to any obligation, consequences can be taken into consideration. Kant regards it important to, in a measure, note the (especially negative) consequences of specific actions by rational beings. In no way does Kant consider consequences a criterion of moral actions nor an expression of the moral value of a rational being. Furthermore, I will focus especially on the relationship between Kant's ethics (including Kantian ethics) and consequentialist ethics.

Currently, the most important or most known forms of utilitarianism and consequentialism that, already in the name, express their positive attitude to Kant's ethics are Richard M. Hare's and David Cummiskey's theories. Mostly discussion is focused on Hare's approach expressed in his book *Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point* (1981), for this reason, I concern Cummiskey's reasoning on the topic following his work *Kantian Consequentialism* (1996).

Cummiskey's Kantian Consequentialism and its Reflections

David Cummiskey in his book refuses to accept the universalization of Kant's inquiry as a starting principle of his theory. He does not derive his affirmations from Kant's starting points, but his conclusions arising from Kant's arguments. In his view, Kant's moral theory justifies a form of consequentialism without debating whether Kant intended to or not.¹⁰ Cummiskey called his concept of Kantian consequentialism for two reasons: firstly because it is based on Kantian internalism and secondly because his value theory is distinctly Kantian.¹¹ His theory of good and value is two-tiered, which means that on the one hand it accepts the Kantian value of reasonable nature and on the other hand, it is completed by the utilitarian requirement of maximizing happiness.¹² When defining Kantian consequentialism, Cummiskey wrote that

[r]espect for persons is more important than maximizing happiness. This version of consequentialism thus provides a justification for the common view-or at least the Kantian view-that preserving, developing, and exercising our rational capacities is more important than maximizing happiness. It is simply not acceptable to sacrifice the life or liberty of some in order to produce a net increase in the overall happiness. Kantian consequentialism is thus a *rational reconstruction* of the most central and influential aspects of Kant's moral theory.¹³

¹⁰ Cummiskey, D.: *Kantian Consequentialism*, *ibid.*, p. 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 159–160.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Based on these allegations, it can be provisionally concluded that Cummiskey pays no attention possible to justify Kantian consequentialism through reflection on the place and role of similarity in those consequences within Kant's and utilitarian or consequentialist ethics.

Nevertheless, it should still pay attention to some aspects of Kantian consequentialism which at least indirectly suggest a link between Kant's ethics and Kantian consequentialism through consequences. Specifically, Cummiskey's opinion concerning the application of the Formula of humanity and the end-in-itself in Kantian consequentialism can be mentioned. Cummiskey considers that the central Kantian principle which demands that all persons are seen as an end-in-itself and not as a means generates a consequentialist conclusion. In his view, Kantianism supports consequentialism using Kant's most influential normative principle, the formula of humanity, with an emphasis on understanding people as an end-in-itself and not the means.¹⁴

Cummiskey's view about lies is one of the first examples presenting his approach to the acceptance of these values in Kant's ethics. According to Kant, a lie is in no way morally justifiable. Cummiskey argues that "...Kantian consequentialism does not require doing anything *wrong* in order to promote the good. If lying, for example, is the best means of promoting the good, then it is not wrong"¹⁵. Duty to promote the good in his opinion is the Categorical Imperative. While Kant thought that lying is the degradation of human dignity, Cummiskey accepts a lie if it is a means of doing good. According to Michael Ridge, Kant's view seems to have the consequence that the ideal moral agent is so obsessed with preserving the goodness of his/her own will that he/she is unwilling to tell a lie even when doing so is necessary to prevent a truly horrible consequence.¹⁶

Reasonable nature is the source of all values and then has an absolute value that is an estimated idea of morality as a system of the Categorical Imperative. Cummiskey says when I am able to be a source of values then I have to accept as a source of values any other agents. Thus, any value that is an attribute of me and my goals must also attribute to any other agent and his/her objectives. All agents have the same practical significance or the same value. Cummiskey calls this argument the "equivalence argument"¹⁷. The argument in itself contains the idea that in the selection, arrangement, and realization of their goals, I am rationally obligated to the equal importance of others. An interest in the same status of other reasonable entities works as a regulative requirement for higher order

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 10–11.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁶ Ridge, M.: Consequentialist Kantianism. In: *Philosophical Perspectives, Ethics*, 2009, 23, p. 425.

¹⁷ Cummiskey, D.: *Kantian Consequentialism*, *ibid.*, pp. 87–88.

confirmation and rational arrangement of goals and also as a restrictive condition for certain actions. According to him, it further means that the achievement and realization of the objectives that I plan must be consistent with the necessary conditions for my rational action as well as rational actions of others. Further, the results in the other rational stated objectives must also refer to my own goals. Then it seems that in promoting rational entity and happiness we need to be strictly impartial and evaluate everything equally.¹⁸

The formula of humanity is, according to Cummiskey, a basic normative principle of Kant's ethics and provides the basis for all moral judgments.¹⁹ Each agent also has to select goals which would be neutral towards other legitimate aims. Equally important is the social context of developing their abilities and the provision of reasonable expectations of happiness. Of course, each person has to shape and revise their conception of the good within clear limits. There is a social obligation to provide the necessary conditions for effective implementation of rationally selected goals. Cummiskey affirms that the obligation of mutual assistance follows from the general obligation to accept the goals of others as their own. This general obligation is, according to Kant, an essential part of the idea of humanity as an objective in the end-in-itself.²⁰

We have a duty to promote good, but this obligation is limited to the suitability and eligibility of the means by which this can be done. On this basis, Cummiskey concluded that in promoting good we must recognize the status of persons other than the end-in-itself. In principle, though not in practice, a consequentialist, in his opinion, may be requested to sacrifice an innocent person because of some greater good. He is aware, however, that according to Kantians, it affirms using people as a means and not an end.²¹ Nevertheless, it submits that fundamental structural feature of consequentialism (at least in principle) can ask us to sacrifice some people to save others. We must now examine whether the sacrificed person is or is not an appropriate feature of understanding the person as an end-in-itself.²²

Consider, Cummiskey writes, what a Kantian must do when faced with the terrible choice between killing several people or leaving for dead a lot more people. Take, as an example, a long-lasting war in which attacks were carried out on a city, home of many innocent people (children, the elderly and citizens of other countries who are against the war, etc.). We are assuming that our actions could significantly reduce human suffering and oppression, could save many human lives, then it is not clear why a Kantian could not sacrifice some

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 106.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 107.

²¹ Ibid., p. 140.

²² Ibid., p. 141.

people to save many others. The formula of the end-in-itself asks us not to use others as a means of subjective goals. But in this case, in his view, the goals of the actions are objective, not subjective. The objective goal is whether it is first necessary to protect the lives and freedom that could be lost during the ongoing conflict and further support the fundamental needs of others. According to Kant's understanding of the negative obligations, we cannot touch or violate the legitimate aims of a person. The positive understanding of obligations means that we have a mission to help people realize legitimate goals.²³ Thus, a conflict of duties arises. According to Kant, however, negative obligations are perfect and take priority over the positive, which are imperfect. It also claimed that a conflict of obligations is not possible because they form a harmonious kingdom of ends.²⁴ That, according to Cummiskey, suggests that it is not possible to sacrifice a few people to save more. On the other hand, however, it points out that the Kantian principle of beneficence calls for the rescue of, or help for, so many people, however much it is possible to help. Kant is right when he says that we have a duty to promote the happiness of others. On this basis, Cummiskey concludes that we have additional responsibilities and lexical priority to save lives and promote freedom. Duty to promote happiness is a limited lexical duty to promote the conditions necessary for the development of reasonable nature. Deontologists, however, contend that this obligation is limited in that they must not be immoral conduct, which should be the means of implementing these obligations and cannot, therefore, lead to an unreasonable sacrifice. In my opinion, the obligation to sacrifice someone and save more is neither immoral conduct nor unreasonable sacrificing. In his view, the sacrifice is demanded by reason. This attitude justifies the fact that this is consistent with Kant's requirement of the end-in-itself because if it is made good, evil cannot be done. Then Cummiskey notes that to save many people cannot be evil.²⁵

Cummiskey concludes that to sacrifice several people for the rescue of many does not use them arbitrarily and does not deny the value of unconditional sentient beings. The term end-in-itself, according to him, does not support the view that we can never sacrifice someone to save others. If we pay attention to the equal value of all sentient beings, then such reasoning leads us to the conclusion that the agent can sacrifice a few people to rescue others. However, it also follows that there are not acceptable non-rational requirements for sacrificing others.²⁶ According to Cummiskey, natural interpretation of Kant's requirement that to

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 142.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 143–144.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 146.

each agent is given equal respect for all sentient beings leads to consequentialist normative theory. The consequentialist interpretation does not ask victims who would be, according to Kantians, considered unreasonable and it does not carry out evil, whereas in this case shows the good.²⁷

Even on the basis of extensive analysis of Cummiskey's views, it is impossible to conclude that he somehow accepts consequences as something common to consequentialism (really just modified utilitarianism) and Kant's ethics. His thoughts about consequences is based solely on utilitarian grounds and also contains a certain amount of sophisticated speculation to help him prove that, on the basis of the conclusions of Kant's ethics, utilitarian or consequentialist approach to such emergencies can be accepted. The starting point for his efforts to reconcile Kant's formula of humanity and the end-in-itself with utilitarian solutions in the case of deceptive acceptance or sacrificing the life of an innocent man is to convince us that everything that is done in order to achieve maximum happiness or maximum good is really good. On the one hand, he creates an unacceptable precedent because it could lead to the acceptance of unwanted forms of behavior and action. On the other hand, thus, he actually got into conflict with its own declared lexical priority of protecting, developing and implementing rational nature. Even when he used consequences as a latent criterion when considering and deciding in favor of sacrificing innocent people, certainly it has been far from the sense in which at least marginally Kant thought of consequences. Cummiskey is aware, as well as other utilitarians and consequentialists that Kant's understanding of the consequences is a marginal issue in his ethical theory. Almost everyone, Kantians and utilitarians or consequentialists are aware of what Jeffrie G. Murphy pointed out that Kant's understanding of the consequences has nothing to do with how consequences are understood in utilitarianism or consequentialism.²⁸

Scott Forschler holds that Cummiskey derives his consequentialist position mainly through an argument in favour of the value of rational agency, only later he considers how a rational agent ought to respond to such a value, revealing a distinctly un-Kantian priority of the good over the right.²⁹ According to him, Cummiskey's two-tiered consequentialism privileges the ends of each rational agent preserving one's life and rational capacities above all other ends, requiring each agent to always give these ends some significant weight vis-à-vis any other ends he or she may have, while still requiring maximization of the satisfaction

²⁷ Ibid., p. 151.

²⁸ Murphy, J. G.: *Kant: The Philosophy of Right*, ibid., p. 106.

²⁹ Forschler, S.: Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap can be bridged. In: *Metaphilosophy*, 2013, 44/1–2, p. 89.

of all agents' ends with this weighting kept in mind.³⁰ Finally, he thinks that it is necessary to distinguish between normative and foundational elements of an ethical theory. Then, for example, Richard Mervyn Hare, Peter Singer, and George Edward Moore are consequentialists, while Immanuel Kant and William D. Ross are deontologists. But following meta-ethical criteria, Kant, Hare, and Singer are ethical rationalists, while Moore and Ross are intuitionists. He concludes that "...[the] utilitarian who starts taking considerations of universality into account is on his or her way to Kantianism—but only to Kant's rationalism, not to his deontology"³¹.

According to Philipp Stratton-Lake, Cummiskey holds that there is no anti-consequentialist argument in Kant's ethics and that there is no Kantian argument for the deontological view and there are constraints on maximizing the good. In Stratton-Lake's view, Cummiskey affirms that Kant's position *entails* consequentialism. He also sees that one of the strengths of Cummiskey's book is the idea of a consequentialist normative principle justified by Kantian non-consequentialist arguments. Another value of Cummiskey's ideas is, in Stratton-Lake's opinion, the way he includes the notion of respect for the autonomy of others, or the special value and dignity of rational nature, in consequentialism.³²

Ridge affirms that these two views, Kantianism, and consequentialism, are logically compatible. He thinks that it is possible to agree with Cummiskey that Kantian meta-ethics can get you to consequentialism and agree with the present account that consequentialism is consistent with Kantian first-order moral theory.³³ He concludes that consequentialism and Kantianism should not be seen as mutually exclusive options. In his opinion, Cummiskey's theory is Kantian in its verdicts about particular cases and its value theory but nonetheless consequentialist in its structure.³⁴

However, Christine M. Korsgaard differently sees relations between Kant's ethics and consequentialism and she rejects Cummiskey's Kantian consequentialism. For her,

consequentialists try to derive the values that concern the quality of our relationships from considerations about what does the most good. If you should be just and honest and upright in your dealings with others, according to the consequentialist, that is because that is what does the most good. If you are allowed to be partial to your own friends and family,

³⁰ Ibid., p. 97.

³¹ Ibid., p. 100.

³² Stratton-Lake, P.: Recent Work: Kant's Moral Philosophy. In: *Philosophical Books*, 1999, 40, pp. 215–216.

³³ Ridge, M.: Consequentialist Kantianism, *ibid.*, p. 423.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 435.

and not required always to measure their interests against the good of the whole, that is because it turns out, the consequentialist claims, that people maximize the good of the whole more efficiently by attending to the welfare of their own friends and family. It is less often noticed, but just as true, that in a Kantian theory the value of producing the good is derived from considerations about the quality of our relationships. The reason that pursuing the good of others is a duty at all in Kant's theory is that it is a mark of respect for the humanity of another that you help him out when he is in need, and more generally that you help him to promote his own chosen ends when you are in a position to do that. This is why it is a serious mistake to characterize Kantian deontology as accepting a "side-constraint" on the promotion of the good. Kant does not believe there is some general duty to maximize or even promote the good that is then limited by certain deontological restrictions. Rather, he believes that promoting the good of another and treating her justly and honestly are two aspects of respecting her as an end in herself.³⁵

Conclusion

Those utilitarian or consequentialist theories which, in some way, declare an adherence to Kant's ethics do not provide any confirmation either that it is in consequences where common features of these conceptions with Kant can be found. Then, the result of the research is that Kant only pays scant regard to the consequences of actions by rational beings, and that is at the level of legal actions based on hypothetical imperative. Kant's understanding of consequences, their position, and role in his ethical theory does not provide any reason to claim that there is a similarity between Kant and utilitarianism or consequentialism concerning issues regarding consequences. Kantians, utilitarians as well as consequentialists are aware of this.

In the context of an ethical position entitled ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism³⁶, I think that there are similarities

³⁵ Korsgaard, Ch. M.: Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason, *ibid.*, pp. 388–389.

³⁶ Gluchman, V.: Etika sociálnych dôsledkov – jej princípy a hodnoty. In: *Filozofia*, 1996, 51/12, pp. 821–829; Gluchman, V.: Etika utilitarizmu a neutilitaristický konzekvencializmus. In: *Filosofický časopis*, 1996, 44/1, pp. 123–132; Gluchman, V.: Hodnotová štruktúra neutilitaristického konzekvencializmu (Pettitova a Senova koncepcia hodnôt). In: *Filozofia*, 1999, 54/7, pp. 483–494. Gluchman, V.: Ľudská dôstojnosť a neutilitaristická konzekvencialistická etika sociálnych dôsledkov. In: *Filozofia*, 2004, 59/7, pp. 502–507. Gluchman, V.: G. E. Moore and theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences. In: *Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)*, 2017, 7/1–2, pp. 57–65; Kalajtšidis, J.: Ethics of social consequences as a contemporary consequentialist theory. In: *Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)*, 2013, 3/3–4, s. 159–171; Kalajtšidis, J.: Ethics of social consequences and ethical issues of consumption. In: *Human Affairs*, 2017, 27/2, pp. 166–177; Komenská, K.: Bioetické reflexie pohrôm a katastrof – nové výzvy pre súčasnú etiku. In: *Filosofický časopis*, 2016, 64/5, pp. 767–768;

between consequentialism and Kant's ethics. It especially concerns his formula of humanity and an approach to humanity as one of the most important values of ethics of social consequences. In this position, humanity is understood as all the forms of behavior leading to the protection and maintenance, i.e. respect and development of human life. On the basis of the differences in the objects of our behavior and conduct, we distinguish between humanity as primary natural-biological quality (fundamental the moral value of respect to human life) and additional moral quality (in some contexts it can be a virtuous action) supporting and developing the human life of strangers.³⁷ The moral value of the first kind of behavior is determined by our biological or social relations to our close ones. In the second case, the moral value of our behavior to strangers is a pure manifestation of our morality and I think that it is also fully acceptable in Kant's seeing humanity overcoming our nature and moral hindrances.

On the other hand, the protection and maintenance of the life of strangers is a moral additional value (perhaps, a virtuous action) by which we create a new, higher quality in our behavior in relation to other people. In this case, we can really speak about humanity as a moral quality or value in Kant's sense. It is something that is really specifically human and which deserves respect and admiration. By such behavior man proves that he can, at least to a certain extent, transcend the natural-biological framework of his determination. Especially in that context, it is very close to Kant's ideas on the extension of the moral realm to strange people.³⁸

In conclusion, we can find similarities between consequentialism and Kant's ethics, particularly in practical terms. It concerns the fundamental values inherent in Kant's ethics and ethics of social consequences in which the value of humanity holds a position of one of the core values. Despite the fact that Kant does not directly regard consequences in his theory in a significant way, Cummiskey's considerations of humanity, as well as the ethics of social consequences, offer us the possibility that there is a scope for finding common approaches in solving moral problems between Kantians and at least some versions of consequentialism, including ethics of social consequences concerning especially humanity.

Švaňa, L.: War, terrorism, justice and the ethics of social consequences. In: *Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)*, 2015, 5/3–4, pp. 211–225; Švaňa, L.: On two modern hybrid forms of consequentialism. In: *Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)*, 2016, 6/3–4, pp. 157–166.

³⁷ Gluchman, V.: Miesto humánosti v etike sociálnych dôsledkov. In: *Filozofia*, 2005, 60/8, pp. 613–623.

³⁸ Gluchman, V.: Kant and Virtuous Action: A Case of Humanity. In: Palmquist, S. (ed.): *Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010, pp. 256–264.

Summary

Kant and Consequentialism (Reflections on Cummiskey's Kantian Consequentialism)

In his article, the author considers possible forms of relationship between Kant's ethics and consequentialism. In this context, he analyses David Cummiskey's views which are expressed in his book, *Kantian Consequentialism* (1996). He demonstrates the possibility of justifying the consequentialism on the basis of Kant's ethics and its values. Likewise, several other authors (such as Scott Forschler, Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) are of the opinion of the possible compatibility of Kant's ethics and consequentialism. On the other hand, however, Christine M. Korsgaard is an example of a strict rejection of the similarity between Kant and the consequentialist ethics. The author based on the ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism claims (like Cummiskey), that there are similarities between Kant's ethics and consequentialism. Unlike Cummiskey, however, he sees similarity in the Kant's formula of humanity and the understanding of humanity in ethics of social consequences, especially in the form of additional moral value.

Key words: Cummiskey, Kant, consequentialism, humanity, ethics of social consequences

Zhrnutie

Kant a konzekvencializmus (Úvahy o Cummiskeyho práci Kantian Consequentialism)

Autor sa vo svojom príspevku zamýšľa nad možnými podobami vzťahu medzi Kantovou etikou a konzekvencializmom. V tejto súvislosti analyzuje názory Davida Cummiskeyho vyjadrené v jeho knihe *Kantian Consequentialism* (1996). Cummiskey dokazuje možnosť zdôvodnenia konzekvencializmu na základe Kantovej etiky a jej hodnôt. Podobne aj viacerí ďalší autori (napríklad Scott Forschler, Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) zastávajú názor o možnej kompatibilite Kantovej etiky a konzekvencializmu. Avšak na druhej strane Christine M. Korsgaard je príkladom striktného odmietania podobnosti medzi Kantovou a konzekvencialistickou etikou. Autor na základe etiky sociálnych dôsledkov ako formy neutilitaristického konzekvencializmu (podobne ako Cummiskey) tvrdí, že existujú podobnosti medzi Kantovou etikou a konzekvencializmom. Na

rozdiel od Cummiskeyho však vidí podobnosť predovšetkým v rámci Kantovej formuly humánnosti a chápania humánnosti v etike sociálnych dôsledkov, a to najmä v podobe dodatočnej morálnej hodnoty.

Kľúčové slová: Cummiskey, Kant, konzekvencializmus, humánnosť, etika sociálnych dôsledkov

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