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Some Political Aspects of Kant's Lectures on Anthropology

Kant's anthropology lectures[1] were the most frequently offered and most popular courses (along with his lectures on physical geography), which he delivered every winter from 1772 – 1773 until his retirement from teaching at the University of Königsberg in 1796. For a long time, they were not considered as an important source of Kantian philosophy and ignored by Kant scholars, which can be explained by their unusual character and their topics that seem to be completely different from more familiar themes of Kant's transcendental philosophy so that "the most charitable interpretative tools have remained powerless in the face of his repeated discussions of human races, gender differences or national characteristics, where stereotyping, prejudice and bigotry abound"[2]. The situation started to change at the beginning of the 2000s with publications of Robert Louden's *Kant's Impure Ethics*[3], John Zammito's *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*[4] and Patrick Frierson's *Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy*.[5] These studies, along with Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain's *Essays on Kant's Anthropology,*[6] works of Holly Wilson[7, 8] and Thomas

[1] A considerable number of Kant's lectures on anthropology were first published as *Vorlesungen* über *Anthropologie* in the volume 25 of the Academy edition of *Kant's gesammelte Schriften* (Göttingen, 1997). Some shorter English translations were published in Cambridge Edition in 2012: *Lectures on Anthropology*, edited by Wood, A. W. and Louden, R. B. translated by Clewis, R. R., Louden, R. B., Munzel, G. F., and. Wood, A. W., Cambridge University Press, 2012.

[2] Cohen, A.: Introduction. In: Cohen, A. (ed.): *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014, p. 2.

[3] Louden, R.: *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings*, London: Oxford University Press, 2000.

[4] Zammito, J.: *Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002.

[5] Frierson, P.: *Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

[6] Jacobs, B. and Patrick, K. (eds.): *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

[7] Wilson, H. L.: Freedom and Klugheit in Kant's Anthropology Lectures. In: *Con-Textos Kantianos*, 5 (Junio 2017), pp. 26-37.

[8] Wilson, H. L.: *Pragmatic Anthropology: Its Origins, Meaning, and Critical Significance*, Albany:

Sturm[9], and finally, with the volume of essays *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology. A Critical Guide*10 edited by Alix Cohen, marked a critical turning point in perception of Kant's anthropology lectures among the scholars. However, the relation of anthropology lectures to other parts of Kant's philosophy is still poorly studied[11] and it requires a number of distinct narratives, corresponding to the many topics Kant takes up in it, to trace the development of Kant's views through nearly two decades encompassed by these lectures.[12] The material of Kant's *Lectures on Anthropology* is wide-ranging and goes far beyond the scope of pure anthropology and touches upon various aspects of Kant's theoretical philosophy, aesthetics, politics and history. This research will be focused on political aspects of Kant's *Lectures on Anthropology* and on the connection between the lectures and Kant's published works on political topics.

It is obvious that politics is not the main topic Kant's lectures course on anthropology. Still, Kant considered his anthropology lectures a pragmatic discipline, a "Knowledge of the World", which should provide students with some important empirical information required to adapt oneself to real life and to socialize. He expresses this idea clearly in a letter to Marcus Herz toward the end of 1773: "Lecture course on Anthropology [...] (will) disclose the sources of all the (practical) sciences, the science of morality, of skill, of human intercourse, of the way to educate and govern human beings, and thus of everything that pertains to the practical" (Br, 10: 145). Thus, he could not avoid telling his students about some political aspects of real life among other people. That is why so many passages in the lectures on anthropology have an evident relation to Kant's political philosophy and can be viewed as a part of his "political anthropology", a very appropriate term, introduced by Günter Zöller to convey both the political dimension of Kant's anthropological thought in general and the anthropological basis of his political thought in particular.[13]

State University of New York Press, 2006.

[9] Sturm, T.: *Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen*, Paderborn: Mentis, 2009.

[10] Cohen, A. (ed.): *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

[11] The exceptions are rare. The most significant attempt to overcome this situation is the collection of essays *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide* (2014) edited by Alex Cohen that sets out to offer the first comprehensive assessment of Kant's *Lectures on Anthropology*, regarding their philosophical importance, their evolution and their relationship to his critical philosophy.

[12] For instance, Paul Guyer used lectures on anthropology to trace the development of Kant's views on aesthetics from the early 1770s up to the publication of the Critique of the Power of Judgment in 1790. See: Guyer, P.: Beauty, Freedom and Morality. In: Jacobs, B. and Kain, P. (eds.): *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 135–163.

[13] Zöller, G.: Kant's Political Anthropology. In: *Kant Yearbook*, 3 (2011), 131–61, p. 132.

But the relationship between *Lectures on Anthropology* and Kant's political works is more than just semantic and conceptual since some passages from the lectures have clear parallels with his earlier published writings, sometimes even verbatim. Interestingly, these "political" passages from anthropology lectures have their origin in a significantly earlier period, the most important of them date back to the years between 1775 and 1785 (*Anthropology Friedländer* from the winter semester 1775/76, *Anthropology Pillau* from 1777/78, *Menschenkunde* from 1781/82, *Anthropology Mrongovius* from 1784/85), which means they were expressed by Kant at least some time earlier, in some cases much earlier than he did it in his published political works (while the earliest of them, *Idea for a Universal History* and *What is Enlightenment?* were published in 1784, his work *On the Common Saying* went to press in 1793 and *Toward Perpetual Peace* in 1795). Even more, *Lectures on Anthropology* not only allow to track the chronology of emergence of some of his political ideas, but also can help to identify the changes that they underwent over time. All that may serve as an argument against Hannah Arendt's hypothesis put forward in her *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* that "Kant became aware of the political as distinguished from the social (italics H.A.), as part and parcel of man's condition in the world, rather late in life, when he no longer had either the strength or the time to work out his own philosophy on this particular matter"[14]. The obvious presence of political problematics and of many important political ideas in *Lectures on Anthropology*, expressed in Kant's later writings, can be seen as an evidence that his reflections on politics date back to an earlier period before they were expressed in his published works in the 1790s.

Political aspects of Kant's anthropology lectures are primarily related to his theory of human evolution where the political development ("cultivation" in terms of Kant's political anthropology) is one of the three dimensions of this process. But even if Kant says that the process of human evolution from natural state to civil state will occur incrementally and gradually, nevertheless, he considers revolutions as an important part of the political improvement, which, apparently, he considers under certain conditions as one of the tools of nature which it uses to influence the evolution of the human species. Kant brings out this point in *Anthropology Friedländer*, delivered during the winter semester 1775/76:

> As a single individual, the human being cannot yet thus make himself perfect, until the whole of society will be perfect. When such a [political] state will be attained, in which everything will be instituted

[14] Arendt, H.: *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Edited and with interpretative essay by Ronald Beiner, The University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 9.

> in accordance with complete rules of justice and of morality, this will then be a condition under which everyone will be able to make himself more perfect. True, such a [political] state still does not in fact exist, yet by means of many revolutions which still must take place, it is to be hoped for (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 690–691).

If it does not come about, "then we have still lost more than we have gained" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 692). As we can conclude based on these fragments, Kant used the very term of revolution with reference to the political sphere long before the revolutionary events in France, describing revolutions as quite ordinary events of human evolution and as one of the tools from the toolbox of nature that it uses to contribute to the progress of mankind. Kant's position can be described as technocratic, devoid of emotions and neutral in the sense that Kant does not pay attention to the possible negative effects of revolutions, giving us the impression that he does not care about them. However, it is rather a different matter: in the framework of his evolutionary theory, Kant reasoned from the standpoint of nature, for which the death and suffering of some part of the population at some point in time is just an insignificant episode on the long path of human development and if these human sacrifices brought to the altar of progress will ultimately lead to the achievement of perfection of mankind, then from the point of view of nature there is expediency in it. Moreover, Kant's vision of revolution seems to be quite abstract until the French Revolution. This vision did not change much even in the light of the revolutionary events in North America (it would only be logical to query whether Kant considered the War of Independence a revolutionary event at all). Kant's statements on the importance of revolutions for human progressive development correlate with his opinion in his later works, published after the end of the Revolutionary War in North America: Kant does not consider revolutions impossible but, apparently, does not believe that they are desirable either. In his *Idea for a Universal History* (1784), published eight years after delivering of *Anthropology Friedländer*, we find the same statement that "after many reformative revolutions, a universal cosmopolitical condition [...] will come into being" (IaG, 8: 28) and that "there was always left over a germ of enlightenment that developed further through each revolution and this prepared for a following stage of improvement" (IaG, 8: 30). Kant is rather skeptical regarding the decisive role of revolution in human development in *What is Enlightenment?* (1784): "A revolution may well bring about a falling off of personal despotism and of avaricious or tyrannical oppression, but never a true reform in one's way of thinking; instead new prejudices will serve just as well as old ones to harness the great unthinking masses" (IaG, 8: 36). Although he does not deny a positive role of revolutions

in the interim stage of human evolution, he rather means that revolutions are insufficient for moral perfection of human being and that a political revolution does not make much sense without a revolution of way of thinking, i.e. a moral revolution.

This understanding of revolution as a part of human progressive development may seem to contradict Kant's later, more pessimistic assessment of revolutionary events and his statements on the right of revolution which he denied in his later writings (subsequently, these statements have become the subject of a lively discussion among Kant scholars).[15] One of these passages, used as an argument by some scholars[16] to support their thesis that Kant denied every possibility to rebel against despotism and at the same time to show its contradictoriness, can be found in *Menschenkunde*, based on anthropology lectures most likely delivered in the winter 1781/1782:

> The human being is a creature that is necessarily in need of a master, which the animals do not ever need. The reason is freedom and its misuse; the animal, on the other hand, is confidently led by its instincts. Now the human being can get this master from no other race than his human species, which is a real misfortune for the human race, precisely because this master, whom the human being chooses over himself, is also a human being, who likewise is necessarily in need of a master (V-Anth/Mensch, 25: 1199-1200).

Kant repeated this passage almost word for word two years later, in his *Idea for a Universal History*:

> the human being is an animal which, when it lives among others of its species, has need of a master. For he certainly misuses his freedom in regard to others of his kind; and although as a rational creature he wishes a law that sets limits to the freedom of all, his selfish animal inclination still misleads him into excepting himself from it where he may. Thus, he needs a master, who breaks his stubborn will and necessitates him to obey a universally valid will with which everyone can be free. But where

[15] Arendt, H.: *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Edited and with interpretative essay by Ronald Beiner, The University of Chicago Press, 1992; Beck, L. W.: Kant and the right of revolution. In: *Journal of the History of Ide*as, 1971, 32(1), pp. 411–22; Burg, P.: *Kant und die Französische Revolution*. Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1974; Westphal, K. R.: Kant on the State, Law, and Obedience to Authority in the Alleged "Anti-Revolutionary" Writings". In: *Journal of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XVII (1992), pp. 383–426; Flikschuh, K.: Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke. In: *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 36 (2008), no. 4, pp. 375–404; Korsgaard, Ch.: *Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution*. URL: https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/3209552 Accessed 2018-02-03.

[16] Chalyy, V. A.: Poryadok i revolyutsiya v politicheskoy filosofii Kanta [Order and Revolution in Kant's Political Philosophy]" [in Russian]. In: *Filosofiya. Zhurnal Vysshey shkoly ekonomiki* [Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics], 2017, 1 (2), pp. 40–60, here pp. 50–51.

> will he get this master? Nowhere else but from the human species. But then this master is exactly as much an animal who has need of a master (IaG, 8: 23).

These almost identical passages demonstrate, on the one hand, that Kant's legalistic and prudential approach to political affairs was inherent to him long before his late writings. On the other hand, their nearly word-for-word match implies a close connection between Kant's anthropology lectures and his published works.

The French revolution is often seen as a milestone that had a significant impact on Kant.[17] Beyond all doubt, the French Revolution and all subsequent events (liberation and establishment of republic, the execution of the French king, the onset of the Terror, a series of internal and external wars, conservative reaction in domestic and international policy of many European countries, but also some liberalization and reforms) had a major impact on Kant. Kant's inspiration from the first revolutionary events in France (legislative process through the National Constituent Assembly, constitutions of 1791 and 1793, establishment of republic) is well known from his correspondence and from some statements in his published works and messages of his contemporaries. It seems to be quite obvious that he turned to a rather pessimistic perception of the French Revolution as a reaction to the execution of Louis XVI and the wars which the young republic would wage against European monarchies.[18] But does this turn in Kant's assessments really mean a radical change of Kant's mind regarding revolutions in general? Did Kant really switch from a positive assessment of revolutions to a negative one under the influence of some evils of the French Revolution? His *Lectures on Anthropology* can serve here as an additional historic-philosophical source, because they were given during a long period of time (from 1772 – 73 to 1795 – 96), namely during his mature years when he conceived and wrote most of his political works.

The fact that Kant closely followed the events in France is evidenced not only by his correspondence, statements in his published works and messages of his contemporaries, but also by lectures on anthropology. In *Elsner* we can see Kant's comments on establishment of the French republic (21. September 1792) during the winter semester 1792/93, where Kant cites the French Republic as an example of something positive that for a long time seemed to be utopic and not realistic, but one day became true: "One must not adhere to the fact that

[17] Gerhardt, V.: *Immanuel Kants Entwurf ‚Zum ewigen Frieden'. Eine Theorie der Politik*, Darmstadt, 1995, p. 19; Vorländer, K.: Kant's Stellung zur französischen Revolution. In: *Philosophische Abhandlungen. Hermann Cohen zum 70 Geburtstag (7. Juli 1912) dargebracht*, Berlin, 1912, pp. 247–269.
[18] See for instance: Gerhardt, V.: *Immanuel Kants Entwurf ‚Zum ewigen Frieden'*, pp. 18–19.

something is not existed in the world before, for example subordinating free people to legal constraint, for example French Republic; but one must go on through the reason. What is rational is also possible, and it is a duty to follow these ideas and to strive to realize them more and more" (V-Anth/Zusatzkommentare, 25: 1560). Interestingly, one year later, in *Reichel*, apparently delivered in the winter semester 1793/94, Kant does not give any negative assessment of actions of revolutionaries just expressing his compassion towards Marie Antoinette: "It would be very bad to say when entering society: The Queen of France had an unfortunate fate" (V-Anth/ Zusatzkommentare, 25: 1554). This statement was made, apparently, on the occasion of the execution of Marie Antoinette, which occurred on October 16, 1793. It contains a clear negative assessment of this event and expresses sympathy for the fate of the queen. However, later, in *Metaphysics of Morals* published in 1797, Kant condemned the execution of Louis XVI (which occurred on January 21, 1793) and advocates a ban on the uprising against the sovereign (MSRL, AA 06:320). In all likelihood, the very idea of a ban on insurrection against authorities came to Kant as a result of the execution of the King of France and his family, even if he had recognized the legitimacy of the transfer of power from the King to the Assembly of the Estates (MSRL, AA 06:341–342). However, Kant's relative disappointment or "sobering" from the French Revolution do not mean that his sympathy for the rising people as well as his general attitude to the revolution as a political phenomenon were undergoing radical changes. In the same lectures of 1793/94, speaking of the war waged by the revolutionary France, Kant does not express any negative reaction, but rather sneers at those people who see in historical events only the exterior part, but do not try to understand phenomena in their depth: "People in society are unpleasant with their thoughts wandering around. For Example: When talking about the war of the French; such a man may well think of the French wines or fashions" (V-Anth/Zusatzkommentare, 25: 1554).

Surprisingly, even in *Perpetual Peace* Kant's opinion on revolutions is not always negative and there is at least one passage where Kant considers revolution an event provoked by nature itself (and therefore logical and making sense at a certain stage of human development): "when nature herself produces revolutions, political wisdom will use them as a call of nature for fundamental reforms to produce a lawful constitution founded upon principles of freedom, for only such a constitution is durable" (ZeF, 8: 373). This suggests that bloody events and wars that followed after the French Revolution were not the decisive factor explaining why Kant speaks more negatively on revolution in his late writings. Two contradictory assessments of revolution do not mean the "Copernican revolution" in Kant's mind in general, although some change

under the influence of the French Revolution could have happened: we can find positive and negative assessments before the French Revolution as well as after it.[19] There seems to be less a difference in Kant's perception of revolution as a historical event (although some changes may have happened), but more a difference between two perspectives: the very "broad" perspective of nature, mostly presented in Kant's 1780s writings (revolutions and wars are positive because they help to achieve a more efficient political structure), and the essentially more narrow juridical perspective (no legislation can exist granting the right of revolution or the right to break the laws in general) in which the role of revolutions or wars is negative because they destroy the existing order, the system of law and governance, mostly presented in his 1790s works. It allows us to argue that Kant's point of view on revolution as a good means of nature at the middle stage, but as evil for the final civil stage was already present in the 1770s (e.g. in *Anthropology Friedländer*), in the 1780s (e.g. in the *Idea of Universal History*, *What is Enlightenment?*) and even in 1790s (*Elsner*, *Reichel*, *Perpetual Peace*). In all likelihood, these two Kant's "contradictory" points of view on revolution are more connected with a shift of focus than with a radical change of Kant's mind under the influence of the French Revolution. This conclusion is close to the opinions of Peter Burg and Lewis Beck, who claim that Kant's assessments of revolution can be different from text to text not because of some contradictions present in Kant's mind, but because Kant considers (political) revolutions from two different perspectives. According to Burg's opinion, outspoken in his book *Kant und die Französische Revolution*, Kant uses the term of (political) revolution in two ways: from a historical-philosophical and from a legal-philosophical perspective[20] (in Lewis Beck's opinion, there are three perspectives, namely the ethical, the teleological, and the juridical perspective).[21]

Kant's ambivalent assessment of the role of war in human evolution seems to be similar and connected to revolution. According to Kant, human beings have an antagonism of "social" and "unsocial" inclinations in their nature which is why people wage wars but also seek to live in peace. In his published works, Kant promotes the idea of "unsocial sociability" [ungesellige Geselligkeit] of men for the first time in the Fourth Proposition of *Idea of Universal History*:

[19] Peter Burg distinguishes between three periods in Kant's assessments of the French Revolution: 1) Constitutional monarchy (1789 – 1792) with mostly positive assessments: 2) Democratic republic (1792 – 1794) with largely negative assessment; 3) Bourgeois republic (1794 – 1799) with the prevalence of positive assessments. See: Burg, P.: *Kant und die Französische Revolution*, Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1974, pp. 19–20.

[20] Burg, P.: *Kant und die Französische Revolution*, p. 19.

[21] Beck, L. W.: Kant and the right of revolution. In: *Journal of the History of Ide*as, 1971, 32(1), pp. 411–22.

"Here I understand by "antagonism" the unsociable sociability [italics by Kant] of human beings, i.e. their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society" (IaG, 8: 20). Interestingly, we can find this idea eight years earlier, in his anthropology lectures from the winter semester 1775/76, where he expresses this idea of inborn contradiction in human nature and as its result the inevitability of wars at a certain stage of human development: "Human beings therefore have an inclination for society, but also for war. It is an active and reactive force, for otherwise human beings would fuse together through constant unity, from which complete inactivity and tranquility would thereafter arise" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 719). In *Friedländer Anthropology* from year 1775/76 Kant considers war an awful but effective instrument of nature to induce the human to improve themselves and to spread over the entire globe:

> Providence's purpose is: God wants that human beings should populate the entire world. All animals have their certain climate, but human beings are to be found everywhere. Human beings are not to stay in a small region, but to spread out across the entire earth. The best means of promoting this is pugnacity, jealousy, and disagreement with regard to property. […] If human beings would be peaceable, they would all live clustered together in one place, and no one would separate from society. Therefore, this is the one great use which arises from maliciousness. Furthermore, when human beings live beside one another, and begin to cultivate themselves, when they advance from the simple needs of nature to the artificial ones, property is thus instituted, and then human beings always get into war (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 679-680).

Kant repeats this idea nineteen years later in *Perpetual Peace* (1795), where he also praises the positive role of war for population of our planet:

> Its preparatory arrangement consists in the following: that it 1) has taken care that people should be able to live in all regions of the earth; 2) by war it has driven them everywhere, even into the most inhospitable regions, in order to populate these; 3) by war it has compelled them to enter into more or less lawful relations (ZeF, 8: 363).

Both fragments essentially express the same idea about certain benefits of war for the development of mankind and reflect the Kantian notion of the importance of struggle, competition for this development. However, an important distinction between the fragment from *Perpetual Peace* and the fragment from *Anthropology Friedländer* is the added statement that war cannot forever be a trigger for the development of mankind. At some point, the harm from it begins to outweigh the benefits while people (both individuals and nations or

states) come to the understanding that "a bad peace is better than a good war" and that being in peaceful, law-governed relations with neighbors, trading with them is much more profitable than waging a war against them. It is obvious that Kant understood the limited nature of war as a means of human evolution long before *Perpetual Peace*, but even a comparison of the two mentioned fragments creates an impression that the Kant from the 1770s – 1780s and the Kant from the 1790s are two different persons from different eras. One of them, the Kant of the 1770s – 1780s is a man who lived during the time when war was a "natural" state of relations between countries and peoples. The other, the Kant from the 1790s, the time of writing and publishing *Perpetual Peace*, is a man from a completely different period of human history, an era when the war became an evident evil while its potential for the human development has completely exhausted itself. It was not Kant who changed, but the era itself.

The idea of the positive role of war for human history is also expressed in *Anthropology Pillau*, lectures delivered in winter semester 1777/78, where he mentions the inventions with the greatest impact on human progressive development: "The security of the civil condition through standing armies" and "Cannons and powder. Which are a hindrance to nations not being driven out of their security" (V-Anth/Pillau, 25: 846). This seems to contradict his ideas in *Perpetual Peace*: "Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall in time be abolished altogether" (ZeF, 8: 345) and "It would turn out the same with accumulation of a treasure: regarded by other states as a threat of war, it would force them to undertake preventive attacks" (ZeF, 8: 345). Like in the case of Kant's idea of revolution, this difference cannot be explained by the evolution of his view on war from the mid – 1770s to the mid – 1790s, but rather by the shift of emphasis on a different stage of human progressive development. In his lectures on anthropology, Kant focuses on the transitional stage of human evolution and therefore speaks about the positive role of wars for it (although not denying that wars bring evil to certain people), stating that wars are inevitable at some stages of human evolution. This shift can be best illustrated by two quotes from the Concluding Remark of *Conjectural beginning of human history* (1786), where Kant writes on war from two different perspectives at the same time. Firstly, he speaks about evil from war and preparations for it (in the sense of *Perpetual Peace*): "One must admit that the greatest ills that oppress civilized peoples stem from war, yet to be sure less from one that actually is or has been than from the never relenting and even ceaselessly increasing armament for future war" (MAM, 8: 121). Several lines later, he says that wars are needed and inevitable at some stage of human development: "Thus at the stage of culture where humankind still stands, war is an indispensable means

of bringing culture still further; and only after a (God knows when) completed culture, would an everlasting peace be salutary, and thereby alone be possible for us" (MAM, 8: 121). We can find the same argument in *Idea for a Universal History* (1784) published during his middle period of life (IaG, 8: 24-25) and in his late work *Conflict of the Faculties* (1798) (SF, 7: 91), where Kant, in a more pessimistic way, states that wars are inevitable for human evolution. This means that Kant's point of view on wars and revolutions did not undergo radical changes after the French Revolution, although it became more pessimistic. In *Perpetual Peace* and *Conflict of the Faculties* he is more focused on the final stage of historical process. This final stage of human development does not need wars, revolutions or rebellions. Moreover, Kant even considers permanent armies and weaponry as an obstacle for lasting peace and consequently perfect political order on the planet, although in his anthropology lectures he ponders on the idea that professional armies, weapons and gunpowder could serve as tools for preserving peace between countries.

Still, even in his anthropology lectures Kant does not consider wars the main instrument in development of global political order. He has higher hopes for a more peaceful way of development, namely for a gradual juridification of international relations. Kant expresses this idea in *Anthropology Mrongovius*, delivered in winter semester 1784 – 85, more than ten years before *Perpetual Peace* was published: "International law will not, then, become any better through war, but rather through a judicial sentence. The kings will themselves no longer administer justice, but will submit themselves to a universal amphictyonic league. Then a universal peace will reign over our globe" (V-Anth/Mron, 25: 1426). We can find passages with the familiar idea that wars will gradually vanish from our planet in *Idea for a Universal History*, published some time before:

> Finally war itself will gradually become not only an enterprise so artificial, and its outcome on both sides so uncertain, but also the aftereffects which the state suffers through an ever-increasing burden of debt (a new invention), whose repayment becomes unending, will become so dubious an undertaking, and the influence of every shake-up in a state in our part of the world on all other states, all of whose trades are so very much chained together, will be so noticeable, that these states will be urged merely through danger to themselves to offer themselves, even without legal standing, as arbiters, and thus remotely prepare the way for a future large state body, of which the past world has no example to show (IaG, 8: 28).

The idea of league of nations is closely connected to idea of gradual

juridification of international relations which is one of the key ideas in Kant's *Perpetual Peace*. Interestingly, this idea may be found already in *Anthropology Friedländer*, where Kant advocates the idea of perpetual peace between nations at the end of human history and the league of nations as a political institution where all nations of the world should be united. Kant says that although the achievement of this civil state can take a long time, but history proves that "great changes are to be hoped for" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 694). Ultimately, all wars on the Earth will disappear and nations will be united in a kind of global union, a league of nations, within which all disputes between states will be resolved peacefully, and thanks to this, mankind will be able to liberate resources spent for military purposes and redirect them to social improvement:

> In order, however, that all wars would not be necessary, a league of nations would thus have to arise, where all nations constituted a universal senate of nations through their delegates, [a league] which would have to decide all disputes of the nations, and this judgment would have to be executed through the power of the nations; then the nations would also be subject to one forum and one civil constraint. This senate of nations would be the most enlightened that the world has ever seen. It seems the beginning is to be sought in this, for before the wars do not come to an end, such cannot be achieved, for war makes every [political] state insecure, [and] hence more care is given to the preparation for war than to the internal condition of the [political] state. If, however [the wars] come to an end, then the improvement of the internal government will result, through which human beings are schooled for such perfection (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 696).

This idea of a league of nations (Kant words it in Lectures as "senat of nations" – "Völcker Senat" – which never occurred in his published political writings) will be developed in detail twenty years later, in *Perpetual Peace* (1795). Still, in anthropology lectures it remains unclear, as it is noted by Holly Wilson, whether this ideal picture of the future, drawn by Kant, is an unrealizable dream or a very remote, but still quite realistic forecast since Kant "does not differentiate clearly between these possibilities"[22].

Some parallels between Kant's anthropology lectures and his published works on political topics may not be substantially relevant on their own but can serve as markers indicating the genesis of some Kant's writings. For instance, in *Lectures on Anthropology*, namely in the margins of *Dohna* (1791/1792), we can find the same quotation of the famous biblical saying "be ye wise as serpents

[22] Wilson, C.: Kant on civilisation, culture and moralization. In: Cohen, A. (ed.), *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology. A Critical Guide*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 191-210.

and guileless as dove" from the Bible (V-Anth/ Zusatzkommentare 25: 1535, p.4), that is used later in *Perpetual Peace*, in the appendix "On the disagreement between morals and politics with a view to perpetual peace": "Politics says", "Be ye wise as serpents"; morals adds (as a limiting condition) "and guileless as doves" (ZeF, 8: 370). Commenting this passage, Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark note that, interestingly enough, the word "politician" can be found in *Dohna* (V-Anth/Zusatzkommentare 25: 1535-1536, p. 4), although this word is never used in other texts of anthropology lectures and is firmly associated with *Toward Perpetual Peace* (cf. ZeF, 8: 343, ZeF, 8: 372 et seqq.) and with the second section of *Conflict of the Faculties* (cf. SF, 7: 80, SF, 7: 88, SF, 7: 92). Thus, it is possible to suppose that even if Kant wrote his *Perpetual Peace* on some certain occasions in 1795, Peace of Basel, the design of this significant political treatise could have been devised in the winter of 1791/92 at the latest.

All the examples given above illustrate a close connection between Kant's *Lectures on Anthropology* and his political writings. Some verbatim coincidences allow us to make an assumption that this connection is closer than one could initially believe. *Lectures on anthropology* provide an opportunity to trace the development of Kant's political ideas from the early 1770s to the early 1790s. Obviously, since the material of the lecture notes is not a text published by Kant himself or, at least, with his approval, it cannot serve as a totally authentic and independent source of Kant's thought. On the other hand, it is its "roughness" and the absence of the Kant's editing that can provide some important shades of meaning of Kant's thought, some small changes and fluctuations that it underwent during its evolution – developments which, for one reason or another, were not reflected in Kant's published works (not least, as it seems, due to strengthening of censorship and pressures against dissent in Prussia as a reaction to the revolutionary events in France). Designed as a course with the aim to provide his students with the knowledge of the world, the lectures on anthropology can be viewed as an equivalent of Kant's sounding board used to test and improve a number of his ideas, many of which later found their place in his published works. This makes *Lectures on Anthropology* a very important source not only for research of Kant's anthropological thought, but also for studying Kant's political philosophy and for understanding of its genesis. The analysis of the fragments from *Lectures on Anthropology*, as well as their comparison with similar and sometimes almost identic fragments from Kant's political works, demonstrates, on the one hand, a considerable consistency of Kant's thought: the central ideas from Kant's late writings are expressed – in one way or another – significantly earlier, as part of his lecture course on anthropology. At the same time, the events of social and political

life (the Independence War in the United States, the French Revolution) and Kant's internal development have undoubtedly affected his perception of his own era, his preferences in choosing the perspective of analysis of contemporary historical events and processes and of the historical process as a whole.

Summary

Some Political Aspects of Kant's Lectures on Anthropology

This article aims to establish a connection between Kant's *Lectures on Anthropology* and his political writings. As the comparative analysis shows, the lectures contain a number of fragments that conceptually or even verbatim reproduce the ideas of Kant's later published works on political topics. Given the fact that Kant did not give separate lectures on politics, *Lectures on Anthropology* represent the most important additional source of the Kantian political thought, allowing us to assume that they were a kind of sounding board which Kant used to think out loud and deliver the first versions of his socio-political ideas to his students, polishing them up before putting the finishing touches and publishing them for a larger audience. *Lectures* also help to trace the genesis of Kant's individual political ideas, to discover changes in the perspective from which he viewed political events of his time and the historical process as a whole.
Keywords: Kant's lectures on anthropology, political anthropology, revolution, French Revolution, war, evolution, progressive development, league of nations

Zhrnutie

Niektoré politické aspekty Kantových Prednášok k antropológii

Cieľom tohto príspevku je poukázať na prepojenie medzi Kantovými *Prednáškami k antropológii* a jeho politickými spismi. Ako ukáže porovnávacia analýza, prednášky obsahujú množstvo fragmentov pojmovo alebo dokonca doslovne reprodukujúcich myšlienky, ktoré Kant neskôr publikoval v prácach k politickým témam. Vzhľadom na skutočnosť, že Kant nemal samostatné prednášky k politike, *Prednášky k antropológii* predstavujú najdôležitejšie dodatočné zdroje Kantovho politického myslenia a môžeme sa domnievať, že boli istým testom, ktorý Kant využil na hlasné uvažovanie. Svojim študentom

tak predstavil prvé verzie svojich sociálno-politických úvah, čím ich uhladil pred dokončením a zverejnením širokému publiku. *Prednášky* rovnako napomáhajú vystopovať vznik jednotlivých Kantových politických myšlienok a objaviť zmeny v perspektíve, z ktorej Kant posudzoval politické udalosti svojej doby a dejinný proces ako celok.
Kľúčové slová: Kantove prednášky k antropológii, politická antropológia, revolúcia, Francúzska revolúcia, vojna, vývoj, postupný rozvoj, spoločenstvo národov

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