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Contents

Science and Ethical Value[1]

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Abstract
The paper concerns itself with the moral aspects of the development of science and its consequences for contemporary society. Particular attention is given to ethical reflection on the problem of scientific activities and the role of moral responsibility in science. *Scientific responsibility* is a problem which, in the context of contemporary scientific discourse, demands a dialogue with ethics. This should not result in burdening science but rather in overcoming the antinomies to which science has, often not on its own, lead itself. To accept responsibility and some degree of critical evaluation in the decision making process is not only the strategy of scientific work but mainly the "human" dimension and mission of science. The ethos of science and the ethos of the scientist are directly connected with the issue of scientific responsibility and its different connotations.

Keywords: science, ethics, reflection, value, society

Man's effort to identify, understand and address the problems of contemporary times is, in the context of responsibility towards human life, an actual and pressing question of discourse in science. Science and its knowledge allows us to know more, and "the more we can and hence the more we also have to do" (Novosád, 1994, p. 17). The contemporary epoch is in its relationship to science, on the one hand, dependent on it, on the other, critical towards it. This criticism arises mostly from the possible consequences of applying scientific knowledge to practical life.

The developments in science, research, and technology have surely brought about threats and potential risks for human life. Despite this, it needs to be understood that it is science which is capable of detecting these risk and offering its resources to solve them. Therefore, it is important to identify not only what is technically possible in the current context, but, above all, what is morally acceptable and permitted. This is especially emphasized in

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[1] The idea of the paper is built around some of the methodological problems and questions connected to the concept of scientific responsibility. The topic of this paper was presented at the international UNESCO conference "*On Emerging Ethical issues in Science and Technology*" in Bratislava, in May 2013, at the panel session "Scientific Responsibility".

contemporary consumer society with its market strategies, claims and needs, which instrumentalize the moral responsibility of individuals and society and "cut it" according to the chosen life style (Jacyno, 2012, p. 74).

The theoretical reflection on the problem of scientific responsibility has its own history. Since the 1960s, a gradual development of the discussion and a positive shift towards its reflection and solutions can be recognized. Contemporary scientific discourse is becoming more open to issues of evaluation processes of scientific activities, especially related to the problem of research and technological development. Reflections of these processes are connected to applications of scientific results to social practice and to discussions on the possible and predictable consequences.

There are several possibilities how to approach the problem of scientific responsibility. One of them is an ethical connotation of the concept of responsibility. Responsibility, when linked to the principle of respect towards others, to the decision to "guarantee" something/for somebody, or to "attribute" (impute) an obligation to someone (not in the legislative sense) (Smreková & Palovičová, 2009, p. 7) is, in the framework of rational consideration, a value. In this way, responsibility implies one's capacity to predict the outcome on his or her actions. With its ethical significance, it becomes a (sub)conscious motivation to guarantee the results of scientific knowledge and research outcomes. Admittedly, as the nature and impact of man's actions have changed and it "has opened an entirely new dimension of its ethical meaning" (Jonas, 1997, p. 19), the aspect of duty enters the notion of responsibility.

Searching for a certain synergy of processes in science, as a type of special human performance, forces us to look at science in its broader contexts. Moreover, the efficiency of the development of science is accompanied by intensive technological development and by the balance which brings internalization of all consequences as feedback for further developments of science and its strategies. Of course, the problem is more complex. Therefore, I will try to emphasize only some of its dimensions.

The most discussed and most complicated topic of contemporary theoretical discourse is the topic of science and its status, functions, and its possible interventions with reality. Contemporary society depends on science; science has integrated into all aspects of social and everyday (private) lives of humans. More and more we seek the help of science to recombine the influence of objective forces, so they correspond with all human needs and interests. However, a simple equation of modern times warns us – if we discover and interfere with objective processes, we need to foresee the consequences of these interventions. The characteristic of rational knowledge is the continuity of the process and also the unpredictability of its outcomes.

Therefore, contemporary discourse is highly critical of science, particularly, in considering the risks and threats to humans and society (it often simply refers to science as good and/or bad). Ulrich Beck posed an open question towards science: "As science has changed the world, cannot the contemporary world compel science to change?" (Beck, 2011, p. 289). His question arose from the symptoms which are nowadays considered as signs of the development of science, mostly the demystification of its status and its demands. The critique of science paradoxically helps to create space for the liberation of science and its research from demands for rightness and objective knowledge in the terms of (post)modern society (science is pluralistic, might be mistaken, etc.). This loosens science from the "bond of responsibility" and moves the results of research to the level of institutional responsibility (in other words, the responsibility of institutionalized structures).

In relation to science, we can discuss the prevalence of the model of "scientification", which limits science and its knowledge. This particularly happens in relation to its objects and to the confession of certain internal methodological doubts linked only to external social contexts. Moreover, significant changes can be observed in the technological developments of science and research (nanoscience). Different forms of nanotechnologies have opened the discussion on "the justification of differentiations of nanoethics and independent scientific fields" (Štefeček, Ravená & Máhrik, 2011, p. 177). In science, contexts of justification undergo changes and ruptures and lead to the realization that, similarly to theories, they are not infallible, nor are the facts "pure and neutral". The effectiveness of knowledge is not only deepened by its specialization, but especially by its overcrossing and searching for new connections "that it could be otherwise". The strength of argumentation and its legitimization is bound to contexts which clarify not only the examined objects, but the means which are chosen to reach this goal, too. This undoubtedly choice has a moral dimension and binds the value rationality/rationally?, as an inherent part of any cognitive activity, with its normative implications. Science does not bring out evaluative judgments. Its pursuit of impartiality and objectivity belongs to its privileges. Science and research, despite their impartiality, must, on the one hand, respond to the feedback coming from social (human) practise using their results. On the other hand, it must state implicit decisions which affect their form and further development. Nowadays, what kind of research will be preferred by science cannot be understood outside of the framework of explicit value-judgments. From these connections and links result the degree and the form of scientific responsibility.

The tendency, which still dominates science, can be described as a separation of scientific knowledge from its practical implication. This

problem is known as a gap between the theory and the practice of science. The negative consequences of this problem are manifested in a sort of split between the outer and the inner sphere of scientific rationality. On the one hand, there is a scientist – a demigod in a white coat and neutral complexion, on the other hand, the "human" interest, that, in the same science, seeks for the defence of their rights and meaningfulness of scientific results with its different connotations (political, economical, power, moral, legal). The separation of factual knowledge and consequences, which arise, or might arise, from them, leads to a call for scientists` responsibility and to a dialogue between science and ethics. The ethos of science and the scientist is accompanied by some degree of normativity. Besides the standardization of values guaranteeing the quality of scientific work, it includes values which direct scientists` way of thinking in a way, so they can be liberated "from the blindness from risks" (Beck, 2011, p. 298). Knowledge of the risks is, then, the moral testimony of this "scientificated" society. Therefore, scientific rationality has its own cognitive and value dimension.

Scientific responsibility implies the ability to predict associations with both calculable and unpredictable consequences. These have to be a part of the agenda of scientists and have to affect their professional performance. It is a subconscious motivation to guarantee the appropriateness and validity of their results. Accepting their responsibility in the decision making processes and applying some degree of critical thinking, belong not only to the strategies of scientific work, but also (and above all) to its "human" aspect. The loss of this aspect of scientific work causes the loss of scientists` identity based in their capacity to be responsible. Research work is also associated with the interpretation phase which, in the process of consideration and decision making, works with certain variables. These indicate the existence of dilemmas, in which the right decision is not only purely a "scientific" (neutral) choice, but also a choice which takes into account the situational and broader "human" contexts.

The problem of scientific responsibility is deepened as well as complicated by the terms of specialization of science, its depersonalization, and emergence of new strategies for decision making and power distribution in science, which accompany the development of science. The power of knowing in science eludes scientists themselves. In the process of specialization of science, the "power of knowing" is divided and science/scientists lose control over it, while power concentrates at the economic and political levels. Nevertheless, the loss of power over their research results is shifted to the institutional sphere which changes the understanding of scientific responsibility. The global context of responsibility takes on a new meaning, which does not try to compromise the autonomy of science and research, but

appeals to its ethos and the need for dialogue. There is no need for limitation of science (for ethical reasons), but a need to overcome the antinomies, to which science has lead itself, often not on its own.

Institutionalization of sciences is a phenomenon which, in a (mostly) positive sense, accompanies the development of sciences. The effort to standardize and to coordinate scientific and research work, together with codes of conducts and their rules, help to reach the humane goal of science, even in the international (and global) context. Along with legal standards, ethical norms and principles are included in the evaluation of science and its research results, both in terms of application and possible consequences. It needs to be said that responsibility in science (in its ethical sense) does not only refer to following the norms and rules of the codes of conduct, but mostly to the character of every individual scientist – to their morality and consciences. The ethos of the scientist cannot be excluded or obviated from his or her professional performance. Transmitting responsibility to institutions creates a new phenomenon – the phenomenon of collective responsibility, which is understood as a pluralistic phenomenon lead by scientific spirit but subjected to technological and bureaucratic pressures. These should control not only the consequences, but the mechanisms of research performance, too, which is more and more out of control. It can be understood as another side of the process of institutionalization of science and research. The complexity of these processes is accompanied by the moral ambivalence of the present day, too, which asks for more intensive pressure on the need for ethical reflection.

Acquisition of control or, so called general consent, which is an expression of the moral minimum of each person in society, deserves special attention. . As an important voice, it enters the active form of public discourse. This phenomenon can be excluded from considerations of science and its status in today's modern society.

To conclude, nowadays reflexive scientification is a phenomenon which opens up discussion but also the possibility for humane progress of science and its tendencies. From this spreads the severity of its axiological dimensions. Science and human consciousness (as Edgar Morin entitled his work) calls for a dialogue, so the problem of scientific responsibility would be left not only as a topic of theoretical debate, but it would be part of real practice with serious consequences for its future forms.

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Human Rights as a Fundament of Bioethics

Veronika Hulová

Abstract
Bioethics represents not only an intersection of ethics and life science, an academic discipline, a political force in medicine and biology, but most importantly a perspective of a consensus in certain questions of ethics. For bioethics that represents a transformation of the older and more traditional domain of medical ethics, a need to define its fundamentals has arisen. The key-stone for bioethics that meets the condition of general recognition, are human rights, as defined by international law. The framework documents in this respect are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Bioethics.

Keywords: bioethics, human rights, declaration, principles

As its title suggests this article discourses upon the role of human rights as a fundament of bioethics. However, for easier comprehension of this relationship, it is also essential to consider the fundamental questions of bioethics itself in the introduction. Furthermore, I will deal with philosophical approaches applied in bioethics and after a discourse on the question of the natural law aspect of human rights I will conclude this article with a short contemplation on the legal basis of human rights and their connection to bioethics.

Not even specialised literature contains any generally accepted definitions of bioethics. There are more or less accurate synonyms for it such as biomedical ethics, health care ethics, health ethics, ethics of life etc.

The encyclopaedia of bioethics states that bioethics is a new science which emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, but asks questions that are as old as humanity itself. It discusses the importance of life and death, attitudes to pain and suffering, authority and power to control life. Bioethics represents a transformation of the older and more traditional science, which is medical ethics and uses an interdisciplinary approach (Reich, 1995, pp. 247–250).

The origins of bioethics and its partial similarity to medical ethics are defined by questions this science attempted to answer in its beginnings. In the first stage of the development of bioethics its key issues were personal autonomy, fairness in access to medical care, patients' rights, and so on. In the

second phase, development of technology and major scientific discoveries in natural science gave rise to ethics of biomedical research.

The first use of the term "bioethics" in 1971 is attributed to the biologist Van Rensselaer Potter, who also groups under this term the area devoted to human survival and improvement of quality of life. Van Rensselaer Potter sees the mission of bioethics in quality of life improvement through new discoveries in the area of natural sciences.

Another school of thought states that bioethics equates to ethics of medical theory and practice. It is represented by T. L. Beauchamp and J. F. Childress, who in their work *Principles of biomedical ethics* formulated four basic principles of its operation. These are respect for autonomy, the principle of beneficence, the principle of non-maleficence and the principle of justice. These principles are sometimes referred to together with the philosophical models to which they relate.

To the principle of non-maleficence corresponds to the so-called Hippocratic model. The name of Hippocrates and his oath is linked to the rise of professional medical ethics. Its main feature is the relationship between a doctor and a patient. Among moral standards embodied in the Hippocratic Oath the rule never to harm and always help the suffering is dominant. The principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are closely related. They instruct one to act for the benefit of the patient or research subject. The aim of both principles is, if not elimination, then at least the utmost reduction of such negative attendant phenomena of medicine and research as inflicting pain, killing and permanent disability. The principle of beneficence emphasizes the good of the patient; its essence is the same as the essence of the principle of non-maleficence. These are the principles formulated by Hippocrates. However, these two principles differ in one aspect. While the principle of non-maleficence focuses mainly on non-inflicting of the above-mentioned negative phenomena, taking steps in the spirit of the principle of beneficence means adopting active measures towards their reduction. One can only figuratively speak about a positive and a negative definition of two sides of the same coin.

The deontological level of the doctor's moral duty to act in accordance with certain ethical norms is expressed by the principle of the carrying out of his responsibilities. It is not entirely identical to any of the principles elaborated upon by Beauchamp and Childress, but embodies fair, patient and moral behaviour towards the patient. In accordance with this principle the doctor has to respect the patient's rights, conscientiously perform his professional duties and cannot deny care for the sick.

One of the most significant and also recent topics in bioethics is the way of dealing with different border situations in which conflicts of different rights

emerge. Typical areas in which these conflicts occur are those associated with the conception of life (e.g. abortion) as well as with the end of life (e.g. euthanasia). The principle of "respect for the rights and dignity of man" is a criterion in most borderline decisions. This principle is implicitly embodied in some other bioethical principles.

The principle of autonomy is closely linked to the practical question of the application of paternalistic approach and informed consent. Respect for autonomy does not mean the patient's or the medical research subject's absolute autonomy in every situation; on the contrary it can be better described as finding its ideal rate while the protection of the weaker link of the doctor - patient relationship still applies. Compliance with the principle of justice ensures uniform distribution of health services and their means of delivery. It is simply the application of the rule that equal cases should be handled in the same way using the same means.

In addition to these there are more fundamental and universally respected principles, such as the principle of accountability, the principle of transparency, the principle of safety and the principle of precaution. The background to the ethical orientation of bioethics is the variety of different philosophical views and philosophical orientations.

In bioethics, utilitarian theory applies to some extent. It is based on the principle of "the maximum good for the maximum number of people". Critics of the utilitarian approach emphasize this principle justifies the suffering of some people for the good of the majority. Furthermore, the criticism focuses on the fact that utilitarianism may allow immoral conduct, and can generate unfair rules. In some cases, the interests of the majority can prevail over the interests of minorities.

Opposition to utilitarianism is represented by deontological theory, according to which conduct is either correct or incorrect as a result of the course of action, but not because of its immediate consequence. It is also stipulated that deontology is an ethical system based on respect for rules. One of the representatives of the deontological direction is Immanuel Kant, who points out that ethical principles have universal validity. According to deontologism, an ethical act is only such that is motivated by duty and responsibility. Kant expresses himself in the way that humanity has to also be seen as the goal and not only as an attribute of its achievement: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (General Theories in Bioethics and Healthcare: Utilitarianism and Deontology).

This means that the welfare of any person should be taken as a target, and not as a means. This exclusion of suffering of individuals for the good of the

rest of the population is the main distinguishing feature of the theory of utilitarianism. Deontologism is applied in bioethics because it considers that, which is equivalent to clearly defined rights and obligations, to be moral. In the *Encyclopedia of Bioethics*, deontologism is seen as an important philosophical direction in contemporary bioethics. Critics of deontologism accuse it of supporting individual behaviour that promotes their own interests at the expense of the interests of others. Furthermore, the critics also state that deontologism allows immoral behaviour, as it is completely free from compassion.

Ever since 1958, when Elizabeth Anscombe published the article "Modern Moral Philosophy", the so-called philosophy of virtue based on the teachings of Aristotle has been put in context with ethics. This philosophy emphasizes the virtues or moral character unlike the approach that focuses on the rules and obligations and highlights the consequences of actions. It focuses on the importance of moral education on character training as well as on human character cultivating, finding positive human qualities that are a prerequisite for good professional conduct.

The above-mentioned principles allow you to decide what is morally right and wrong, to distinguish between good and evil. Bioethics works with these principles in relation to medicine and biomedical research and policy. In thinking about what the individual deems morally right and what for him is morally unacceptable a number of subjective attitudes as well as ethical and philosophical principles play their role. These attitudes are based on the culture in which the individual lives, on the religion and religious traditions in which he moves and on the historical situation into which the individual was born. In this case purely subjective experiences, opinions and attitudes that an individual receives from his environment or creates himself are also significant. None of these factors are fixed in time. For this reason a need to enshrine natural-law rules, which originate in the above-mentioned systems, in generally applicable and accepted legal acts emerged.

The idea of human rights is based on natural rights. Natural rights include those held by every human being by its very nature, regardless of whether those rights are recognized by relevant institutions of the society of which the human is part. In another approach it is possible to describe human rights as those guaranteed by a system of legal laws, e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is necessary to distinguish human rights from all so-called special moral rights of an individual arising out of his special status (e.g. citizens, physicians or biomedical research subjects).

For completeness it should be added that the most important kind of institutionalized rights are rights set out in any legal system and the most basic moral rights are human rights. The area of moral rights seems to be

more problematic than that of institutionalized rights especially in matters of their enforcement. For an entity claiming a suspected breach of law is undoubtedly easier when this right is contained in any legislation to which specific provision can be referenced unambiguously, than when the enforced right is a vaguely defined moral right that itself lacks objective evidence of its very existence. Rights enshrined in a relevant legal document can be considered proof.

For these reasons, a need is felt to enshrine inherent human rights in an instrument, which would be respected and recognized by states, their institutions and on the basis of which the enforcement of such rights could become real.

This theoretically-legal perspective is also confirmed by historical experience. After the first and especially the World War II, debate on human rights became more and more necessary. The idea itself is not entirely new; it appeared as early as in the 17th century. The effort to grasp human rights normatively was materialized in the late 18th century, particularly as a result of the American Revolution in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789. In response to the situation after the Second World War, the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Its importance lies in the fact that "it deprives the governments of the possibility to control completely the lives of their citizens and to freely determine their rights and obligations" (Přibáň, 2001, pp. 53–54).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its preamble declares recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family. Human Rights declared legally-positively herein are universal and indivisible rights, their bearer disposes of them from birth, and they are his natural rights.

Enshrining universal human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was undoubtedly a huge step forward. It is the first comprehensive document that reflects the requirements of the international community to create a list of basic human rights and freedoms accorded to all people. In the preamble the states stipulate to universally recognise and respect these rights and freedoms. The Declaration is considered to be the starting point which paved the way for more specific conventions, charters and declarations on human rights.

Thus, it is more than logical that progress in this area had a major influence on the development of bioethics, which began to rapidly accelerate in the 1970s. Today's bioethics entails questions of medical ethics, but the main reason for its existence is the fact that its content goes much further than the various professional codes of ethics. It reflects social changes and

scientific and technological development and adds some competition between ethics, science, education and freedom.

The enormous development of science transcending national boundaries and the related need to set universal ethical rules that would cover all issues occurring within bioethics and the need to promote the emergence of common values, are becoming increasingly an incentive for international debates. The need for setting standards in the field of bioethics is based on the needs of physicians, researchers and lawyers, but also ordinary citizens.

States have special responsibility in their lawmaking. The successfulness of reflecting bioethics in this effort varies and will vary from country to country, hence the need to establish an international catalogue of human rights in the context of bioethics.

Among the specialized UN agencies that deal with ethics is, since 1970, UNESCO. Since 1993, UNESCO has managed a group of experts that are independent from governments – the International Bioethical Commission (IBC). This group has gained an exclusive position within the UN structure in the field of their activities. Three important declarations, although not legally binding, arose from the work of this commission. The first declaration related to bioethics is from 1997 – The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The International Declaration on Human Genetic Data was adopted in 2003. Two years later the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights was adopted. With this step, bioethics and its norms were given international legal recognition, as was the case for human rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This document defines the subject of bioethics, formulates the basic principles of bioethics and is based on a broad international consensus.

The process of preparation of this declaration lasted for several years. At its 31st session, in 2001, the General Conference invited the Director-General to submit "the technical and legal studies undertaken regarding the possibility of elaborating universal norms on bioethics" (Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, Background). The Director-General therefore requested the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) to draft the "Report of the IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics". The report deals with some problematic areas in bioethics, which should be addressed at the international level. It shows how the development of an international instrument governing these issues could lead to support of efforts to direct bioethics with regard to current scientific development. The report also addresses the likely form and scope of the instrument as well as its value in education, information dissemination, bioethics-related awareness raising and related public debate. The report summarizes legislation existing at the time and states the need of a text on the universal nature of bioethics.

Relevant individual topics of the report are: health care, human reproduction and the beginning of life, genetic enhancement, gene therapy and genetic modification, human genetic data and other personal healthcare data, end of life, research involving human subjects, intellectual property rights, human organ and tissue transplantation, the use of embryonic stem cells in therapeutic research, behavioural genetics and genetically modified organisms.

In 2003, at its 32nd session the General Conference also invited "the Director-General to continue preparatory work on a declaration on universal norms on bioethics, by holding consultations with Member States, the other international organizations concerned and relevant national bodies, and to submit a draft declaration at its 33rd session" (Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, Background).

After the discussion on the possible form of the instrument, the IBC with the support of Member States at the session clearly decided that it would, at least initially, be of a declaratory nature. Such a document would be best suited to a constantly changing context and would enable Member States to reach the maximum possible consensus. Any such instrument in the field of bioethics must call strong attention to the importance of awareness-raising, information, education, consultation and public debate.

The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights was approved on 19th October 2005. General Conference notes in it that UNESCO has its role in determining the general principles based on shared ethical values that provide guidance for scientific and technological development and social transformation in order to identify emerging challenges in science and technology. It takes into account the responsibility of present generations towards future generations and that questions of bioethics, which necessarily have an international dimension, should be dealt with as a whole.

The General Conference recognizes that scientific and technological developments based on freedom of science and research was and is very beneficial to mankind. It also emphasizes that this development should always seek to enhance the well-being of individuals, families, groups or communities and humankind as a whole. This development should take into account the dignity of the person and universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and their observance.

The actual text of the declaration contains 28 articles broken down into five areas. The general provisions define the scope and addressees of the declaration. These addressees are states, but it should also serve as guidance to individuals, groups, communities, institutions and associations - national as well as private. The eight main goals of the declaration are also defined here. The second part is titled "Principles". These are to be respected by the

recipients. These include respect for human rights and human dignity, maximization of benefits and minimization of harm, autonomy and individual responsibility, respecting informed consent and special protection of persons incapable of giving informed consent. Other principles are respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity, respect for privacy and personal data, equality, fairness, impartiality, non-discrimination and non-stigmatization, respect for cultural diversity and pluralism, solidarity and cooperation promotion, promotion of health and social development, sharing benefits stemming from scientific research, the protection of future generations, the environment, the biosphere and biodiversity.

The third part is devoted to application of the principles, to establishment and decision making of ethics committees and international practice. The fourth section entitled "Promotion of the Declaration" defines the role of states, support for bioethical education, information dissemination, development of international cooperation and follow-up activities of UNESCO. The final provisions outline the status of the Declaration as a whole and principles as complementary and interrelated in the context of the other principles. They address limitations on the application of the principles and denial of acts contrary to human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity.

The question for legally-theoretical examinations is whether this declaration is legally binding. As the name suggests, this text is declaratory in nature, meaning that it merely confirms already existing rights and does not constitute any new rights or obligations. It is a formal source of international public law, because its specific provisions are protected by the very form of the document. Legal theory subsumes acts of international institutions, which this declaration certainly is, under the sources of public international law. One cannot yet state that the declaration is binding since it falls under customary law. Although it is a norm that is applied by states, and it is a large number of states, in the way that a breach of the Declaration is considered to be an infringement, the essential requirement for it to become a part of customary law, which is the constant and long-term practice of states is not yet fulfilled, since it is a declaration from 2005. Another important aspect of the examination is the fact that the states themselves have declared their intention to take all appropriate measures to give effect to the principles set out in the Declaration but, as is necessary in public international law, its binding effect has to be seen with a certain reservation. This refers to generally low enforceability of similar commitments. The de facto authority of UNESCO as of the legislature in the field of bioethics is also not insignificant.

UNESCO has already contributed to the formulation of the basic principles of bioethics in the form of the previous two declarations. It is also the only

organization whose fields of competence include social and human sciences and for this reason it is not surprising that it took the lead in this initiative.

Ethical issues related to progress in the biological sciences and their applications have been and are very actual. They will also probably play a significant role in the future. The roots of these issues include cultural, philosophical, historical and religious background of different human societies.

Systems of philosophy, religion and culture play an important role in defining needs and issues and in discourse development. However, unlike in the case of other philosophical theories and doctrines, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is a comprehensive text that was generally agreed on. Its observance is not given by authoritative treatment and enforcement, it is the general consensus that is decisive and has been achieved despite the differences in the above-mentioned systems. The initial step was reaching a general agreement on fundamental human rights and freedoms. This resulted from the historical context, because states had the will and felt the need to unite and jointly maintain peace and order in the world. Its name and the content of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights refer to and resume the ideas set in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the question remains for the future, what the direction of bioethics itself in today's world will be. The deepening and not just economic global crisis could in fact cause some states to lose the aforementioned desire for peaceful development of human civilization or would not be able to afford the general consensus that has been reached in bioethics. If this consensus ceased to exist, the hope to achieve any other legally relevant achievements in this area would disappear too.

However, one can legitimately think that everything that has been already achieved in the field of bioethics means such a fundamental shift in the thinking of the professional public that the fear of such negative developments are not entirely justified. Therefore I expect analogical development in this field as in the very field of human rights that already constitute a significant solid foundation for bioethical discourse and consensus platform for addressing the ethical, social and legal issues of biomedicine.

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History of Nursing Ethics in Slovakia before 1989

Júlia Klembarová

Abstract
This article is devoted to the development of nursing ethics in Slovakia before the year 1989. It points to the fact that it was impossible to speak about nursing ethics as an autonomous field in this period of time. Reflections on nursing ethics were presented within medical ethics, or particularly based on the importance of reflections about the need of philosophy within medicine.

In recent decades, increased interest in ethical reflections on various problems dealing with different fields of social practice, for example business, environmental issues, health care, medicine, education and so on, can be found. The reasons for the origination of such ideas are, among others, the aftermath of World War II, growing concern for human rights, the development of science and technology, the application of new instruments in preservation of human life (Fobel, 2009, p. 7). I agree with Viera Bilasová who states: "The origin and development of applied ethics in all relevant fields of social life can be considered as a demonstration of the human effort to solve moral problems, which accompany the current post (modern) period" (Bilasová, 2012, p. 55). Based on the abovementioned facts I can point out that applied ethics present an inspiring component of the ethical discourse of the present-day. Through applied ethics, people try to find theoretical answers to various ethical questions and also authentic solutions to different practical problems they have to face in their lives.

In this article, I will deal with the field of applied ethics and particularly I will focus on professional ethics in nursing.[1] As it has been already said, the development of applied ethics and also the development of nursing ethics is a

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[1] Nursing ethics is a type of professional ethics primary focusing on ethical problems in nursing care. Nowadays it is still developing and trying to profile new situations within the health care system. The subject of nursing ethics is represented by the various moral problems of nursing practice, for example moral conflicts in the relationship of health care professionals (not only nurses) and patients when providing care, in relation to their colleagues, the issues of trust, information, and so on. The aim of nursing ethics is based on the humanization of the mentioned relationships, regulation of the behaviour when providing services to patients with the main interest of meeting the biological, psychological, social and other needs of the patients (Kopecká, 2008, pp. 43–44; Kovaľová, 2004, p. 7).

matter of the last few decades. But what was the situation with this type of professional ethics in the past? Can we speak about ethics of the nursing profession before the year 1989? In this article I will try to find an answer to this question. Consequently, the main aim is to offer the development of nursing ethics in Slovakia before the year 1989. I think that it is a demanding task, because discussion on nursing ethics as an autonomous field only started to appear in the last few decades. So if I want to speak about the nursing ethics before 1989, it is necessary to think in more general terms. It means that it is useless to look for particular works dealing with nursing ethics. On the other hand, for the successful accomplishment of my aim, it is necessary to try to find some reflections on ethics in nursing, the role of nurses, nurses' personality and the importance of their morality within the works of authors who worked and wrote their papers before the year 1989.

In the early introduction of this article there is one important question. Do we need to distinguish between medical ethics and nursing ethics? I consider this question significant because there can be some questions and objections to the need for nursing ethics as they are closely related to medical ethics. Both of these fields belong to the sphere of medicine and care for patients' health, so the question is clear, is it necessary to distinguish between them?

When answering this question I am inspired by Rudolf Novotný, who speaks about the difference between medicine and nursing and thereafter about the need of nursing ethics. The main focus of nursing is directed onto patients and their needs. There is a certain difference when comparing nursing care and medical care. In medicine, there is an emphasis on the scientific character and the primary subject of interest is the disease. Based on this, there is also space for autonomy of the nursing profession on a scientific basis (Novotný, 2009, p. 178). As we can see, author points to the distinct character of both fields. While medicine is more scientific with the primary aim of curing the disease, the nursing profession offers a more human approach with the main aim of caring about the patient as a bio-psycho-social person.

Novotný states that as equal as the ethics of each professional field are, nursing care also has some particularities that result from the given field, from the character of the important relationships within nursing care. "Within bioethics, nursing care has an exclusive position, as it involves more intimate ethical contact with the patient than other medical activities" (Novotný, 2009, p. 178; Novotný, 2011, p. 38). I agree with the abovementioned opinions on the exceptionality of the nursing profession and that is why I am confident about its significance and I think that it is necessary to distinguish nursing ethics from medical ethics. In spite of this, I have to agree with Novotný's opinion that, despite all efforts, we have to admit that the medical profession still takes superiority and there is an absence of responsible and adequate

specific education and practical application of ethics in nursing profession (Novotný, 2009, p. 178).

Based on the given facts, I will try to point to reflections about the need of nursing ethics (before the year 1989), as speaking about nursing ethics as a separate field of social practice is impossible. Before this period, it is rather necessary to find some indications that could be associated with nursing ethics. It is important to state that, during this period, the ethics of the nursing profession was developed within medical ethics neither of which was specifically named in Slovakia. Ethical reflections were only marginally reflected in medicine.

Various problems (that we consider to be issues of medical ethics now) as, for example, problems connected to patients' information, professional silence, issues dealing with the doctor's responsibility, reflections on the doctor – patient relationship, questions of abortion, euthanasia, transplans, etc. were reflected mainly from the legislative and medical point of view. The problems of medical ethics were presented primarily through different scientific medical journals, for example *Lekársky obzor, Vnitřní lekářství, Československá pediatrie* and others (Lešková Blahová, 2010, p. 17). Generally, the period before the year 1989 can be characterised as stagnation to a certain degree when discussing the development of applied ethics in Slovakia. After this year, the slow development and emergence of individual fields of applied ethics can be found, including ethics in the nursing profession.

Nursing Ethics in Slovakia before 1989

Concerning the development of applied ethics or the development of society and life in Slovakia generally, the situation before the year 1989 was not very favourable.[2] I believe it is very important to point out to the two main factors, which in my opinion significantly influenced the status of nursing ethics in Slovakia in that period of time. In other words, I want to present two criteria that were closely related to the absence of nursing ethics as an autonomous field in Slovakia before the year 1989.

The first criterion was represented by the overall status of society, in which no other morality was allowed than socialist morality.[3] This fact is

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[2] It is not my aim to deal with the political situation in this period, so I will leave this topic out.

[3] In spite of the fact that the constitution in socialism introduced humanistic principles into the life and also into the health care, it is necessary to emphasize that it was not connected with the entrance of ethics into the health care system. Conditions necessary for the development of the health care of human beings and free medical care started to be formed. Relations in public health were modified, there was a shift from a clearly gain occupation to a field based on human interpersonal relations (Bokesová-Uherová, 1989, p. 330). I can conclude that we can

documented by Karol Gecík in his book *Etika a práca zdravotnej sestry*. The author speaks about the presence of opinions on the existence of special morality and special ethics for health care workers. "There are also such opinions that special ethics for the doctors exist, special one for the nurses, and particular ethics for other health care workers" (Gecík, 1964, p. 9). These words are used to outline the possibility of the existence of professional ethics for health care workers. But at the same time, in accordance with the morality that was valid throughout that time such ideas were disclaimed. Gecík emphasizes the fact that from the Marxist point of view, such special morality for a particular profession is not accepted. "Socialist society requires from each member of the country to behave always in accordance with its moral rules. This request is also significant in relation to health care workers" (Gecík, 1964, p. 9). Following these words I believe, that some possible reflections on nursing ethics were restrained because of the morality of the socialist citizen. The freedom of the people, as we can see, was also limited in reflections about morality. The only respected morality was the morality of socialism and it needed to be followed by the people.

In the mentioned work, the author offers some instructions for doctors and nurses and their behaviour, but he still emphasizes that these directives represent "moral principles of socialist society" (Gecík, 1964, p. 10). These recommendations for physicians and nurses include the effort to minimize patients' stress and tension, respect for patients, establishment of adequate conditions for patients' welfare, kindly nurse – patient relationships, good relations among colleagues, economical use of resources during work, the importance of education by nurses, meaning that the role of the nurse was not to provide information for the citizens about the possibilities of improvement of their health (Gecík, 1964, pp. 10–14).

From among these pieces of advice, it is possible to find a dominance of recommendations focused on the improvement of patients' health. It means that the majority of these pieces of advice are of a medical nature. But also some indications of nursing ethics can be found, for example, suggestions that it is important to respect the patient (moral value of respect, reverence to patients and their life), the nurse – patient relationship should be based on humanity and kindness (value of humanity), good relations with colleagues (mutual solidarity among colleagues). So, ethical aspects within the advices for nurses are also present, but the medical nature of particular recommendations dominates. As it has been already mentioned, all specific morality and ethics for health care workers at that time was rejected, because the only accepted morality was socialist morality.

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speak about some degree of the humanization of the health care system, but it is not possible to speak about the entrance of nursing ethics into social life in the nursing profession.

I suppose that socialist morality represents one factor that constituted the absence of nursing ethics before the year 1989. The second important criterion that influenced the status of nursing ethics in that period was the status of the nursing profession itself. The nursing profession and nursing care were not understood as a separate profession and autonomous discipline at that time. Primacy within the medicine was held by the doctor who also represented the only authority in the field of health care for the patient's health and the health of whole population.

Nurses were seen as a physicians' subordinate, as their right arm and as their advisor. It is also documented by various publications from the period before the year 1989, which dealt with the physician's personality and appropriate behaviour towards the patients. Understanding of the nurse as an important person within health care was absent. Different articles and books in that period were dedicated to the status of medicine, its significance, but nursing was not reflected or, more precisely, it was understood as a subordinate component of medicine and not as an autonomous discipline.

Jana Kutnohorská points to the connection between medicine and nursing in the past. These two fields within medicine were closely connected, but their development and status were not the same. Medicine had (and still has) a certain prominent position, it was (and still is) seen as a prestigious profession. On the other hand, nursing is still trying to achieve such a status (Kutnohorská, 2010, p. 12). An author using these words emphasizes that, despite the progress made in health care and in nursing activities, the prominent position of medicine still persists today.

Dana Farkašová speaks about difficult situation in nursing, too. Work in hospitals was very demanding; a lack of staff was a frequent problem with low financial compensation and long working hours. All these factors, in a significant way, influenced the status of nurses in that period (Farkašová, 2001, p. 26). In my opinion, these social problems of nursing combined to form one relevant part. The second one was represented by the status of nurses who were accepted as physicians' assistants and not as their equal partners in the nursing team and specialists in the field. Nursing was understood as a practical activity and not as a separate discipline with theory that can be applied into practice (Farkašová, 2001, p. 28). I think that the abovementioned factors caused the absence of nursing ethics before the year 1989 in a significant way.

The problems of medical ethics[4] were reflected, as it has been already mentioned, only marginally within medicine and legislation. Later on, reflections about the insufficiency of the scientific character of medicine and

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[4] It is better to say the problems that belong to the scope of medical ethics today.

the need for social sciences and their entrance into the field of medicine started to appear. In accordance with this statement, the editors of the collective work with the title *Filozofia a medicína* [*Philosophy and* Medicine] present their opinion: "Philosophical maturity is also necessary for the right formation of ideological, social-political, interpersonal and also professional relations among doctors, pharmacists and other health care workers" (Ciger, Gavalier, Krajčovič a kol., 1977, p. 5). The authors underline the need for philosophy because of interpersonal relationships that represent an essential component of medicine and the medical profession. I agree with this opinion, because it is really important to focus on the appropriate behaviour in the physician – patient relationship and also in relation to their colleagues.

Michal Topoľský points to the humanization of sciences generally and then he moves particularly to medicine. Sciences are starting to humanize, their subject is not only analysed from the natural and scientific perspective, but also within social integration. It means that the subject of science is not only created by nature and an "unpurified" reality, but also the social component started to appear. It is visible mainly in medicine as a system of sciences that still has a natural-biological character, but it also became a social science that is related to the physician – patient relationship (Topoľský, 1977, p. 14).

Based on these words it is possible to observe the change in the character of science. More humanistic and social aspects are implemented into the sciences. It is also valid in medicine which is not more seen as just a natural-biological science, but it also has a social dimension. Various social disciplines, such as medical ethics, psychology, sociology and others are understood by Topoľský as sciences that are necessary for the good working practice of physicians. "Without knowledge of these disciplines, a doctor can only by an elemental practitioner, but not a conscious and capable doctor – scientist" (Topoľský, 1977, p. 15). But it is necessary to keep in mind that these reflections do not automatically mean an immediate presence of medical and nursing ethics. It points to a slow process of transformation of the sciences and the appearance of a social dimension in the form of philosophy within the natural sciences.

The relevance of the human and social approach within medicine was also presented by Juraj Ciger. Natural-scientific thought is not capable of understanding the person in holistic reality and so it cannot stimulate such therapy which is mainly oriented on the person as a whole (Ciger, 1977, p. 103). In medical practice it means to preserve the health of the patient who represents a living person. For such an understanding of the person as a whole, the physician needs philosophical proficiency. In connection to this, Ciger refers to the theoretical as well as the practical dimension of the

relationship between philosophy and medicine. "The relationship of philosophy and medicine represents a mass of problems that overreach the theoretical-scientific sphere and move into the field of history as well as into contemporary social practice" (Ciger, 1977, p. 105).

So as we can see, the scientific as well as the social character of medicine is very important in medical practice. Ciger holds the view that basis of the healing process is not only in the cure itself. A very important aspect is to guide and support the persons (patients) and their environment as a whole. The question of the patient's personality in various social relations became an important element in modern medical thought (Ciger, 1977, p. 105). Through these ideas we can see the diversion of medicine from the pure natural-biological focus of interest into the concern for the patient's personality. So we can see certain aspects of medical ethics.

In Ciger's opinion, the role of medicine is not only a therapeutic one. Deepening of the patients' health and abilities, improvement of their physiological functions with the main aim of fullness and social full-value based on their freedom, their value of dignity, their balance, their adequate life satisfaction and movement towards the ideal human being in society represent other crucial components that constitute another important role of medicine (Ciger, 1977, p. 20). I agree with author in his understanding of philosophy as a culture of rationality and personality, categorical thinking and social human substance. No specialists without the philosophical point of view can enable more than just manipulation with their patients. Physicians should be aware of the fact that their role is not only to diagnose the patients and provide them with appropriate therapy. Very often it is more difficult and also more important to bring patients to permanent cooperation with doctors (Ciger, 1977, p. 124). For this reason, medicine also needs philosophy for good results in practice, because without philosophy, it can become only an empty and mechanical science.

Ciger further evolves his ideas and he perceives the person as a subject of the physician's actions (subject and object) that have a certain meaning of life, personality, consciousness and emotions. Persons (patients) have their dignity, value and the role of the doctor is to increase and not to lower their dignity. Therefore, when the doctor's role is to decide about health and diseases; the person cannot be understood abstractly, incompletely as an anatomical and physiological unit. Doctors have to take notice of the whole personality with the body and psychics, to understand the person as a member of social existence and component in the development of the species, an actor in society's development (Ciger, 1977, p. 118).

Ethics with its principles, among various social disciplines, has a special place in medicine. The important position of ethics within medicine is given

by the fact that it is helpful in solutions of various conflict situations in practice. Medical-ethical casuistics[5] represents an important problem in everyday medical practice. Ciger declares various situations dealing with the trust in the doctor-patient relationship, doctor's responsibility (in the legislative and moral point of view), etc. as an important problem (Ciger, 1977, p. 119). The author directly mentions ethics as an important part of the physicians' work, but as we can observe, he does not refer to work of the nurse in ethically conflicting situations, so the issues of nursing ethics are absent. It is also documented by his opinion in which he considers a physician to be the basic representative of medical science and as a natural health care leader, advisor and teacher of the population.[6] So the physician is understood as a basic personality in medicine and practice, but the position of nurse is unnoticed.

The need for ethics in medicine and in medical practice was also reflected in articles published in different journals. Ladislava Lysáková in her article *Etika: súčasť profesie – o žiaducich vlastnostiach a kvalite lekára* which was published in the journal *Nové slovo,* speaks about the existence of two opinions on the physician's personality. First, physicians should be professionals, first-rate experts who should have knowledge of all new medical information and subsequently they should be qualified to apply it in practice. The second opinion emphasizes that humanity of physicians is of the most importance, the ability to have good relationships with patients that represent an inseparable and important part of his professionalism and adequate cure. Lysáková does not underestimate the importance of science and technology, but she inclines to the second of the mentioned opinions and emphasizes that the abilities and personal qualities of the physicians, their relations to the medicine and patients take precedent. Nor can the most modern techniques replace the living, whole personality of the physician (Lysáková, 1986, p. 23).[7] The author emphasizes the need for a humane

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[5] Assessment of the particular situation through the general norm, rule.

[6] Ciger, as an example of such physicians, presents Dr. Ivan Hálek who was, in his opinion, one of the most interesting personalities within Slovak medicine and national life (Ciger, 1977, p. 122). More information about Ivan Hálek and his educational and moral message can be found in the article by Júlia Klembarová *Etický a výchovný odkaz v živote a diele I. Hálka* (Klembarová, 2012, pp. 265–267).

[7] The need for ethical reflections within medical practice is also reflected on by another author; Gennadij Ivanovič Caregorodcev. The physician's activity is characterized as a group of professional, ethical and psychological factors. It is mainly emphasized that, together with the scientific – technological revolution, the topicality of moral problems also increases. New inventions and discoveries influence medical practice and represent the reasons for the formation of new legal, psychological and also ethical problems (Caregorodcev, 1978, p. 7). Based on it, it is not enough for doctors to have only expert knowledge, experience and skills, but they have to have also certain moral and psychological abilities, because it is impossible to

approach of physicians towards patients and using this opinion she stresses the importance of ethics as a part of the medical profession.

Conclusion

Based on the abovementioned facts and issues dealt with by individual authors, thinking in the second half of the 20th century was oriented on the need of philosophy and ethical reflection of medical practice. These ideas were influenced by the existence of new problems arising in medicine. Nursing ethics as an autonomous field of professional ethics was absent in that period and its issues were reflected within medical ethics. Medical ethics was neither addressed marginally, nor without significant interest. There was a dominance of general reflections about the need for medical ethics, the presentation of particular requirements on the physician's personality and descriptive understanding of the individual problems meeting physicians in their everyday work. So I can conclude that some particular issues of medical ethics were present, but it was impossible to speak about medical ethics. The situation was more difficult concerning nursing ethics. Issues of nursing ethics were addressed marginally within reflections on medical ethics that were also reflected indirectly.

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work optimally without it (Caregorodcev, 1978, p. 8). As we can see, in these words, the human approach of doctors to their profession is stressed. Among the mentioned psychological and moral requirements on the physicians' personality are the compassion, solidarity, humanity, attention, responsibility, obligation, and so on (Caregorodcev, 1978, p. 8).

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Independent Ethics in Poland

Stefan Konstańczak

Abstract
In this article the author presents the history of the development of independent ethics in Poland, which was developed by followers of the Lvov-Warsaw School, the most famous Polish school of philosophy in the world. The general specificity of all branches, defined as independent ethics is presented first. Next, the author presents the historical and political conditions for the creation of this type of ethical concept. In Poland, such ethics was established in two forms, the first of which exhibited its separation from the whole ethical tradition while the second, in contrast, tried to generalise this tradition in a form, named by Tadeusz Czeżowski, as metaethics. This article discusses in depth only the most well-known concept of independent ethics developed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński.

Keywords: independent ethics, Lvov-Warsaw School, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Władysław Witwicki, clerisy, the learned, liberal

Independent ethics is a postulate rather than a consistent branch in ethics. Unlike known systems, it is not based on one overriding value (summum bonum), from which detailed instructions of moral nature are drawn. The term "independent ethics" also points to its individuality from all other fields of science and society, as well as all previous ethic traditions. Independent ethics was born in Poland under specific historical conditions, in an attempt to develop a concept that would distance Polish philosophers from being accused of collaborating with institutions from invading nations. Initially, all its variations of intrinsic understanding in the sphere of human duties which should not have any external justification were overexposed. Such a possibility was to exist only when ethics was treated as a discipline which fulfilled all scientific criteria. Independence, therefore, was to be guaranteed by the submission of ethical considerations to the requirements placed on empirical sciences. In Polish philosophy's history there was a widespread, but unjust, belief that for the independent ethics' supporters it was allegedly about dismissing religion as a basis for determining the sphere of human duty. The truth is just that, in the then dominant Polish Lvov-Warsaw School, discussions were undertaken on how ethical indications should be formulated so as to preserve its scientific character, and hence to indicate why such an opportunity is not provided by supporting ethics on religious indications. Thus, it was about a scientific ethics project, objective in the sense that its indications do not depend on the beliefs and physical and intellectual

dispositions of individuals. All the sciences form a unity understood in two ways: „Individual theories and disciplines, dealing with the different perspectives of the world also form a unity, thanks to the unity of the world which they research. And finally, their common task can be most generally encompassed in: they have to provide man with knowledge" (Czeżowski, 1967, p. 28). Therefore, ethics is to provide knowledge, but it does not have to try to remove the imperfections of the social world. Thus, independence is not so much maintaining an equal distance or avoiding external influences, as supporting the whole concept on a repeatable and verifiable foundation. Only then is it possible to discover laws and formulate scientific theories. Tadeusz Czeżowski expressed this clearly: "He who wants to work and fight for the realisation of his objectives must rely on one's beliefs and dogmas but science does not provide the dogmas and therefore science, while fulfilling what does not belong to it, remains on the side in this dispute" (Czeżowski, 1958, pp. 24–25).

The History of Independent Ethics in the Lvov-Warsaw School

The independent ethics postulate, in terms of its reliance on the results of research, was not only born in the Lvov-Warsaw School. It is suffice it to recall the works of Julian Ochorowicz or Leon Petrażycki who also undertook such an effort. Nevertheless, it was the creator of this school, Kazimierz Twardowski, who gave this contemplation a formula which has survived to this day in Polish ethics. In the first instance he advocated the release of ethics from moralisation and moral education. He justified his position as follows: "I am well aware of the fact that a religious or metaphysical view of the world and life provides extremely positive motives of conduct, and therefore plays an important educational role, but it does not change the fact that ethical norms can be derived from scientific claims; most of all this means to be scientifically justified" (Twardowski, 1990, p. 379). Educational activities should therefore be fulfilled by a "morality technique" rather than science. In his lectures "The main branches of scientific ethics" he claimed: "Many scholars have attempted to build normative ethics by trying to justify it scientifically, what is good and what is bad. Did they not succumb to the noble illusion, did they not resort to the task which exceeded science's competence" (Twardowski, 1974, p. 206). Moreover, Twardowski was an advocate of ruthlessness and ethical universalism, which was for him a condition of its scientificity. The task of ethics is to set criteria, in this way it is supposed to ensure a minimum limited freedom in individual and social relations. Such an understanding of ethics as a science had no executive power, as it could apply sanctions which were the domain of the "morality technique".

However, we can find in his well-known speech "On the dignity of the university" an indication on which independence is based in practice: "He who really sees the purpose in life when acquiring and preaching the objective truth, he who really is, as they say, a man of science, a scholar in the fullest and most beautiful sense of the word, he can be deaf to the whisperings of different ambitions and defend himself from the temptation of playing any role there, where it is not about truth but about authority, influences, dignity, honours and titles, or just simply about money!" (Twardowski, 1999, p. 377). Later, his students, formulating their ideas about independent ethics, consistently complied with this recommendation.

The sources of independent ethics must also be traced back to the pre-war idea of clerisy (from German klerisei/Latin clericia – an elite group of intellectuals; learned people, the literati), popular among the intellectual and artistic elite. The learned (from French clerc – scholar, clerk, cleric, guardian of the Truth) man is one who distances himself from any involvement in public affairs, maintains an attitude of an "objective observer", and devotes himself only to his vocation, or in the case of scholars, service to the Truth. Hence, independent ethics postulated by its followers does not have to fight for the realisation of its demands, for ethics provides knowledge about reality like any other science; however, there are others to implement it. For example, Tadeusz Kotarbiński also opposed the involvement of academics in an activity which he called organisational. By that he meant, most of all, to become active in the political and social spheres. Science, in his opinion, was not practiced for honour, but for its own sake. He vividly expressed this in his article published in "Nauka Polska" ("Polish Science"): "He who once got stuck in the sands of organisational life, is pulled in deeper and deeper, until the sand gets into the brain, causing exhaustion" (Kotarbiński, 1958, p. 290). According to this philosopher's belief the basic task of a scientist is to practice science, and from there he denounced all academics that were "fleeing" from the responsibilities of the researcher into much easier didactics. It is no wonder that Tadeusz Kotarbiński, even before the war, warned against imposing researchers' dependence on authorities, saying that science in this situation will ultimately transform itself into "an orgy of paid lies".

However, soon afterwards, events took place on Polish campuses, which necessitated the modification of such a position. The reason for this change of views were the events that led to the introduction of the so-called "bench ghetto" for Jewish students on Polish campuses. From the departmental chair at Warsaw University Kotarbiński then declared in a loud voice the following words: "I am not a young man, it would be much more comfortable for me to deliver my lectures sitting in the departmental chair, however unusually

important moral, ethical and universal forbearance forces me to deliver my lectures standing. I will continue to deliver my lectures standing so long as the medieval ghetto orders are not lifted" (Jadczak, 1997, p. 164). It was the observation of the current situation which led Kotarbiński to reject clerisy and adopt an attitude committed to the problems of the modern world. The learned man is indeed free from external coercion, but as it turns out, at the same time is utterly helpless in a situation where such coercion occurs. In effect, long before World War II Kotarbiński understood that the learned man's attitude does not meet the needs of teamwork. Thus, the full freedom of practicing science was, in his opinion, impossible, because freedom must be subject to the rules of reason, and thus is always associated with responsibility, that is it must be so utilised that it does not to lead to a "brawl". Such a person fights with evil, renouncing all violence, has no need to exploit others. A person with such an attitude was called [by Kotarbiński] a liberal, because: "valuing freedom for its own sake, and not just for its tactical benefits, a genuine liberal demands from governments that what he is ready to grant opponents himself in the event of him coming to power" (Kotarbiński, 1987, p. 238). However, one cannot identify a liberal with libertine, because freedom does not mean anarchy, as freedom so understood also means greater responsibility.

Maria Ossowska, later characterising a liberal's attitude, aptly remarked: "Tadeusz Kotarbiński protests against equating a liberal with a brawler. If a liberal had to be a brawler, it would be necessary to include in the brawlers all those who have ever struggled with tyranny. However, he who claims that an independent man is incapable of solid action, in his opinion, he mixes two different things which are: to go hand in hand and march in step" (Ossowska, 2011, p. 115). Involvement was a necessary attribute of a liberal, but concerned only those situations in which people were going to get hurt i.e. they experience undeserved suffering either because of imperfections in positive laws, or as a result of somebody's ill-will. It seemed that for independent ethics in Poland it was a turning point, and Tadeusz Kotarbiński increasingly began to delve into ethical problems, which was especially noticeable after the atrocities of World War II and the onset of a new political order in Poland.

The political situation in Poland was so shaped that, following the end of World War II a special task of protecting science from falsehood and deception was placed on philosophers. This Lvov-Warsaw School characteristic was particularly exposed when its cherished objectives were confronted with political practices implemented according to Marxist principles. Historical materialism assumed a belief in objective and absolute social rights, acting similarly to the laws of nature, and did not perceive the need to ensure freedom for the creators and intellectuals. An investigation of

the disputes which occurred at the time is also the tracking of the development of independent ethics in Poland. However, it would be incorrect to recognise that at the time only one concept to guarantee independence came into being, for there were several ways. The best known is Tadeusz Kotarbiński's ethics, but legitimately at least two ways can be identified in which followers of the Lvov-Warsaw School endeavoured to ensure an independent program for their concepts.

The first of these ways can be described with the help of Stanislaw Ossowski's well-known statement – "do not be obedient in thought." He claimed that for the scientist: "his social service is dependent in that when fulfilling his professional activities he is not obedient in thought. In this respect, he must not obey the synod, the committee, the minister, the emperor, or God. If he is obedient, if he changes his views on command or if his thoughts are not in accordance with his words, he is betraying his duties" (Ossowski, 1956, p. 4). In such terms independent ethics was guaranteed to be unyielding to external influences, especially the existing philosophical tradition. The only guidelines for ethicists were supposed to be the indications flowing from research carried out in accordance with the rigours of the scientific workshop. Almost all attempts to formulate independent ethics undertaken in the Lvov-Warsaw School are contained in this approach. The best known is Tadeusz Kotarbiński's proposal, which will be further discussed, and Władysław Witwicki's concept, which differs from the first one in that it does not exhibit its atheistic provenance. Nevertheless, his concept of independent ethics based on instincts, that is the biologically determined sphere of duty, emerged just after the First World War and was in principle the main voice of dissent during attempts to subordinate the moral sphere under ad hoc political interests.

Tadeusz Czeżowski suggested an alternative approach for which independence guaranteed, above all, the realisation of making ethics more scientific. To this end, he developed an original concept of generalising all previously known systems of ethics and formulated a single general theory which he called meta-ethics. With this intention he remained isolated and did not even gain the understanding of other Lvov-Warsaw School followers, since, as an example, Maria Ossowska criticised his reflections decidedly, albeit incorrectly (Ossowska, 1983, p. 476).

Tadeusz Kotarbiński's Independent Ethics

Although Kotarbiński's ethical views are widely spoken of in Poland as an "independent ethics system", it is undoubtedly exaggerated. It was not even the intention of the philosopher himself, since this ethics, as if, grew out of his personal relationship with the world. He just wanted to "give an outline of the

possibility of such a system of views and directives", which an honest man could profess to, one who does not feel intimately associated with any religion or ideology. Mieczysław Wallis aptly characterised this idea: "Kotarbiński wants to base his view of the world exclusively on reason and experience. He is a definite enemy of all intuitionism, fideism, and irrationalism. Also by his conduct he wants to be guided only by rational incentives. ('I set myself as a directive to follow my progress exclusively and only by rational incentives'). Nevertheless, he based the domain on the 'certainty of the heart' and hence on something irrational, that is ethics" (Wallis, 1948b, p. 42). The second assumption was to actively involve himself in solving problems surfacing in his modern world. His concept was therefore an attempt to replace the existing ethical concepts, which on being challenged with the reality of totalitarianism failed. Kotarbiński therefore wanted to apply the Lvov-Warsaw School characteristic principle of minimalism to ethics: "Minimalism as a careful and critical pursuit of the basis for certainty" (Borzym, 1993, p. 274). In place of an undefined and very capacious Christian principle of love thy neighbour he suggested a simpler solution, which refers to the belief that evil is simply more pronounced, more easily understood and more quickly perceived than good. Therefore, his ethics program was based on eliminating evil, and this can be achieved by way of "a more moderate: negative rather than positive, demanding of a certain minimum instead of a maximum from the program. Refrain from any hostile feelings for other monads; do not breed malicious worms in the heart" (Kotarbiński, 1987, p. 262).

According to Kotarbiński it is sufficient to observe the world and follow the rights of reason, to be able to follow the path, which was promoted by his independent ethics. They appear during actions, and so are characteristics (of will, of intentions, of people) of legitimate actions, worthy of respect, and honourable. Their antimony is evil, for a person something shameful. Such a combination of honourable and shameful acts is then sanctioned by every aware person and so is clear for everybody. Kotarbiński, for teaching purposes, tempted himself to identify such antonymous pairs of decent and shameful actions (Kotarbiński, 1987, p. 187):

1. kindness – cruelty
2. honesty – dishonesty
3. heroism – cowardice
4. prowess – laziness
5. self-control – succumbing to temptations

From this he also tried to identify individuals who must succumb to a negative moral evaluation deserving to be called a wretch: "bully, coward,

cheat, a fallen man (slave of habit)" (Kotarbiński, 1987, p. 107). He never spoke of values as their ontological status was for him at least doubtful. In opposition to these categories of people there is a trustworthy guardian who combines all the qualities that adorn people. Therefore a trustworthy guardian is a person who discloses all the good things of this world, and therefore is a person on whom you can always rely, as he permeates his kindness towards all others. Thus, he is "an honest, brave, valiant and self-controlled man" (Kotarbiński, 1987, p. 188). In order to behave properly, and in a manner worthy of man, it is not necessary to refer to religious reasoning. Everyone can be a trustworthy guardian, a goodness of heart is sufficient. It is a typical human disposition and everybody possesses it.

Tadeusz Kotarbiński's independent ethics was therefore an ethics of common sense; no specific knowledge was needed in order to 'implement it, nor anything else besides a sensitive heart, or rather a conscience. As Mieczysław Wallis emphasised: "Kotarbiński often expressed his ethics as 'the ethics of a good heart'. He based it on the 'certainty of the heart' which exists for him and those with similar feeling. The heart requires participation in the fate of all beings dependent on us. Independent ethics is to be an 'emphasis of our current conscience'" (Wallis, 1948a, p. 44).

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is worth quoting Mieczysław Wallis: "Tadeusz Kotarbiński at a meeting of the Congress of Professors collaborating with the Council of Scientists (December 1947): 'I am an atheist. I am an ontological materialist; I see a lot of valuable things in dialectical materialism. I am a rationalist. It would seem then, that I should feel good in the present circumstances. However, I feel bad and it's getting worse'" (Wallis, 1948a, p. 155). Nevertheless, he did not stop working on the independent ethics concept, which in Poland, during the period of real socialism became very popular, mainly for this reason that even simple people were able to understand its recommendations and adhere to them in their lives. Instead of a complex hierarchy of values and a system of moral standards he proposed that people should be guided by simple recommendations, which he called "advisories". Their sound somewhat resembled Kantian categorical imperatives, but their understanding did not exceed the capabilities of the average person. The overall advisory took the form of a conditional sentence: if someone wants to act good he must first earn the respect of others, and become an authority for them, and then his actions should be guided by his heart and conscience. If someone can do this now, he has started to act selflessly and nobly, capable of self-control, gaining the title of a trustworthy guardian. Becoming an authority for others, at the same time raises the moral condition of his environment. It is

no wonder that Kotarbiński attained popularity for his independent ethics already in his lifetime, which no ethicist before him managed to do in Poland.

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John Dewey's Ideas of Moral Education

Marta Gluchmanová

Abstract

I would like to research Dewey's philosophy of education and its moral issues in context of contemporary debates. Dewey pointed out many moral educational problems which are topical also nowadays (in Slovakia too). Education tends to socialize its members. Dewey focuses especially on the quality and value of the socialization which depends upon the habits and goals of the group including its morality. According to him, to have a large number of common as well as moral values, it is necessary to offer to all the members of the group an equal opportunity to receive them. The commitment of society to education is a familiar fact. For the reason it is necessary to build connections among teachers, schools, parents, families and society. Dewey emphasizes necessity to look upon such moral values like honesty, loyalty, perseverance, amiability, as moral goods and also some rules for other values – balance, harmony, etc. They are very important as norms or criteria of judging the benefit of new experiences that parents and teachers are usually want to teach them to the youth. Moral values provide the norms and models that guide us to satisfaction and meaning. Dewey's philosophy of moral education is expressive about the duty of the teacher in moral education of students. He emphasized the influence of intellectual environment the minds of young generation.

Keywords: moral education, values, philosophy, education

Introduction

In the present study, I would like to deal with John Dewey's ideas on education (including moral education) in modern society, compare them with some contemporary ones, and perhaps propose a possible implementation of these ideas in Slovak schools at present. Dewey''s work in the field of philosophy of education is relatively unknown in Slovakia, primarily because no comprehensive work dealing with his philosophy of education has been translated into Slovak to date.[1] I presume that his ideas are still current and relevant in our circumstances as well – especially as far as the period after the year 1989 is concerned, because it has seen many changes in moral education.

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1 The anthology entitled *Pragmatizmus* (*Pragmatism*) was published in Slovakia (Višňovský & Mihina, 1998), containing Dewey's *The Bearings of Pragmatism on Education* (Dewey, 1998b) and Chapter 24 of his *Democracy and Education* (Dewey, 1998a). Apart from this anthology, some of Dewey's essays have been published in Slovak translation recently. The selection of the essays is entitled *Rekonštrukcia liberalizmu* (Dewey, 2001).

Bearing in mind that the issue of education in Slovakia is not central to our politicians' attention, I must conclude that even those proposals for change that have already been made in this area – similar to Dewey's ideas in many respects – have proved very slow to take effect.

Bogdan Suchodolski considers Dewey's pedagogy an important part of the history of Comenius' (Komenský) followers, including Rousseau and Pestalozzi. The main aim of this pedagogy was an attempt at true education (Suchodolski, 1972, p. iv). Dewey's philosophical and pedagogical ideas began to form under the influence of contemporaneous thought in American pedagogy (particularly J. J. Rousseau's and J. F. Herbart's ideas). However, Dewey found fault with the Herbart school, asserting that the child is not the focal point. He emphasised that this tendency of pragmatic pedagogy (the child/pupil becoming the centre around which the whole education is built) was not to be understood as extreme pedocentrism; rather, it was to be interpreted in the sense that pupils are supposed to work actively, live their own life, and dynamically grasp the experiences that life brings.

Moral Education and Social Life

The central notion of Dewey's pragmatic philosophy was the category of experience. However, the child had to learn to gain experience first. In his opinion, using experience in education meant taking advantage of the child's natural tendencies and inclinations, process management, and ability to gain experience. He stated that it was vitally important such education in which the learned skills and knowledge of pupils and students are integrated fully into their lives as persons, citizens and human beings. He recognised the importance of the subjective experience of individual people in introducing revolutionary new ideas. For Dewey, faith in experiences was inseparable from faith in democracy. It was his *Democracy and Education* that brought on a revolution in the tradition of education. No longer isolated from society, school was becoming central in the fight for a better life. Contrary to the approaches of traditional pedagogy, where discipline and study materials were repeatedly emphasised, and the extremes of progressivism, which overestimated the importance of the child's inner life and interests, Dewey created his model of an active school in which experience, free activity, and respect for children's needs were in organic unity with their preparation for social life (Krankus, 1992, p. 533). Similarly, the authors of the "Millenium" project have recently outlined the general goals of the education system in the Slovak Republic: they are to be based on a purposeful and systematic development of pro-social behaviour and creation of noble values such as love, respect, good will, tolerance, trust, honesty, mutual help and cooperation, search for the right value orientation, relationship to oneself,

other people, environment, and the world as such. As opposed to the traditional school, where the teacher-pupil relationship was directive, the humane-oriented school puts emphasis on the humanisation of man, relationships, and atmosphere in general (Rosa, Turek & Zelina, 2000, p. 11).

What Dewey had in mind was not just gaining a lot of knowledge and information on the part of pupils and students, but, most of all, developing their motives, moral powers, and adapting and finding their place in social life.[2] He dealt with issues that are still current, and he was partly right to assert that the main source of "the discipline problem" in schools results from suppressing physical activity. With education largely resting on using the "mind", we ought to indulge in physical activities to a greater extent, because the development of a human being cannot do without physical fitness under normal circumstances (Dewey, 1922, p. 175). Therefore, I believe that in the current era of scientific progress and over-technologized society, in which computers, mobile phones and other technological conveniences are used by pupils and students in schools on a daily basis, we should demand, bearing in mind their healthy physical development that our students get involved in physical activities.

In the concrete, the value of recognising the dynamic place of interest in an educational development is that it leads to considering individual children in their specific capabilities, needs, and preferences (Dewey, 1922, p. 163). Contemporary moral education emphasises the importance of treating every single personality on an individual basis. It is necessary to take into consideration any given individual's unique personality characteristics, peculiarities, and abilities to grasp the knowledge that is to be gained. Since the intellect played a sole role according to Dewey, namely that of using experience to solve problems effectively, the main emphasis in education should be put on activities and various forms of problem-solving. The process of moral education thus changes from handing down pieces of experience to organising their actual acquisition. The strategy of learning by doing was employed to ensure that the child is in constant contact with nature and social reality. It is thanks to activity and communication with society that man's personality is encouraged to develop (Krankus, 1992, p. 533).

Moral Education and Importance of Moral Values

The term "value" had two different meanings. On the one hand, it denoted the attitude of prizing a thing, finding it worth while, for its own sake, or

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2 Similarly, the authors of the project mentioned earlier emphasise that, apart from teaching pupils to think for themselves, it is also necessary to teach them ways of obtaining information through dynamic, creative activities, which is, after all, a lot more effective process than trying to instill loads of raw information into pupils' heads (Rosa, Turek & Zelina, 2000, p. 29).

intrinsically. To value in this sense is to appreciate. But to value also means a distinctly intellectual act – an operation of comparing and judging to evaluate (Dewey, 1922, pp. 284–285). The specific values usually discussed in educational theories coincide with aims which are usually urged. They were such things as utility, culture, information, preparation for social efficiency, mental discipline or power, and so on. Every adult has acquired, in the course of his prior experience and education, certain measures of the worth of various sorts of experience. He has learned to look upon qualities like honesty, amiability, perseverance, loyalty, as moral goods; he has learned certain rules for these values – the golden rule in morals, harmony, balance, etc. Since Dewey did not make a strict distinction between the goals of education from the process that lead to it, it merged with the process of personality development. According to him, "*(i) the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganising, reconstructing, transforming*" (Dewey, 1922, p. 72). Bearing in mind our understanding of human activity, the goal of education cannot be a given for all pupils alike either: it is situational, circumstantial, and has to reflect changes dynamically (Krankus, 1992, p. 533).

Dewey criticised the old school[3] for its detachment from life, lack of awareness of children's mental individuality, and relegating the pupil to the passive role. He claimed these elements were in contrast to the demands of the sort of developing society that calls for a new type of man. Instead, he advocated a radical change in the conception of education, one that brought school and life together. He showed respect for various psychological and social aspects, most of which became the cornerstone of his concept of society based on democracy (Dewey, 1922, p. 113). In his opinion, any new, plausible model of education had to correspond to the development of society and its new forms of social and moral life, the dominant features being the ability of an individual to react to changing situations, search for creative solutions, and fight against rigidity and prejudices. In connexion with some negative phenomena in school and non-school institutions in Slovakia, it has been increasingly emphasised that the role of school is to establish contact with new forms of social and moral life, unify them, and make a selection of the most essential ideas thereof. Furthermore, it must be ensured that the child

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3 Nowadays, similar issues are brought into focus by Boyles, who states that, at the start of their professional career, many teachers had their own visions and experiences regarding what to do and how to do it in their future career. However, the social climate and fear of losing their job often makes it impossible for them to differ or stand out from the average, thus potentially imparing the structure of the school system. Instead of implementing innovations that they would greatly appreciate, many of them prefer to stay "in the old ruts" (Boyles, 2006, p. 67).

understands these ideas, enjoys active contact with its social and moral environment, and gains control over its behaviour and conduct.[4]

Another thing that Dewey considered invaluable was teachers' awareness of various psychological methods: a detailed knowledge of the child, its mental characteristics and the social environment that it comes from is a complementary part of the teacher's acquired personal knowledge.[5] In this connexion Brian stressed that according to Dewey psychology should be taught in high schools as a bond between other studies and a means of making the mind more open to new ideas as well as for the student's own self-awareness (Brian, 1998, p. 20). The pragmatic school was based on the pivotal idea of organising educational situations around specific issues that the teacher considers important. Rather than a systematic classification of knowledge, the teaching process was understood as a development of the child's experience. It is for this reason that the child was to become familiar with and remain in contact with its social, moral and physical experience. Experience was understood to be acquired through personal activities. In this connexion, I would like to stress that nowadays demands are increasingly placed on pupils to learn by problem-solving designed to make them think effectively.[6] The pupil is thus expected to seek and weigh all sorts of information, opinions, and solutions. The way Dewey saw it, the basic method of acquiring knowledge was involving in practical activities and experiments

4 The authors of the *Millenium* project emphasise the importance of pro-social behaviour on the part of pupils, students, and other moral subjects taking part in the educational process. Furthermore, they stress the significance of ethics; abilities and skills to communicate effectively, live with other people, and help them establish progressive social relationships. Assuming that the new millenium is likely to be a millenium of humanity and emphasis on the spiritual dimensions of man and mankind, they stress the necessity to support shared values and tolerance and prepare the young for the role of responsible European citizens and participants in the working process in an integrated Europe (Rosa, Turek & Zelina, 2000, pp. 16–17).

5 Especially in an era when we bear witness too many negative, violent manifestations and instances of vandalism in and out of school in Slovakia as much as elsewhere, though particularly in Western countries, it is very important to get acquainted with the mentality of pupils and students influencing their behaviour and conduct. Even though knowledge of pupils and students' mental processes is repeatedly emphasised at present, university graduates training future teachers keep pointing out that, based on various studies carried out in Slovak primary and secondary schools, teachers are still not sufficiently prepared to face these issues. More thorough preparation for understanding children's and adolescents' minds is demanded so as to facilitate understanding this age group and become more prepared to face the kind of ethical and moral issues that are becoming ever more frequent in school institutions nowadays.

6 However, bearing in mind the rapid development of information and communication technologies, we often witness students giving precedence to computers and the Internet over their own reasoning and problem-solving. We should therefore look for ways of taking advantage of their interest in information technology in the process of forming their experience related to real-life situations.

on the part of the pupil. This kind of work was seen to offer sufficient room for freedom as well as to create a sufficient number of problem-solving situations. The child's ability to solve a problem was a benchmark of its mental development.

Dewey's Ideas of Democracy in Moral Education

According to Dewey, one of the fundamental goals of the pragmatic, active school was to mould the citizens of a future democratic society and their moral and social qualities. Project-based schoolwork created the necessary preconditions for individuals to assert themselves in a group, which laid the fundaments of rational communication and cooperation habits. Learning as a cooperative form of activity is thus a process of forming the socio-ethical qualities of an individual. When addressing the issue of children's education as preparation for life in society, Dewey adhered to the principles of his philosophy of education as well as moral education. Education has to be based on psychological evidence and child's needs, interests, and process of acquiring experience, but equally also on acquiring social experience. Through individuals' integration into various groups, levels, and social environments, life itself is to be seen as a starting point of moral education. In this connexion, Dewey claimed that a number of interpersonal relationships in any given social group are automatized. Emotional and intellectual predispositions were absent (Brian, 1998, p. 20), and social as well as moral experience, primarily involving contact with other people, was one of the most essential kinds of experience.

Dewey described democracy as the only social form in which self-realisation and self-identification are possible. It gives its citizens both the right and duty to participate in and have control over public affairs, while directing them towards an identity of interests and social goals. Democracy was marked by an intensive experience exchange, securing that everyone has their right to seek their own way and to assess the situation by means of independent judgement and rational control. The moral aspect of democracy involved making it possible for citizens to think critically in order to become familiar with inevitable social changes and interpret events from a holistic point of view. Dewey's moral education was conceived of along the same lines as the newly-emergent socially-oriented individualism. Although he knew that democracy was a process that would never be brought to completion, the task incumbent on schools was to contribute to the implementation of this process. When dealing with morality, Dewey kept stressing the importance of rational, scientific principles: the moral conduct of an individual was formed by their social context and studying the demands and problems of social and moral life. The socially-oriented function that

schools are to play in order to bridge individual and social interest's involved shared activity, establishing new contacts and cooperation, all of which make it possible for a child to develop its own social experience (Dewey, 1922, p. 417). The teacher's role is to help the pupils understand current moral issues, although not by means of precepts (nonetheless, verbal expressions of moral principles are important, too) (Krankus, 1992, p. 537). Nowadays, teachers face an even greater demand because schools are not isolated from society. It is ever more difficult to emphasise moral and ethical principles in schools when students frequently bear witness to law-breaking in their own society.

Dewey put emphasis on creating the kind of environment for children that would enable them to acquire social and moral experience, make their own way in life, and establish democratic relationships with other people. The development of personality and individuality manifests itself through a growing understanding of one's actions, interest in social as well as moral life improvement, social goodness, freedom, and progress. Whereas the basis of democracy lies in an individual's moral self-determination, its development depends on voluntary cooperation among all citizens. Dewey rejected isolated moral education, claiming it was to be implemented through all aspects of school life. Schools were to teach cooperation, support awareness of mutual dependence, responsibility for shared tasks, and individuals' ability to cooperate. Always involving some problem-solving, moral education ensured that habits related to cooperation and understanding the importance of social changes were formed. Not just the teacher, but the whole situational context, including all circumstances of the educational environment, "has to make pupils' conduct more conscious, self-consistent, and decisive" (Krankus, 1992, p. 538). Interpreted as an education of the will, character, and reason, moral education should potentially be included in any educational subject matter or teaching method – whenever children happen to be learning to think independently, organise and plan their work, make decisions and assessments, and behave responsibly.

Siegel claims: "In order that theory and practice may be coordinated, there needs to be a forum where philosophers and educators can talk to each other about their common interest in improving social life. This forum is philosophy of education, that is, philosophy and education properly understood in their necessary dependence on each other. By viewing philosophy and moral education as Dewey does, philosophers and educators can and should work together, and talk together, so as to preserve and enhance the precarious life of their society. And those who largely play the role of intermediaries,

facilitating the conversation as a whole, would be philosophers of education"
(Siegel, 2002, p. 274).[7]

Conclusion

Many historians concerned with the philosophy of education claim that Dewey's insistence on a radical transformation of school and its adaptation to the demands that life places changed the structure of American schools. Moreover, it had an impact on many pedagogical innovations as well as on the development of pedagogical reformism in other countries of the world. His views on the position of the child/pupil in the process of teaching, importance of motivation, interests and child's experience with the social and moral function of school (central to which is cooperation and the principle of individualisation) had a considerable influence on subsequent theoreticians concerned with reforms in pedagogy in both the USA and Europe.

One of the positive aspects of Dewey's philosophy of education is his effort to transcend the formalism of the old school and its detachment from life; instead, he promoted realism in the teaching process, emphasis on work education, and various social, moral and democratic elements in education. As for teaching methodology, his contribution includes project methods and problem-based teaching. Based on a balanced diet of providing theoretical information reflecting children's interests and supporting their motivation, independence, and morality, his contemplations on the organisation of subject matter in schools were similarly important. The pivotal idea of his work – connecting school with life, school as both an institution and a place for free, creative work and preparation for life – has been the subject of pedagogues' discussion for many generations until today.

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[7] Transforming the philosophy of education in Slovakia also implies that upbringing is to become more important than education; more precisely, education is only a part of upbringing. Upbringing is a matter of society as such, not just a matter of school. The philosophy of education is based on humanism, personality development and creativity. Instead of making efforts merely to acquire knowledge, those who are being educated should also try and learn to be positive about life, find motivation and reasons to live no matter how difficult the conditions, acquire skills for social life and progressive interpersonal relationships, adopt the values of creating and protecting human rights and natural environment, and learn to be free, responsible and creative (Rosa, Turek & Zelina, 2000, pp. 20–22).

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Ethics of Social Consequences as a Contemporary Consequentialist Theory

Ján Kalajtzidis

Abstract
The main aim of the paper is critical reflection of the ethics of social consequences. The reflection is based on two partially related positions. Ethics of social consequences is, on the one hand, characterized as a contemporary ethical theory and, on the other, as a specific form of consequentialism. Methodology of criticism is based on the works of a homogenous group of modern-day consequentialist authors (though these are of diverse platforms): Pettit, Singer, Sen, Shaw. The purpose of this paper is to provide objective reflection on the ethics of social consequences which may possibly become the base for further development and / or improvement of this original Slovak ethical theory.

Keywords: ethics of social consequences, consequentialism, non-utilitarian consequentialism, maximization

Introduction

The presented paper has been written with the aim of introducing *ethics of social consequences* as a contemporary consequentialist theory. In accordance with this orientation I have considered two alternative ways of presenting ethics of social consequences. On the one hand, I could present this ethical theory from its difficult beginnings in the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, through its quite successful establishment which was later completed with the creation of a tradition (or we may say a school). On the other hand, there is the more interesting and productive path which I have decided to take and to introduce ethics of social consequences by criticizing it.

The critical reflection I present here is based on two partially related positions. Ethics of social consequences is characterized as a contemporary ethical theory, along with its approach as a specific form of consequentialism.[1] Ethics of social consequences identifies itself with a position known as non-utilitarian consequentialism. Non-utilitarian consequentialism is a relatively new form of consequentialism which only began to be properly established in the 1980s. It is a form of consequentialism

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[1] Those who would like to read more about the history of the theory and the problems which stood at its formation should content themselves with the book: *Hodnoty v etike sociálnych dôsledkov* [*Values in Ethics of Social Consequences*].

which has developed from the critique of classical consequentialism[2] — utilitarianism. This critique comes from two main sources: the first one is based on diverse ethical theories which stand apart from consequentialism, such as deontology. The second one comes from within consequentialism, during the history of which a lot of different ideas were formed and began to oppose each other and diversify once solid ethical theory.

Philip Pettit is one of the first, and today one of the best known, authors of the non-utilitarian form of consequentialism. Pettit is even one of the first authors who (quite successfully) tried to identify the dividing line and contrast between consequentialist (teleological) and non-consequentialist (deontological) theories. He argues that even if consequentialists and deontologists may share a theory of the good (value),[3] they do not share a theory of the right[4] (Pettit, 1989, p. 117).

A very simple interpretation of the issue in Pettit's words is this: a consequentialist promotes whatsoever value he (or she) chooses. An agent (if he or she is a consequentialist) will honour the values only so far as honouring them is a part of their promotion, or is necessary in order to promote them. On the other hand the opponents of consequentialism (non-consequentialists) claim that there are values we should honour without asking if this honouring will promote them. In other words, there are values which should be honoured even if honouring them will not lead to their promotion. The main difference is in the attitude the agent has towards the values. For consequentialists, the relation is purely instrumental. An agent should act to promote the value. For non-consequentialists the relation is not purely instrumental. The agent may exemplify designated values even if it does not help to promote them (Pettit, 1991, pp. 230–231).

Ethics of Social Consequences and Contemporary Issues in Consequentialism

McNaughton and Rawling, who are in a long running argument with Pettit, explain the difference between promoting and honouring of values. They use the value of honesty to explain the distinction. To honour the value of honesty

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[2] The term consequentialism cannot be used to name one complex ethical theory nowadays. In today's notion (which I identify with) this term is used mostly as a label for a group of ethical theories with similar characteristics and most importantly the same scope (focus on outcomes) - consequences.

[3] Theory of what is valuable, what we should aspire for. Theory of good can be even used to distinguish diverse ethical theories within consequentialism. Utilitarianism for example separates itself from other consequentialist ethical theories by focusing on values of happiness and pleasure.

[4] Theory of what one should choose, what is right or as Pettit puts it: "the theory of what makes one, among a set of options, the correct one to choose" (Pettit, 1989, p. 117).

means to strive to be an honest man in life (non-consequentialists). To promote the value of honesty means to strive to encourage as many people as we can to be honest (consequentialists). A consequentialist agent will honour the value of honesty only as far as it will help to promote it. If the conflict between honouring and promoting occurs, they will choose promoting (McNaughton & Rawling, 1992, p. 835).

Similarly, Vallentyne believes that promoting the value, counter to just honouring it, is one of the two main differences between the consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories. He claims that: "if in a given choice situation, one action is permissible, and a second is more valuable, then the second action is also permissible" (Vallentyne, 2006, p. 22).[5]

In the question of honouring versus promoting values, the ethics of social consequences remains on the side of consequentialism. One of the arguments that support my claim is the attitude towards the value of humanity (one of the core values in this ethical theory)[6] that ethics of social consequences declares. Gluchman (a prominent author and founder of ethics of social consequences) states that the moral value of humanity can only be performed (the value is promoted), not solely respected (honoured) (Gluchman, 2008, pp. 73–74). An example of this position is the notion of ethics of social consequences on the help in the prolonged suffering[7] of a human being. To perform (promote) the value of humanity means to help to end the suffering and not just to respect (honour) the value (Gluchman, 2008, p. 81).

The second distinction which Pettit identified to help him classify ethical theories (distinguish consequentialism from non-consequentialism) is the position the agent holds towards the values: agent-relative versus agent-neutral. Pettit connects these issues (agent-neutral versus agent-relative) with the former ones (honouring versus promoting values) and he tries to formulate the answer by operating with the question of rightness. He claims that if we refrain from the position that rightness can only be achieved by an agent-neutral position, then we can mark even typically non-consequentialist

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[5] We can agree that the rule about not lying is generally accepted. Try to imagine a situation when our lie can prevent five other lies from happening. In other words, if I lie once, my action will prevent another five lies from happening. So even though I know I should not lie (action is not permissible) it will become one (permissible) because at the end it will help reduce the amount of lies in general. As a consequentialist I should promote the value of truthfulness (do not lie) even if it means to lie, but only if the lie will bring more truth telling people (amount of lies will decline). For a non-consequentialist it is acceptable just to honour the value of truthfulness by not lying.

[6] Primary (core) values are: humanity, human dignity and moral right. Secondary (auxiliary) values closely interconnected with primary ones are: responsibility and justice. They are all covered under the notion of positive social consequences.

[7] I assume that the result of the fatal suffering will always be a painful death.

theories as consequentialist. As an example he indicates the agents who decided to promote the values (not just to honour them) but they did not refrain from relativisation of those values towards their own future, towards their children and so on. In other words: even if an agent holds a value honouring position but does not hold the agent-neutral position, he or she is not a consequentialist because holding an agent-relative position (in relation to the agent) means to prefer duties or obligations which are, in relation to him, counter to maximization of good (Pettit, 1997, pp. 129–130).

McNaughton and Rawling disagree with Pettit's claim on the issue of an agent-neutral versus agent-relative position.[8] Pettit claims that both agents (consequentialist and non-consequentialist) can respond to the value of honesty in the same way – by exemplifying it.[9] The agent will strive to be an example of an honest person. The difference is in their reasons. The consequentialist's reason is to realize the value of honesty as widely as possible (agent-neutral), the reason for a non-consequentialist to do so is to be an honest person (agent-relative). McNaughton and Rawling do accept that agent-neutral and agent-relative positions may be used to distinguish between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, but they do not accept Pettit's example. One of the reasons for their denial is that even if this example may work on some values (honesty), it does not work for all of them (e.g. happiness) (McNaughton & Rawling, 1992, p. 836).

To sum up the text above, we can conclude that the best way to distinguish consequentialist theories from non-consequentialist is by looking at their locus on values. Values (what we think is valuable) can be shared between consequentialist and non-consequentialist. But there are at least two main differences in the attitude towards those values: consequentialist must be impartial (values cannot be relativized toward the agent) and the agent must promote those values (just honouring them is not enough).

What I am trying to indicate is that the discussion about distinctions in ethical theories is much more complex than one might think. On the one hand there is a view (one of many) that we can classify ethical theories by identifying their position towards values; that we can describe a theory as consequentialist if the position is agent-neutral and non-consequentialist if the position is agent-relative. On the other hand, there is a big discussion about

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[8] They use few models of defining agent-neutral and agent-relative positions. One of them comes from Nagel: "If a reason can be given a general form which does not include an essential reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-neutral reason. On the other hand, if the general form of a reason does include an essential reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-relative reason" (McNaughton & Rawling, 1991, p. 170).

[9] Of course, only to the point that it promotes the value of honesty.

how to characterize and define those positions (what one means when labelling a position as agent-neutral or agent-relative).[10]

Ethics of social consequences tends toward the agent-relative position. This is to stress the belief that every moral agent has special obligations towards their nearest and dearest (family members and close friends). The obligation can be stressed as acting on behalf of those agents. On the other hand, interconnected with this obligation is the condition that the substantial interest of others must be taken in the account too. Until now ethics of social consequences has not dealt with the issue more closely (Gluchman, 1999, p. 120).[11] One of the questions which remain open is whether the theory can hold an agent-relative position and fulfil the former condition (to promote the values and not just honour them).

The specific differences I have written about up to this point are used to identify differences between consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories. But the most common and most widely used criterion remains consequences (evaluation of acts based on consequences of those acts). It must be stressed that consequences in consequentialism are just one of the ways to evaluate the acts (not the only one, though the most important).

One of the reasons why we talk about diversification in consequentialism is the principle of maximization. Classical utilitarian consequentialism asserts that "the morally right action for an agent to perform is the action, of those actions that the agent could perform at the time, which has the best consequences or results in the most good". This assertion is quite different from proclaiming that the morally right action for an agent to perform is the action or those actions that the agent could perform at the time that has good consequences, or satisfying consequences, or prevalence of positive consequences over negative consequences. Classical utilitarian consequentialism does not recommend this type of action (which will result in the best consequences); neither just favours this type of action. Classical utilitarian consequentialism clearly formulates this assertion as a condition. The action can be right only when there is no other action (of those actions that the agent could perform at the time) that would bring better consequences. Otherwise the action is immoral (Shaw, 2006, pp. 5–6).[12]

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[10] More precise and deeper discussion on that issue can be found in Tim Mulgan's work (2001), where he tries to widen the discussion by interconnecting it to one of the most famous problems which exist in contemporary consequentialism – demandingness objection.

[11] One of the attempts to resolve, or even only enhance this issue on the platform of ethics of social consequences is the chapter called: Agent-neutral versus agent-relative (Kalajtzidis, 2012).

[12] Paradoxically an action in utilitarianism can be moral even if it brings bad consequences, but only when other actions (of those actions that the agent could perform at the time) would bring even worse consequences.

The principle of maximization brings limitations into agent behaviour – their decision making and acting. One of those limitations is what Vallentyne calls "limited moral freedom". He claims that morality recognizes a significant range of optional actions which can be identified as permissible (but not morally required). But if our choice is limited by the maximization principle, then there is no moral option. Our moral freedom is limited by the principle of maximization to the extent that there is only one action which is permissible and obligatory (Vallentyne, 2006, p. 27).

As well as the agent-neutral position, the principle of maximization is rejected by ethics of social consequences. Its position is that positive social consequences should prevail over negative consequences. There is no restriction on striving to achieve the maximum amount of positive social consequences. But maximization of positive consequences is not required as the primary (or only) objective (Gluchman, 1995, pp. 92–105).[13] In other words: maximization is rejected as the primary criterion for the desired action (rightness of the action is not determined by the maximization principle).

But ethics of social consequences goes even further and claims that you do not even need to strive to achieve a maximum of positive social consequences and the action can still be evaluated as right (Gluchman, 1999, p. 126). In my opinion this claim is a result of insufficient understanding of the issue of maximization in consequentialism. The principle of maximization in ethics of social consequences remains rejected because it is understood as a principle connected only to the theory of right, [14] and thus used in the assembling of an evaluation scale.[15]

The discussion on the issue of the maximization principle in consequentialism is much wider. The contemporary discussion focuses on the effort of an agent (or cost of their actions) and not just on outcomes' attributes (agent's contribution to the outcome or outcome itself) (Mulgan, 2001, pp. 143–144). As a result of not elaborating on this issue, unreasonable situations might arise. In this sense ethics of social consequences for example recommends (or at least approves) actions which do not bring the best outcomes even if they could. To make my point I will provide an example.

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[13] I assume that the agent-neutral position and maximization principle are closely connected to each other in the classical utilitarian form of consequentialism. Utilitarianism is agent-neutral, because it assigns every moral agent the same mutual aim: to maximize common utility.

[14] The theory of right in ethics of social consequences is a very complex issue. The acts which the theory of right distinguishes are: moral ─ immoral, right ─ wrong, praiseworthy ─ blameworthy, efficient ─ ineffective, obligatory ─ one that should be avoided (Gluchman, 2008, p. 11–32). In that way, if the act does not bring the best consequences but "barely" prevalence of positive consequences over negative consequences, we can evaluate it as right instead of immoral (as opposite of moral).

[15] Evaluation scale is a scale which is used to evaluate the acts which moral agents perform.

Let us imagine the story about a doctor of medicine, Xenophon. Xenophon discovered a cure (drug) for a very dangerous illness which is killing people around the world. At the present time, there are around 1 000 000 sick people: 400 000 in the USA, 400 000 in the EU and 200 000 in the Russian Federation. The process of making the drug is relatively easy and cheap. The only thing which the affected regions need to know is the formula of the drug. Xenophon has decided (we do not know why) to give the formula only to Russia and the EU, but not to the USA.

How could we evaluate his act? According to ethics of social consequences (ESC), the act is not moral, but it is still right, because acting in this way saves 600 000 people and only 400 000 people die. Positive consequences overcome negative ones. Xenophon, as a supporter of the theory of ethics of social consequences does not need to achieve the maximum. (ESC claims that you can, but you do not need to). You do not even need to strive to achieve the maximum of positive social consequences and the action can still be evaluated as right ["Na to, aby určité konanie bolo možné hodnotiť ako správne, nemusíme sa usilovať o maximalizáciu pozitívnych sociálnych dôsledkov z neho vyplývajúcich"] (Gluchman, 1999, p. 126).

If we do not know the motive behind his act, we know the consequences, but we do not care about the effort – (cost of his act), it is easy to deny the principle of maximization. But if we evaluate the same act and include the effort (measurement), evaluation will become more difficult.

We are in the same situation, but now it is not that simple. Xenophon cannot just give up the formula, but he must travel to the destination and has to explain how to produce the drug. So, in comparison with the first situation, effort – cost of the action is increased (1. example – just give up the formula, 2. example – need to travel and explain). His decision is the same; he is going to help Russia and the EU, but not the USA. The consequences are the same: 600 000 survive, 400 000 die.

If we evaluate his act now, do we consider accepting or denying the maximizing principle differently? I believe yes. If you can maximize the consequences of your act without any more effort and you do not or you can maximize your consequences but only with more effort (on cost) and you do not, it might change the view on the question whether maximization should be obligatory or not.

To make it even easier to understand, I tried to formalize the example:

USA: 400 000 sick   EU: 400 000 sick   Russia: 200 000 sick

Alternative action   **Evaluating the act**

X1- Help everybody (maximizing   Moral
    the positive consequences)   Right
X2- Help nobody   Wrong
X3- Help Russia   Immoral
X4- Help Russia, EU
X5- Help Russia, EU, USA
X6- Help EU
X7- Help EU, USA
X8- Help USA
X9- Help USA, Russia

Situation #1 Xenophon needs to travel to destination and explain how to make the drug[16]

We do not seek maximization of act.   We seek maximization of act.
    X1- moral   X1- moral
    X2- immoral   X2- immoral
    X3- immoral   X3- immoral
    X4- right   X4- immoral
    X5- moral (same as X1)   X5- moral (same as X1)
    X6- immoral   X6- immoral
    X7- right   X7- immoral
    X8- immoral   X8- immoral
    X9- right   X9- immoral

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[16] I do understand that it is relatively very easy to criticize this evaluation. For example: how it is possible to make the same evaluation for actions X2 (where everybody dies), X3 (200 000 people are saved) and act X6 (where 400 000 are saved)? At this moment I am using evaluation scale only as an instrument to formalize my example, and I will not try to clarify, or resolve this problem.

Situation #2 Xenophon just needs to give the formula of the drug to help them

We do not seek maximization of act.

    X1- moral
    X2- immoral
    X3- immoral
    <u>X4- wrong</u>
    X5- moral (same as X1)
    X6- immoral
    <u>X7- wrong</u>
    X8- immoral
    <u>X9- wrong</u>

We seek maximization of act.

    X1- moral
    X2- immoral
    X3- immoral
    X4- immoral
    X5- moral (same as X1)
    X6- immoral
    X7- immoral
    X8- immoral
    X9- immoral

The difference in evaluation between the first and the second situation is that in the first one, if Xenophon wants to help more he will need to *increase his effort (cost of his act),* but in the second example, even if he saves the same amount of people, in acts X4, X7 and X9 he could save more *without increasing his effort.*[17] Hence, the evaluation of the act is different, even though the number of saved / dead people is the same.

By the presented example I attempted to demonstrate that the issue of maximization (accepting or denying of the principle of maximization) is a much more complex problem than is understood by ethics of social consequences. The issue of maximization should not only be reflected from the point of consequences that action brought, as is reflected in ethics of social consequences and their projection in the evaluation scale at present.

Ethics of social consequences is already using motives and intentions as additional (auxiliary) criterion in its theory of right, and must extend this endeavour, and focus on the efforts of the moral agent which could be expressed by the cost of the act for the agent.

There are other features closely related to the maximization principle which are used to diversify different types of consequentialism. One of them is the attitude towards the evaluation of consequences. Shaw claims that classical consequentialism clearly prefers expected consequences over actual consequences (even this position can cause paradoxical situations).[18]

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[17] Actions X4, X7, X9 could be replaced by X1 (X5) without increased effort (cost of the act).

[18] When a moral agent chooses the action which has less expected value than other possible actions that he or she could have performed, but through unexpected circumstances, the action brings more good than anything else the agent could have done, standard consequentialism would still hold the position that the chosen action was wrong (Shaw, 2006, pp. 8–9).

The main reason why utilitarianism prefers expected consequences over the actual ones is prospective and action-guiding theory (consequentialism is action oriented theory and does not want to just evaluate actions afterwards they were performed) (Shaw, 2006, pp. 8–9).

Ethics of social consequences takes a similar position and agrees with the view that the evaluation of an action (and its justification) can be based on expected consequences. On the other hand, ethics of social consequences emphasizes that the evaluation based on expected consequences is relevant only as a preliminary and informative evaluation made before the act. Justification of this evaluation decreases after the act has begun and the legitimacy (of this evaluation) is lost after the act is finished. The reason why ethics of social consequences proclaims this is that this type of evaluation (when exercised retrospectively) is inaccurate and even misleading (Gluchman, 2008, pp. 22–25). Ethics of social consequences prefers evaluation based on actual consequences, done ex posto (afterwards). An evaluation based on expected consequences is thus used only to verify the decision making and moral reflection of the agent. This type of evaluation in ethics of social consequences is connected with agent motives.

I do not think it is desirable to connect motives with expected consequences. In my opinion motives express the intention of an agent, his or her aim (target, objective), whereas expected consequences express the probability of possible consequences (feasibility).[19] This is another issue which ethics of social consequences need to resolve in future as it is much wider than it looks at first. If the theory is striving to become a contemporary ethical theory, it must provide the moral agent with tools to help him or her make decisions and not just to help with evaluation afterwards.[20]

Conclusion

One of the shortcomings of ethical theories is that there is no way (or at least I am not aware of any) how to find the definite answer (proof) to the question which ethical theory we should choose (which one is better) in the way we have (the proof) about e.g. gravity.

Is it consequentialism or non-consequentialism? Is it ethics of social consequences or utilitarianism? In my view consequentialist theories are superior to non-consequentialist ones because they are much more coherent,

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[19] In other words: while the motives are good to find out the intention of the agent (what he or she is trying to achieve), expected consequences helps them (and us) to understand what they can achieve.

[20] Some other problems which are connected to these issues and issues of responsibility and justice can be found in my book *Ethics of Social Consequences and Business Ethics* [Etika sociálnych dôsledkov a hospodárska etika] (for example, comment 329 on p. 185) (Kalajtzidis, 2012).

systematic (methodical) and oriented towards the moral agent. Consequentialism is closer to what we call "common sense morality" (than non-consequentialism), and in my opinion it is because of the way how the theory of right is oriented (on consequences and not on something else e.g. duties).

The *theory of good (value)* has been widely criticized in the classical version of consequentialism (utilitarianism). During the development of consequentialism the theory of good has evolved, and the clearest proof is the existence of non-utilitarian forms of consequentialism. One of the contemporary examples of this non-utilitarian form of consequentialism is *the ethics of social consequences*. However, there are a wide range of problems in the *theory of right* as well, as this paper has tried to point out (for example the problem of maximization in consequentialism). Some of those problems should be resolved in the near future.

Ethics of social consequences faces its own problems as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism (maximization principle, expected versus actual consequences etc.), but at the same time the theory is striving to become a successful contemporary ethical theory. It means that when trying to resolve the issues with which it is faced, ethics of social consequences must additionally satisfy other requirements as well.[21]

Even though in the history of human thinking there were times when philosophers (ethicists) created ethical theories (or philosophical systems) in abstracto (detached from reality), now that time is over. As far back as several centuries ago, the first authors of classical consequentialism realized that an ethical theory must be practical, and this tradition has prevailed in consequentialism until today.

Today's ethical theory does not need or want to be a theory for theory's sake, or theory for a few people, for their intellectual satisfaction (somehow elitist). If an ethical theory wants to survive in today's world, it cannot be utopic. On the contrary, it must be practical and able to be put into use in everyday life. One of the ways how a theory can achieve its practicality is to build itself as a suitable methodological base for applied ethics. In the light of this demand, ethics of social consequences is already doing quite well.

In today's globalized and pluralistic world, an ethical theory must detach itself from one strict external authority, whether it is religion or other types of world-view. Quite the opposite – it must head for autonomy and look for justifications in itself, whether it be rationality or intuition. With this

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[21] In the following text I do not try to determine the requirements for the ethical theory. My aim is to describe some of the issues which the ethical theory faces in today's moral life (attributes of contemporary ethical theory). This part of the paper is widely inspired by the chapter *About Ethics* in Peter Singer's book (2011).

requirement, ethics of social consequences and equally all the consequentialist theories are doing well. You can be a consequentialist irrespective of your religious or other world-views.

A contemporary ethical theory must avoid normative ethical relativism[22] and look for universal, unconditional (absolute), widely acceptable principles. A contemporary ethical theory must strive to find objectively valid and unconditional principles. Even if it sounds unrealistic, there are some judgments on which we can all agree objectively.[23] Ethics of social consequences is trying to achieve this (diminish subjectivism and relativism and tend towards objectivity and universality) by using the principle of positive social consequences (as a central idea). For now I do not know any arguments against using the prevalence of positive consequences over negative ones as a tool for recommending and evaluating moral acts. What stays open is the debate on how to fulfil all the stated (and other) requirements.

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[22] The idea is that moral norms are valid only in a society which accepts them and not in others. As a result, it is impossible to evaluate other societies other than those which accept them.

[23] A very simple example was provided by Shaw. He claims that sometimes we can agree on which results are better than others. He states that it is always better when eight people have headaches and two will die, than when the situation is contrary: two people have headaches and eight will die. It is hard to oppose this conclusion.

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"Ethics of Social Consequences" and "Ethics of Development" as Theories Belonging to Stream of Ethics of Act

Paulina Dubiel-Zielińska

Abstract

This article presents the author's main assumptions of two professors' ethical theories – Vasil Gluchman and Grzegorz Grzybek, that is: "ethics of social consequences" and "ethics of development". It presents the similarity of "ethics of social consequences" to "ethics of reverence for life". It shows the definition of the act, the nature, types and its special place in the two theories. It highlights three major historical perspectives on the standard of morality: eudaimonism, deontonomism, personalism. It relates these considerations to the analyzed theories. At the end, a new dimension of the act in the context of the present day is indicated. It is, of course, to help people in need, the poor and the hungry. There is a reference to Peter Singer, whose philosophy was the inspiration for V. Gluchman and G. Grzybek. The summary can be a significant remark that the pursuit of high moral standards leads one on the right track of procedure. Thinking about morality in terms of "black – white" is a mistake. Life has more shades. Therefore, we should praise people for much better deeds than these, which most people can afford, and rebuke – for a lot worse. If someone does more than he should, it is hard to scold him that he does not do much more.

Keywords: standard of morality, human act, eudemonism, deontonomism, personalism, eudemonism of perfection, utilitarianism, non-utilitarian consequentialism

Basic Principles of "Ethics of Social Consequences" and "Ethics of Development"

"Ethics of social consequences", as belonging to the mainstream theories of non-utilitarian consequentialism of extended rules, assumes two types of obligation for every human. The first one says that one should act so as to achieve the most positive consequences (Gluchman, 2012, p. 24). The consequences are, therefore, the main measure of deeds (Gluchman, 2008, pp. 31–32). Secondly, there are intentions. Gluchman states, that the terms "good" and "worthy" cannot be used to assess behavior in an unambiguous manner (Gluchman, 2012, pp. 23–32).

In "ethics of social consequences" when examining the effect of acts having the advantage of positive results over negative ones, intentions are not tested (Gluchman, 2012, p. 26). Taking into account the consequences, the proceeding may be the following: true (appropriate), false (wrong), true (appropriate)-moral, false (wrong, unjust)-immoral. We can assess it from the

point of view of motivations and consistencies. If the motives are right and the consequences are also positive, then – from the point of view of motivation – the act is assessed as fair, and from the point of view of consequences – as true-moral. If the intentions of actions are right, and the consequences of them are negative – from the point of view of motivation – the act shall be assessed as unworthy of condemnation, and in terms of consequences - as wrong. If the intentions of the acting subject are false, and the consequences of the act are good, from the point of view of motivations – the actions we take as wicked, and - from the point of view of their consequences as appropriate. Finally, when a human act, in its intentions and effects, is wrong and bad, that - from the point of view of motivations – the act is wicked, and – from the point of view of consequences – wrong-immoral. This true act may have an advantage of negative consequences over positive ones and a wrong action can similarly have the advantage of positive consequences over negative. Thus, the primary moral issue boils down to predicting the effects of one's own actions (Gluchman, 2008, pp. 11–31). Vasil Gluchman elaborates his theory of the consequences of actions and distinguishes between real and probable (expected). We can evaluate acts (moral, right, immoral, unjust) based on the consequences before and after the action, and both can be contradictory. If the real consequences (after the deed) are consistent with the expected ones (before the action), the act is assessed as either fair or wicked. Fairness is given to us at that time when the real and expected consequences and intentions of the act are positive (good), and an act is wicked when both types of consequences with the intention are negative (bad). In a situation where there is a contradiction between the real and the assumed consequences, the act is assessed as wicked, regardless of intentions. If, in addition, apart from the conflict between the two consequences, there is a conflict of the act with the intentions, the act is neither fair nor wicked (Gluchman, 2012, pp. 36–56).

Another duty – according to the assumptions of "ethics of social consequences" is respect for the maintenance of certain rules. The basic rule is moral law, characterized by the fact that if everyone respected them, the results of human activities (actual or expected) would be the best. Moral laws are genetically, biologically, socially and culturally predefined. They operate outside statutory law and supersede statutory law, or infiltrate it (they are based on statutory law) (Gluchman, 2012, pp. 200–201). Moral law is one concept, but it has many forms, depending on different communities and cultures. Moral law has a function of entitlement (promotion and development of life) and protection (protection of life) (Gluchman, 2012, pp. 220–222). Moral laws concretize human dignity, they are an informal expression of moral values, and legal rights are an institutionalized expression of certain moral laws. Moral law is the framework, the form for the

implementation of nothing but the moral value, because the aim is not the law but the realization of value. The main values are: dignity and humanity. According to Vasil Gluchman, emergence of morality is an inherent consequence of human development; it is a social phenomenon that leads a person to self-awareness. So man instinctively is the author of morality (Gluchman, 1997, p. 25). Morality and moral customs function in the interaction of biological, social, and mental sources. The mental source is free will and moral freedom (Gluchman, 2012, pp. 59–61). Free will and moral freedom (custom) developed on the basis of biological and social factors (Gluchman, 2012, p. 88). Free will and moral freedom in determining shape manifested through the consequences (social) resulting from our reasoning, decision and conduct (Gluchman, 2012, p. 88). The basis of all our morality is the existence of life. The right to live is the fundamental axiological basis of "ethics of social consequences" (Gluchman, 2008, pp. 143–144). Therefore, we can speak of the moral right of human beings to live, as well as of animals, plants and other life forms. The level of a living form conditions the size of respect that we have for those forms of life. We can distinguish conscious and unconscious representatives of moral law. Unconscious are: plants, animals, babies, infants and children of early school age. Aware (conscious) are: people from middle school age and up. The human embryo or fetus is not a human being; it cannot therefore have a moral right to life as human beings do. It is only a potential human being. A human being receives the right to live at birth. This is not an innate right - it is acquired, obtained by the fact that other human beings consider the new-born baby morally equal to a human being. The moral law for living developed in a natural way, as a result of the social, historical, and moral development of mankind. Morality and moral right for living has a biological basis (Gluchman, 2012, pp. 208–216). Moral law is a law for the promotion and protection of life, which in turn can mean the promotion and protection of the dignity of life, with the support of humanity in all our dealings. Accordingly, any action aimed at the killing of innocent people is contrary to moral law. Its results are that all the perpetrators, who with their actions, deny the rest of the moral law for living, should be punished for acts against humanity (Gluchman, 2012, pp. 216–220).

Analyzing the standard of morality, thus moral law according to Vasil Gluchman, I observe its significant similarity to a standard "reverence for life" (veneratio vitae), formulated by Albert Schweitzer: "True philosophy must start from the most immediate and far-reaching fact of consciousness: I am the life that wants to live, in the midst of life that wants to live" (Lazari-Pawłowska, 1976, p. 183). This standard abandons the concept of a person for the benefit of concept of life. According to Schweitzer, the standard of reverence for life is directly experienced by every human being. It arises from

the initial desire for one's own will to live and turns into a mystique to any life. Reverence for life is realized during the mutual experiencing of the states of life, mutual experiencing of pain and joy with other living beings. Reverence for life comes from the desire to strengthen it: "[…]points out the fundamental principle of morality, which states that the good is the maintenance, support and multiplication of life, and destruction, reduction, acting to the detriment of life is wrong" (Lazari-Pawłowska, 1976, p. 166). "Being good is: to maintain life, promote life, help life develop one's highest values. The essence of evil is: to annihilate life, do harm to life, to hamper the development of life" (Lazari-Pawłowska, 1976, p. 232). Schweitzer's reverence for life referred to as the absolute principle, which is opposed to any compromise ethics.

"Ethics of development" is a theory showing the normative dimension of human development, in which the basic assumptions are the thesis of moral human existence and ethical personality (Grzybek, 2010, p. 12). It is assumed that a human is a moral being, perfecting itself, capable of asceticism and sacrifice. The moral existence of a human is a natural human ability to make choices on moral issues based on one's own beliefs and the opinion of the community in which one lives. The basis of these capabilities is rationality and human freedom. They demonstrate the personal dimension of human life (Grzybek, 2010, p. 12). The axiological basis of the theory are; dignity, fundamental values and ethical personality. The standard of morality in this theory, in my opinion, is to identify the values and development of the ethical personality. Ethical human personality by Grzegorz Grzybek is "a state of cognitive and volitional skills that allows one to permanently strive for one's own moral perfection" (Grzybek, 2007a, p. 30; Grzybek, 2007b, p. 8). Human as a being perfecting must be considered as a person whose whole rational and free activities should lead to the development of the ethical personality (Grzybek, 2010, p. 14). Human development takes place while meeting another person. A human, guided by a moral imperative to improve, interacts with others in achieving the common good, creating social bonds.

In "ethics of development", value is "all which, due to its nature, corresponds to human as a human, allows one to execute and develop cognitive and volitional skills" (Grzybek, 2009, p. 55). Value is all that is worthy of aspiration, gives meaning to human life. Just because of the values, a person takes action (Grzybek, 2010, p. 128). Values can be targets - then we are talking about core and spiritual values, which are less variable and may also be the guiding means to achieve goals. "In the order of purposes, the human (and with him every rational being) is an aim in itself, that can never be treated by anyone (even God) only as a means, without being the aim at the same time" (Kant, 1984, p. 211). Values have the power to make sense of

human life only when they are accepted, assimilated, processed. Good is not a value, because it is the source of all values. The values we learn through standards, hence the standards resulting from social arrangements are signposts in life. Cognitive abilities allow one to recognize the standards, and the will – to realize them. Learning can be sensory (external, involving the recording of information) and mental (internal, involving the processing of information). Learning recognizes things from a certain point of view and leads to reflection. Learning reaches beyond one's own person. The ability to gain knowledge is manifested in mental operations. Knowledge revealed the intellectual dimension of human life. Thinking leads to the proper handling of reality, because the "quality" of the comprehension determines the manner of living as a rational being.

Basic values in "ethics of development" are: wisdom, freedom, happiness, love, dignity (Grzybek, 2010, pp. 31–46). Wisdom is defined as "the ability to apply knowledge and experience to achieve fair targets, allowing the improvement of the person and the experience of happiness" (Grzybek, 2010, p. 33). We feel freedom on two levels: in the sphere of consciousness (then we have the ability to create, to make choices) and in the sphere of real options (which gives us the right). We can also consider it in two ways: as physical, psychological, political freedom, and as a freedom "from" and freedom "to". Liberty consists in choosing from among given possibilities and creating something completely new. As freedom is not a continuous state, it requires constant work on oneself, which is self-education. Freedom with development requires wider work on oneself. Human freedom includes self-determination and self-control, the ability to decide for oneself. The basis of freedom is intellect and will. The subject of will is luck and sticking to it. The development of will take place through moral improvement, allowing the experience of happiness as a goal. Happiness as a directional value depends on the realization of fundamental values. Humans by nature want happiness and sustainability. It cannot be otherwise. The pursuit of happiness is as important as fulfilling one's duties. The pursuit of happiness is a fundamental ethical standard, in terms of respect for the dignity of another person. Happiness has a reflective nature, is associated with an attitude of life. Both the lack of ability to enjoy life and the fear of losing happiness do not allow one to experience it. So how to act to experience long-lasting satisfaction with life? First of all, we need to take care of the security of life and health. We should set ourselves small goals, which are possible to achieve. It is necessary to control one's thoughts, feelings, moods, and not to focus too much on goods and people, act wisely, pay attention to the opinions we express, not make the change which does not depend on us, keep moderation, perseverance, strength, and - most importantly - indulge in a daily reflection

upon oneself (Grzybek, 2010, pp. 134–136). Happiness, according to Grzegorz Grzybek, should be understood as "the arrangement of one's own desires, relationships with other people and the environment, ability to enjoy exploring the world in as undisturbed a way as possible, free from contact with other people and of pursuing one's own life goals and being successful" (Grzybek, 2010, p. 44).

The meaning and purpose of human life is realized in happiness. The immanent purpose of human life is the development of personality, because it allows one to talk about the valence of the action and the experience of happiness. Development must be comprehensive - that is the meaning of human existence. A human is a being striving for fullness, i.e. has a natural tendency desire happiness, achievement of values, made domesticated in nature, in which is expressed his cultural tendency, confirms himself by self-determination, the fulfillment is done by updating cognitive and volitional skills (Grzybek, 2010, pp. 132–133). Love can be treated as a desire for good and a benevolent act of devotion. Real love for thy neighbor starts with self-love. A human must love himself, otherwise he loses the love of the neighbor. Goodness cannot be unfair. It is necessary to be fair to others, as well as to each other. One has to grant the right, which is due to him, to be able to serve other people later in that respect (Tischner, 2011, pp. 196–197). Human dignity is a given value (personal) and set (personalistic). Human life itself is a task. This task is achieved through action (Cornelius Van Der Poel, 1987, p. 36). Personal dignity, as the name suggests, belongs to each person individually. It is ontological, as it refers to the human as a moral being, that is capable of morally estimating by reason and will. Personalistic dignity is a function of how to implement the inherent in human capacities and it is associated with the development of an ethical personality. As everyone should be respected because of his personal dignity, recognition because of personalistic dignity depends on human commitment to the good (Grzybek, 2007b, p. 10). Personal dignity does not depend on individuals, communities and their relationships, and, so, personalistic dignity depends on the ratio of the individual to the social environment and its standards. "Dignity is expressed in the desire to have respect for community because of its unique spiritual, moral or social merit" (Grzybek, 2010, p. 46). Specific human dignity is expressed in the ability to assess duties and values. Evaluation and evaluative abilities of human are underlined by the conscience which is a kind of ethical self-awareness (Grzybek, 2010, pp. 13–14).

"Ethics of development" takes the question of moral and ethical development in the meaning of teaching. In the case of adolescents moral development is a process aimed at achieving autonomy, and in the case of adults formation and involvement of the work on oneself. In development,

man acquires a so-called ethical experience. The ability of ethical experience shows the human as a moral agent, who bear the moral responsibility (Grzybek, 2010, pp. 46–49).

"Ethical development can be understood as the improvement of cognitive skills revealed in the unfettered thinking of making preferences of values in accordance with their recognized hierarchy and the improvement of volitional authority which is to maintain the relationship of fairness in a meeting with another person, which involves taking valuable project of action" (Grzybek, 2013, p. 103). The effect of successive, or parallel- running processes of moral and ethical development is the creation of personal identity. According to Tischner, what makes man distinguishable is the way of being (Tischner, 2012, pp. 61–63). Applying this idea to the "ethics of development" Grzegorz Grzybek states that while reaching one's own way of being the unit starts from social morality resulting from pressure. In the course of development in an open or partially open society, growth opportunities resulting from the implementation of values can be seen. Then morality based on the desire to realize values allows for a fuller realization of their own life chances. Grzegorz Grzybek believes that the fulfillment of one's own opportunities in life means being able to produce one's own way of being. One's way of being, firstly, allows the perception of other members of society, and secondly, a full and creative realization of one's own potentialities (Grzybek, 2013, p. 68).

About Ethics and Human Action

Ethics is a philosophical and normative theory of a moral obligation to act: a philosophical one, because reason and experience are a source of knowledge in ethics; a normative one, as ethics finds and justifies the source and criterion of a moral obligation to act. A duty of action flows from a verdict, the imperative of action. The material subject of ethics is an act - a conscious and voluntary human action. The act is a sign of dynamism and realization of human nature. The act is shaped through a dialogue between reason and the will of man. The mind (consciousness) is a cognitive authority. It finds pleasure in good. Thanks to it, good becomes a target. Will, in turn, is the appetitive power. The types of human acts are as follows:

Acts

rational   irrational   reluctances   whims

a) material, physical

b) physically-mental

c) unconscious-passive / unconscious-free / conscious-passive

free   required

1) [a] self-induced [b] ordered (by the ontological structure of the act)

2) [a] fully aware [b] partly conscious [c] spontaneous (according to the level of consciousness)

3) [a] currently intentional [b] virtually intentional [c] habitually intentional (by awareness of intentions)

Rational acts come causatively from the will of man, fitted to the act by rational knowledge of the good (purpose), as intended by its effect (Ślipko, 2004, p. 74). Free rational acts are those acts that will selects, unfettered, as a particular product among several known possibilities of the action (Ślipko, 2004, p. 77). Self-induced deeds come directly from will, which is the right and the sole cause of the action (e.g., act of love), which indicates on a certain, only spiritual, area in the action of the human (Ślipko, 2004, p. 79). Commanded actions are done by other human authorities: internal ones (memory, imagination) and external ones (pressure) due to an order from the will. Their external implementation can be positive (the compliance of action) or negative (omission). A positive action can be direct (made independently) or indirect (made by others) (Ślipko, 2004, p. 79).

Concerning fully aware acts, full knowledge of the good appears, man knows what he is doing with the full consent of the will. In partially conscious deeds, some obstacle partially reduces awareness or freedom of action. By contrast, in spontaneous acts, intellect and will are limited by an extremely strong factor and take the form of reflex (Ślipko, 2004, p. 80).

We have to deal with currently intentional actions, when carrying out the appropriate action accompanied at the same time by awareness of intentions, it means the will of fulfillment the act. There are virtually intentional acts,

when a human has, in the past, decided to fulfill a particular function, now it does not realize it, but it is still stuck in his subconscious. This facilitates the mechanical executing of the tasks. Habitually intentional acts, in turn, mean a decision once taken, now forgotten, that does not direct human activity, but it may have some effects (Ślipko, 2004, pp. 80–81). Rationally required acts are then, when the will is determined to actions by the specific nature of the infinite good, the Absolute (Ślipko, 2004, p. 76).

Irrational deeds come causatively from other human's authorities without his reason and/or will. These are material acts (physical only), subjected to the necessary actions of nature (such as respiration, circulation or sleep), they are involuntary. Physical-mental acts are partly rational and partly irrational (e.g., I can look or not look at something, but while looking I cannot see it). Finally, unconscious-passive/unconscious-free/conscious-passive acts - these are essentially rational, but sometimes, in certain situations, where external circumstances exclude the action of awareness or understanding, they can lose their rational nature (e.g., hypnosis, talking in sleep) (Ślipko, 2004, p. 75).

There are still reluctances and whims. The resistance and the inversion of the specified object occurs in the reluctances. Whims belong to the sphere of human wishes and desires going forward beyond the boundaries of his causative possibilities (Ślipko, 2004, pp. 82–83).

The act is sometimes referred to as intentional authorship, which indicates that every action comes from a desire. This is the traditional approach to the term. It is built into a claim that every action is an event in which one tries to do something. "It is suggested here that when a person has any right to do something, then they try to do so, and if a trial brings the desired results. We are dealing with intentional authorship" (Honderich, 1995, pp. 131–132).

Human Acts in "Ethics of social consequences" and "Ethics of Development"

"Ethics of social consequences" with "ethics of development" focus on free, rational, self-taught and commanded actions. Man, as a conscious being, intelligent and free (Grzybek, 2010, p. 12), must seek to maximize the positive consequences of his actions, he should anticipate their effects. No matter whom the initiator of action is (individual or external authority) then the author is always a particular individual, human thinking, acting. Therefore he cannot transfer the responsibility onto someone else for his choices. Besides, everyone wants something. One of the objects of our desires is happiness. The feeling of being happy is largely dependent on the ordering of one's own relationships with other people and the environment (Grzybek, 2010, p. 44). Organizing relationships requires moral-legitimate acts.

The standard of morality is the criterion of right and wrong.[1] It always has in mind (some) good of man and the rule of categorization of acts as morally good or morally bad. I always mean the standard of morality, since by virtue of the fact that the two ethics – "ethics of social consequences" and "ethics of development"- are contemporary theories; their subject is the field of moral human action and the axiological dimension of an action, and, thus, the orientation to determine the standards of morality. There are several ways of ethical reflection on the standard of morality: eudaimonistic ethics, deontonomistic ethics, personalistic ethics. In the literature, there is also a distinction between: hedonistic ethics, utilitarian ethics and personalistic ethics. In my opinion, the more useful is the first division, which does not limit eudaimonistic ethics to hedonistic ethics, and utilitarianism is treated as a version of eudaimonistic ethics. In "ethics of social consequences" we can see the inspiration of the stream of utilitarian ethics. And, in addition, we can see nothing but "ethics of development" as part of the eudaimonistic and personalistic trend with features of deontonomistic ethics.

Eudaimonism[2] considers the action to be morally binding, when approaching the achievement of happiness, which is the standard of morality (right of moral obligation of action) determines the ratio of an act of subject's happiness. Eudaimonism has essentially two versions: perfectionism (1. contemplatic: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, 2. autarcic: Cynics, the Stoics; 3. aretic: Democritus, Socrates, the Stoics) and hedonistic (Epicurus, Jeremy Bentham). As we should treat utilitarian eudaimonism as a third version of eudaimonism (1. quantitative – Jeremy Bentham, 2. qualitative – John Stuart Mill) based on the utilitarian principle, according to which happiness is possible to achieve if it selects only the pleasant goods that bring the greatest benefit. Eudaimonism has thus representatives in ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary ethics. Perfectionistic eudaimonism demands actions aiming at the ultimate goal (which is personal happiness) by working on oneself. For example, Plato's ultimate human goal is to have perfect right, and it can be achieved through love. That is, for the good doing man, rising higher and higher degrees of love. He starts from the love of good in the beauty of nature then returns to his love of the beauty of spiritual things, to embrace love as a result of the Good as such, Good perfect, eternal. Born of love, the pursuit of good is, in Plato, the core and essence of virtue – the moral perfection of man. There are four moral virtues: wisdom, courage, self-control, justice. Among them the

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[1] http://www.ptta.pl/pef//pdf/n/ normam.pdf.
[2] Eudaimonism ([gr. Eudaimonia] – true, complete happiness, prosperity, wealth) - theory of eudaimonia (happiness); view of ethics, according to which happiness is the ultimate goal and highest good of man (http://www.ptta.pl/pef//pdf/e/eudajmonizm.pdf).

highest is wisdom. This virtue gives happiness to man, because it shows him true good and lets him experience truly moderate pleasure (Ślipko, 2010, pp. 18–19). Eudaimonism in Aristotle is identified with the improvement of man's rational nature. He is happy who carries the sublime and precious good. Above all goods is truth. Inspection of the truth is the most exalted form of living human activity. Virtue consists in the improvement of the human mind to action properly embodying to him excellence. Happiness is only possible on the basis of virtue. Only virtue gives true happiness. Aristotle divided moral virtues into: dianoethical (wisdom, sense) an ethical (prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice). Virtues encourage man to act, showing him what is morally good for him; true virtues to avoid any extremes in action (Ślipko, 2010, pp. 22–25). St. Thomas Aquinas taught that one should do good. Good first defined as that which we all desire. To find out what is good, considered thus as: desirable, appropriate, improving (perfectivum) and perfect (perfectum). So something is good, not because it is desirable, but it is desirable, because being good in itself, has the ability to improve another being.[3] Hedonistic eudaimonism for the purpose takes personal happiness seen as a state of maximum enjoyment. This is the teaching of Epicurus, that ideal state of happiness is identified with the state of spiritual relief which gives a person nothing but consciousness of life, resulting from restraint in the use of pleasure. Virtue is valuable to such an extent to which it maximizes their enjoyment, while respecting the right of others. An expression of life here is peaceful and quiet. The concept of happiness is therefore contemplative (Ślipko, 2010, pp. 27–29). To eudaemonists, we can include utilitarians (utilitarian eudaimonism - quantitative and qualitative), who taught that the morally good is this what leads to the greatest possible happiness to the greatest possible number of people (Bocheński, 1993, p. 216). Examples are the theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Bentham's theory is also a typically hedonistic theory, because as he deemed, good is what brings the most pleasure and the least pain in a quantitative sense. The right decision, leading to a truly moral act, causes the greatest pleasure. The size of the effect was determined through utility reckoning, called hedonistic reckoning, according to the seven criteria: strength, durability, reliability, depth, postponement, wealth, purity (Vardy & Grosch, 2010, pp. 68–71). Mill was skeptical about measuring fun in that way. Therefore, he more carefully defined pleasure, which he combined with the emphasis not upon quantity, but quality. Mill distinguished between the higher pleasures associated with the mind, from the lower pleasures, typically of the flesh. Both types of pleasure correspond with each

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[3] http://www.ptta.pl/pef//pdf/n/normam.pdf.

other in the compound. From this point of view, the higher pleasures of the mind should be submitted over the low pleasures of the flesh (Vardy & Grosch, 2010, p. 73), because "it is better to be a dissatisfied human being than a satisfied pig, better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool" (Mill, 1959, p. 18).

Deontonomism[4] assumes that the source and criterion of moral goodness (duties) of action is a warrant of the appropriate authority, in that warrant there is no need to justify it. Types of deontonomism depend on what authority we recognize: self (autonomism and voluntarism – human will is the main factor influencing both the knowledge and the object of cognition (Tokarski, 1980, p. 811), or another entity – heteronomism (teonomism – moral norms are dictated directly by God, and his free decision is the source and the only reason for any of moral values), another human being (socionomism – an individual or group of people) (Biesaga, 2001, pp. 488–490). A representative of deontonomism and a critic of eudaimonism (including utilitarian eudaimonism) was Immanuel Kant. According to him, the relevant subject of ethics is only moral law (moral duty, the standard of morality) because it is necessary and universal in nature and, therefore, allows the building of science. Moral law does not apply to the world of phenomena, because the determinants of content coming from the environment and acting on our senses are always based on the principle of happiness, so addict the moral value of an act to the condition, which is happiness, for at least to heteronomy. Kant gave the standard of morality in the form of an imperative: "Act as if you used your humanity as a person, as also in the person of any other use always at the same time as a target and never only as a means" (Kant, 1953, p. 62). This standard guaranteed the autonomy of the person.

A morally good act in Personalism treats as an act of affirmation of a person for herself: always has in mind the good of the person – "the recipient" of an act. A person as a person deserves affirmation (love) for him/herself. Karol Wojtyła was, for example, a representative of personalism. The personalistic norm of morality emphasizes morality as a reality of the person, not only as a reality of the dynamisms of nature. It aims to be a complementary principle to the standard that expresses the law of nature. "The law of nature, as a standard or set of standards of morality, refers above all to the fact that man - the offender and the author of moral values – is in the world, in a multitude of beings and natures, as one of them. [...] The personalistic norm seeks to emphasize the special position of man as a person, hence resulting in his identity and transcendence" (Wojtyła, 1991, p. 85). Man

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[4] Deontonomism [gr. deon - duty, nomos - order, rule, law].

realizes himself principally in interpersonal relationships. The standard of morality should refer mainly to the person, to his/her exceptional value, to their dignity and lead to expose and develop what is most human. It is all about expressing what the fulfillment of a person is. Wojtyła insisted that the ethics of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, based on the principle of "do good and avoid evil" (the principle of synderesis – the use of natural law precepts), relates rather to activities in general, inter alia, to produce a variety of works. In this perspective, ethics can become a science of practical action. In ethics, it is about becoming good as a person and not as a being. The personalistic norm does not eliminate the norms of natural law, but it explains them. The principle of synderesis is enriched with content. The affirmation of the person does not nullify its reference to nature; it recalls an act of love and determines a dimension of goodness of the action. Thus, what kind of act is suitable for the expression of love for the person, determines the nature of personal being.[5]

In terms of standards of morality I see "ethics of development" as a personalistic theory derived from eudaimonism of perfection, and "ethics of social consequences" – as derived from the stream of eudaimonistic utilitarian ethics (quantitative and qualitative), but not belonging to it directly. "Ethics of social consequences" is an extension of the utilitarian version, draws attention to something more than the "usefulness" of acts, judging them on the basis of consequences, and more - to achieve the maximum amount of positive social consequences. The structure here is the pluralistic, unlimited realizing of the utilitarian. Hence non-utilitarian consequentialism becomes a stream of unifying disputes and differences of opinion on other issues being discussed (Gluchman, 2012, pp. 9–10). The value in non-utilitarian consequentialism is any value able to coexist with the consequences, able to coexist with other moral values and contribute to the moral good of the individual and human society.

Conclusion - A New Dimension of Action

Both, "ethics of social consequences" and "ethics of development" belong to the stream of ethical action and are inspired by the teachings of Peter Singer, one of the most influential living philosophers. Both include meeting the needs of the poor and hungry – "ethics of social consequences" by highlighting, in their axiological foundations, the value of life and the duty to obey moral law, the right to life in the form of promotion and protection of human life, and "ethics of development" by showing the essence of social human existence and focus on the development

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[5] http://www.ptta.pl/pef//pdf/n/ normam.pdf.

of the ethical personality. Both theories agree with the golden rule of ethics: "Therefore all things that you would ever like people to do to you, you should do to them" (Mt, 7,12). So, if you think in terms of moral categories, that these desires must be as important for us or almost as important as our own self, so we cannot deny that suffering and death are evil (Singer, 2011, pp. 39–40). Man has an intuitive belief that he should help people in need. But for the realization of the action with a humanitarian character, it is necessary to think with the moral character is. It has a deep-rooted tradition. Judaism, Christianity and Islam – related culture, as well as barely different theories, such as the Chinese tradition (the teaching of Mencius, the most authoritative interpreter of Confucianism who lived about 300 years before Christ) give instructions as to the duties towards the poor (Singer, 2011, pp. 42–47). The moral duty of all of us is to help the needy. Why do we not do that? There are several reasons: first - we are more willing to spend money to rescue recognizable (concrete) victims than to save a statistical life; second - evolution has shaped us so that we look after relatives and those with whom we have joint ventures because it promotes spreading and survival of genes; third – the smaller the proportion of people at risk, which we can save, is the less likely we are to help; fourth – we are less likely to help people if no responsibility lies only with us; fifth – the sense of justice is so strong that to avoid others getting more than they deserve, we are willing to do less and additionally prefer to punish injustice rather than gain money; sixth – the lack of a specific recipient; seventh – plain selfishness (Singer, 2011, pp. 81–101). This, however, does not justify us. Ethical arguments show that it is important to do good, to help, and realize that there are many more people in need should only mobilize us more. In addition, the discharge of liability to the other leads to a situation where everyone thinks the same and no one helps. In addition, human nature cannot be explained by evolutionary considerations because genetic and biological reasons cannot decide everything. Finally, it is worth adding that the needs of others should be more important to us than they were previously (Singer, 2011, pp. 101–105). This will happen if we start to treat the entire education process as a process of inculcating values that constitute its core. Therefore, we should model our behavior on examples which embody values such as altruism, tolerance, responsibility, love (Śniegulska, 2013, pp. 56–64).

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Military Ethics – Goals, Perspectives and New Paradigms towards Humanity

Lukáš Švaňa

Abstract

The paper proposes and confronts some of the essential problems in the field of military ethics. It primarily focuses on its goals, perspectives and its use in practice. Just war theory and ethics of social consequences are used as two possible methodological approaches in dealing with these issues and in revealing the most fundamental answers in times of wars and conflicts. The article also presents the idea of the inevitability of implementing military ethics and all of its sub-fields into the structure of liberal arts and providing a defendable moral standpoint in these delicate issues.

Keywords: military ethics, humanity, war, ethics of social consequences, just war theory

Introduction

The aim of this paper and of the whole research is to present the past and the present form of professional ethics as a subsystem of liberal arts of ethics and its place within particular professions and thus contribute to the revitalizing process of the just war tradition often used as the only criterion in evaluating acts of war. In my opinion, one of the least researched fields that can influence the situation and that immediately need theoretical reflection aimed at ethical elements and their implementation into practice is that of military ethics. Therefore I will concentrate my focus on the profession of professional soldier and its status in contemporary society. Military ethics can be characterized as a conjunction of ethics and the military sphere. Many spheres of our social life are connected in close links and ethics is, or should be, an inherent part of each of these subsets. These subsets are in strong interaction with one another and it is inevitable to search, examine and theoretically and practically explain the regularities of these inter-connections. Ethics as one of the connecting elements is present in the majority of other social spheres and also when we speak of professional ethics. Its overlaps into the sphere of professions are only limited by the number of these professions. There is no single profession that should not be an object of ethical reflection. But the influence of ethics in the fields of profession differs. This difference is based on many geographical, cultural and/or religious conditions, but it also depends on the type of profession itself.

Such a form of professional ethics is a required precondition for proper, safe, effective and good relationships, which can automatically produce positive social consequences and thereafter contribute to enhancing and improving the life of an individual and of the whole society as well. Developing and designing a code of conduct and an ethical code in any of the professions is definitely a positive moment, but we are very often confronted with the general idea that it is sufficient enough to do so. Designing such a code in particular professions that can possibly serve as a manual for our behavior is just one of the steps on a long journey towards answers for the most problematic questions of interpersonal relations and their regulation. Military ethics is a field that deservers deeper reflection and research as well as revitalization in the form of new procedures and systematic solutions with the goal of more effective work done as well as behavior and actions not violating the basic moral values free of any political, economic and/or religious background.

"The contemporary world is in a state of very hard times. Many countries experience various processes of transformation, new relationships among countries are being formed, systems of values are changing in relation to fundamental changes in social, political and international orientation" (Hulan, 2010, p. 50). Therefore, in my opinion, there is a need to appeal to morality and ethics for help as they are capable of changing the thinking and acting of individuals in these dynamic times and military ethics, in particular, is an ideal sphere deserving our attention.

I will also focus my attention on the ethics of social consequences proposed by Vasil Gluchman as one of the possible solutions towards the more humane and righteous behavior of moral subjects preserving the values of humanity, human dignity, moral rights, tolerance, etc. and producing positive social consequences that will prevail over negative ones. The purpose is to show how new paradigms and forms of ethics associated with moral education in the field of the military contribute to building a better and safer world of tomorrow. Liberal arts such as ethics (moral philosophy) can be of a great importance in developing a general sense for effective and just engagement in issues of war and peace. Firstly, I will present a particular type of professional ethics and its characteristic features as well as its contribution to the contemporary situation in the world and secondly I will present the idea of revitalizing just war theory and implementing the ideas of ethics of social consequences into the complex field of military issues as well as ethics as such.

Military Ethics, its Function, Code of Conduct, Goals and Fields of Activity

To a certain extent the history of mankind is a history of violence, harming, suffering and killing. The reasons and grounds that were and still are the basic preconditions for such actions are of a varied nature – economic, religious, ideological, political, etc. Violence, being a natural element of humans, grew and people had to regulate and systematically eliminate these ailments of their character. Paradoxically it was all happening in the same manner – through violence. Despite the fact that we use violence for eliminating other much worse forms of violence, we cannot deny that the original purpose of doing so was to protect the basic moral values of life, health and safety of people in a particular society. The indispensable demand to act in such a manner has become an essential commitment of every military system and organization in order to serve society itself. Despite the fact that military professions has considerably transformed from their initial offensive, drastic and violent nature into more pacific forms, the ethical reflection of its basics is a topical problem even in present times. Even now in the 21st century we witness actions of horror and terror of how a man can behave. Even though, victories of war are primarily achieved by political power and economic interests with the diplomatic sphere as the main battlefield, I assume that questions of morality and ethics are becoming more urgent than ever before. This assumption is based on the fact that harm, suffering and loss of lives are often perceived as a natural outcome and a secondary but necessary consequence of these (political and economic) interests. The problematic of military ethics is valid in a broader sense i.e. the decision making process of armed and peacekeeping forces about military aid in a particular country, and in a narrow sense as well i.e. the sphere of a professional soldier as an individual, his behavior, moral thinking and moral education.

The development of military ethics has a long history seeing that the emphasis on the moral spirit of an army has been an important issue, but these ideas were of coincidental, purely empirical nature, they were not systematic and therefore cannot be considered as a compact military theory (Volkogonov, 1975, p. 23). I presume that the perfect example for this statement is Plato's *Republic* in which he clearly and accurately defines not only the physical and character traits of a professional soldier but also his moral equipment corresponding to the times in which he lived and wrote. This can be considered as one of the offsets of today's professional ethics for a soldier being a member of a social class with the aim of protecting the safety of civilians. The main attribute of a soldier is courage and Plato emphasizes that soldiers have to be taught laws (even moral ones) and these should be imprinted once and for all (Platón, 1993, pp. 190–192). Overlooking Plato's

strong sense for determinism and idealism, one purpose of his utopian ideas has to be recognized – an effort and striving for the welfare of society itself. That is another sign proving that military ethics is not an autonomous unit. Military ethics is always a kind of projection of social situation, tradition and religion and as these components geographically and culturally differ, universal solutions, general statements and answers to the most problematic questions of military ethics are not easy to find as all these factors contribute to the complexity of this phenomenon.

"We are imminent witnesses of different evaluating attitudes towards the military activities of a democratic world. Traditional approaches of formulating justice, ethical behavior and/or authentic humanity seem to be unsatisfactory (inadequate)" (Rojik, 2011, p. 163). Is a commander a moral authority? Does disobedience deserve our condemnation? Is it always moral and right to obey a command? Where are the boundaries of morality and rightness of an action that we are forced to do? Is a soldier a human as well or is he just a machine built for killing, torturing and causing harm? What are the fundamental virtues of a professional soldier? What is the true purpose of a professional soldier – killing and causing harm or rather establishing peace? These are just examples of questions that should be answered and therefore make the basic premises of military ethics clear. "We are fully convinced that there is a place and perspective for military ethics, as we are all striving for preservation of peace and values of humanism" (Rojik, 2011, p. 172).

War has become profitable and it is necessary to support such a productive global market. Observing and monitoring the situation from a safe distance is also highly desirable especially if it delivers profit in various areas of life. Millions of civilians killed in the process are just a natural outcome of the desolate global situation. A professional soldier is subordinated to these external interests and simply follows and accomplishes his orders that were planted into his mind and thus they are actively influencing his behavior in every situation. We do not expect him to think about humanity, human dignity, moral rights, the rightness or wrongness of his actions. He is just another pawn on the battlefield behaving according to some code of conduct which claims of itself to be moral and just. This is also a problem of ethical codes in the profession as the majority of them are based on the fact that a professional soldier has to be a "professional", but does not concentrate on the moral side of an individual – his moral rights, laws and his capability of producing positive outcomes in general. Effective soldiers are also ethical soldiers and this is an important assumption if we want to acknowledge the problem properly. The American sociologist R. Allen once pointed out: "in a battle of ideas and thoughts, we have to emphasize purely human questions, anthropological and ethical moments" (Allen, 1972, p. 68). There is no place

for any "higher purposes" as often claimed by people not realizing the urgency of the contemporary "status quo". The problem of not solving the crucial questions of mankind immediately is a guarantee of further problems of an even greater scale, field and of a considerably lesser chance to solve them.

The professional soldier is not just a personification of positive values and virtues, but he should also be an autonomous moral subject capable of thinking, decision-making and acting in accordance with moral principles and common sense morality and therefore it is in our intention for him to not be a narrow minded machine with only one possible solution for every question, moral dilemma or problem. Deontological approaches are incapable of reflecting situation by situation and present several different standpoints for our possible actions that definitely have to be case-oriented and reasonably relativistic. It is essential to focus our attention on military ethics that can be very helpful in building, training and benefiting a moral subject which we may possibly reflect on as a moral authority.

Ethical codes of conduct need revitalization even in modern countries because many of them are primarily focused on the professional background of a soldier. Virtues such as loyalty, honesty, discipline, pride, team responsibility, etc. are presented in the majority of these codes all around the world. But these virtues are simply insufficient in making oneself an autonomous moral subject capable of fulfilling the moral ideals and this fact can possibly degrade the profession of a soldier. Loyalty and devotion are one of the primary imperatives on a soldier since the very beginnings of the profession. But these virtues have lead to many bizarre situations and extremities when soldiers protected the interests of political leaders and/or institutions despite the fact that the same leaders and institutions were responsible for the bad situation and crisis in the country. This is also a contemporary situation in developing countries when soldiers do not hesitate to use force and violence of terrifying power against civilians and their fellow citizens as they usually perceive them as the ones responsible for their strife to stand against the administration and government which represents an actual parody of a healthy state system as well as a time bomb for the future. I do not intend to say that loyalty and devotion are useless, but I am convinced that they need to be closely interconnected with dispassionate conclusions and common sense morality. Who is to blame for the terrible actions that we witness every day? Is it the government governing the army or a soldier as an individual moral subject who should be able to distinguish good from evil, right from wrong and moral from immoral? We have to be very careful with providing an answer for this issue as there is another factor entering the argument i.e. punishment for not obeying military orders. Refusing to obey an

order has often meant many negative consequences for a soldier – execution,[1] imprisonment, torture, etc. It is not so common in modern armies to punish in such an inhumane manner as it was in the past, but this change in perspectives is not coincidental and many goals were achieved by the expansion of many programs aimed at the improvement of military ethics. Sadly, this fact cannot be asserted globally. Blind loyalty is usually accepting the current *status quo* i.e. uncritical and automatic obedience and not bearing responsibility. It is an obligation to protect basic human values and give them higher priority than military discipline, loyalty or possible punishment.

Military ethics should face the basic problems of today's world – resolving the moral dimensions of wars and war conflicts from the point of view of their process and consequences, moral evaluation of the means of waging war, moral rules of armed conflict, the moral dimension of treating the wounded and killed, the moral relationship with captured soldiers, etc. and last but not least the moral relationship towards civilians (non-combatants) and the material and cultural values in enemy territory. Without virtuous moral education in these fields, there will always be more injustice, evil, heinous and immoral behavior towards innocent people. Military ethics is one of the starting points on a long journey towards a world where conflicts are resolved effectively and justly and the actions of political leaders and authorities are deprived of any ideological, religious or economic background.

New Paradigms towards Humanity and a Renewal of the Just War Theory

The value of human life is incalculable. There are no exceptions. When commands go against our conscience, these commands should definitely not be performed as our conscience serves as the highest ethical norm. Speaking of commands is strictly and primarily connected with the military profession, but the function of conscience as the highest ethical norm should not be limited to that area only. We are confronted with moral problems and/or dilemmas on a daily basis and we always choose among several options of our behavior and actions. The study of liberal arts themselves is not sufficient enough to guarantee any satisfactory results, but it has a major impact on the development of the moral consciousness of an individual on its way towards becoming a moral subject upholding the basic moral values of humanity and human dignity. The aim of ethics as well as of any other subordinated parts of it (bioethics, business ethics, professional ethics, etc.) is to improve our moral behavior and find conditions for fruitful discussion.

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[1] Death by execution is definitely the most formidable punishment and this was often used during the 2nd World War in Russian and German armies.

In the last few years, we can observe one undeniable fact i.e. that despite the global position of just war theory being the right (if not the best), most righteous, appropriate and especially the most defendable and legitimate response to war, terrorism and other conflicts of modern times, its tradition is being undermined by various changes in the development of many aspects of human life including politics, international law, military doctrines, etc.

We are all aware of just war theory, its *ius ad bello* and *ius in bellum* rules and restrictions. But does just war really exist? Isn't it just an obsolete book theory that is no longer usable in the present? If so, is there a way to reformulate just war theory so it can be applied to any kind of conflict, in any situation, at any time without losing its original intention? Are these rules and restrictions included in the theory capable of being effective in practice? Or should we make a new, extended and revitalized just war theory that will represent our viewpoint of possible answers to the most demanding questions of our modern history?

In mentioning demanding issues I put the issues of war and terrorism in first place and our response to these global and international phenomena, in particular. As in other spheres of life, just war theory has been very helpful in responding to blood conflicts for ages. It has been a symbol of aid, help and resolution to many conflicts and as we all know there are certain rules that have to be met to do so. But there have been examples of using just war theory as an excuse for our immoral, abominable, disrespectful and heinous acts. Thus just war is becoming a synonym for justification of these crimes against people.

The aim of this paper is to fill in the missing element of this theory, as it is often unveiled by its critics, by providing a defendable moral standpoint. The most useful is non-utilitarian consequentialism which will make our reformulation valid and it will guarantee the production of positive social consequences that do not only bring satisfaction of human needs, but they also create preconditions for the development of our society. One of the biggest problems came along with World War II, when just war theory was misused to the advantage of the Allies and a lot of innocent people died when they dropped the bombs on Dresden, for example. And the same thing is happening now when we kill and slaughter a whole family of one terrorist in order to kill the one evil and villainous person. One example standing for all: In January 2009, a high-level member of Hamas, Sheikh Rayan was killed with his 4 wives and 13 children. Rayan was a very dangerous terrorist and a 900 kg bomb was dropped on his house during the night when everyone was sleeping. Among the children was his 1 year old daughter, who was accused of being born into the family of a terrorist, but she refused to leave by which she admitted her contribution to her father's crimes, she is sentenced to death

and the judgment is executed immediately. And this is happening on a daily basis. I believe that such misuse of just war theory is unacceptable. Is it ever permissible to kill an innocent person? Is just war just an excuse for such wrong treatment? I hope that we can all agree on one fact that the reasons for waging war are usually just, but there is no legitimacy to wage it unjustly.

I perceive these moments as an example of sudden and dramatic inclination of just war theory towards utilitarian theory whose aim is to maximize the benefits and very often overlook the costs. But non-utilitarian consequentialism can bring solutions to these issues. The situational principle is very important because history can give us many examples of using just war theory without any observations of a particular situation in which we must make particular decisions and bear particular consequences. But we always have to postulate the limits and control them constantly in order not to destroy what we are primarily fighting for i.e. democracy, legitimacy, morality and last but not least humanity.

One of the possible methodological approaches is ethics of social consequences presented by Vasil Gluchman[2] in which "a moral agent is a morally mature adult individual able to recognize and understand the existing moral status of society and also capable of conscious and voluntary actions for which he/she bears moral responsibility" (Gluchman, 2011, p. 156). Ethics of social consequences is primarily focused on the production of positive social consequences (or at least minimizing the negative ones) and these positive social consequences should guarantee the moral progress of an individual and of the society as well. Ethics of social consequences must be an integral part of teaching of applied ethics for its focuses on consequences, concretely on a production of positive consequences and minimizing negative consequences, is something that can motivate a moral subject for thinking, reasoning, decision-making and acting which is not only beneficial but has an effect on its future ability to predict as many consequences as possible in much broader temporality. A just decision-making process in accordance with the humanity principle and principle of legitimacy play a great role in forming fundamentals for a moral subject and its development. Producing a calculating robot trying to maximize the positive outcome and pleasure and avoiding the negative outcome, harm and pain of a person is not the aim of this theory as it is in many utilitarian concepts. I do not intend to claim that ethics of social consequences is the only right and good theory and a way-out from this

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[2] Vasil Gluchman has spent many years revealing the basic moral values that function as a precondition for our moral behavior and can possibly bring positive social consequences for the entire society and mankind as well. His ethics of social consequences is a highly viable ethical theory and can stand as a moral waypoint out of many problematic situations and/or moral dilemmas.

serious situation of moral stagnation and decline, but I present it as a viable ethical theory capable of contributing to ameliorate the current situation and as a possible way out of this misery and decadence

I agree with an opinion of Vladimír Ďurčík who writes: "There is no doubt that global problems of mankind are within the sphere of ethical standards. This can be applied to extreme situations, when no questions are off the ethical boundaries. At present, the most inevitable requirement is that of moving from calls and appeals to performing duties and to ethics of responsibility considering the future of man and of the whole planet" (Ďurčík, 2011, p. 238).

The question is: How to apply any of these proposed ideas, methodologies and/or new paradigms if the contemporary situation does not allow us to even think in moral categories in times of conflicts and wars? How to apply ethical norms and ideals if everyday reality is rather a presentation of the animal side of a human being? Appealing for morality in any of the professions is definitely a positive step towards a better world, but that is just not enough. Firstly we need to eliminate the real problems e.g. the selective approach[3] of armed forces under the command of NATO to helping in countries in which their help is needed and thus preventing enormous losses lives of innocent people, punishing war criminals effectively and justly, using private armies, etc. These are just a few of the problems and without a real effort to sort out these issues once and for all, there is no chance of implementing any moral values into the lives of professionals and thus into the lives of ordinary people. All of these issues are described in a thrilling bestseller by the Slovak author M. Adamik called *Maverick*, as he was one of the professional soldiers in the German army called Bundeswehr. Based on his experience in service, he states that "in war, nobody thinks in moral categories. Certainty and confidence, that no matter what you do - no one will punish you for your acts, has been turning people into monsters. The first to die in a man is innocence" (Adamik, 2011, p. 261). In times of war there are no questions of what is moral and what is not, and the protection of your own life and the lives of your comrades is your primary instinct. You are equipped with a gun and you are very well trained to use it – appropriately if it is possible.

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[3] It is inhumane to send peacekeeping missions into countries that will possibly bring some profit in the form of mineral or oil resources and not helping the countries that seem to be unprofitable. Innocent people will always pay the highest price for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Examples are genocides in Rwanda (1994) and Somalia (1992) with more than one million dead civilians. Where there is no political will – the innocents die. They also die where political will is not absent – in fighting for peace, protection of democracy or spreading the influence of world powers.

Saul Smilansky proposes another two principles that seem to be very helpful and that could be of great validity. The first is the principle of noncombatant immunity stating that killing or harming a civilian (noncombatant) is strictly forbidden. This principle forbids the use of violence on innocent people not primarily involved in the war or any other type of conflict. Therefore harming, torturing and killing civilians should be punished immediately and effectively. Making decision-making process prolegomenous and ineffective is just another factor supporting the unenforceability of not only international law but moral laws as well. The second principle is the principle of an exception from the first principle and it states that: "The principle of noncombatant immunity is right in general, but there are several exceptions when weaker armed forces fight against oppression and oppressive regimes" (Smilansky, 2004, p. 793). A situation, when violence and killing could be morally justified, is for example an imminent threat of the mass killing of civilians (noncombatants). It is of our most primary interest to prevent this massacre despite some unavoidable losses on the side of civilians. In some way, this is also a question of utilitarian conceptions, but our intervention should definitely not violate the basic values that form our morality and the morality of the whole civilization. Respecting the values of humanity, human dignity, tolerance, justice and moral rights should never be overlooked.

Conclusion

Despite many strong negative expectations of the soon-to-come future and the place of mankind within it, I personally see possible and defendable solutions for the majority of the current issues. Military ethics and training in moral education is one the places to start if we want to change something. Basic values of humanism should be revived and a moral subject should be strong enough to behave in a manner that is in accordance with his moral conscience. This basic precondition for change should also be applicable to professional soldiers as they are often directly influenced by various facts bearing on the issue of morality. Soldiers should not be trained to become perfect and flawless beings as it presents an immense moral risk in thinking, behaving and acting as moral beasts rather than moral subjects worthy of such denomination. This possible lethargy, dullness and indifference towards the fact that innocent people are being killed right in front of your eyes and that you can't change it, cannot be considered to be right or even moral. We can't recognize that this immoral behavior is just another natural outcome of the situation and that the losses on the side of the innocent are just natural casualties of no higher value, as it is often in the mind of a soldier. The only salvation from the total loss of faith in humanity is to stay clear of it. But

pretending that the problems around us don't exist or even accepting the fact that they do exist, but we are not primarily concerned with them, is a perfect example of apathy and moral stagnation in a world of never ending conflicts.

One of the first steps of rectification is unprecedented and quick punishment of war criminals without any signs of hesitation and/or disputation. As the most recent example of a failure in these issues is the example of the professional soldier, Ramil Safarov, who brutally killed a soldier of another country on an ordinary English language course. One of the soldiers was Armenian and the other one was form Azerbaijan. Even though these two countries are in the state of war, the incident happened in Hungary and at first the soldier was sentenced to a life imprisonment. But after extraditing the prisoner to his country, he was reprieved of all crimes, promoted and celebrated as a national hero. This incident happened in September 2012. This is just a trivial example, but claiming justice is a sciamachy in much more worse and inferior war crimes, when the numbers of victims can be counted by millions. There is no guarantee that genocides, massive killings and other types of inhumane behavior won't be repeated in the future as demanding justice and punishment for those responsible for these acts, is at least abhorrent with political and diplomatic relations and "peacekeeping" attempts. The price to be paid for keeping this "peace" is almost always the highest.

In a dynamic, pluralistic and globalized world in which *homo homini lupus est* (the latin equivalent for a dog eat dog situation) is the most common situation affecting mankind and in which the main motivating power is financial power and greediness, it is our duty to search for systematic solutions based on better, more effective and more modern moral education not only for professionals. This can be achieved by employing all available means – implementing specialists and moral authorities and using forms and models of communication that directly influence the abilities of people (professional soldiers in this context) to identify themselves with moral standards, that appear to be of key importance. Implementing the values of humanity, human dignity, tolerance, solidarity, moral rights and others into the profession of a soldier not regarding his cultural, national of religious background is a potential and desirable process, too. Professional soldiers should have professional competences as well as moral ones.

Decisions (good, bad, right, wrong, moral, immoral) are made by people and people can change. I realize the fact that it is a challenging and long-lasting mission, but we must also realize the fact that when it comes to the issues of warfare, wars, crisis situations, peacekeeping missions, etc., we must focus our attention on military ethics as it is one of the places to start the process of revitalization and reviving the moral side of human character.

Authors note: The majority of the quotes and references were translated into English for the purpose of this paper only as the majority of them were published in other languages (Slovak, Polish, etc.).

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Conference Reports

Contemporary Issues in Bioethics at the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy

On August 4th – 10th, the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy took place in Athens, the capital of Greece. It was the first world congress to take place in Greece – the cradle of Western philosophy, education and civilisation in general.

According to the President of the organisational committee, Konstantin Boudouris, the congress was a significant cultural institution functioning as an international forum for philosophical research, a place where associates in the field of science, philosophy and education met and where new research teams were created, existing ones renewed and ideas reflected upon. In his view, the congress contributed to strengthening universal values aimed at common problems of man of the given era. It was a place of searching for answers to Socrates' question "How shall a man live?"

The program of the congress was rather complex, it was divided into a great number of sections, among them a section dealing with issues of ethics and bioethics as well as sessions dedicated to issues of philosophy of education, philosophical problems of globalisation, friendship and civil society, freedom and responsibility, art and culture, teaching of philosophy and many other topics.

With regard to the section dealing with bioethics, I would like to draw the reader's attention to some presentations which prompted discussion and are also topical. Natalia Sedova & Boris Navrotskiy (Russia) presented *Methodological relationship between bioethics and philosophy*. They stated that theoretical bioethics can act and acts as an applied philosophy. According to them, theoretical bioethics development lags behind that of practical and applied, which may lead to defragmentation of the discipline in general and loss of its scientific and social status. It is possible to overcome this trend purposefully treating axiological problems of bioethics as primary to deontological ones. The next paper *The roots of European bioethics* presented by Ivana Zagorac (Croatia) claimed that the idea of integrative bioethics undoubtedly represents both an intellectual product of the region of Southeast Europe and a certain novum, most certainly when it comes to the theoretical and practical limits of bioethics. According to the author, the conceptual footholds of integrative bioethics are characterized by historical-philosophical connections to an intellectual heritage of mostly European thinkers. Her contribution focused on three authors: St. Francis of Assisi, Fritz Jahr, and

Albert Schweitzer. Their intentions can generally be defined as a search for guidelines – non-anthropocentric, non-reciprocal, and not simply formal ones – which should underline our everyday actions. This overview intended to provide grounds for a reconstruction of the specific tradition of bioethics thought in Europe, as well as to emphasize the history of idea rather than its geographical settings. The practices of normalization were the subject of philosophical attention to M. Foucault in the contribution *Bioethics as practice of normalization* presented by Tatiana Sidneva (Russia). She stated that normalization is the mechanism which turns knowledge into power. This idea can be used in bioethics to explain its regulatory content. Bioethics is multidimensional, and therefore has many definitions. In the normative and cultural bioethics moral choice involves an ideological, social context. Foucault's structuralist methodology pointed out the historical conditioning of epistemes, which become the basis for constructing the power relations in society. If the ideas of what is normal historically and culturally are relative, then the author asked how is the norm stated in bioethics? The subject of bioethical debates can be understood as a question: What is considered normal in relation to life and death of man, his nature? For the representatives of conservative bioethics liberal position is an excuse of "abnormal". A need for a child can be perceived in society either as a norm or deviation from norm depending on family type, method of reproduction, the concept of "own" child, sex-role functions of male and female in gamete donation. After normalization of value in bioethics proceeds its socialization.

Yuehong Han & Yunbao Yang (China) in their presentation *Is "dignity" a useless concept in bioethics?* Asked the question if, *in bioethics, "dignity" is useful or useless*? According to the authors, this is a debate focusing on bioethics at present. Their paper responds to the "Useless theory" and proves that: firstly, "dignity" cannot be equal to "respect" and has more connotations called "surplus" beyond "respect". Secondly, in bioethics "dignity" is not only useful but also of great use, and has a bioethical fundamental value. Especially "the dignity of human life" is a bioethical core and key value. The purpose of bioethics is to protect the dignity of human life. . Thirdly, "dignity" in practical application, generally needs to be transited or transformed from the normal values to the basic ethical principles, later to the "Four Principles", then to the rights.

The paper *Human dignity and assisted human reproduction technologies: Bioethical challenges within the Nigerian context* was presented by Michael Etim (Nigeria). According to him, reproduction is a fact of life and assisted human reproduction signifies all those techniques which involve the manipulation of germ cells, as a substitute for natural procedures, with the finality of achieving reproduction. According to him, infertility is a major

reproductive health problem in Nigeria. It is important to have an open bioethical reflection in the country with regard to these techniques and their use. The expression "human dignity" remains complex; however, its complexity as an over-arching principle also gives it the profundity which is important in dealing with ethical issues, especially those that touch upon human life, human responsibility and human reproduction. Sebastian Muders (Switzerland) dealt with *Normative foundations of human dignity and the debate on assisted suicide*. Despite some initial and in part ongoing scepticism, as he stated, human dignity has reached a strong standing in several applied debates in biomedical ethics. The aim of his paper was to show the importance of including the normative background assumptions of the concept of dignity when assessing the plausibility of these arguments. He first analysed two examples from a group of ethical positions he called natural good theories. He argued that they have an important pragmatic advantage when their notion of dignity is applied to debates where it is used with apparently divergent meanings. In a second step, he presented two further examples to demonstrate how discussions of dignity enhanced arguments in the debate on assisted suicide regularly fail to give sufficient attention to the background assumptions of the specific normative theories, and how this prevents significant advancement with respect to these arguments.

The most intricate ethical problem is euthanasia and nowadays, due to the biotechnological revolution, the most debatable bioethical dilemma. Myrto Dragona-Monachou (Greece) presented her paper *In search of a minimal consensus on euthanasia, where she* stated that it is difficult, if not impossible, to attain even an overlapping consensus on this issue. Most forms of euthanasia are defended by secular pro-choice liberal bioethicists according to the bioethical principles of autonomy, dignity, beneficence and respect of human vulnerability, while pro-life conservatives and religiously minded supporters of the sanctity of life take a stand against it. In her paper, after a short historical account, he argued that there can be a minimal consensus between both sides at least as far as the artificial prolongation of life of patients with incurable diseases is concerned, whose process of dying rather than life itself is prolonged by mechanical devices. According to her, artificial preservation of the "life" of terminally ill patient amounts to medical futility. Therefore some theologians and most secular bioethicists agree that palliative care is altruistic, merciful and socially fair. The topic of William Soderberg (USA) was *Human genetic modifications and parental perspectives* He stressed the utilitarian argument of John Harris and the libertarian position of Ronald Green concerning genetic modifications of children omit a parental perspective. John Rawls proposed that the negotiators of obligations to future generations were viewed as heads of families. Drawing upon John Rawls,

Erik Malmqvist, and Michael Sandel, defended four claims: first, in seeking to balance social stability, autonomy, and general welfare the negotiators of obligations to future generations would assign priority to social stability; secondly, the negotiators would preserve a distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic human genetic modifications; thirdly, they would rule out non-therapeutic genetic modifications of children; finally, the negotiators would endorse a right not to be discriminated against on the basis of genotype. Rekka Navnett (India) emphasized that genetic engineering, the latest offshoot of biotech, furnishes medical sciences with an ability to design and invent living organisms (e.g. the Chimera, a hybrid between a sheep and a human) as well as to observe and analyse their function. In her paper *Ethical reflections on genetic cloning* she stated that genetic engineering leading to the process of cloning, stem cell research and reproduction innovations, which are being heralded as new age wonders in bio-medical technology need to be contemplated with an ethical-philosophic vision to ponder over the pertinent query. She has tried to raise a few concerns that need to be deliberated upon by lawyers, policy makers, scientists, researchers, common public and academics before new life forms and world view become an actual socio-cultural reality. The queries about values and virtues in the context of the quality and dignity of life and human relationship in relation to the continued research and advancement in biomedical technology i.e. in genetic cloning formed the integral part of her paper.

In the XXI century interest in nanotechnologies directed on the solution of the most various problems in industrial, military, medical and other spheres, defining futurological projects of development of modern mankind sharply increases. Yadviha Yaskevich (Belarus) in her presentation *Humanistic priorities of nanotechnologies and nanoethics* stressed that nanoscience, nanotechnologies, bringing new measurement and understanding of the modern world, cause some kind of social order for development of special interdisciplinary areas of research – nanoethics directed on judgment of debatable problems**,** generated by the latest developments of nanoscience and nanotechnologies, search and justification of moral ethical principles and regulated nano research, an assessment of social consequences of practical introduction and the use of nanotechnology. Takako Okinaga (Japan) presented her paper *Possibilities in "Education for life and death" in Bioethics ― Ethical issues of advanced medical technologies*. She underlined that people in the past handled most areas of life and death using religion. Because of progressed "advanced biosciences", it is necessary for us to rethink the meaning of life and death. Advanced medical technologies have enabled people to live by receiving another person's organs, to have babies using another person's eggs or sperm, or by borrowing another woman's

uterus. However, these medical technologies have raised ethical questions, such as "should we manipulate life?" In her presentation she discussed "education for life and death" and the value of life, which is questioned by the study of bioethics. It centred on ethical dilemmas in the clinical field that involves "life", which were discussed in conventional bioethics education. Johanna Ahola-Launonen (Finland) argued that there is much discussion about individual responsibility in bioethics, especially in the context of health care distribution. It was the main theme of her paper *Conceptions of personal responsibility in present and future bioethics.* Despite some different views, the majority of the literature seems to admit that there are limits to individual responsibility because of environmental factors including ecological, physical, social and societal issues and epigenetics that affect a person's health and well-being and her ability to control her own life and make genuine choices. However, when the discussion comes to health care in the future and new genetic technologies, environmental issues seem to be forgotten. According to the author, the issues concerning health and well-being were reduced to genetics and choices about genetics, as if the present environmental effects through epigenetics and societal issues would be diminished. The environmental issues should be acknowledged in scenarios of the future, for otherwise the discussion about individual responsibility will lead to a questionable direction and the most efficient means for improving health and well-being will be undermined.

Subsequent topics concerning issues of bioethics are among the most important and interesting. They included the most significant papers, such as *On democratic deliberation in bioethics* (Aikaterini Aspradak, Greece); *Towards participative bioethical assessment* (Bernard Reber, France); *Appreciative ethics of care* (Antonio Sandu, Romania); *Ethical responsibility of the physician with reference to the works of art* (Berfin Kart, Turkey); *The importance of patient's autonomy: The advance directives* (Ana Ylenia Guerra Vaquero, Spain); *Why letting die instead of killing? Choosing active euthanasia on moral grounds* (Evangelos Protopapadakis, Greece); *Self-sufficiency in human biological materials – Time for an Aristotelian perspective on donation policies* (Dominique Martin, Australia) and *Between the secular and the religious: Japanese Buddhism in the public discourse on the issues of organ transplant* (Shin Fujieda, Japan).

The Slovak participants of the Congress, for example, Matúš Porubjak addressed the issue of why Socrates quotes Theognis, Vasil Gluchman dealt with issues concerning the theories of professional ethics, Emil Višňovský's contribution was devoted to the way of life in the context of pragmatic philosophy, Marta Gluchmanová stressed the role of the teacher in the educational process at present.

As can be seen from this brief overview of some most interesting presentations, the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy provided a wide range of views, and, in some cases, suggestions how to solve some problems in bioethics. It became clear from the discussions that, despite different social, cultural, religious and ideological contexts, due to globalisation, a great number of shared or, at least, similar problems in bioethics are being addressed in various parts of the world. In conclusion, the Congress was a really interesting and productive place for discussions, polemics, exchanges of views, but also renewal of personal meetings of philosophers from around the world. Certainly, it enriched the participants, and among other things, gave them the opportunity to meet current forms of Western civilization, including its philosophy. The FISP decided to hold the next World Congress of Philosophy in Beijing (2018), the cradle of one of the Eastern civilizations. The Asian continent will continue the dialogue of cultures, philosophical, social, political, ideological and religious ideas.

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Ethics in Professions, International Conference, 17th – 19th September 2013, Červený Kláštor, Slovakia

From September 17th to September 19th 2013 the 13th international conference, from the cycle *Ethical Thinking of the Past and Present* called *Ethics in Professions*, took place and was organized by the Department of ethics and ethical education (The Institute of Philosophy and Ethics, Faculty of Arts, University of Prešov). This interesting scientific event took place in the Smerdžonka spa resort in Červený Kláštor in Pieniny, where almost 50 participants from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine attended.

The aim of the conference was a description, analysis and comparison of actual theoretical, as well as practical problems of particular professions through which the development of particular professional ethics of the present occurs.

The plenary session was opened by Professor Vasil Gluchman with his contribution called *Social Relevancy of the Professional Ethics,* which was aimed at an analysis of three main areas of Professional ethics, namely the socio-ethical level, i.e. axiological range of the profession, the individual ethical level, consisting of the moral subject and requirements that are put on it in terms of the particular profession and the third area was understanding ethical codices. The contribution discussed not just the state of Professional ethics in Slovakia, but it was concerned with the Czech Republic and Poland, too. Professor Mária Nemčeková in her lecture called *A few remarks on the criterion of morality in professional ethics* predominantly pointed out the actual need of developing the sensitivity of professionals towards moral problems. Professor Olga Sisáková introduced a contribution called *Ethical potential of the Sociology of Richard Sennett's Work* where she analysed the possibilities of people's adaptation to the world's deficits in the cultural context which does not offer some kind of permanent institutional idols. The contribution of Richard Sennett to professional ethics in terms of conditions and possibilities of the inclusion of people in a conflicting world of social inequalities was absolutely essential. Ján Kalajtzidis, with his contribution *Description of the state of professional ethics in the Czech Republic* focused on the analysis of publications dedicated to professional ethics in more fields, such as the medical, teaching, economic and public administration ones. Eva Smolková lectured about the *Ethical Codex of a Scientific Institution* where she stressed the methodology and principles of creating the ethical codex of scientific institutions.

The conference continued with a debate in sections. In the section on caring ethics and medical ethics interesting and motivating challenges and ideas about ethics in the caring practice and medicine could be heard. The

analysis of the codex of medical ethics was not omitted either and animal ethics and veterinary ethics were discussed in a broader context. Conference contributions were also aimed at the area of business and managerial ethics with the emphasis on the necessity of ethical reflexion in business or in economy. Other vocational lectures were concerned with the ethical questions of the teaching profession and academic ethics while the lecturers were concerned with moral dilemmas in a teacher's work and ethical decision making. The broad scale of professional ethics was completed by contributions from the professional ethics of a journalist, police ethics, military ethics and law ethics.

The topic of ethics creates a lot of lively and inspiring discussions at present with the emphasis on practical applications directly in the practice of particular professions with the aim of their development. The conference – *Ethics in Professions* – realized within the project *The State and Perspectives of the Professional Ethics in Slovakia* (APVV-0432-10) and under the patronage of *The Centre of Bioethics UNESCO at the University of Prešov* was evaluated as successful, as for the experts from the ethical area as well as for the experts from the professional area. Other ethical problems and challenges keep opening as some of the questions have not been answered. Therefore, there is still room for examining the ethical aspects of professions. See you next time!

Eva Demjanová

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Veterans' Voices: Learning from the Experiences of Disaster Relief Teams and Home-Front Coping in Israel, COST Action Meeting IS1201, 15th – 17th October 2013, Tel Aviv, Israel

In October 2013 (15th – 17th October 2013), Tel Aviv University hosted the second COST Action Meeting together with a conference *Veterans' Voices* organized by COST Action ISI 201. The main goal of the conference was to present experiences of humanitarian and medical teams which took part in disaster relief around the world. The event had its working group sections (working group on healthcare, on moral theory and culture, on governance, and on the topics of research ethics in the context of disaster) in which members of COST Action presented current outcomes of the COST Action. Another aim of this part of the event was to set new, partial tasks for individual working groups.

The program of the conference offered several keynote speeches. The first speaker, Hadas Ziv, introduced the problem of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. At the beginning of her talk, she emphasized that, even if the chronic state of humanitarian help in Gaza should be talked about instead, there are still some moments in which this state can be understood as a catastrophe. The main problem she sees in the understanding of (in)equality and distributive (in)equality in the means of health care in Gaza. To overcome this inequality, a complicated system of bureaucracy was established which, unfortunately, has led to the reduction of understanding what the necessary and minimum care is.

On the second day of the conference, Nir Eyal from Harvard Medical School gave a speech on the problem of repeat triage during disasters. The case study from the Haitian earthquake in 2010 and the USNS Comfort offering medical services afterwards was used to introduce the basic problems arising from the repeat triage (e.g. limitation of care, premature completion of care, or withdrawal of life-sustainable treatment). Several possible priority reasons were formulated as a) a pragmatic reason to prioritize existing patients from new ones because of the efficiency of the treatment, b) a principle of honoring the patient`s trust, c) an argument to serve the ones who come first (and in this way treat rather the existing and already admitted patient than accepting new ones), d) a priority setting based on the balancing of withholding and withdrawing care, or, in other words, withholding care from new patients is easier to justify than withdrawing medical treatment from a patient who already uses the resources, e) a reason for prioritizing the patient based on a health care professional`s motivation, morals, values. The speech was followed by a rich discussion, in which the role of non-utilitarian consequential ethical theory in the disaster context was emphasized

by Nir Eyal. The discussion re-opened another crucial issue connected with disaster relief; the problem of timing, locating, and resources in organizing and managing medical and humanitarian help in disaster relief.

Beside the keynote speakers, several other experts were invited, namely prof. Y. Donchin (The Hebrew University), prof. N. Davidovitch (Ben Gurion University), Dr. K. Peleg (Tel Aviv University), Dr. E. Ram (Bar Ilan University), prof. P. Halperin (Tel Aviv University), prof. YM Barilan (Tel Aviv University), prof. S. Lavi (Tel Aviv University), prof. M. Gross (University of Haifa), Dr. O. Kamir (The Israeli Center for Human Dignity), Dr. Z. Rubinsteing (Tel Aviv University), and prof. Y. Donchin (The Hebrew University).

The final day of the COST Action meeting was dedicated to a workshop visit in the Israeli Palestinian Division Zone. Participants visited the *Caritas Baby Hospital in Bethlehem* where they had a tour around the hospital and were permitted to talk with some of the physicians, social workers, and nurses. In a short presentation, they were informed about the history of the hospital (dating back to the 1960s) and about the current issues and problems which employees of the hospital have to face every day. In the discussion, that continued until the late afternoon, the employees of the hospital were ready to answer questions stated by COST Action members and, in this way, the context of health care possibilities in the Palestinian region was presented.

The goal of the COST Action Meeting and the conference *Veterans' Voices: Learning from the experiences of disaster relief teams and home-front coping in Israel* was approached from many different perspectives, e.g. from the public health perspective, philosophical perspective, cultural, legal, health care perspective, etc., which emphasized the main task of the COST Action ISI 201; to establish advanced multidisciplinary research and to reduce fragmentation in the different research and scientific communities and to provide scientific excellence.

For those who are interested in the project, its outcomes, future events or in possible cooperation, please, visit the official COST Action website (www.disasterbioethics.eu) or contact the chair of the Action, Dr. Dónald O´Mathúna from Dublin City University, Ireland. Lately, the call for papers for the *Workshop on Disaster Justice* (which takes place in February 2014 in Copenhagen, Denmark) has been announced through the Action.

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