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RATIONAL PERSUASION, COERCION OR MANIPULATION? THE ROLE OF ABORTION IN CHINA'S FAMILY PLANNING POLICIES

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Abstract:

China's recent history of family planning restrictions is well known. An increasing amount of attention has been paid to the role of abortion in both national and local policy implementation as well as individual-level decision-making. In this paper, we explore the recent history of abortion within the Chinese family planning policies within a broad bioethics framework. In particular, we explore themes of rational persuasion, coercion and manipulation at the various levels of implementation.

Keywords:

China, Family planning policies, Abortion, Restrictions.

Introduction

It is commonly held that there is a broad tripartite categorization of 'influence'. The first is 'rational persuasion', whereby the subject is influenced by a reasoned or rational argument. Generally speaking, this approach of influencing is permissible in a bioethics framework. The second method of influencing outcomes is through coercion; coercive efforts might involve the implementation of violent actions, pecuniary or other social disadvantage (or the threat of any of the above). The consensus here is that such actions are not permissible. But what is coercion? On the basis of works by Hobbes, Kant and Locke, we would consider coercion to be, at its most simple, circumstances where there is a relationship between the coercer and coercee; that there is an act of coercion by the coercer; and that the coercee responds (or changes an aspect of behavior) in response to that action. However, there is a great deal of debate about the definition,

meaning and execution of coercion – which has been further differentiated within philosophy by the transhumanist perspective (as characterized by Robert Nozick (1969), for example) and the bioconservative view (such as that of Alan Wertheimer, see (Wertheimer, 1987) for a review).

Here, then, the focus is on how the coercee is affected by the coercer, with the process of analyzing coercion grounded in a non-moral framework (Hasken, 2007). Wertheimer, on the other hand, strongly argues for a ‘moralized baseline’ based upon the economy of ‘threats’ (Wertheimer, 1987). According to Wertheimer, a threat is coercive when, if the threat is refused, the coercee will be worse off than he would have been had it been accepted; and that the coercee has no reasonable choice but to consent. This consent requires a contextually specific, moralized judgement (Hasken, 2007).

Moving beyond these interpretations, Gunderson (1979) states that ‘There is nearly universal agreement that coercion is an evil... Even when it is necessary to avoid a greater evil or to attain a good, it is still a necessary evil’ (Gunderson, 1979, p. 247). Anderson (2011) translates this into a practical dimension by stating that ‘coercion is typically thought to carry with it several important implications, including that it diminishes the targeted agent’s freedom and responsibility.’ In this context, Anderson continues, ‘it is [therefore] a (*pro tanto*) wrong and/or violation of right’. Finally, we must briefly consider the concept of harm as it relates to coercion. In the Millian (Mill, 1869) sense, ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’ As such, the link between ‘the common good’ and a coercive act is a highly contested, complex one where harm can delegitimize itself as an action if not correctly justified.

The third component occupies the ground between these two ‘extremes’. Some scholars, such as Blumenthal-Barby, have explored this ‘neglected space between rational persuasion and coercion in bioethics’ (Blumenthal-Barby, 2012, p. 345) – not least because the definition of the two ‘extremes’ is so fraught with difficulties. (Indeed, a core textbook in bioethics

(Singer, 2008, p. 32) recognizes the ‘fine line between persuasion and coercion’). This area is often called ‘manipulation’, though Blumenthal-Barby (2012) argues for this space to be re-labelled as ‘nonargumentative influence’ with two subtypes, namely ‘reason-bypassing’ and ‘reason-countering’.¹

It is within this tripartite framework that we consider the history of China’s family planning policies over the past three decades, with a particular focus on activities related to abortion. We begin with a discussion of the design and implementation of the policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and show how this was framed very much in the language of ‘rational persuasion’ and a ‘common good’. This has been a constant throughout the various reforms and transitions of the policies over time. It is a commonly held view that many Chinese citizens believe that family planning restrictions have been a success for the country; but this is not an adequate reflection of whether ‘rational persuasion’ was a defining characteristic of the policies. Secondly, we move to an in-depth discussion of one particular element of the shift from ‘persuasion’ to ‘enforcement’, with a particular focus on the role of abortion. Here we suggest that the language of the ‘common good’ and ‘rational persuasion’ is very much diluted/polluted by the language (and action) of coercion. Finally, we move towards a discussion of the extent to which harm is present and whether it therefore acts as a form of delegitimacy in a Millian sense. We suggest that, indeed, harm is present.

The ‘pre-history’ of the one-child policy

Long before China implemented the stringent one-child-per-couple birth control policy, the relationship between population and economic development had been the subject of heated debate. In the late 1950s, Coale and

¹ ‘Reason-Bypassing Nonargumentative Influence’ refers to ‘influence that operates by bypassing a person’s reasoning capacities and often their awareness, with examples including framing, setting up defaults, setting up the environment a certain way, and priming using subconscious cues’ (p. 349). ‘Reason-Countering Nonargumentative Influence’, on the other hand, operates by ‘countering a person’s reasoning capacities, with examples including social norms/pressures, inducing affective states, playing on desires’ (2012).

Hoover (1958) proposed a classic theory that extra births in a high fertility context would have a negative impact upon economic development, providing strong scientific evidence for birth control measures. This view was confirmed by many further studies in the 1950s, which identified the negative correlation between high fertility and economic development (Birdsall, 1977). As a climax to this activity, Club of Rome researchers argued forcefully that it was necessary for developing countries to implement immediate and draconian population control policies in order to solve their crises (Greenhalgh, 2008).

In China, a broader family planning policy had been discussed and implemented from the early 1950s; yet because of Chairman Mao Zedong's ambiguous and pronatalist attitude, the firm implementation of a birth control policy did not occur until the 1970s. In the spring of 1979, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun issued a number of directives on family planning in order to limit population growth. Deng commanded that policies and laws be stipulated to curtail population growth. When Li Xiannian introduced the "one is best, two is most" policy to Chen Yun in 1979, Chen replied, "Be tougher, stipulate clearly that only one is permitted". Several months later, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hua Guofeng, proposed making 'concrete measures' to reward couples who give birth to only one child. After Hua's suggestion, the "Only one is permitted" policy was implemented nationwide, both in urban and rural areas (Liang, 2014). As Greenhalgh (2008) observes, by the end of 1979 the three most powerful leaders in China, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, all supported a strong antinatalist population policy. In addition, the one-child policy had already been implemented in 1979 (Liang, 2014). In this sense, therefore, within a bioethics framework the history of family planning in China from the 1950s to the late 1970s was very much grounded in a scientifically driven narrative of 'rational persuasion' (albeit with some statutory restrictions imposed by the end of the period). This 'scientific rationalism' was carried forward to the next phase of the design of family planning restrictions.

Along with his group of researchers, Song Jian, an outstanding missile expert in China in

the late 1970s, crafted a narrative of a Chinese population crisis using western ideas. According to their projections, China's population would expand so dramatically, and at a historically unprecedented pace, that rapid population growth and overpopulation would deplete natural resources, destroy the environment and prevent China from achieving its rightful place in the world. They therefore suggested that the only solution was for national decision makers to immediately implement a one-child-per-couple policy, irrespective of the social and political costs (Greenhalgh, 2008). Despite the fact that the data used by Song Jian and his colleagues for their projections were not intended to be applied to real populations (Hvistendahl, 2011), and that their very long-range population projections were seriously flawed by the lack of reliable demographic data at that time (Greenhalgh, 2008), the combination of the relative lack of qualified demographers and the determination of national leaders meant that these leaders were easily convinced of the necessity – and feasibility – of such a policy in the name of science. As such, China readily transformed Song's suggestions into basic state policy.

'Rational persuasion and the common good': shaping family planning policies

The Chinese central government campaigned to promote the post-1979 birth control policies in the name of the common good. In the official discourse by the Chinese government, family planning policies would benefit individuals and families, relieve the pressure on the environment and resources, fit the long-term interest of all Chinese people, and even advance the well-being of all humankind. In 1980 the Central Committee of the CCP delivered the 'Open Letter of the CCP Central Committee to the General Membership of the Communist Party and the Membership of the Communist Youth League on the Problem of Controlling Population Growth in Our Country', stating the effects of rapid population growth. Apart from the costs to individual families through greater levels of dependency, it was argued that the state would need to significantly increase educational expenditure, facility investment and greater levels of state financing through income generation for their

education and employment. It was argued that rapid population growth would also lead to over consumption of natural resources, aggravating existing environmental problems and worsening the living conditions of the population. Finally, if it was not kept in check, the demographic increase would result in difficulties in providing food, clothing, housing, transportation, education, medical care and employment for the entire population, therefore limiting the state's capacity to reduce poverty and 'economic backwardness'.

In this sense, the 'Open Letter' did indeed appeal to 'rational persuasion' for the 'common good'. In order to limit the population size to 1.2 billion and as a means for all people to reap the benefits of 'modernity', the State Council appealed to all citizens to give birth to only one child. While the central government did not list concrete measures for implementing the policy, strict demographic indicators were indeed set. In order to 'promote' the one-child policy and ensure that these demographic 'targets' were met, physical apparatus at all levels were subsequently established. In 1981, the National Family Planning Commission was established, followed by a top-down establishment of family planning administrative organs. Since then, the network of family planning has extended from the national level to the more local levels of province, municipality, county and town. At the village level, the village leader is responsible for birth control (Nie, 2005). Already the distinction between 'persuasion' and 'coercion' was beginning to blur.

While the administrative teams were being put together, relevant provisions were added to the law. In 1980, the revised Marriage Law obligated citizens to practice family planning. This was reinforced by a directive in the 1982 Constitution stating that: "both the husband and the wife have an obligation to practice family planning". In 2001, the Law on Population and Family Planning restated the civil obligation of practicing family planning (Nie, 2014). Yet it is important to note, despite this, the relatively weak statutory framework of the Chinese family planning regulations. Firstly, the 'Open Letter' was conceived as an *exhortation* to citizens 'advocating' population control policies rather than a stated law. As Wang et al. note, "the one-child policy strategy strangely was never issued as a government order nor

written explicitly in Chinese law" (Wang, 2013). Secondly, when parents have more children than they are allowed under their particular family and geographical entitlements, the relevant organ imposes not a 'fine' but a 'social maintenance fee' to cover the additional expenses to the public purse of the 'out-of-quota' child. This therefore suggests that the primary *ideal* of the state is to ensure the implementation of birth control policies through 'rational persuasion', as evidenced from a relatively weak statutory framework and a strong grounding in 'science', which has been the hallmark of most pronouncements on family planning in China. For example, the notion of 'four hundred million births into poverty have been averted' is a globally known claim about the policy (Wang, 2013). However, the presence of a large surveillance network, as well as the pecuniary and other penalties associated with transgressing the boundaries set by the state, mean that the policy clearly strays outside of being solely concerned with 'rational persuasion'. Indeed, the Chinese government has been enthusiastic and confident about its ability to make people's private reproductive behavior compatible with the national goal of reducing population growth (Li, 1995). Despite this, since the early 1970s (if not before), coercion has been an integral part of China's birth control policy (Aird, 1990). The Chinese family planning programme remains highly coercive throughout the process; central policies have resulted in many forced abortions, as well as other coercive activities, in the birth control campaign (Nie, 1999). As Banister (1987) put it: "[China] makes extensive use of compulsory family planning..., forced sterilization, compulsory IUD acceptance, forced IUD retention, and forced abortion". In the following section we consider in greater depth some of the more unabashedly coercive elements of the family planning policies - namely the execution of abortions. As we shall see, with the pressure to achieve specific short-term goals, the birth control policy has often been carried out against the popular will by means of a variety of coercive measures, and in many places direct enforcement measures have been used as key tools in policy implementation (White, 1994).

Abortion and the 'targeting of agent's freedom and responsibility'

For the one-child birth control policy, the State Family Planning Commission developed a birth-quota system, in which the target number of children allowed to be born in the coming year was allocated to each province. The provincial government then stipulated the exact number of children permitted to be born in every prefecture government under the provincial jurisdiction (Li, 1995). Through the administrative bureaucracies at all levels, birth quotas were passed down to units at the levels of the city, county, and then town and village (Huang, 2002). Officials at all levels often took these ambitious population goals extremely seriously, in order to demonstrate their organizational capacity and political commitment. In order to achieve their targets and pass their performance evaluation or even exceed the average level, officials who were personally responsible for meeting the quotas, from the provincial level to the village level, would use whatever methods necessary. Contraception and sterilization were the first-choice methods, but for those out-of-quota births, people in charge of, and responsible for, the family planning programme had to rely on abortion to achieve their targets (Rigdon, 1996).

The view of the Central Government regarding coercion has oscillated over time, from a tacit acknowledgement of acceptability in the early 1980s towards a more determined opposition; yet local authorities often saw coercion as the only means by which fixed targets for the fertility rate and birth quota could be met. Indeed, there is something of a contradiction between national and provincial pronouncements on this matter. Even in the 'Open Letter' of 1980, it states that every family planning worker should be a propagandist (publicist) who should help the masses with their ideological and practical problems; should never commit illegal acts (in family planning work) by force; and should dissuade others from committing illegal acts by force.

At the provincial level, however, the way in which family planning regulations were written meant a significant degree of scope in interpretation. To quote a verbatim extract from Article 23 of the 1991 *Population and Family Planning Ordinance* of Henan Province: 'For

whatever reason, remedial measures must be taken to terminate [an] unplanned pregnancy' (1998). Similarly, Article 18 of the 1998 *Population and Family Planning Ordinances* of Guangdong and Shandong Provinces state that 'Remedial measures should be taken for unplanned pregnancy at an early stage' (1998). Article 19 of the 2001 *Management Measures for Family Planning* issued by Guizhou Province stipulates that 'remedial measures should be taken for women of unplanned pregnancy' (2001). These so-called 'remedial measures' are taken to refer to abortion only, which would be performed on women who had an unplanned pregnancy as well as where the pregnancy was caused by IUDs and ligation failure (2008). The central and provincial policies have permitted – and assured – (at least indirectly) that local cadres can, and sometimes must, use coercion in their work (Nie, 1999).

In 1991, to strengthen the implementation of the strict policy, the 'one-vote veto' directive was issued, which connected family planning achievements directly with the cadre's promotion opportunities and other benefits (Jiang, Li, Feldman, 2014). Cadres who succeeded in meeting their quotas were eligible for bonuses and promotions, whereas they would risk a reduction in salary, disciplinary sanctions, demotion or even discharge from their post, if they failed. This pushed cadres harder to limit births with physical force, and abortion served as the last protection for local authorities from failure to meet their preset demographic targets (Tu, Smith, 1995). So pressured were they by the demands of the national policy, local officials often had no choice but to resort to coercion and physical violence (Nie, 2014).

As the bottom rungs of the state apparatus, township and village birth-planning cadres were obliged to enforce provincial and municipal policy as part of their official duties (Greenhalgh, 1994). Under the constraints of the specific quotas set by provinces, cities and counties, family planning work had been one of the most important tasks for township organs. In Shaanxi province at the turn of the 1990s, in an attempt to improve birth control performance, many areas introduced economic mechanisms linking family planning to land allocation and other resources under the control of grassroots cadres (Greenhalgh, Zhu, Li, 1994). However, it soon became apparent that

such economic mechanisms were insufficient. In the 1990s, a township party secretary in Henan province said, "To be honest, nothing could be achieved in accordance with the current legislation". He continued to say that "it is inevitable to break the laws if the tasks assigned by the superiors are to be seriously implemented" (Cao, 2013).

The practice of abortion was therefore deemed essential in meeting the targets of the birth control policy. In a survey of four villages in Shaanxi, one out of every four village women married in the 1970s had had an abortion by 1987, and one in eight had undergone the trauma of a second or third trimester abortion (Geenhalgh, 1994). In rural areas, mandatory pregnancy testing was performed by township family planning staff every 2 – 3 months on all married women under the age of 50, and the village and township family planning authorities jointly decided whether a pregnancy was to be permitted or terminated (Wu, Viisainen, Hemminki, 2006). According to a 1982 report by Guangdong family planning authorities, 80% of the 624,000 abortions in the province were performed "by order", and one-third were in the sixth month of pregnancy or later (Banister, 1987). The survey by Nie (2005) showed that over two-thirds of women considered their abortion to be 'caused' by the family planning policy. There were two respondents who declared that most of the abortions were caused by the restrictions in fertility policy. Another respondent said that the prevailing family planning policy led to forced abortions; and that while some were performed on a voluntary basis, most were the result of "having no other choice".

Forced abortions continued into the early 1990s, but had dramatically declined in scale by the end of the decade. On 23 January 2007, Zhang Weiqing, director of the National Population and Family Planning Commission, emphasized at a news conference that induced abortion was a common problem in many countries, and that the state did not view it as a measure for family planning. It has been clearly and officially stated that "induced abortion" is no longer to be employed as a means of implementing Chinese family planning policy (Han, 2013). However, in practice, induced abortion is still one of the primary measures for family planning in various parts of the country.

For example, in some counties of Guangxi Province in 2009, it was reported that family planning authorities performed some 48 abortions in a day; in a county of Hunan province in 2010, those officials who performed abortions during concentrated periods of activity would receive a reward of 600 RMB (around 100 USD) per aborted child within quota and 1,000 RMB (around 160 USD) for each aborted child outside of quota (Hu, 2011). Arguably the most notorious recent case is the forced induced birth performed in Ankang prefecture of Shaanxi province in the summer of 2012. The mother was a 23-year-old woman with a child. As she and her family were unable to pay a fine of 40,000 RMB (around 6,600 USD) for an ineligible second birth, she was detained and her seven-month fetus was aborted. The disclosure of this news triggered outrage and wide discussion among both netizens and more traditional media outlets (Liang, 2014).

To conclude this section, therefore, we are clearly able to identify the presence of coercion in the implementation of family planning policies in China, especially through the act of forced abortion. In the final section of this paper below, we return to the discussion outlined at the start concerning the *justification* of these coercive acts as a 'necessary evil'. In the meantime, we progress with our agenda to consider the (Millian) notion of 'harm' in the history of abortion in China, focusing on the relatively under-studied health consequences of women who underwent abortions in the implementation of the birth control policy.

'Harm', abortion and family planning policies in China

It is estimated that a total of 200 million abortions were performed in China during the 1970s and 1980s (Zeng, 1991), with a further 295 million cases of induced abortion from 1980 to 2012 (NHFPC, 2013). Clearly, many cases of abortion in China have been, and are, entirely voluntary. However, as we discuss above, at least in the early years the vigorous promotion of family planning work was a key motivating factor behind some of these abortions (Yu, 2012). Since the early 1970s, therefore, many women have been required, persuaded and even forced by the authorities to abort fetuses against their will (Nie, 1999).

While the vast majority of abortions do not lead to any physical harm, unprofessional surgery can lead to significant harm. Complications can develop even in instances of small mistakes, and infection can be caused by the lack of strict pre-operative disinfection and lax operation of asepsis techniques during the operation (Yao, Wang, 2002). This, indeed, has often been the case in China, particularly in rural areas (Zhu, Li, 1997).

During the early stages of the implementation of the one-child policy (1979 – 1983), the incidence of abortions skyrocketed in China. So-called ‘barefoot doctors’ were the primary actors in birth control procedures and abortions. However, such ‘barefoot doctors’ were often inadequately trained and/or lacked the necessary facilities or equipment to perform safe abortions (Rigdon, 1996). In poorly equipped rural clinics, the deficiencies in training and facilities were compounded by the large number of late-term abortions. Since there were a large number of women from many villages requiring abortions under the strictures of the birth control policy, many doctors were unable to devote their entire attention to each case (Li, 1996). The family planning service station in Linfeng county of Hunan province conducted a survey of women suffering from complications following abortions prior to 1983, which showed that 90% of respondents were operated on temporary scaffoldings in the village. In one village in particular, 13 women had ligation operations in a villager’s home on the same day, among whom eight were hospitalized due to serious post-operative infections (Zhu, 1988).

In some cases infertility was the unintended outcome for many women. However, forced abortion can have many other ‘harmful’ outcomes, including more general poor health effects. Some patients who suffer from complications as a result of unprofessional abortions may be unable to resume their usual working life, or even experience difficulties in self-care. In the summer of 1995, a random survey was conducted among 300 women of childbearing age resident in 12 villages in 10 provinces nationwide. The survey found that health damage caused by improper family planning operations accounted for about 10% of all women interviewed, most of which were the result of unqualified family planning officials perform-

ing the operations (Zhang, 1999). In 2005, a survey of two villages in Shandong province showed that women suffering from apparent sequelae following family planning operations accounted for 7% and 9% of the total number of fertile women respectively (Kong, 2011). These circumstances can lead to a double financial burden, where (e.g. anti-inflammatory) medicines become the major item of household expenditure (Kong, 2011). A survey of 2,840 women conducted in seven provinces in 1994 indicates a potential negative psychological impact, with reported feelings of loss and guilt, and anxiety about unpredictable recovery from the operation and future childbearing. This can then translate into interpersonal and relationship problems (Zheng, 1996).

In terms of abortion, therefore, we must be careful to differentiate between ‘voluntary’ abortion and ‘forced’ abortion. But, of course, the definition of ‘forced’ is itself highly contested. In general, the higher profile cases discussed here involve the active involvement of family planning cadres in determining the outcome of a pregnancy (i.e. through abortion). However, how do we classify women who have ‘voluntarily’ submitted themselves for abortion through wanting to avoid an out-of-quota birth? While not ‘forced’ in the physical sense of the word (at least as defined by the egregious behavior of some cadres outlined above), the element of ‘choice’ is certainly heavily curtailed for such women. Of course, a third dimension is the presence of sex-selective abortion which, it is often argued, has been exacerbated by the family planning policies themselves (Zhu, Lu, Hesketh, 2009). Therefore, unpicking purely ‘voluntary’ abortions from those where the family planning policy (and its administrative network) have implicitly and/or explicitly been involved is extremely difficult. Despite this ambiguity, the evidence seems to suggest that the key cause of abortions in recent years was due to an inconsistency of individual desire with the requirements of the family planning policy (Qiao, 101). The likelihood that a pregnancy will be aborted is strongly determined by official family planning policy and regulation (Tu, Smith, 1995). A study ranging from 1979 to 2010 indicates that the likelihood of individual abortion is correlated with the stringency of the family planning policy: the more stringent the family

planning policy, the more likely married women are to undergo an induced abortion (Wang, 2014).

How do we 'judge' this? If we determine the outcomes in the bioethics frameworks outlined in the introduction, we can certainly identify evidence of coercion, and we can certainly identify evidence of harm. In terms of the latter, we are able to frame this outside of a moral framework by simply referring to the inadequate way in which abortions were performed by 'barefoot doctors' and other personnel.

Interpretations and conclusions

China's recent history of family planning restrictions, at first glance and without any knowledge of their workings, bear many of the hallmarks of the 'rational persuasion' model of behaviour change. Based upon a clearly scientific discourse, the policies were designed for the 'common good', where local officials were meant to be 'propagandists/publicists' rather than 'enforcers'. The common good has long served as the basis for the moral necessity of population control and citizens' fundamental duty to practice family planning (Nie, 2014). Indeed, if we just considered these narrow terms of the 'common good' and positive individual outcomes *judged by the expected top-down outcomes*, we might be able to view the policies as a 'success'. According to data collected in the late 1990s in three provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui and Yunnan, interviewed women related family planning to the country's positive economic situation and attributed their ability to prosper to having fewer children to support (Jiang, Hardee, 2014). Indeed, until recently there was widespread 'support' (again narrowly defined) for the policies. Leading demographer Wang Feng, for example, suggested that in the late 2000s only 30% or so of Chinese citizens were adamant that the family planning restrictions should be discarded, compared to maybe 90% today (Kaiman, 2014).

Yet the translation of the aims of the family planning policies into practice did entail a degree of coercion. As White (2006) puts it: 'What had begun as an effort to slow population growth by encouraging fewer births became a state-mandated program of birth rationing...What began as a concern to prevent population growth from undercutting economic

advances became a relentlessly determined effort to force human production to submit to the will of the state' (White, 2006, p. 245). Greenhalgh and Winckler (2005) go further: 'By world-historical standards, China's birth control program has been exceptional in its hostility to women. It is women's bodies that have been made to bear the burden of contraception and abortion, and women's private and public selves that have been diminished by the policy's prescriptions and social sequelae' (Winckler, 2005, p. 3). Women's bodies indeed appear to have been the vehicles for the enforcement of the birth policies – the notion of 'maleness' or *qi* often precludes vasectomies or other birth control methods that put the responsibility on men. Evidence produced by state-controlled media shows that coerced (both implicitly and explicitly) abortion was used to implement the national birth control policy, often against the interests and wishes of individuals (Nie, 2005).

We once again return to the bioethics framework set out in the introduction. In order to curtail population growth for the 'common good' as well as for individuals, the Chinese government had to adopt whatever measures that were necessary to achieve this end. Coercion was thus considered a necessary measure for the good of society (Nie, 1999). It is not for us as authors writing in the early 2010s to 'pass judgement' on the decisions taken more than three decades ago. This is for a number of reasons. First, it is almost impossible to adequately distinguish the desired outcome trajectory from that which occurred. The 'Open Letter' was indeed couched in terms that suggested a voluntary adherence to the policy, but we simply do not know what the 'true' intentions of the designers of the policy were in terms of levels of coercion and the 'harm' principle. Secondly, we need to embed the discussion of policy design and implementation in the context of the era. As noted elsewhere (Basten, Jiang), the population history of China prior to 1980 was a turbulent one, with rapid population growth following long-term stagnation (coupled with the disasters of the 1960s). Decisions on the future of population growth were therefore set against this extreme backdrop and, as we have highlighted earlier, on the basis of potentially misleading data. This is critical to our interpretation of the 'harm principle'. Thirdly, given the complex, decentralized na-

ture of government in China and the characteristics of Chinese local administration, it is almost impossible to unpick the actions of individual cadres from the broader context in which they operate. We have shown a degree of 'ambiguity' in both the letter and the 'spirit' of the regulations, which means it is often difficult to identify an agent upon whom to ascribe 'blame' for some of the more (or even less) egregious examples set out here.

There is certainly no shortage of critics of the Chinese family planning policies, both within and outside of China. Aside from the critiques above from a bioethics perspective (see especially the work of White and Greenhalgh), it has also been strongly argued that the 'success' of the policies in terms of curtailing population growth have been exaggerated, not least through the highly contested claim of '300 million births into poverty being averted'. This particular claim has been comprehensively debunked by Wang et al. (2013), who examine comparable declines in birth rates in other countries not characterized by the kinds of policy seen in China, as well as Bayesian modelling based upon the sharp fertility decline of the 1970s and, again, the experience of other countries. They conclude that the 'one-child policy' is an 'ill-conceived policy that has prevented Chinese individuals and families from having the number of children they desire' (Wang et al., 2013, p. 123). They continue that

'it is a policy that has forcefully altered family and kinship for many Chinese, has contributed to an unbalanced sex ratio at birth, and has produced effects that will be felt for generations, with its burden falling disproportionately on those many couples who were forced to have only one child... *In other words, at the same time as the demographic effect of the one-child policy in controlling population growth has been exaggerated, its long-term impact on Chinese society has been underappreciated* (emphasis added) (Wang et al., 2013, p. 123).

In this paper we have set out to demonstrate that while the discourse of the family planning policies may have been couched (and possibly even designed) in the 'rational persuasion' and 'common good' model, the execution was coer-

cive. There is clear evidence of coercion both in the transhumanist conception of the choices available to the coercee and the bioconservative framework of moralized reaction to threats. The day-to-day interplay of these two narratives might, however, be located somewhere between these two extremes where citizens alter their own behavior within a confined framework. Within a traditional bioethics framework this might be termed 'manipulation'. If, however, we return to Blumenthal-Barby's (2012) schema outlined in the introduction, this might be better referred to as 'Reason-Bypassing Nonargumentative Influence'. This, as a reminder, is 'influence that operates by bypassing a person's reasoning capacities and often their awareness, with examples including framing, setting up defaults, setting up the environment a certain way, and priming using subconscious cues' (Blumenthal-Barby, 2012, p. 349). This certainly appears to be an appropriate lens through which to view much of China's family planning policies.

In sum, while we do not feel it appropriate to 'pass judgement' on the Chinese family planning policies from the perspective of a bioethical framework, we might conclude with a few words of caution for those who advocate the implementation of similar policies for other parts of the world. Recent apocalyptic visions of the implications of global population growth (such as Stephen Emmott's (2013) remarkably successful book *Ten Billion*) have pushed demography to the top of the policy and media agenda. Humans have been called a 'plague on the earth' by leading naturalists (UKHP, 2013). Based upon the *purported* success of 'averting' hundreds of millions of births with strong environmental benefits (see (Porritt, Monbiot, 2009) and (McDougall, 2010) for examples of this), there is a widely held view among many online commentators – especially those writing 'below the line' – that the implementation of policies similar to the Chinese one-child policy would be beneficial, if not perhaps even a 'necessary evil'. According to a report by the formerly named *Optimum Population Trust* (now *Population Matters*), while one-child policies are 'generally counter-productive and liable to discount human rights... in extreme situations, where states or regions may be almost uninhabitable through environmental damage, [they] may become unavoidable' (Guillebaud,

2007). Suffice to say many online commentators take a less balanced view. For those advocating such policies, we therefore submit for their consideration our argument that whether the intended policy instruments are based upon science and improving the common good, and designed to be executed through 'rational persuasion', the evidence from China suggests that coercion in implementation and harm in outcome is likely to be an outcome, intended or otherwise. When it comes to reproductive liberty, it has been argued that coercive state intervention is never justifiable, even if it is socially beneficial (Nie, 2014). We might conclude, based on the evidence from China presented here, that inadequate constraints on the power of governments and states in making and implementing public policies, and social engineering projects through proscriptive birth control, may result in both societal - and individual - level problems (Nie, 2014).

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BUDOVÁNÍ POSTSOVĚTSKÉHO STÁTU. UKRAJINA A GRUZIE NA CESTĚ K DEMOKRACII A (NEBO) STABILITĚ?

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Abstract:

The article analyses political transformations in Ukraine and Georgia after Orange and Rose Revolutions. Both countries are treated as hybrid regimes and the concept of competitive authoritarianism is used as the main framework for the comparison. Afterwards, diverging political paths of Ukraine and Georgia are interpreted by means of the theory of patronal politics. In the conclusion we argue that whereas Ukraine's political liberalisation lead to political chaos, economic stagnation and, finally, to the autocratic backsliding, Georgia's focus on reforms under relatively autocratic Saakashvili's administration resulted in relatively stable and efficient institutional framework, which enabled political liberalisation of the country after 2012.

Keywords:

*Ukraine, Georgia, Hybrid regimes,
Competitive authoritarianism, Patronal politics.*

Úvod

Pomineme-li pobaltské státy, patří Gruzie a Ukrajina spolu s Moldavskem, případně Kyrgyzstánem či Arménií, k těm svobodnějším postsovětským zemím (Freedom House, 2015a). K častému porovnávání Ukrajiny a Gruzie svádí zejména to, že v první polovině první dekády 21. století obě země prošly tzv. barevnými revolucemi (McFaul, 2005, Way, 2008), které byly ve své době považovány za závěr huntingtonovské třetí vlny demokratizace, o níž se myslelo, že přinese liberální demokratickou vládu i do postsovětského eurasijského prostoru (Pop-Eleches, Robertson, 2014, s. 4). Gruzínská růžová a ukrajinská oranžová revoluce byly pro obě země rozhodně významnými předěly. Navzdory určitým dílčím či dočasným demokratizačním, resp. liberalizačním trendům, empiricky změřeným vybranými indexy (viz tabulka 1), nelze s odstupem jedné dekády říci, že by barevné revoluce vedly k přechodu Ukrajiny a Gruzie k demokratickému politickému režimu, jak jej známe ze západní či střední Evropy (Pop-Eleches, Robertson, 2014, Mitchell, 2011). Obě země se nadále pohybují v jakési šedé zóně mezi demokracií a autoritářstvím a spadají tak do typu politického režimu,

pro nějž se v posledních letech ujal termín hybridní politické režimy (Wheatley, Zürcher, 2008, Sedelius, 2012).

Cílem této studie je pomocí komparativní analýzy ukázat, že navzdory v zásadě obdobným výchozím podmínkám, které obě studované země po barevných revolucích měly, byl jejich vnitropolitický vývoj značně odlišný, což vedlo i k odlišným výsledkům co se institucionálního prostředí týče. Naše analýza je rámována teorií hybridních politických režimů, resp. kompetitivního autoritarismu coby jejich subtypu (Levitsky, Way, 2010). Odlišné vývojové trajektorie Ukrajiny a Gruzie budeme demonstrovat pomocí metody rozboru procesu, a to v rámci čtyř arén definovaných Levitským a Wayem, v nichž se v kompetitivních autoritarismech odehrává soutěž mezi vládnoucími a opozičními silami. Dynamika tohoto vývoje je následně interpretována pomocí konceptu patronalistické politiky (Hale, 2015).

Hybridní režimy

Během tzv. třetí vlny demokratizace deklarovala řada zemí přechod k demokratické formě vlády, ovšem zdaleka ne všechny byly schopny (či ochotny) formální demokratická kritéria naplňovat i v praxi. S postupem času se ukázalo, že se v případě těchto zemí nejednalo o protrahovanou či zamrzlou tranzici k demokracii, ale o konsolidaci do podoby nového politického režimu situovaného kdesi do mlhavé zóny mezi demokracií a autoritarismem (O'Donnell, 1994, Carothers, 2002). Toto zjištění vedlo k rozvíjení teorie hybridních režimů, kombinujících prvky demokracie a autoritářství.

Jedním ze subtypů hybridních politických režimů je kompetitivní autoritarismus (Levitsky, Way, 2002 a 2010). Lze si jej jednoduše představit tak, že daný stát formálně přijal demokratická pravidla hry, nicméně vláda s opozicí o podobu těchto pravidel svádějí kontinuální souboj (srov. též podobný koncept volebního autoritarismu, viz Schedler, 2006), který se v praxi podle Levitského a Waye (2002) odehrává ve čtyřech arénách – volební, legislativní, soudní a mediální. Ty tak představují prostor, v němž mohou opoziční síly soustavně napadat, oslabovat a někdy dokonce porazit autoritářsky se chovající vládu. Zdánlivé demokratizace a návraty k méně demokratickému režimu

(viz tabulka 1) tak nejsou ničím jiným než definičním znakem hybridního politického režimu. V textu proto tyto výkyvy nenazýváme demokratizací nebo autoritarizací, neboť se nejedná o tranzice mezi politickými režimy. Dochází-li k otevírání jednotlivých arén, v nichž se souboj mezi vládou a opozicí odehrává, hovoříme o liberalizaci, pokud se naopak tyto arény uzavírají, používáme termín autokratizace.¹

¹ Zde je důležité si uvědomit rozdíl mezi autokracií a autoritarismem. Zatímco autoritarismus je typ politického režimu definovaný Linzem (1964) a následně rozvíjený dalšími autory (např. Linz a Stepan, 1996, Merkel, 1999), termín autokracie (doslova z řečtiny přeloženo jako samovláda) značí koncentraci moci do rukou jednotlivce (Sartori, 1993, s. 205 – 209), k čemuž může docházet v různých typech politických režimů.

Tabulka 1: Srovnání Ukrajiny a Gruzie podle vybraných politických, sociálních a ekonomických ukazatelů

roky	Ukrajina						Gruzie					
	FW PR/C L status ¹	NT ²	P IV ³	CPI ⁴	RSF press	HDP p.c. PPP	FW PR/CL status ²	NT ³	P IV ⁴	CPI ⁵	RSF press	HDP p.c. PPP
2001	4/4 PF	n/a	6 D F	83/91	n/a	4300	4/4 PF	n/a	3 N F	n/a	n/a	2797
2002	4/4 PF	n/a	6 D F	85/102	40,00	4639	4/4 PF	n/a	3 N F	85/102	n/a	3016
2003	4/4 PF	4,71 THR	6 D F	106/133	40,00	5219	4/4 PF	4,83 THR	7 D	124/133	17,33	3438
2004	4/3 PF	4,88 THR	6 D F	122/146	51,00	6057	¾ PF	4,83 THR	7 D	133/146	27,50	3749
2005	3/2 F	4,50 THR	6 D F	107/159	32,50	6468	3/3 PF	4,96 THR	7 D	130/159	25,17	4199
2006	3/2 F	4,21 THR	7 D F	99/163	26,50	7202	3/3 PF	4,86 THR	7 D	99/163	21,00	4695
2007	3/2 F	4,25 THR	7 D F	118/180	26,75	8025	4/4 PF	4,68 THR	6 D	79/180	20,83	5427
2008	3/2 F	4,25 THR	7 D F	134/180	19,25	8417	4/4 PF	4,79 THR	6 D	67/180	31,25	5667
2009	3/2 F	4,39 THR	7 D F	146/180	22,00	7257	4/4 PF	4,93 THR	6 D	66/180	18,83	5461
2010	3/3 PF	4,39 THR	6 D F	134/178	46,83	7685	4/3 PF	4,93 THR	6 D	68/178	27,00	5818
2011	4/3 PF	4,61 THR	6 D F	152/183	54,00	8281	4/3 PF	4,86 THR	6 D	64/183	38,00	6322
2012	4/3 PF	4,82 THR	6 D F	144/176	36,79	8468	3/3 PF	4,82 THR	6 D	51/176	30,09	6822
2013	4/3 PF	4,86 THR	6 D F	144/177	36,93	8614	3/3 PF	4,75 THR	7 D	55/177	29,78	7159
2014	3/3 PF	4,93 THR	n/a	142/175	39,10	8665	3/3 PF	4,68 THR	n/a	50/175	27,70	7582
2015	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	7841 odhad	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	7885 odhad

Zdroj: Transparency International, 2015, Freedom House 2015a; Freedom House, 2015b; Center for Systemic Peace, 2014, Hospodářské noviny, 2015, Antidze, 2015.

- ¹ FW – *Freedom in the World* – měří politická práva (PR – *political rights*) a občanské svobody (CL – *civil liberties*). Nejhorší známka u obou měřených částí je 7 (zcela nesvobodný), nejlepší 1 (zcela svobodný). Obě známky se průměrují a jednotlivé země se pak dělí na tři skupiny – svobodné (F – *free*), částečně svobodné (PF – *partly free*) a nesvobodné (NF – *not free*).
- ² NT – *Nations in Transit* – se zaměřuje na transformující se postkomunistické země Eurasie, jedná se o vysoce agregovaný index hodnotící demokratičnost země pomocí sedmi subkategorií, přičemž 7 je nejhorší skóre a 1 skóre nejlepší. Podle výsledného průměru jsou země členěny na konsolidované demokracie (CD – *consolidated democracies*), částečně konsolidované demokracie (SCD – *semi-consolidated democracies*), přechodné (tranzitivní) vlády a hybridní režimy (THR – *transitional governments or hybrid regimes*), částečně konsolidované autoritarismy (SCA – *semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes*) a konsolidované autoritarismy (CA – *consolidated authoritarian regimes*).
- ³ P IV – *Polity IV* – je dataset kvantifikující charakter mocenských vztahů v rámci státu (*polity*). Nejnižší známka je -10, nejlepší +10. Kromě kategorizace států ke třem typům režimů – autokracie (A – *autocracy*), anokracie (N – *anocracy*, de facto obdoba hybridního režimu) a demokracie (D – *democracy*), identifikuje také různé typy změny režimu a specifická období, v nichž je obtížné jednoznačně identifikovat politický režim – např. frakcionářství (F – *factionalism*).
- ⁴ CPI – *Corruption Perception Index* – měří vnímání korupce v jednotlivých zemích. Počet analyzovaných zemí se měnil a v roce 2012 se změnil i výpočet indexu. Proto nejsou uváděny absolutní hodnoty indexu, ale umístění země v žebříčku od nejméně po nejvíce zkorumpovanou zemi a celkový počet analyzovaných zemí v daném roce.

Podle Levitského a Waye (2002) existují v zásadě dva důvody, proč kompetitivní autoritarismy existují. Za prvé, kompetitivní autoritarismy vznikly v zemích, které deklarovaly přechod k demokratické vládě a mají většinou dobré vztahy se západními demokraciemi a tudíž je pro ně výhodnější udržovat formální demokratická pravidla hry, než je zcela demonstrovat a čelit kritice západních partnerů. Za druhé, jedná se vesměs o chudší státy se špatně fungujícími formálními institucemi, které vládě neumožňují dosáhnout takovou míru kontroly nad politickou sférou, aby zabránila vzniku opozice.

Z logiky věci vyplývá, že špatně fungující formální instituce mohou být jak příčinou, tak důsledkem kompetitivního autoritarismu. V každém případě se však vzhledem k jejich problematickému fungování značná část politického provozu odehrává skrze instituce neformální. Ty si lze spolu s Lauthem (2000, s. 22) představit jako „*diskrepanci (...) mezi normami chování formálních politických institucí a reálných politických aktérů*“. Tyto neformální instituce bývají i v případě Gruzie či Ukrajiny často popisovány termíny jako klientelismus (Protsyk, Wilson, 2003, Kikabidze, Losaberidze, 2000), systémová korupce (Stefes, 2008, 2009, Darden, 2001), (neo-)patrimonialismus (Laruelle, 2012, van Zon, 2005) apod. Jak argumentuje Hale (2015, loc. 847 – 855), tyto a jiné koncepty lze subsumovat pod obecnější koncept patronalismu.

Hale (2015, loc. 798 – 823) patronalismus popisuje jako sociální ekvilibrium založené na personalizované distribuci odměny a trestu, která se děje v rámci hierarchizovaných sítí charakteru pyramidy. V jednotlivých zemích s patronalisticky založenou politikou může existovat buď jedna dominantní pyramida (*single-pyramid*), případně dvě či tři soutěžící pyramidy (*competing-pyramid*). Toto uspořádání koresponduje s formálním ústavním systémem příslušné země. Prezidentské systémy vedou k existenci jedné centralizované pyramidové sítě, jejíž vrchol tvoří prezident coby nejvyšší exekutivní pozice. Semiprezidentské systémy rozdělují exekutivní kompetence mezi prezidenta a premiéra mají tendenci k vytváření systému s dvěma či více soutěžícími pyramidovými strukturami. Parlamentní systémy s dominantní rolí premiéra vedou podobně jako prezidentské systémy k existenci jedné pyra-

midové struktury, avšak s několika výraznými subpatrony, což je důsledek komplikovaného sestavování vládní koalice v parlamentu (Hale, 2015, loc. 2465 – 2556). Tři typy patronalistických hybridních režimů mají i tři různé dynamiky, které se odehrávají v určitých cyklech determinovaných očekáváními politických aktérů o přetrvání či pádu dominantní mocenské pyramidy. Semiprezidentské patronalistické režimy se, zejména v některých etapách režimního cyklu, zdají být relativně demokratické, zatímco prezidentské patronalismy se zdají být autokratičtější (Hale, 2015, loc. 2795 – 2820).

Politický vývoj na Ukrajině a v Gruzii do barevných revolucí

Gruzie i Ukrajina fakticky získaly nezávislost rozpadem Sovětského svazu během roku 1991. Prvním prezidentem nezávislé Ukrajiny se stal Leonid Kravčuk, ale již v roce 1994 ho v prezidentské funkci nahradil jeho bývalý ministerský předseda Leonid Kučma, jemuž se podařilo prosadit přijetí nové ústavy značně posilující prezidentské pravomoci (Kubicek, 2005). Díky tomu stanul Kučma na vrcholu poměrně centralizované pyramidové struktury složené z „klanů“ jednotlivých ukrajinských oligarchů (Way, 2005, s. 133 – 134), udržované a kontrolované pomocí systémové korupce, zastrasování a vydírání (Stefes, 2008, s. 75, Darden, 2001).

Míra propojení soukromé a státní sféry se za vlády Leonida Kučmy rozrostla do obřích rozměrů. V roce 2000 zaznamenala daňová inspekce, že 386 ze 450 členů parlamentu vlastní téměř 4000 firem, podílí se na 25 % ukrajinského importu a 10 % exportu. Mnoho z nich pak využívalo vládní konexe právě jako nástroj k zefektivnění svého byznysu, kdy oplátkou za přístup ke státním prostředkům poskytovala politickou podporu Kučmově režimu (Way, 2005, s. 136). Dalším účinným nástrojem, který využíval Leonid Kučma pro posílení svého politického postavení, byla kontrola médií. Navzdory formální privatizaci elektronických médií v roce 1996 kontroloval stát neformálně téměř všechny důležité televizní stanice a novináři kritizující režim byli vystaveni neustálým útokům (D'Anieri, 2005).

Kučma v roce 1999 obhájil prezidentský post, v roce 2004 však již potřetí nekandidoval a v prezidentských volbách podpořil premiéra

Viktora Janukovyče, který podle zveřejněných výsledků porazil ve druhém kole opozičního lídra Viktora Juščenka. Opozice však označila volby za zmanipulované a dožadovala se jejich opakování, k čemuž po několika týdnech masových demonstrací a následných jednání mezi oběma tábory nakonec došlo. Zároveň byla přijata i nová ústava, která omezila moc prezidenta na úkor premiéra a parlamentu a učinila tak z Ukrajiny semiprezidentský systém. V opakovaném hlasování Janukovyč s Juščenkem prohrál a k moci se tak dostala opozice, jejímiž hlavními programovými prioritami byla demokratizace, ekonomické reformy a orientace na EU (Kuzio, 2005).

Gruzie se po svržení prvního demokraticky zvoleného prezidenta Zviada Gamsachurdii počátkem roku 1992 propadla do chaosu občanské války, během níž se od Gruzie de facto separovaly dvě její autonomní součásti – Jižní Osetie a Abcházie (Souleimanov, Hoch, 2012). V čele země coby provizorní hlava státu stanul Eduard Ševardnadze, poslední sovětský ministr zahraničních věcí a dlouholetý první tajemník gruzínské komunistické strany, který byl v letech 1995 a 2000 zvolen prezidentem.

Ševardnadzemu se do roku 1995 podařilo zbavit hlavních politických rivalů, aby poté vybudoval takřka neofeudální systém založený na distribuci moci mezi lokální patronalistické pyramidové struktury. Některé z nich byly založeny na pokrevní bázi, v centru jiných stáli Ševardnadzem jmenovaní guvernéri, případně představitelé bývalé komunistické nomenklatury (Jones, 2000, s. 66 – 68, Wheatley, 2005, s. 109 – 120). Neoficiální transakce podle Kinga (2004) tvořily 60 – 70 % celkové gruzínské ekonomické aktivity. Státní aparát nebyl zejména v raném období své existence schopen vykonávat základní služby jako budování infrastruktury, vynucování práva či výběr daní (Mitchell, 2004). Zároveň si však oproti jiným postsovětským zemím Gruzie udržovala vcelku vysokou míru občanských a politických svobod, což vyneslo Ševardnadzemu poměrně dobrou image mezi západními politiky (Kopeček, 2012, s. 53).

Postupem času však Ševardnadze začal výrazněji používat nedemokratické praktiky, což se projevilo zejména u evidentně zmanipulovaných výsledků prezidentských voleb z roku 2000, v nichž Ševardnadze „zvítězil“ s téměř 80 % hlasů (Jones, 2006); zároveň však do vlády přivedl mladé reformisticky laděné politiky,

mj. i Micheila Saakašviliho, který se v roce 2000 stal ministrem spravedlnosti. Konflikt mezi reformisty a konzervativními ministry vyústil v odchod reformátorů z vlády a vznik reálné politické opozice (Devdariani, 2004, s. 101 – 102), která pod Saakašviliho vedením nakonec Ševardnadzeho odstavila od moci. Došlo k tomu po parlamentních volbách na podzim 2003, které opozice označila za zfalšované ve prospěch Ševardnadzeho a jeho politického spojence, prezidenta autonomní republiky Adžárie Aslana Abašidzeho. Na rozdíl od ukrajinské oranžové revoluce nepožadovali opoziční představitelé pouze opakování voleb, ale i demisi prezidenta, ke které poté, co demonstranti vedení Saakašvilim vtrhli do parlamentu, také došlo. V předčasných prezidentských volbách byl Saakašvili zvolen novou hlavou státu a v následujících týdnech prosadil rychlé a podstatné změny ústavy, které dále posílily jeho pravomoci. V opakovaných parlamentních volbách pak Saakašviliho proevropské a proreformní Spojené národní hnutí získalo v parlamentu absolutní většinu (Mitchell, 2004).

Ukrajina a Gruzie mezi liberalizací a autokratizací

Jak tvrdí Hale (2015, loc. 311 – 315), politická dynamika řady postsovětských států, jejich liberalizace a následné návraty k autokratičtější formě vlády nejsou ničím jiným než projevem hybridního charakteru jejich politických režimů. Oranžová ani růžová revoluce ostatně nebyly skutečnými revolucemi, ale pouhými převraty, jejichž strůjcům se dostalo podpory obyvatel (Lane 2008, s. 529); k reálné změně politického režimu však nedošlo. I přes tento poměrně skeptický pohled na možnosti demokratizace na Ukrajině i v Gruzii v následujících odstavcích ukážeme, že rozdílné politické trajektorie vedly v realitě kompetitivního autoritarismu coby typu hybridního politického režimu k rozdílným výsledkům. Zaměříme se přitom na jednotlivé arény, v nichž podle Levitského a Wayne (2010) dochází k soutěžení mezi vládou a opozicí.

Volební aréna

Přestože volební proces bývá v kompetitivních autoritarismech charakteristický rozsáhlým zneužíváním státní moci ve prospěch

vládnoucí skupiny (např. odmítání registrace opozičních kandidátů, jejich zastrašování, zatýkání, omezování předvolební kampaně apod.), volby se konají pravidelně a mají kompetitivní charakter bez rozsáhlých volebních podvodů (jak při odevzdávání, tak při sčítání hlasů), kvůli kterým by volby postrádaly smysl. Volby v kompetitivních autoritarismech tak vždy představují pro vládnoucí skupinu značné riziko, že i přes využití všech možných zvýhodnění mohou volby prohrát (Levitsky, Way, 2010, s. 12).

V případě volební arény jsou rozdíly v politickém vývoji mezi Ukrajinou a Gruzii nejmarkantnější. Zatímco na Ukrajině se po oranžové revoluci ve volební aréně odehrávala vcelku otevřená soutěž mezi vládou a opozicí, což vedlo k několika předáním moci (Haran, 2011), v Gruzii byla volební aréna místem nerovného souboje. Často bylo poukazováno na to, že vládnoucí Spojené národní nutí vedené Micheilem Saakašvilim zneužívalo svého postavení a ovlivňovalo výsledky voleb ve svůj prospěch. Např. při předčasných prezidentských volbách na jaře 2008 Saakašvili jen těsně zvítězil v prvním kole s 53,5 % hlasů. I relativně malé neregulárnosti, které dokumentovali např. pozorovatelé OBSE, tak mohly Saakašvilimu zajistit bezproblémové zvolení v prvním kole. V parlamentních volbách na podzim téhož roku pak volební pozorovatelská mise OBSE zdokumentovala vážné problémy dokonce ve 26 % volebních okrsků, což opozici přimělo k neúspěšným požadavkům na opakování celých voleb (Lanskoy, Areshidze, 2008, s. 164).

Nerovné podmínky, které ve volební aréně v Gruzii panovaly, byly narovnány až při parlamentních volbách v roce 2012. Spojenému národnímu hnutí se postavila opoziční koalice Gruzínský sen vedená nejbohatším Gruzínem, miliardářem Bidzinou Ivanišvilim. Tato koalice musela čelit řadě arbitrárních zásahů ze strany státních institucí (o některých blíže v částech věnovaných soudní a mediální aréně), avšak takřka neomezené finanční prostředky ze strany Ivanišviliho, jednota opozice, tlak EU a USA na férovost voleb a nakonec i dobře načasovaný skandál s videem dokumentujícím týrání odsouzených v gruzínských věznicích vedlo k přesvědčivému vítězství Gruzínského snu (Kopeček, 2012, s. 68 – 69). Kandidát Gruzínského snu Giorgi Margvelašvili byl o rok později zvolen prezidentem a v Gruzii tak poprvé

v historii došlo ke kompletní změně vlády prostřednictvím voleb, přičemž poražení volební výsledky uznali.

Rozdílné vývojové trajektorie v rámci volební arény v Gruzii a na Ukrajině byly způsobeny v zásadě třemi faktory. Za prvé, již zmínované ústavní reformy, které v případě Gruzie prezidentské pravomoci zvětšily, je na Ukrajině naopak snížily a přerозdělily mezi více aktérů. Platí zde poměrně jednoduché pravidlo: větší kompetence znamenají větší moc a také větší riziko jejího zneužití – a to i při volbách. Za druhé, zatímco gruzínský prezident Ševardnadze, stejně jako jeho nejvýraznější spojenec Abašidze, byli při růžové revoluci svrženi, což pro ně znamenalo odchod z politiky (a v případě Abašidze i ze země), na Ukrajině se poražený prezidentský kandidát Janukovyč z politického života nestáhl. Se svou Stranou regionů vyhrál parlamentní volby v roce 2006 a až do předčasných voleb v roce 2007 zastával funkci premiéra. V roce 2010 pak byl zvolen prezidentem země. Na Ukrajině tak i v porevolučním období existovala značná politická pluralita (Mierzejewski-Voznyak 2014), zatímco v Gruzii dominovala jedna politická strana – Spojené národní hnutí –, která integrovala většinu politických subjektů podílejících se na růžové revoluci (Kopeček, 2012, s. 58). Za třetí, na rozdíl od Juščenka si Saakašvili zachoval pozici jediného lídra „revolučního“ tábora. Ukrajinský tandem Viktor Juščenko – Julija Tymošenkova se rozhádal již v druhé polovině roku 2005, což vedlo k vítězství Strany regionů v parlamentních volbách v roce 2006 (Katchanovski, 2008, s. 351 – 352). Ani Gruzie sice nebyla rozporů mezi „porevoluční“ elitou ušetřena, Saakašvili je však vždy ustál. Z ministerských či vysokých ústavních postů postupně odešli předsedkyně parlamentu Nino Burdžanadze, ministr školství Ghia Nodia, ministryně zahraničních věcí Salome Zurabišvili, premiér Zurab Noghaidei či ministr vnitra Irakli Okruašvili. Až na Nodiu, který se rozhodl vrátit k akademické kariéře, se všichni ostatní pokusili o založení vlastních politických stran, nicméně jednalo se o neúspěšné projekty, které ve volbách propadly (Kopeček, 2012, s. 63 – 64). Svou roli zřejmě sehrála i náhoda; po Saakašvilim druhá nejvýraznější postava růžové revo-

luce – premiér Zurab Žvania – tragicky zemřel v únoru 2005.¹

Legislativní aréna

Otevřenost volební arény v porevolučních letech na Ukrajině a naopak její relativní uzavřenost v Gruzii vedla k rozdílnému vývoji i v aréně legislativní. Ta v klasických politicky uzavřených autoritarismech vůbec neexistuje anebo je natolik kontrolovaná vládnoucí garniturou, že soupeření mezi ní a exekutivou prakticky nepřipadá v úvahu. V kompetitivních autoritarismech je legislativa zpravidla slabá, ale často se stává důležitým místem, kde může opozice vyvíjet určitou politickou aktivitu, oslabovat a napadat autoritářsky se chovající režim. Na Ukrajině byla legislativní aréna poměrně otevřená již před oranžovou revolucí. Parlament například zablokoval snahu prezidenta Kučmy svolat referendum zaměřené na omezení moci zákonodárského orgánu a opoziční představitel Aleksandr Moroz využil parlamentní půdu pro distribuci nahrávky usvědčující Leonida Kučmu z objednávky politické vraždy (Levitsky, Way, 2002, s. 55).

Porevoluční přechod Ukrajiny od prezidentského k semiprezidentskému systému měl za následek další otevření legislativní arény. Parlamentní půda se stala v porevolučních letech ústředním politickým kolbištěm. Na základě rozložení sil v parlamentu a dohody s hnutím Naše Ukrajina prezidenta Juščenka byl Janukovyč v roce 2006 jmenován premiérem a parlamentní strany se roku 2007 dohodly i na předčasných volbách (Haran, 2011, s. 95). Po prezidentských volbách v roce 2010, v nichž Viktor Janukovyč porazil Juliji Tymošenkovou, se však parlament v důsledku dvou kontroverzních rozhodnutí Ústavního soudu (blíže viz pasáže věnované soudní aréně) dostal do závislosti na exekutivě, aby se po obnovení ústavy z roku 1996 Ukrajina vrátila k prezidentskému systému, který pravomoci parlamentu dále snížil (Haran, 2011, s. 97 – 98).

Zatímco legislativní aréna na Ukrajině se v letech 2010 – 2014 relativně uzavřela (ač z ní opoziční politické strany nezmizely a byly

z parlamentní půdy schopné vládu alespoň kritizovat), v Gruzii byla trajektorie opačná. Micheil Saakašvili bezprostředně po růžové revoluci využil svého nebyvle silného mandátu, soustředil většinu důležitých pravomocí ve svých rukou a roli parlamentu marginalizoval. Velmi záhy se tedy rozplynuly optimistické vyhlídky ohledně gruzínské demokratizace a někteří autoři začali hovořit o Saakašvilioho fascinaci mocí a ustanovení jakéhosi „bonapartistického“ režimu (Tudoroiu, 2007).

V parlamentních volbách v roce 2008 získalo Spojené národní hnutí v gruzínském parlamentu 119 mandátů z celkových 150, přičemž část opozičních poslanců odmítla v parlamentu na protest proti údajným volebním podvodům zasедnout a uchýlila se k pouličním protestům. Nino Burdžanadze dokonce zformovala paralelní parlament (Kopeček, 2012, s. 65). Zbylé tři další parlamentní strany byly vnímány jako „loajální“ opozice (Lanskoy, Areshidze 2008, s. 166). Z těchto důvodů je pochopitelné, že legislativní aréna až do roku 2012 nebyla místem, kde by docházelo k soutěži mezi Spojeným národním hnutím a opozicí. To se změnilo až po roce 2012, kdy Spojené národní hnutí i v důsledku změny ústavy na semiprezidentskou, prosazené na sklonku Saakašvilioho druhého prezidentského období, přešlo po prohraných parlamentních volbách do opozice, v níž však nadále zůstalo výraznou politickou silou, která v parlamentu kritizovala vládu Gruzínského snu. Opoziční řady následně posílili i svobodní demokraté, původně součást koalice Gruzínského snu, a to poté, co byl z funkce ministra obrany odvolán jejich předseda Irakli Alasania (Rukhadze, 2014).

Soudní aréna

Třetí arénou, v níž se v kompetitivních autoritarismech může odehrávat soutěž mezi vládou a opozicí, je soudnictví. Vládnoucí garnitura se zpravidla snaží podříditi si soudy buďto formální kontrolou nad jmenováním soudců nebo neformálně pomocí korupce, vydírání či kooptace soudců k vládnoucí elitě. Přesto však v kompetitivních autoritarismech může kombinace formální nezávislosti soudů a jejich neúplné kontroly ze strany exekutivy poskytnout jednotlivým soudcům prostor pro nezávislé rozhodování (Levitsky, Way, 2002, s. 57).

¹ Žvania podle oficiálních informací zemřel na otravu oxidem uhelnatým, přetrvává však řada spekulací, včetně té, že byl Žvania obětí politicky motivované vraždy. Více k různým spekulacím o Žvaniově smrti viz např. DFWatch, 2015.

Soudní arény v Gruzii a na Ukrajině se ve sledovaném období značně lišily a jejich dynamika byla obdobná dynamice arén volebních. Na Ukrajině se již za vlády Leonida Kučmy jevila soudní aréna jako relativně otevřená, přičemž dílčí vítězství v ní slavila jak vláda, tak opozice. Za vítězství prezidentského tábora lze považovat rozhodnutí Ústavního soudu, které umožnilo Leonidu Kučmovi kandidovat v prezidentských volbách v roce 2004, i když by se v případě Kučmova vítězství jednalo již o jeho třetí funkční období v řadě. Kučma se nicméně práva kandidatury nakonec sám vzdal. K porážkám prezidentského tábora patřilo například referendum iniciované Kučmou za účelem omezení vlivu parlamentu, které Ústavní soud prohlásil za nezávazné (Levitsky, Way, 2002, s. 57). Byl to také Ústavní soud, který v roce 2004 odmítl uznat legitimitu druhého kola prezidentských voleb a umožnil tak Viktoru Juščenkovi ujmout se prezidentského křesla v opakovaných volbách (Kuzio, 2005, s. 41).

Po zvolení Viktora Janukovyče prezidentem v roce 2010 se soudní aréna na Ukrajině začala uzavírat a z několika zásadních soudních rozhodnutí je znát, že v ní měla jasně navrch Janukovyčova klika. Již krátce poté co se Janukovyč ujal funkce, umožnil Ústavní soud navzdory ústavnímu zákazu zformovat vládní koalici za pomoci „přeběhlíků“ z dosud opozičních parlamentních frakcí a o několik týdnů později tentýž soud obnovil platnost ústavy z roku 1996, která dávala mnohem větší pravomoci prezidentovi, což ukrajinský režim značně autokratizovalo. Haran (2011, s. 97 – 98) v této souvislosti dokonce hovoří o ústavním puči. V kontroverzním procesu, který ukrajinská opozice i řada západních politiků označovala za politicky motivovaný, byla v roce 2011 odsouzena za údajné zneužití pravomocí na sedm let trestu odnětí svobody bývalá premiérka Julija Tymošenkova. Propuštěna byla až po svržení prezidenta Janukovyče v únoru 2014 (Dearden, Saul, 2014).

V Gruzii byla soudní aréna poměrně uzavřená a po celé období Saakašviliho vlády nezaznamenali autoři článku žádný rozsudek, který by zvrátil problematická rozhodnutí vlády či parlamentu. Během Saakašviliho vlády došlo ke třem ústavním reformám – k reformě samosprávy, ke změnám volebního zákona i k přesunu parlamentu z Tbilisi do druhého

největšího gruzínského města Kutaisi. Všechny tyto změny byly opozicí kritizovány, avšak nepodařilo se zabránit ani jediné z nich (Kopeček, 2012, s. 59 – 63). Opozice zpochybnila i těsný výsledek prezidentských voleb z roku 2008, nicméně jako celek volby soudně nenapadla, což zdůvodnila nedůvěrou v gruzínský soudní systém. Takřka všechny stížnosti na dílčí pochybení během voleb soudy zamítly (OSCE, 2008, s. 17 – 19). Podobně jako v případě Ukrajiny a kauzy Julije Tymošenkové i v Gruzii proběhlo několik kauz, u nichž existuje podezření na politickou motivaci. Nejprůkaznější je v tomto ohledu vzetí do vazby bývalého ministra obrany Irakli Okruašviliho, který po rezignaci na ministerský post v září 2007 obvinil Saakašviliho z korupce a plánování vraždy mediálního magnáta Patarkacišviliho. Je velmi podivné, že Okruašvili byl obviněn z korupce a zatčen jen dva dny po svém veřejném prohlášení a poté, co svá obvinění stáhl, byl promptně propuštěn (Tsikhelashvili, 2010, s. 125). Podivně vyhlíží i proces z jara 2011 se čtyřmi fotografy viněnými ze špionáže ve prospěch Ruska (Natsvlisvili, 2011). Před parlamentními volbami v roce 2012 čelil nepřízni soudů zejména opoziční blok Gruzínský sen vedený miliardářem Bidzinou Ivanišvilim, a to včetně udělení několika vysokých pokut a zbavení Ivanišviliho gruzínského občanství (Kopeček, 2012, s. 68). Po vítězství Gruzínského snu v parlamentních a posléze i prezidentských volbách se počet kauz, u nichž existuje podezření na politický motiv, ještě zvýšil. Dokumentováno je více než deset procesů s bývalými exponenty Saakašviliho režimu, přičemž zatykač byl vydán i na samotného exprezidenta (Fuller, 2014).

Mediální aréna

Ve většině plnohodnotných autoritarismů jsou média zcela ve státním vlastnictví, silně cenzurována nebo systematicky potlačována. I v kompetitivních autoritarismech může sice centrální vláda potlačovat nezávislá média, ale často jí to stojí velmi drahο. Tak jako v případě Ukrajiny, kdy byl v roce 2000 v tzv. „kuchmagate“ usvědčen tehdejší prezident z objednávky vraždy nezávislého novináře, což vyvolalo rozsáhlé protesty zejména v Kyjevě a výrazně ochladilo vztahy země se Západem (Levitsky, Way, 2002, s. 58). V Gruzii informování celostátními médii (zejména TV Rustavi-2) o vo-

lebních nesrovnalostech bylo jedním z faktorů, který vyvolal masové demonstrace a zapříčinil konec Ševardnadzeho vlády (Mikashavidze, 2014).

Nástup Saakašviliho do čela země sice znamenal liberalizaci v určitých oblastech jako je hospodářství nebo společenský život, svoboda slova se však oproti Ševardnadzeho období ještě snížila, aby svého dna dosáhla po krátké gruzínsko-ruské válce ze srpna 2008 (Freedom House, 2015). Přesto však v porovnání s ostatními post-sovětskými zeměmi můžeme označit mediální prostředí v Gruzii za svobodnější a rozvinutější, snad s výjimkou pobaltských států a Ukrajiny. Silnou pozici, kterou média v gruzínské politice hrají, dokumentují tři případy. Na podzim 2007, když v Tbilisi probíhaly masové protesty proti Saakašviliho vládě, hrála v jejich organizaci výraznou úlohu TV Imedi vlastněná miliardářem Patarkacišvilim (DFWatch, 2012). V TV Imedi zveřejnil svá obvinění vůči Saakašvilimu i již zmiňovaný Okruašvili (Tsikhelashvili, 2010, s. 125). Před parlamentními volbami v roce 2012 sehrálo zřejmě jednu z rozhodujících rolí video zveřejněné na TV Maestro, považované za opoziční stanici, ukazující brutální zneužívání odsouzených v gruzínských věznicích, z něhož byl činěn odpovědným Saakašviliho ministr vnitra Bačana Achalaia (Corso, 2012, Civil Georgia, 2012). Konečně na podzim 2015 zřejmě v souvislosti s blížícími se parlamentními volbami vypukly spory kolem vlastnictví TV Rustavi-2, považované za blízkou opozičnímu Spojenému národnímu hnutí. V pozadí událostí je spatřován zejména Bidzina Ivanišvili, bývalý premiér a de facto lídr Gruzínského snu (Lomsadze, 2015).

Oranžová revoluce na Ukrajině znamenala kromě jiného výrazné uvolnění poměrů v tamější mediální sféře, což ve svých výročních zprávách zohlednila také organizace Freedom House, která mezi lety 2004 a 2006 zlepšila známku v oblasti nezávislých médií téměř o dva celé stupně (viz tabulka 1). Porevoluční období na Ukrajině tedy bylo charakterizováno výrazným snížením tlaků ze strany centrální vlády na nezávislá média, jež se mohla těšit relativně velké míře svobody – alespoň co se celostátních médií týče. Na regionální a lokální úrovni však mnohá média nezávislost stále postrádala (Freedom House, 2015).

Nástup Viktora Janukovyče do prezidentského úřadu byl pro ukrajinskou politiku zásadním zlomem. Do té doby relativně otevřený a liberální režim se začal poměrně rychle autokratizovat, což ve výsledku ovlivnilo také mediální arénu. V důsledku politických změn začala mnohá média zaujímat provládní postoje ohledně citlivých politických témat, a přestože se minimálně zpočátku nedá mluvit o přímé vládní cenzuře, byly zaznamenány pokusy ze strany vlády odebrat licenci některým televizním stanicím, které zaujímaly kritické postoje vůči novému režimu (Freedom House, 2015). V srpnu roku 2011 pak zmizel za záhadných okolností investigativní novinář Vasyl Klymentyjev, což ještě prohloubilo strach nezávislých médií z možných represálií ze strany vlády (The Guardian, 2010). S odchodem Viktor Janukovyče ze země se situace v ukrajinské mediální sféře opět poněkud uvolnila (Freedom House, 2015b).

Transformace patronalistických pyramid a jejich vliv na institucionální strukturu

Dynamika demonstrována v přecházející kapitole v rámci jednotlivých arén definovaných Levitským a Wayem (2002) zcela zřetelně koresponduje s pravidly fungování patronalistického prezidencialismu a semiprezidencialismu dle Halea (2015). Kučmova Ukrajina byla příkladem patronalistického prezidencialismu s Kučmou coby lídrem dominantní pyramidové struktury (srov. Darden, 2001). Země však po oranžové revoluci zavedla semiprezidentskou ústavu, která vedla ke vzniku v zásadě tří soutěžících pyramidových struktur soustředěných kolem prezidenta Juščenka, premiérky Tymošenkové a neúspěšného prezidentského kandidáta Janukovyče, manévrujícího mezi Juščenkem a Tymošenkovou (srov. Hale, 2015, loc. 2518). Ukrajina tak při pohledu zvenčí vykazovala známky demokratizace, v kontextu vnitřní dynamiky se však jednalo jen o určitou liberalizaci v rámci režimního cyklu. Manévrování mezi zneprátenými lidry oranžové revoluce nakonec vyneslo Janukovyče do prezidentského křesla, podařilo se mu osobou premiéra Mykoly Azarova kontrolovat i druhý vrcholný exekutivní post, aby posléze navrátil Ukrajinu k prezidentské ústavě podporující existenci jedné centralizované pyramidové struktury. To se opět změnilo v roce 2014 v dů-

sledku tzv. euromajdanu, kdy byla Janukovyčova a Azarovova vláda svržena a byla obnovena platnost semiprezidentské ústavy.

Zatímco se na Ukrajině odehrával souboj mezi několika mocenskými pyramidami, ekonomický růst ve srovnání s Gruzii silně zaostával (nepočítáme-li pokles HDP v důsledku války na Donbase, tak podle údajů z tabulky 1 vzrostlo HDP p. c. mezi lety 2005 a 2014 „jen“ o 34 %) a nedařilo se ani bojovat proti endemicky se vyskytující korupci. V roce 2011 se Ukrajina propadla téměř na samotné dno žebříčku vnímání korupce, když zaujala 152. místo ze 183 sledovaných zemí. Podle údajů Světového ekonomického fóra z roku 2014 byla, co se kvality institucionálního prostředí týče, Ukrajina na 130. místě žebříčku konkurenceschopnosti ekonomik, tj. na úrovni Východního Timoru, Nigérie nebo Mosambiku (Schwab, 2014). V žebříčku zemí podle nejlepších podmínek pro podnikání figurovala v roce 2014 Ukrajina na 96. místě, tj. mezi Filipíny a Srí Lankou (Doing Business, 2014).

Nová Porošenkova a Jaceňukova administrativa deklarovala snahu o zásadní reformy, nicméně ani po dvou letech od euromajdanu to nevypadá, že by se jí to dařilo. Jaceňukova vláda je po odchodu dvou koaličních partnerů velmi slabá a ukazuje se, že návrat k semiprezidentské ústavě je provázen i návratem k soupeření mezi více pyramidovými strukturami seskupenými převážně kolem výrazných oligarchů – Porošenka, Achmetova, Kolomojského, Pinčuka či Tymošenkové (Eristavi 2016).

Gruzie za prezidentství Eduarda Ševardnadze měla sice podobně jako Ukrajina prezidentskou ústavu, nicméně patronalistická pyramida s Ševardnadzem na svém vrcholu byla poněkud decentralizovanější, než v případě Kučmovy Ukrajiny (srov. Stefes, 2008, s. 74). To je ovšem důsledek občanské války z první poloviny 90. let, která umožnila vznik místním klientelistickým strukturám, jež se Ševardnadze po svém nástupu pokoušel vyvažovat a kontrolovat. Ševardnadzeho režim tak měl velmi inkluzivní charakter. Ghia Nodia (2005, s. 43) jej zdařile přirovnal k akciové společnosti, v níž Ševardnadze byl manažerem držícím 51 % akcií, ochotným dát podíl na moci komukoliv, kdo bude respektovat jeho autoritu.

Po revoluci růží a odchodu „většinového vlastníka“ Ševardnadzeho nemohly lokální klientelistické sítě Saakašvilimu čelit, což se jasně

ukázalo v květnu 2004, kdy nejmocnější z regionálních lídrů, prezident autonomní Adžárie Aslan Abašidze, byl sesazen ze svého postu, aby následně uprchl do Ruska (Hoch, Souleimanov, Baranec, 2014, s. 58). Reforma ústavy, přijatá brzy po Saakašvilioho zvolení do funkce prezidenta, dále posílila prezidentské pravomoci a vedla tak ke vzniku jediné patronalistické pyramidové struktury (srov. Wheatley, Zürcher, 2008, s. 6), která však disponovala reformistickým prozápadním étosem a pustila se do odvážných reforem, které vedly ke konsolidaci a modernizaci gruzínského státu (Tsi-khelashvili, 2010, 118 – 119).²

Tyto reformy vedly k značnému snížení míry korupce v některých sektorech, kde reformy proběhly úspěšně (Aliyev, 2014, s. 26), např. policie (Light, 2013), vysoké školství (Orkodashvili, 2010), zdravotnictví (Gotsadze, Zoidze, Vasadze, 2005), státní správa (Mitchell, 2009) nebo ekonomika (Ademmer, Börzel, 2013, s. 590). V žebříčku vnímání korupce se Gruzie během několika let posunula o cca 80 míst a v současnosti figuruje nad některými zeměmi Evropské unie včetně Slovenska a do roku 2015 i Česka, což je v postsovětském prostoru mimo Pobaltí zcela nevídané (Transparency International, 2015). Zároveň však došlo k centralizaci přeživších korupčních praktik a jejich přenesení z reality všedního dne do nejvyšších pater gruzínské politiky do okruhu Saakašvilioho politické kliky, přičemž obvinění z korupce Saakašvili často používal jako nástroj pro diskrétní svých oponentů, např. již zmiňovaného Okruašvilioho (Ademmer, Börzel, 2013, 589 – 590). Z hlediska kvality institucionálního prostředí podle Světového ekonomického fóra v roce 2014 Gruzie figurovala na vcelku licho-

² Je příznačné, že nová ukrajinská vláda přizvala po roce 2014 řadu gruzínských odborníků, kteří zaujali významná místa ve vládě i veřejné správě. Bývalý gruzínský prezident Micheil Saakašvili se stal gubernátorem Oděské oblasti, ministrem zdravotnictví se stal Alexandr Kvitašvili, který stejný post zastával i v Gruzii, podobně je na tom první náměstkyně ministra vnitra Eka Zghuladze a zástupce generálního prokurátora Davit Sakvarelidze, při ministerstvu spravedlnosti vznikl celý tým gruzínských protikorupčních expertů v čele s Ghiou Gecadzem, bývalým děkanem právnické fakulty tbiliské univerzity a před svou smrtí v roce 2014 krátce jako poradce ukrajinské vlády působil i autor gruzínských ekonomických reforem Kacha Bendukidze (Socor, 2015).

tivém 48. místě na světě, vysoko nad Českem nebo Slovenskem (Schwab, 2014). V žebříčku zemí s nejlepšími podmínkami pro podnikání se Gruzie již léta drží na čelních příčkách, v roce 2014 skončila na místě patnáctém (Doing Business, 2014). HDP per capita se od růžové revoluce do roku 2015 více než zdvojnásobilo, dle údajů z tabulky 1 činí růst HDP per capita mezi lety 2004 a 2015 celých 110 %.

Volební porážky Saakašviliho hnutí v letech 2012 a 2013 doprovázené již dříve schválenou změnou ústavy směrem k semiprezidentskému modelu způsobily na gruzínské politické scéně zásadní změnu. V gruzínském parlamentu zasedlo více politických stran a i samotná vláda má poprvé od růžové revoluce koaliční půdorys. Nelze však jednoznačně říci, že by se gruzínská politika zřetelně posunula k systému více soupeřících mocenských pyramid. Je zde totiž pouze jediná typická pyramida v čele s Bidzinou Ivanišvilim; ten v roce 2013 rezignoval na post premiéra i lídra Gruzínského snu, nicméně ze zákulisí stále tuto stranu řídí a zřejmě stál i za výměnou na premiérském postu na podzim 2015, kdy Irakli Garibašviliho vystřídal Giorgi Kvirikašvili (Fuller, 2015). Ostatní subjekty zastoupené ve vládě či v parlamentu, včetně bezpartijního, byť Ivanišvilim nominovaného prezidenta Margvelašviliho, však zatím představují značnou protiváhu Gruzínského snu a až parlamentní volby plánované na podzim 2016 zřejmě ukáží, jaká panuje v současné Gruzii reálná konstelace sil.

Závěr

Ač Ukrajina i Gruzie zůstaly po barevných revolucích hybridními režimy, cesty, jimiž se obě země vydaly, jsou odlišné a vedly také k rozdílným politickým i ekonomickým realitám. Zatímco na Ukrajině došlo během oranžové revoluce k dohodě mezi znesvářenými táboři a v jejím důsledku k zásadní změně ústavy směrem k semiprezidentskému modelu, v Gruzii se po růžové revoluci podařilo nově zvolenému prezidentovi Saakašvilimu dále posílit prezidentský charakter země. Zatímco Ukrajina se vydala cestou politické liberalizace, gruzínská cesta začala již několik let po svržení Ševardnadzeho směřovat k větší autokratizaci, provázené ovšem impresivními reformami, které zemi značně zracionalizovaly a zmodernizovaly. Ukrajinská politická liberalizace si

však v kontextu místní patronalistické politiky vybrala svou daň: porevoluční politické elity se místo soustředění se na potřebné reformy rozštěpily na dvě soupeřící pyramidové struktury, čehož využil dříve poražený Janukovyč; poté, co byl roku 2010 zvolen prezidentem, obnovil platnost původní prezidentské ústavy, marginalizoval konkurenční patronalistické pyramidy a Ukrajinu opět značně autokratizoval – ovšem bez Saakašviliho reformistického étosu.

Janukovyčova autokratická vláda byla po pouhých čtyřech letech svržena a nová vláda prezidenta Porošenka a premiéra Jaceňuka deklarovala snahu o prosazení reformů v gruzínském stylu – zatím však bez valného úspěchu. Oproti tomu v Gruzii relativně autokratická avšak prozápadně a modernisticky orientovaná vláda de facto připravila (být nezáměrně) půdu pro liberalizaci politického života po roce 2012. Detailní analýza politického vývoje v obou zemích zřetelně ukazuje, že zatímco důraz na provedení rychlých reformů za poměrně autokratické Saakašviliho vlády umožnil Gruzii reformovat a stabilizovat formální státní instituce, což zemi zajistilo slušný ekonomický rozvoj, v ukrajinském případě důraz na liberalizaci politické sféry vedl k politické nestabilitě, neefektivitě státní správy a zvýšení role neformálních politických institucí. V této logice pak současná ukrajinská politická garnitura nemá v důsledku kombinace semiprezidentské ústavy a soupeřících oligarchických pyramidových struktur příliš mnoho šancí na uskutečnění reformů, které by zemi zmodernizovaly, snížily míru korupce a vliv oligarchů v politice obecně.

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THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE RUSSIAN THOUGHT THE (RE)CONSTRUCTION OF THE IDEA

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Abstract:

This article attempts to determine the extent to which the investigation in history of philosophy can produce beneficial impact upon the systematic (theoretical) philosophical enquiry. Taking the history of Russian philosophy as an exemplary domain, there will be an attempt made to propose certain metaphilosophical resolutions regarding the essence and the idea of social philosophy. This essay is aiming to take into consideration two essential problems: 1) the thesis about the primacy of social and historical thought that plays the predominant role in Russian philosophy; 2) departing from the political model of Eric Voegelin the concept of political gnosis will be proposed accordingly

Keywords:

Social and political philosophy, History of Russian philosophy, Political gnosis, Anthropocentrism, Activism, Revolution.

Today more than ever before the serious-minded are convinced that philosophy has practical tasks. The life of both the individual and the community is not molded by their mere needs and fortunes but also at all times by the strength of dominant ideas. Ideas are spiritual powers.

N. Hartmann, *New Ways of Ontology*

The essential insistence to refine and specify what the philosophy is and what it is preoccupied with, what objectives philosophers attempt to attain and what method is to be employed in order to bring the pursued goals to fruition has always coexisted with the philosophical reflection since its nativity. The philosophy from its foundation has always been self-reflexive and the questions that concerned the meaning and status of this domain, its existence-oriented or social utility, its significance for the culture, are also fundamental problems for the philosophy alone. This self-reflection clearly differentiates the philosophy from other scientific disciplines that examine just certain

problems, formulate a hypothesis, proposing new theories that replace the former ones. Conversely, the reflection on the workshop, on the method, on the essence or on the social function of the given discipline is only auxiliary to the relevant research activities. Chemists and historians do not need to take into the consideration the particularity of their discipline, they do not have to justify and elucidate their work and do not even need to be familiar with the history of the domain of knowledge they cultivate. For example, one can successfully cultivate historical science without taking into account the history of historiography. On the other hand, it is impossible in my opinion to cultivate philosophy with no regard to its history. Likewise, any attempt to eliminate the metaphilosophical problems out of the philosophical scope of deliberation would result with the significant dispossession of the philosophical tradition, the philosophers would be deprived of the traditional area of thought as well as, as far as I can see, lacking any kind of foundation.

These remarks refer, both, to philosophy as a whole and its particular subdivisions or disciplines. Although this essay affects only the segment of the philosophy, it is a notable part of the particular importance for human life. This particular segment of the philosophy attempts to comprehend human practical involvement, commitment, and desire to change the world or to preserve some of its qualities. It stems from man's active attitude towards reality and the fact that human is a moral being that inhabits a community with a certain structure and order. To put it bluntly, I would like to take into consideration a metaphilosophical intuition associated with the question of the essence and objectives of the social philosophy. However, instead of raising the question of what social philosophy is, I will rather consider purpose and aspirations of the social philosophy.

The proposed answers emphasize the practical nature of this discipline, the social commitment of the philosophers (or, to put it broadly, the intellectuals) and the responsibility that lies on individuals considering the complex nature of the world of human affairs and actions. In this sense, the 'reconstruction' of the idea of social philosophy – a wording

that can be traced in the title above – is not merely an attempt to reinstate and clarify of what this discipline is. It is, in addition to it, an imperative and prerequisite for its reformulation or even reconstruction from the scratch, with an account for the consistent historical grounding. This is the first objective I would like to articulate here: an endeavor to expose two great dimensions of philosophical thought: metaphilosophy and praxis that together constitute the domain of social philosophy.

The second objective of this essay is an attempt to emphasize the significance of the history of philosophy with respect to the metaphilosophical studies. In a way, the history of philosophy is the most essential and the most tangible field of metaphilosophy, because it is embedded in the viable past. I strongly believe that the preliminary objective of the history of philosophy does not amount to producing the collection of the superfluous discarded ideas and surmounted views considered as a museum exhibits or as a catalogue of the great philosophers' notable quotes. The goal of the history of philosophy is to elucidate how the philosophy is recognized when it is questioned by the philosophers themselves. The questions and the issues raised are more remarkable here than the answers. The philosophical nature of these enquiries and problems lay in the fact that they don't make definitive and comprehensive decisions available, let alone explanatory systems. Taking into account two different approaches, two separate manners of understanding these philosophical questions distinguished by Nicolai Hartmann, I find the systematic reflection on issues that cannot be easily unravelled more appealing than the procedure of the structural approach, that compels the observance of the system resolutions. Systems fade away, questions and problems remain viable (Hartmann, 1955, pp. 1 – 3).

I would like to demonstrate this complementary relation between the metaphilosophy and the history of philosophy, departing from the example of the history of Russian philosophy. I am convinced that the reconstruction of the idea of social philosophy that I would like to propose coincides with certain, often explicitly expressed qualities of the Russian thought. It reveals the unique character of Russian philosophical thought, which, in turn, endeavours

to expose a practical dimension of philosophy. This thought no longer can be considered as an academic theory, quite conversely, it becomes an authentic effort taken to transform the world. The great number Russian philosophical investigators has always emphasized such merits of this field as anthropocentrism, criticism, social commitment, apprehension for the philosophy considered as a practical field, panmoralism (the domination of ethical reflection and urge to recognize the ethical criterion as a source of meaning and truth). These qualities coincide with the elements forming the idea of social philosophy proposed here. That is why the Russian philosophy will be considered as an exemplary illustration of the particular metaphilosophical concept. The practical life orientation of Russian philosophers is another example of the convergence between metaphilosophy and praxis.

The concept of social philosophy, that will be considered here, stems from the theoretical model of political gnosis, which has been originated by Eric Voegelin as a result of his historical and philosophical studies. However, it must be strongly marked at this point that this sketch will not take the account of the general views of this author and his reflection concerning the history of political thought, his criticism of modernity, his endeavor to unmask the political gnosis that the Western civilization crisis is enrooted in – the crisis initiated at the beginning of the modern era and presently encompassing more and more poignant form. I leave aside the views of Voegelin, one of the most insightful critics of the modernity, who was tremendously effective in exposing religious foundations and references to modern political doctrines and common ideologies. In a way, my effort can be considered as an axiological reversal of his concept. The issues that in Voegelin's view falsify the political gnosis, the issues that are described as the source of many devastating consequences, these issues express, in my terms, the positive aspects of social philosophy. Conversely to enquiring about dispassionate, detailed description of the world that imitates the model of scientific studies, the social philosophy presupposes that the social world is a human product, the effect of the collective work of people who are trying to change and improve it.

Voegelin himself would probably evaluate my views expressed above as a symptom of political gnosis in its purest form, as a false belief contaminated with such sins of modernity as activism, immanentism, anthropocentrism and criticism. However, at this point the particular conceptual structure formed by Voegelin is employed in my discourse with crude intention to illustrate the main features of the political gnosis that I will consider merely as a historic model. The particular elements of that model can be adapted and applied so as to reconstruct the idea of social philosophy (Voegelin, 1952). That is why, I will not include in my discussion the problem of the gnostic (in Voegelian sense of the word) character of modern social and political thought. What is more, I will not take into account the fundamental question of whether philosophy is a gnosis itself, or some other form of intellectual heresy.

Voegelin argues that each gnostic adherent (a follower of the false theology of citizenship) repudiates and rejects the existing world. It appears to me that equal merits might be allocated to entire social philosophy as a whole. This is because this domain stems from the belief that there is something fallacious about the collective existence. The social philosophy as a discipline originates as a diagnosis of the crisis that overwhelms the society. It is an agency through which this crisis is about to be understood and overcome. Pitirim Sorokin, the Russian co-founder of the American sociology, goes even as far as to emphasize that the greatest historiosophical visions and profound reflections upon social reality usually flourish in periods of war, disasters, major socio-cultural and economic crisis, or at times (or also immediately after such periods) when the former structures of life are disrupted (Sorokin, 1963, pp. 3 – 4). Perhaps this belief might refer as well to philosophy, as such. The philosophy originates from questions conveying uncertainty regarding the human existence. It emerged when mythological and religious explanatory schemes declined and human life and man's place in the world ceased to be evident. The new doubts, hesitations and fear were becoming more prevalent, contrary to the preceding confidence and common rules of conduct. To put it very plainly: when there's no ground to go astray, nothing happens (these are indeed

the notable Hegelian blank, empty, non-historicizable spaces) – everything proceeds on as in a rut, each single thing is arranged in the right place. There is no need to concern about it, deliberate and give consideration to the revealed circumstances, let alone re-establishing new meanings and discovering new truths. It is not until certain interference arises, a disturbance, a problem that alerts the affinity to think and explore new paths. This explains the creative potency of the crises which stimulate the philosophy, political thought, and art and promote the emergence of new great visions or alternative solutions.

It is proposed here, that the criticism (exposing the existing situation) and crisis closely converge together to combine unity. It is worth to recall, that both of these concepts are related etymologically, both stemming from the common Greek etymological root (Gr. word *Krino*: division, differentiation, distinction). Social philosophy is a critical reflection upon the situation that demands for adjustments and transformations. The main objective of social philosophy might be defined as exploring alternative ways in which the crisis (regardless of its nature) is to be overcome. To put it another way, social philosophy is the self-awareness of the crisis and critical deliberation upon the society – the society that at least throughout the last two centuries has been defined in the Western terms as declining. When there is no concern about the future of the political community, the political and social thought becomes banal and repetitive.

The second element that formulates the structure of the Gnostic thinking stems from the beliefs about the sources of the crisis. Voegelin argues that Gnostic adherents do not consider the criticized state of affairs as natural, nor as a consequence of the imperfect nature of man. The crisis is disarray in the world's order, which arise from peoples' actions. One must simply arrange the world differently to remove the evilness. The social philosophy attempts to reorganize the social world. However, it does not aspire to salvation of the humanity or even to the transformation of the society into one sound and sustainable structure. Human defects cannot be eliminated so that is why the institutions, laws, rules, actions and habits are of such a high im-

portance. Only as a result of the operative force, the conflicts in the community can be neutralized and diverging objectives unified (yet, never absolutely, only to the certain extent). The principles that synchronize the community should be prudently composed, so as to suit different individual tendencies and ambitions. It is not easy because people have different inclinations and different objectives. Nevertheless, in my view, the social philosophy takes as an assumption all those issues that Isaiah Berlin considered as pluralism of values. The social world is a field of collisions and conflicts that is why it is so vital to sustain the procedures and basic axiological principles acknowledging that the differences and complexities emerging from the human world are natural and enduring. This undertaking arise from the conviction that, in spite of those differences, one must live, communicate and interact together without losing a sense of solidarity. The conversion of the community does not amount to transforming people into angels, quite the reverse, it attempts to adjust the rules of coexistence. The political action aims at building such structures that bind community together without ruining the pluralism and without eliminating the sphere of freedom. Is it possible? The answer to this question is connected with the third element, considered by Voegelin as a component of the political gnosis.

He argues that the gnostic adherents believe they have a capacity to eliminate the evilness completely. The aspirations of the social philosophy are, of course, less elevated. The purpose of the social philosophy does not merely involve criticism, but also adjustment, as it is assumed that the corrective actions, even though they are difficult, are by the same token meaningful. The alleged strategy is confined to minimalism. It is not a universal happiness and prosperity for all, or even endeavor to maximize the subjective well-being of people who constitute the community. However, even a partial transformation, might contribute to make the existence less oppressive. The main objective is to strive for harmony between the private domain of freedom and the public realm of compromise and concessions. First of all, the principal point considered here is that the man is about to become not only the con-

scious and responsible, but also a critical agent involved in the social world.

Man is a social being, which means that they ought to consider the society and take others into account while performing their activities. The social philosophy is aiming to reflect the society not only as an existing fact (the social sciences as has always dealt with that issue with greater or lesser success), but also as an object of common concern and measures, as a product of human activities and aspirations.

Another element to be taken into account is the variability of the world. The order of things is ever altering. According to Voegelin, the political gnosis supplements this common-sense assertion with problematic belief that the balance of changes is positive, and that one day, the path of the evolutionary or revolutionary change will result in a perfect world -the world deprived of evil. As in the previous case, the social philosophy does not share this optimism, assigned to gnosis by the German-American scholar. What counts for the social philosophy is the conviction that the history is a sequence of the meaningful and profound changes (even if it is an accidental cause that appears to be their ultimate reason). I am deeply convinced that it is possible to identify a sort of progress in the history of the mankind, although the mere idea of the progress is a subject of everlasting disputes and refutations. The idea of progress has been a matter of harsh criticism since it has been originated during the classical period of Enlightenment, however, what matters for the social philosophy is chiefly a certain intuition associated with the idea of progress. It states that the history constitutes the alternating sequence through which people express their desire to improve their own destiny. It is simply a hope that one can live a better life, though such belief is regarded by many as utopia. Thoughts on freedom, equality, solidarity, the aspiration to have impact upon one's own life – all these desires are not meaningless – or else they wouldn't be an integral component of the human condition. Perhaps, all these matters can be eventually reduced to the desire for happiness. Be as it may, the social philosophy should not ignore that desire.

One of the basic goals of the social philosophy is to rethink the World as a better place, as well as to involve actively, in order to improve

the human condition. Full excellence and satisfaction of all requirements are not possible, but it is worth to strive to make one's lives enhanced and improved.

Is it possible? According to Voegelin the positive response to that question is crucial for the political gnosis. In his view, the gnostic adherent believes that changing the world and the order of things lies within the human capabilities, and in this case this faith goes even as far, so as to reach the idea of self-salvation. The social philosophy addresses this issue differently. It's not the salvation that is at stake, but the belief that people create the social world, belief that people take part in the historical process. Nothing and no one is to substitute them. The social philosophy puts forward that all the agencies, the social world is comprised of – the culture, the institutions, the values, the traditions, the laws, the constitutions of social life and so on – are the products of the people's efforts, since there is no other world for the human beings than the one that has been formed by themselves. The social philosophy, like philosophy in general, breaks with mystical and obscurant views, accepting as true the belief that people are dominated by some supreme powers. The social world is a correlate of human actions and renunciations. Since there is no other world than the human world, it is a culture that constitutes this world – the culture considered broadly – as everything that people create and learn.

The last point I would like to give emphasis to, concerns gnosis as such. Gnostic adherent assumes that any salutary transformation of the world or one's own life results from the possessed knowledge – the knowledge that might be labelled as absolute, both in terms of accuracy and its boundlessness. Again, one might notice some internal relationship between political gnosis, as it was defined by Voegelin, and philosophy, which stemmed from the efforts associated with knowledge that is characterized as certain and universal. Social philosophy is of course, an equivalent form of knowledge about the human world and the rules which govern it. However, similar to the corresponding philosophy in its classical form, the social philosophy has a dual nature: it is simultaneously knowledge and art, theory and practice, reflection and action. It is

an attempt to describe and to understand the social world. In this respect, this domain complies this task more efficiently, in my opinion, than so-called social or political sciences, distracted by details of the public debates and limiting their aspirations with media reports. The social philosophy shapes its theories as more convincing, precisely because of the second aspect of it: its normative or practical merits. This aspect reveals objectives, patterns, visions and human dreams about well-ordered society expressed in a systematic manner. Social philosophy is, both, a description and a dream, a theory and a persuasion.

This knowledge supplemented with utopia does not, of course, aspire to salvation. Despite the fact that it does not have any simple and political implications, it is still something more: a testimony that reflects the condition of human being, this strange creature willing to repair the world and enhance own fate.

Therefore, the reconstruction of the idea of the social philosophy, emphasizes the following elements: (i) a critical judgment of the contemporary society and its history, combined with the awareness regarding human flaws and deficiencies of the institutions formed by people. This awareness does not only convey the belief that the human world is not perfect, but also becomes a diagnosis of the upcoming or experienced crisis. (ii) the crisis can be overcome, because the crisis pertains to the formations created by people themselves. The forms constituting the human co-existence rather than sin or fate shape their lives. (iii) the flaws that become the source of the crisis are not absolute. One can refute them. Any structure can be modified, improved. The crisis can be avoided or overcome. The forms of human life reflected in legal norms and institutions ought to be altered. (iv) the amendments more or less successful constitute the human history. History is a continuous course of human efforts to improve their own lives. The excellence is not accessible to us, but one can improve various elements of common life. (v) no one is to substitute people in this task. History is a product of human creativity, or rather the combination of actions and renunciations of people. History is a representation of the consequences of human actions that lead to good or bad results. (vi) It must be studied and understood.

Knowledge is a central problem in the philosophy. However, this knowledge is associated with action. It is knowledge of the human that exists in the world, and above all that exists with others, together or separately. Philosophy is an art of life that penetrates life in urge to comprehend it and transform it. As a result, the knowledge becomes the wisdom.

Metaphilosophy lacking a historical foundation is empty and infertile. The investigation of the history of philosophy facilitates and revitalises reflection on its essence. For each of the above-mentioned structural elements of the idea of social philosophy, one is able to add a number of historical examples and enhancements. This would however entail one to write an entire, comprehensive book, rather than a short article. Therefore a concise example of Russian philosophical thought would allow me to demonstrate that such concepts of social philosophy are present in the history of philosophy, and even that they penetrate and determine the entire scope of the philosophical thinking. However, I would like to demonstrate that, due to my observation shared by numerous distinguished experts on Russian philosophy and Russian philosophers themselves, the distinctiveness of Russian philosophy is articulated precisely by the attitude that prevails in the model of social philosophy mentioned above. I also want to indicate that the objective of the history of philosophy is not just recovering the past and the telling the story of how different issues were once considered. The history brightens the philosophy from inside. It teaches not only what the philosophy has been, but above all what it is as such. It specifies the position in the culture that philosophy occupies or should occupy.

I would like to make few general comments on the specific nature of Russian philosophy as an illustration to more abstract speculations, presented above about the nature of social philosophy. The concept of Voegelin would be, on one hand, only a theoretical framework that enables to reconstruct the idea of the social philosophy, on the other hand, the departure point that can help to comprehend the concise history of Russian philosophical thought. First of all, there should be a strong emphasis put on the specific quality of Russian philosophers' attitude, the remarkable tendency to convergence

theory with practice, as well as a particular totality of philosophy, labelled by the Russians as *integrity* (rus. *cel'nost'*). Philosophy is not limited to the realm of academic teaching and abstract considerations detached from tangible matters. The philosophy is considered as a vital element of the practical life. The philosophy is bound to understand life which cannot be encapsulated in sophisticated treatises. The philosophy is a measure to change life, to make it better or more bearable. That attitude can be easily traced as common when studying Russian philosophers' pursuits to explore more practice-oriented ways of literary expression, in art criticism or political pamphlets.

Andrzej Walicki, one of the greatest contemporary experts in Russian philosophy, has always emphasizes the practical and human-oriented character of the Russian philosophical thought. We might go even as far as to regard it as a "blend" of philosophy and social thought, which principally results in philosophical concern about man and his action in the society. The Russian philosophy is dominated by questions about man's fate in history, ideals and objectives of the historical development, the perfect model of the society and, last but not least, the destiny of Russia and its purpose in the world. The historiosophy is strongly fused here with ethics. In addition, this tendency is usually supplemented by kind of a moral tension involving intensive absorption with practical and socio-political impact of philosophical ideas on the problem of the common existence (Walicki, 2015, pp. 20 – 22). The crucial mission of the philosophy cannot be reduced to a theoretical framework that reflects the world, but aims to occupy man with work that makes the transformation of the world and improvement of their own lives possible. This practical pathos appears in the Russian enlightenment and dominates throughout the nineteenth century. The social-orientation in philosophy is connected, not only with the subject of philosophical reflection, which finds man as a social and historical being as a central issue, but also, if not primarily, with a specific understanding of the social engagement of philosophy, social commitment of the philosopher and even moral duties that go along with this occupation.

The philosophy in Russia is not an academic science, detached from everyday life, concerned with specific problems and employing esoteric language. Philosophy, like an art, is a social service that cannot be separated from other spheres of life and should be involved in enhancing the world. One must be aware that this belief has also dominated Russian literature, at least starting with Nikolai Gogol. But it must be remembered that the great examples of the Russian literature of the nineteenth century – Gogol, Turgenev, Dostoyevsky, Leskov, and Tolstoy – cannot be just considered as a manifestation of the social service principles, but they contain as well a powerful dose of a philosophical reflection. One could even argue that, at the particular period, it was a literature and literal criticism that took over the assignments of philosophy. This phenomenon had its origin in the weakness of the academic philosophy as such, as well as in the unfavourable attitude of the Russian authorities towards philosophy, after 1848. Today, no one doubts about the philosophical nature of the literary works of such giants as Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy. And they were not an exception. By the same token, the Russian literary criticism since Vissarion Belinsky (the peer of Gogol) can be described as a great sample of philosophical thought. Such important figures from the history of Russian philosophy as Belinsky, Nicholas Chernyshevsky, Nicholas Dobroliubov, Apollon Grigoriev, and Dmitri Pisarev – were all literary critics and not professional philosophers. The non-academic nature of the Russian philosophy and its profound connection with literature are the most convincing indications of its practical nature and social alignment.

The extraordinary pathos and moral subordination of entire philosophy to ethics are the central qualities of Russian philosophy. As noted by Nikolay Lossky, one of the most important Russian philosophers of the twentieth century, Russian philosophers, even when involved in the remote branches of philosophy, never lose the account of the moral issues conveyed. The ethical reflection and awareness of the moral responsibilities that philosophy must satisfy encompass even the most abstract metaphysical speculations or research in the theory of knowledge. In this context, Lossky evokes the wording that derives from dissertation of

the professor's exam of another Russian philosopher, Vasyly Zenkovsky. Zenkovsky argued: "The ethical endeavours are of the particular importance when it is the dialectics of Russian philosophical research involved. Even radical positivists and naturalists cultivate ethics as an independent or even principally predominant orientation. The primacy of ethics can be apparently singled out in Herzen's works even more evidently it might be traced in the writings of Lavrov and Mikhaylovsky, Tolstoy and the like. The ethical personalism to this day is the most distinctive achievement of the Russian thought" (quoted after Lossky, 1994, p. 440). One might only add here that this ethical dominant the Russian philosophical personalism entails: anthropocentrism, and moralistic maximalism of the religious (the idea of theosis and the idea of the Kingdom of God) or immanentist and anti-religious (utopia of a perfect society character) nature.

Both thinkers cited above – Lossky and Zenkovsky – were authors of the most prominent synthesis of the history of Russian philosophy written by these eminent philosophers in the twentieth century, in the realm of pre-revolutionary Russia or inspired by the emigration circles. In this sense, their assertions do not only have a value of the historical hypotheses, but are also an illustration of their own philosophical attitude. This interpretation is clearly emerging as a testimonial of those who are absorbed into the historical process. It is an attempt to understand and describe the philosophy taking the pure practice as an internal reference point that is categorised as a mere activity and does not presuppose any historiographical distance. Zenkovsky indicates anthropocentrism as a central feature of Russian philosophy. And here as well, one can differentiate the strong connection between Russian philosophy and the idea of social philosophy described above: "The Russian philosophy is not theocentric (although many of its advocates are profoundly and truly religious) nor cosmocentric (although the problems of natural philosophy prompted the attention of Russian philosophers since its initial phase) – it is mostly captivated by the problem of man, their destiny and their ways [in the world] as well as with the meaning and purpose of the history as such" (Zenkovsky, 1991, p. 16).

However, this anthropocentrism, has a special character. The man is considered as a centre of the philosophical reflection, being primarily a moral being, operating in the world, striving to realize their goals and values, changing the world and being held responsible for all these prerogatives. Anthropocentrism is defined as a domination of practical philosophy and moral orientation that can be reflected even in the most abstract ontological and epistemological studies (in this regard Zenkovsky's and Lossky's views are coherent). According to Zenkovsky, "panmoralism" is a fundamental quality of the Russian philosophy. Apparently, the domination of ethics and moral values orientation take different shades. It is on the one hand, the orthodox and expressed explicitly Tolstoy's panmoralism that acknowledges the virtuous man living here and now as the highest value and considers Christianity as an immanent expression of morality, on the other hand, it is a hidden panmoralism, latent, pervading works and speeches that have at first glance nothing to do with morality and ethics as a philosophical discipline.

Due to Zenkovsky, the Anthropocentrism in Russian philosophy results with an additional, essential implication: it is absorbed with social issues and raises a particular awareness to the historiosophical concerns. Russian idea – says Zenkovsky – is almost completely absorbed with the historical studies, especially when considering its inevitable and immediate decline (Zenkovsky, 1991, p. 16). Social issues draw the philosophy towards current and political problems, while the classical and conventional issues, cultivated by the *philosophia perennis*, cease to be equally appreciated. The historiosophy that, on the contrary, converts to the religious or secular apocalyptic teaching has a specific maximalist and nihilistic spirit. These merits, in my opinion, can be viewed as deficiencies affecting the academic philosophy, encapsulated in the ivory towers. Perhaps the benefits of a philosophy, that avoids abstract and technical speculations of metaphysics and gnosiology, are what is more essential for the society.

The Russian neokantist, Boris Yakovenko (whose works were contemporary to the above mentioned authors) concluded in his work, intellectually inspired by Tomas Masaryk (and

the financial support of the government of Czechoslovakia), that this attention to practical issues, such as life and social activity, is standard for all the nations at the initial phase of the philosophical formation (this idea greatly reflects the unity of the Slavic philosophy in the nineteenth century) and periods when the processes of socio-cultural and political transformation can be observed. The philosophy is exposed then via journalism and literature striving to understand and explain the progressions taking place (Jakovenko, 1938). Consequently, it can be labelled as "Gnostic" correspondingly to the social philosophy. It is assumed that one can change the world as long as they are able to apprehend it and assuming that this apprehension is possible by means of active being in the world.

However, Jakovenko is more reserved than Lossky and Zenkovsky when attempting to describe the peculiarity of Russian philosophy. He does not consider practical and moral orientation as an inherent Russian quality, but as a permanent component that shapes the philosophy in various countries. This author even argues that Russian philosophy is deficient in traditions and exceptional merits of a general nature. According to him, so far (the 30s of the twentieth century), there had been no principal, universal and stimulating idea developed in Russia, which would be an expression of a Russian spirit and that at the same time would give rise to self-apprehension. There is no such thing as a Russian genre of philosophy likely to be recognized as harmoniously developing a whole (Jakovenko, 1938).

In my opinion, Yakovenko's assumptions are too harsh and too critical. Throughout his historical research Yakovenko himself seems to depart from his own conclusions. In fact, while studying his work, it is difficult to identify any arguments that would visibly falsify my hypothesis. In addition to it, the contemporary approaches emphasizing pragmatism, anthropocentrism, activism and moralism as singular features of Russian philosophy are remarkably recurring. I will recall one example here: the academic textbook published recently (2005). The authors highlight the passion for a man as a specific feature of Russian philosophy – man explored beyond one's own internal domain and considered rather as a component of hu-

man society or a creator and recipient of the culture. These issues are to be found mostly in the context of the historiosophical considerations, addressing both the problem of Russian and the whole world's history. All these domains of philosophical reflection – the anthropological, social, cultural and the historical one – are recognized as taking the perspective of morality, as a reference point (Maslin-Zotova, 2005, p. 6).

The abovementioned distinctive component of Russian philosophy, the human being issue, presupposes that is an existence of a man, rather than their essence, to be taken into account. That gives the Russian philosophy the genuine focus on the practical and social issues. As a philosophy cantered on human life, the Russian philosophy has always managed to avoid scholastic and abstract speculations. The theory, the intangible structural considerations are treated with reserve. It is more a philosophy of innovation and commitment – a philosophy that wants to create and build – either the earthly "crystal palaces" as in the case of Chernyshevsky's utopia, or the God's Kingdom (Maslin-Zotova, 2005, p. 6).

Is therefore Boris Yakovenko accurate, when claiming that there is no single common idea that illustrates the spirit of Russian philosophy? In my view, this statement is too strong, as evidenced above. The scepticism of the Russian philosopher is justified when limited to the Russian academic philosophy. But at this field it is difficult to presuppose any spectacular uniqueness. Russian philosophy, especially the academic one, was created in due with the European standards and involves nothing extraordinary or anything that might undermine the value of Russian philosophizing as such. In my opinion, the philosophy in Russia constitutes a part of the universal philosophical discourse. It is a component of the Western philosophy, comparably to the philosophy in Poland and Slovakia. The mutual inspiration, the influence of the ideas, the enhancement of the theories and methods originated in other countries is a standard practice in science and this might be applied to philosophy as well. The uniqueness of Russian philosophy is rooted in something else – in its practical attitude as well as in the awareness to the social, historical and ethical issues. The

sphere of such interests is inescapably more local and historically and culturally biased than the theoretical and abstract investigations, prevalent at the field of ontology or epistemology. Yakovenko himself redefines the identity of Russian philosophy not as something that has been achieved and completed, but as a task apt to be attained by the Russian philosophy. The Russian neokantist believes that the specific assignment of the Russian philosophy might be defined as a pursuit to overcome the fundamental contradictions that Western philosophy encounters on each single step. Russian philosophy eager to formulate the final solutions as well as the actual synthesis of the contradictory views of the European thought.

In my opinion, this view must be revised. This synthesis, to which Russian philosophy aims, is, to put it in Kantian terms, an ultimate objective unattainable and unreal as such, though it constitutes a horizon of human efforts and aspirations, the efforts and aspirations of Russian philosophers in this particular case. Contrary to Yakovenko, I would attribute the values of Russian thought and the objectives it is involved with elsewhere. It is not a synthesis, but a collision of contradictions, problems tackled and studies considering the excessive solutions. This is why, precedent to the emergence of notable Vladimir Soloviev that is until the second half of the nineteenth century, there was actually no complete philosophical systems developed in Russia. However there was a systematic and profound discussion carried with respect to the social, moral and political issues. Questions that have been raised regarded Russia and its place in Europe, the European constituents of its culture and its historical destiny. These questions and problems comprised (and partly still comprise) a unique character of the Russian thought. On the other hand, the assumed unity and integrity, is principally addressing the steady convergence of theory and practice, attempting to consider philosophy and human life as coherent issues. This applies both to the public activity performed in the historical domain as well as to the integrity of man's powers and capacities to apprehend and act. It is precisely why these two ideal types described above – the social philosophy and the Russian thought soundly combine together.

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THE LEVEL OF INTERETHNIC TOLERANCE OF THE UKRAINIANS IN THE TRANSCARPATHIAN REGION

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Abstract:

The article is devoted to the analysis of tolerance and xenophobia of the Ukrainians of the Transcarpathian region towards some ethnic groups. Based on the opinion polls conducted according to Bogardus method of measuring of social distance, the author analyzed the attitude to the Russian speaking Ukrainians, the Hungarians, the Romanians, the Russians, the Roma, the Slovaks, the Jews, the Americans and the Hindus. The survey results indicate that the Ukrainians of the Transcarpathian region mostly demonstrate their tolerance towards the Slovaks, the Americans and the Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The social distance to the Hungarians, the Romanians, the Jews and the Hindus can be characterised as alienation. There is an openly xenophobic attitude towards the Russians and the Roma people.

Keywords:

Tolerance, Ethnic tolerance, Ethnic group, Ethnic relations, Xenophobia, Transcarpathian region.

In recent years Ukraine has faced a number of new phenomena and processes that have a great impact on the internal politics of the country. It is a large-scale relocation, that is migration, that leads to the increasing of ethnic, cultural and confessional diversity of the society. The mass migrations have inevitably resulted in different versions of the relationship between migrants and the host ethnic majority. Cultural and communicative, social and psychological characteristics, inherent in every ethnic community in practice leads to problematic interethnic communication. The participants, to some extent, face a difficulty interacting with those whose culture is different from their own. The beginning of the military confrontation in the East of Ukraine and Russian aggression under the guise of protecting of the Russian-speaking population actualized the study of inter-ethnic interaction and inter-ethnic tolerance in the Ukrainian society, as well as the changes in attitudes towards some ethnic groups caused by the war.

The research of the tolerance in the Ukrainian society has been regularly conducted by different researchers. During the 1992 – 2002

a Ukrainian Scientist N. Panina (Panina, 2005, Panina, 2005a) modified a Bogardus scale and conducted the research of the tolerance level in Ukraine. Thus it was concluded that the level of the tolerance was decreasing. In 2012 a comprehensive study of tolerance in the Ukrainian society was conducted (Regional tolerance, 2012). The results revealed a rather high level of alienation in Ukraine and identified ethnic/racial groups, the attitude to which was the most negative. In the Transcarpathian region tolerance measuring were made by O. Pelin (Pelin, 2011) who came to the conclusion that tolerance level of the Transcarpathian population is somewhat higher than in the rest of Ukraine. All the studies were conducted before the year 2014, and so a new factor, that is the Russian aggression, was not taken into consideration. Our study had as a goal to determine the change in the attitude of the Ukrainians of the Transcarpathian region towards different ethnic groups in the conditions of war.

Thus, the aim of our research is to study an inter-ethnic tolerance of the Ukrainians of the Transcarpathian region based on a sociological survey conducted in November 2014 – February 2015.

In Ukraine, the journalists, government officials and community leaders are mostly trying to avoid the recognition of the problem of interethnic tolerance, emphasizing only positive nature of these interactions. For example, the use of the phrase “Transcarpathian region is one of the most distinctive multiethnic regions of Ukraine, where the representatives of 100 nationalities live in peace and harmony” is a traditional one for Transcarpathia (Shutanych). So two factors were emphasised – the multiculturalism of the region and the high level of tolerance. Therefore, our aim is to determine the level of tolerance of the Ukrainians towards the ethnic minorities of Transcarpathia.

Presenting the main material. Tolerance (from the Latin. *Tolero, tolerare*) – to transfer, to hold, to endure (Pelin, 2011, p. 349). In sociology tolerance is understood as a social phenomenon caused by certain socio-economic and political relations and by the traditions of interethnic communication, as well as by the level of political and humanitarian culture of the society.

The Ukrainian researcher M. Dzera determines “tolerance” – as a tolerant attitude of political parties to the opinions of political opposition, the ability to admit its defeat in the political struggle (Dzera, 2007, p. 72). Another Ukrainian researcher Y. Shveda defines tolerance as a tolerant attitude to others' opinions, attitudes, points of view, beliefs, considering it as a mandatory rule of a constitutional state and democratic society (Shveda, 2005, p. 413).

If to appeal to the regulatory framework, “The Declaration of Tolerance Principles” defines tolerance as respect, acceptance and proper understanding of the rich diversity of our world cultures, our forms of expression and the ways of being human individuality. It is promoted by knowledge, openness, communication and the freedom of thought, conscience and belief (Declaration of principles). Thus, the ethnic tolerance means tolerance towards people of other ethnic groups, the absence of discrimination.

The most common and reliable method of measuring of sociological tolerance is considered to be the Scale of social distance created by Emory Bogardus. The author of the theoretical concept of measuring of ethnic (racial) distances Robert Park considered the social and racial distances to be the product of the biased attitude to “others”. “We usually turn to bias, which later seems rough, instinctive and involuntary disposition to maintain a social distance. These distances in our democratic society are striving to move to exclusively individual level” (Park, 1924, p. 344).

The first measuring of ethnic distance was made by Bogardus in 1925. It showed virtual absence of distances between the ethnic groups that speak English (the English, Scots and Irish) and a considerable distance towards the Turks, Negros, Mulattos and Japanese. Bogardus results are explained by the fact that the idea of these ethnic or racial groups based on stereotypes, not on their own experience of communication (Pelin, 2011). Thus, even the first experimental measurement of ethnic distance fully confirmed the theoretical assumptions of R. Park as to the bias in the evaluation of interethnic distances and the level of interethnic tolerance.

In Ukraine Bogardus methodology was refined and adapted by N. Panina. Exploring

Ukrainian interethnic tolerance within 1992 – 2002 she came to the conclusion that tolerance level was decreasing. This trend the researcher explained by the following: Ukraine, as a newly created state needed some strengthening of its independence, and this caused a negative attitude towards the minorities (Panina, 2005, Panina, 2005a).

Another Ukrainian researcher Paniotto came to similar conclusions. On his opinion the level of xenophobia in Ukraine during the period from 1991 to 2007 significantly increased. The least biased attitude of the population of Ukraine was observed towards the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, followed by the Russian-speaking Ukrainians, then by the Russians and the Belarussians. Then, with a large margin they are followed by the Jews, the Frenchmen, the Canadians, the Americans, and then – with some margin, by the Negroes and the Roma (Paniotto, 2008, p. 211).

In 2012 the results of “Regional tolerance, xenophobia and extremism in Ukraine in 2012”, conducted by Kiev International Institute of Sociology on the request of the Human Rights and Prevention of Extremism and Xenophobia (IHRPEX) were published. The authors described the interethnic relations as moderately alienated. During 2012 they have undergone some minor changes, mainly in the direction of reduction of the distance towards the representatives of the Slavic ethnic groups, the Jews and the Caucasians (ethnic categorization which is broadcasted through the media was used while conducting a public opinion poll). The shortest social distance is kept towards the Ukrainians (the index of ethnic distance is higher for the Russian speaking Ukrainians compared to Ukrainian speaking) and the Russians. The greatest distance according to the scale of Bogardus is observed towards such groups as the Roma (5.8), the Negroes (5.6), the Asians and the Arabs (5.5), the Caucasians (5.3). Towards all these groups there is a latent xenophobic setting in the Ukrainian society (Regional tolerance, 2012).

A Transcarpathian sociologist O. Pelin asserted that interethnic tolerance of the population of the Transcarpathian region was in general higher than throughout Ukraine. This assertion was based on the fact that ethnic groups living in the region did not have any

significant conflicts over the 1991 – 2013. Indirectly, these results are confirmed by the findings of the non-government organisation “The Ukrainian peacekeeping school”. Exploring the potential conflict points of the Transcarpathian region, the experts have determined the most probable ones: civil society – government, inter-confessional conflicts and political conflicts. However, the experts did not consider any interethnic conflicts as a serious threat to the Transcarpathian region (Shveda, 2005).

In November 2014 – February 2015, in the Transcarpathian region there was some research in order to determine the level of ethnic tolerance. The conducted study was based on the Bogardus scale. The list of ethnic groups contained: the Ukrainians, the Russian speaking Ukrainians, the Hungarians, the Romanians, the Russians, the Roma (Gypsies), the Slovaks, the Jews, the Americans and the Hindus. The Russian speaking Ukrainians were put in a separate group as we tried to test the hypothesis that with the beginning of the war a language has become a marker of the detection a “friend/ foe”. The Hungarians are the largest minority in Transcarpathian region. They live compactly along the border with Hungary and are the most politically active ones. Their political activity is reinforced by the existence of two Hungarian parties, which are in fact politicized wing of their non-governmental organisations. Even though these political parties are competitors, but in the aspect of strategic issues they have mutual understanding. The strategic goal of the Hungarians is to achieve territorial autonomy – in particular by means of creating a separated Tysa Region. The Romanian minority is one of the most closed and compact living along the border with Romania. The Russians, according to the census of 2001 is the fourth largest minority, which has a distinct trend towards downsizing. During the 2000s the Russian minority’s influence has weakened. However, it was perceived by the Ukrainians of the Transcarpathian region rather positively. In the study, we were trying to check how the war has influenced the perception of the Russian minority by the Ukrainians. According to census of 2001, there are 14 thousand of Roma people. However, the Roma activists say that the real figure is 40 thousand. (Novakova, 2014, p. 29). The information of the

local doctors also indicates that the figure is close to 40 thousand. Therefore, to our mind, the figure of 40 thousand is a real one. Let us pay attention to the fact that during the census of 2001 the majority of Roma indicated Hungarian as their mother tongue – 62.3% (Molnár, 2005, p. 23). Given the negative attitude towards the Roma, probably most of them were trying to choose a more “prestigious” nationality in the census indicating a different nationality, mostly a Hungarian one. The leaders of the Hungarian minority are also interested in the idea of recording the Roma as the Hungarians thus the Hungarian minority is becoming the most numerous in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine.

The Slovak minority is not numerous but well integrated into Ukrainian society. We included it in the study in order to determine the attitude taking into consideration intensive cross-border cooperation with Slovakia. Another ethnic group is the Jews. It is traditionally considered to be discriminated. It was also included in the study in order to determine the attitude of the Transcarpathian Ukrainians towards the Jews. It should be noted that the number of the Jews within the years 1990 – 2000's considerably reduced and their current amount is 568 people. We also included the Americans into our study, so we tried to see how the attitude of the Ukrainians to the Americans had changed in terms of military aggression. We have suggested that Americans receive a complementary attitude because of support provided to Ukraine by the US.

In the study we also included the Hindus. This is a collective term which includes citizens of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. They are not a traditional minority of the Transcarpathian region, but because of military actions in Eastern Ukraine a large number of Hindu students moved to the Transcarpathian region, where they continue their studies. We are interested in what will be the attitude of the Ukrainians of the Transcarpathian region towards the ethnic group, which is a new one and there is no experience of communication and interaction with it. In the study, we used the scale of social distance of Bogardus adapted by N. Panina in order to assess the state of interethnic relations in Ukraine and the relative level of ethnic / racial xenophobia. The index in the range of 1-3

is interpreted as proximity, 4-5 as alienation, 5-6 as latent and more than 6 as open xenophobia.

Chart 1. Interdependence of ethnical relations (based on the author's research in Transcarpathia, 2015)

Group	Urban	Rural	Average rate
The Russian speaking Ukrainians	2,7	3,2	2,9
The Hungarians	3,2	3,8	3,5
The Romanians	4,0	4,0	4,0
The Russians	5,2	5,5	5,35
The Roma (Gypsies)	5,8	5,9	5,85
The Slovaks	2,3	2,5	2,4
The Jews	3,4	4,2	3,8
The Americans	2,2	3,6	2,9
The Hindus	3,7	4,2	3,95

According to the results of the study the distance towards Russian speaking Ukrainians is 2.9, which is interpreted as proximity. However, there is some distrust to the Russian speaking Ukrainians. We tend to explain it by foreign policy factors, by the discrimination of Ukrainian population in Donbass as well as by the dissemination of the information by regional mass media about the unwillingness of immigrants from the East to get socialized in the Transcarpathian region. Basically it goes about the unwillingness to learn the Ukrainian language and the rumours of a large number of male immigrants who evade mobilization. In fact, at the time of the survey in the Transcarpathian region 3623 refugees were registered. Of these, 279 from the Crimea and 3339 from the zone of Antiterrorist Operation. Among them: 1573 – capable, that is healthy and able to earn for living on their own, 987 – children, 1063 – disabled. That is most of the migrants are people with children and disabled. Overall, their number is one of the lowest among the regions of Ukraine. So, we partly received the confirmation of our hypothesis that this was a marker called “friend/ foe”.

There is some longer distance can be observed towards the Hungarians. They are traditional and the largest minority. Overall the Hungarians are well perceived by the Ukrainians who consider them neat, family oriented and rich. Somewhat higher alienation can be explained by the insularity of the Hungarians, weak integration into Ukrainian society. The Romanians live compactly in Tyachiv and Rakhiv districts in total in 18 settlements. The

alienation towards them can be explained by the fact that many Ukrainians equate them with the Roma. The insularity of the Romanian ethnic group should also be emphasized. Although it should be stressed that the Romanian minority, primarily due to the positions of their leaders has always expressed the support to the Ukrainian majority. The attitude to the Russians can be characterized as latent xenophobia. It should be noted that sociological studies conducted before 2014 indicated that the attitude towards this ethnic group was proximate. In the course of the study we found that the main factor that influenced the negative perception was the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the annexation of the Crimea and the Donbas war. Therefore, the foreign policy factors were decisive in shaping the attitude towards the Russian ethnic group. It should be noted that changes in attitude to this group are characterized by the greatest dynamism. It is likely that the war ending will somehow reduce the level of negative attitude towards the Russians, but no radical improvement is expected.

The highest level of alienation, that is latent xenophobia we observe towards the Roma. It should be emphasized that the absolute rejection of the Roma is inherent in all age groups without exception. Slightly higher level of alienation is observed among rural population and lower one is among urban one. As the main reasons for the alienation the respondents indicated a lifestyle that is characterized as social parasitism, basically begging, refusal to work, the involvement of children in begging and others. The second factor that was specified is unkempt appearance and the third one is aggressive behavior of members of the Roma minority. Overall, the researchers determined such problems among the Roma population (Novakova, 2014, pp. 22 – 27).

The greatest proximity the Ukrainians of the Transcarpathian region identified towards the Slovak minority, which was somewhat unexpected. This phenomenon can be explained by good integration of the Slovak minority into Ukrainian society, language affinity and the absence of conflicts. The index of proximity towards the Jews was 3.8, it is lower in urban areas and much higher in rural ones. Most respondents described the Jews as intelligent and

educated people, but the negative reaction was caused by the idea of excessively high number of Jews among Ukrainian politicians and by blaming them in the country's difficult economic situation.

The high level of tolerance towards the Americans can be explained only by foreign policy factors. During the military conflict the US brings pressure on Russia and expresses its support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Therefore, the majority of respondents see the US as a guarantor of independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. This explains a high level of complementarity towards the Americans. It should be noted that we register more positive attitude to the Americans among the urban population rather than in rural areas. This can be explained by the fact that the urban population is more concerned with political problems.

The Hindus are a new ethnic group in Transcarpathia. They are concentrated in Uzhhorod, where they study at university. Most people could not clearly express their attitude to the Indians, therefore their perception was very careful. The greatest polarization was observed among the residents of Uzhhorod. Some of them treated Indians positively and the others extremely negatively, explaining that by the fears of the spread of exotic diseases.

Thus, the level of tolerance of the Ukrainians of the Transcarpathian region is selective. Most tolerance can be seen towards the Slovak minority due to its integration into Ukrainian society and the absence of conflicts. The high level of complementarity to the Americans can be explained by solely foreign policy factors and hope for political support to Ukraine from the US. The attitude to the Russian speaking Ukrainians is generally defined as proximity, but we can see the growth of the distance towards the group.

The attitude to the Hungarians, the Romanians and the Jews can be characterized as alienation. The first two ethnic groups are very poorly integrated into Ukrainian society in general and the relationship with them are influenced by both internal and external factors. For example, the state of relations between Hungary and Romania with Ukraine and their position as to the Russian aggression in Ukraine. The group of the Jewish population is

very small in number but the determining factor in the attitude to it is the situation throughout Ukraine and the stereotypes.

At the same time, openly xenophobic attitudes of Transcarpathian Ukrainians can be observed towards the two ethnic groups – the Russians and the Roma. The attitude towards the first is a direct consequence of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. So, the attitude to the Russians before the war was characterized as proximity. The xenophobic attitude to the Roma ethnic group is defined by a complex set of social factors that influence the perception of the Roma in the Ukrainian society.

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ETICKÉ VEDENIE ĽUDÍ V SLOVENSKOM PODNIKATEĽSKOM PROSTREDÍ – RECENZIA VEDECKEJ MONOGRAFIE A. REMIŠOVEJ, A. LAŠAKOVEJ, J. RUDYHO ET AL.

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Problematika etického vedenia ľudí nachádza v prostredí tranzitívnych a novoindustrializovaných ekonomík svoje významné miesto (v rámci vedeckej, odbornej i výsostne praktickej roviny) v kontexte parciálnych tém venovaných praktickej stránke corporate governance, personálneho manažmentu v súkromných firmách, ako aj v organizáciách pôsobiacich vo verejnom sektore. Faktom podčiarkujúcim význam predmetného diskurzu je, že spoločensky zodpovedné správanie organizácií, ktoré významným spôsobom ovplyvňuje kvalitu podnikateľského (resp. vo všeobecnosti inštitucionálneho) prostredia, úzko koreluje s účinnosťou aplikovaných nástrojov etického riadenia. V krajinách V4 bolo v posledných rokoch publikovaných niekoľko špecificky zameraných monografických prác autorov, venujúcich sa problematike podnikateľskej etiky a organizačnej kultúry (napr. Putnová, Seknička, Remišová, Dubcová, Lašáková, atď.), ktoré mapujú špecifiká etického riadenia v tunajšom podnikateľskom prostredí.

Monografia autorského kolektívu z Fakulty managementu Univerzity Komenského v Brati-

slave je jedným z kľúčových výstupov výskumného projektu VEGA č. 1/0333/13 – Kritická analýza vplyvu kultúrnych a etických faktorov na vedenie ľudí v slovenskom podnikateľskom prostredí, ktorý bol na Katedre managementu FM UK realizovaný v rokoch 2013 – 2015. Výskumný tím pod vedením prof. A. Remišovej si kládol za cieľ identifikovať kultúrne a etické faktory, ovplyvňujúce manažérske rozhodovanie v oblasti hodnotovo orientovaného vedenia ľudí v rámci súčasného slovenského podnikateľského prostredia a získať tak reálny obraz o kvalite tunajších manažérov. Výskumníci aplikovali zmiešaný dizajn empirického výskumu, založený na kvalitatívnom a kvantitatívnom prístupe. Výskumnou vzorkou v rámci dotazníkového výskumu boli 810 manažéri a odborníci z oblasti riadenia ľudských zdrojov, výstupy kvantitatívneho výskumu boli ďalej precizované pomocou fókusových skupín. Medzi respondentmi boli viacmenej rovnomerne zastúpení manažéri pôsobiaci vo vrcholovom, strednom i prvostupňovom manažmente firiem a organizácií alokovaných v rozličných odvetviach slovenskej

ekonomiky (pričom z hľadiska vlastníctva firiem prevažuje zastúpenie súkromného sektora). V rámci bližších charakteristík vzorky respondentov je zaujímavým momentom vzdelanostná štruktúra manažérov (prevaha manažérov s vysokoškolským vzdelaním v ekonomických odboroch) a absolvovanie manažérského tréningu, resp. školenia zameraného na etické riadenie v prípade 53,5 % opýtaných (teda takmer polovica manažérov bez tohto druhu vzdelania, či tréningu).

Medzi hlavné zistenia, ktoré vyplynuli z výskumu patrí konštatovanie, že miera etického vedenia ľudí (validovaná na základe Brownovej škály ELS – Ethical Leadership Scale) sa v slovenskom podnikateľskom prostredí realizuje na priemernej až mierne nadpriemernej úrovni (hodnota ELS 5,07), pričom sú tu prítomné a vnímané všetky faktory etického vedenia ľudí. Výskumníci pritom konštatujú, že etické vedenie ľudí na Slovensku je viditeľnejšie v individuálnom správaní manažérov, v morálnej sile ich charakteru a v ich vlastnom konaní. Menej výrazne sa však prejavuje v cieľnom vedení spolupracovníkov k etickému správaniu, vo vytváraní proetického pracovného prostredia a procesov, ktoré eliminujú neetické správanie zamestnancov. V odporúčaníach preto nachádzame formulovaný apel na zodpovednosť lídrov za vytváranie proetického prostredia, viditeľnosť a správne nastavenie etických procesov, za formovanie etického povedomia a správania svojich podriadených.

Spomedzi organizačných faktorov ovplyvňujúcich rozvoj etického vedenia ľudí v organizáciách respondenti najväčšiu váhu prisúdili etickému správaniu vedenia organizácie, jasne deklarovanej požiadavke dodržiavať platné zákony a rešpektovať ľudské práva, možnosti otvorene komunikovať na každej úrovni riadenia o akýchkoľvek problémoch v organizácii, transparentnému boju proti korupcii, diskriminácii, transparentnosti a objektívnosti v kariérnom raste, spravodlivému odmeňovaniu, atď. Medzi veľmi významné organizačné faktory respondenti zahrnuli i morálne oceňovanie tých, ktorí hodnoty organizácie naplňajú v praxi a sankcionovanie tých, ktorí porušili etický kódex organizácie.

Odporúčania formulované na základe najvýznamnejších výsledkov výskumu organizačných faktorov ovplyvňujúcich rozvoj etického

vedenia ľudí v organizáciách smerujú jednak do roviny vzdelávania budúcich manažérov, ako aj do roviny samotného riadenia organizácií. V oboch prípadoch autori akcentujú potrebu rozvoja morálnej úrovne a etického povedomia (študentov i manažérov), ako aj rozvoja emocionálnej a kultúrnej inteligencie. V rámci vzdelávacieho procesu odporúčajú riešiť situácie podnecujúce k identifikácii etických problémov. Rozvojové programy a workshopy v organizáciách by mali byť založené na získavaní praktických skúseností s riešením etických dilem prostredníctvom participatívnych metód rozvoja zamestnancov. Okrem akcentu na kognitívnu stránku jednotlivcov má medzi odporúčaniami pevné miesto apel na dodržiavanie legislatívnych noriem, ako aj ukotvenie etických princípov v organizačnej kultúre a ich dôsledné dodržiavanie. To predpokladá na jednej strane potrebné poznatky a informovanosť zamestnancov, na druhej strane efektívny systém kontroly a vyžadovanie zodpovednosti a transparentnosti smerujúce k enkulturácii zamestnancov (v zmysle akceptácie a osvojenia si organizačnej kultúry zamestnancami).

Autori monografie sa v rámci komplexného výskumu venovali tiež identifikácii prejavov a príčin neetického vedenia ľudí, etického vs. neetického rozhodovania manažérov a aplikácii konkrétnych nástrojov etického riadenia v reáliách slovenského podnikateľského prostredia, pričom formulovali niekoľko relevantných odporúčaní pre oblasť vysokoškolského vzdelávania a výskumu, pre decíznu sféru i pre samotnú prax riadenia firiem a organizácií. Za najvýznamnejšie zistenie možno považovať, že podľa výsledkov empirického výskumu sa takmer polovica respondentov stretla s neetickým správaním manažérov, najčastejšie v podobe klamania, zavádzania, klientelizmu, a pod., čo podčiarkuje potrebu monitorovania spôsobov vedenia ľudí zo strany organizácií a potrebu implementácie etických programov založených na relevantných nástrojoch etického riadenia. Prezentované a erudovaným spôsobom interpretované výsledky výskumu zároveň inšpirujú a otvárajú priestor pre ďalšie interdisciplinárne skúmanie vplyvu rôznych úrovní etického vedenia ľudí na pracovný výkon zamestnancov, ich angažovanosť, lojalitu, fluktuáciu, stres v pracovných vzťahoch, ako aj na vnímanie organizácie zo strany interných

a externých stakeholderov a na celkovú ekonomickú výkonnosť, resp. efektívnosť organizácie.

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Vydavateľstvo SLON v koedícii s Masarykovou univerzitou v Brne prináša čitateľom a čitateľkám so záujmom o štúdium politiky identity publikáciu Ireny Kašparovej: *Politika romství – romská politika*. Autorka je akademičkou pôsobiacou na Katedre sociológie Masarykovej univerzity, kde sa venuje primárne antropologickému výskumu rómstva. Slovenským i českým čitateľom a čitateľkám sa tak do rúk dostáva monografia, ktorá spája poznatky politickej antropológie, etnografie a verejnej politiky.

Publikácia je funkčne rozdelená na štyri kapitoly, ktoré prinášajú rozdielne pohľady na rómsku politiku a jej špecifický vývoj v kontexte českej a slovenskej skúsenosti s komunistickým režimom. Už v úvode autorka čitateľov a čitateľky varuje, že vo svojich textoch vychádza z predpokladu, že „rómstvo nie je objektívna, v spoločnosti existujúca veličina, ktorú možno uchopiť v jej danosti a aplikovať na vybrané osoby. Práve naopak – je to konštrukt situačne premenlivý a jeho použitie slúži rôznym mocenským účelom“ (Kašparová, 2014, s. 7). V kontexte bourdieuvského habitu si tak autorka v monografii kladie otázku, ako sa rómstvo stáva kategóriou, na

základe čoho dekonštruuje súčasný stav rómskej politiky v českom prostredí. Napriek tomu, že sa autorka v práci nevyhýba konvenčnému historickému inštitucionalizmu, jej perspektíva je bližšie diskurzívnemu a sociologickému inštitucionalizmu, cez ktorý sa autorka pýta, ako Rómovia a Rómky prežívajú štát.

V prvej kapitole sa autorka venuje objasneniu politiky identity, kde vychádza zo súčasnej romistickej literatúry, ako i z grafických výskumov uskutočnených v Českej i Slovenskej republike. Poukazuje na to, že táto literatúra často vychádza z esencialistického a biologického ponímania rómskej etnicity, čo často vedie k zavedeniu nútenej homogenizácie tejto skupiny, ktorá je však vnútorne veľmi diverzifikovaná. Autorka ako príklad uvádza olašských a moravských Rómov, ktorí sa líšia jazykom i rebríckom životných hodnôt. „Nie sú a nechcú byť jednotní a brání homogénne, ako to vyžaduje väčšinová spoločnosť“ (Kašparová, 2014, s. 35). Ponímanie rómskeho etnika autorka ďalej dokumentuje cez vplyv evolucionizmu (sociálneho dárwinizmu), teórie rasy a rasizmu, teórie asimilácie a teórie multikulturalizmu. Práve v tejto časti zdôrazňuje ako vnútorne di-

verzifikované etnikum zápasí v kontexte týchto teórií o dosiahnutie sebaurčenia.

V druhej kapitole pod názvom *Možnosti politicky aktívnych Romů v politické kultúre majority*, autorka venuje svoju pozornosť nacionalistickým a etnoemancipačným iniciatívam rómskeho etnika. Zdôrazňuje rómsku históriu ako nelineárne orálne predávané mýty, ktoré boli písomne rekonštruované etnomajoritnými vedcami a vedkyňami, čím bola rómskemu etniku odopretá ich vlastná história. Napriek tomu je folklorizácia a muzeifikácia „tradične rómskej“ kultúry podporovaná štátom, keďže je tento proces nutný pre úspešné fungovanie multikultúrnej spoločnosti. Avšak „spôsob, akým je prezentovaná rómska história, etnicita a jazyk do značnej miery odráža a kopíruje vlastné historické skúsenosti väčšinovej spoločnosti“ (Kašparová, 2014, s. 89). Autorka ďalej dokumentuje rómske politické hnutie na území Českej a Slovenskej republiky, ako aj vývoj, ktorý poznamenal Zákon o trvalom usídlení kočujúcich osôb č.74/1958 Sb. Študenti a študentky politických vied v tejto kapitole rozhodne ocenia prehľad vývoja politických strán a hnutí rómskeho etnika, ktoré doposiaľ na tomto území pôsobili. V tomto kontexte autorka zdôrazňuje problematiku reprezentácie a často neúspešnú snahu jednotlivých organizácií a inštitúcií, ktoré nedokázali naplniť predpoklady ucelenej politickej reprezentácie rómskeho etnika.

Prístup politickej antropológie je zreteľný i v tretej kapitole monografie *Politika romství – romská politika*. V tejto kapitole autorka píše primárne o rómskej rodine ako o symbolickom zdroji politického kapitálu. Poukazuje na to, že „pokiaľ politik majority presadzuje svoju vlastnú rodinu, je jeho konanie prinajmenšom kritizované. V rómskej politike tomu tak nie je. Rodina tu stojí v strede záujmu rómskeho politika a jedine politika založená na rodine je vnímaná ako správna a získava si rešpekt“ (Kašparová, 2014, s. 130). Irena Kašparová v tejto kapitole opisuje i rozpad pôvodných rómskych komunít a ich štruktúr, ktoré postihlo sociálne inžinierstvo komunistického režimu a spomínaný Zákon o trvalom usídlení kočujúcich osôb. Pôvodne organizované komunity rodín boli tak aj v dôsledku presídlenia nútené žiť často samostatne bez tradičného vplyvu vajdu, čím sa zmenila mocienská štruktúra ovplyvňujúca životy Rómov

a Rómiok. Zánik inštitúcie vajdu v druhej polovici minulého storočia vníma autorka ako jeden z negatívnych faktorov vývoja rómskeho etnika na území Českej republiky. Pokus o nápravu situácie nastal v roku 1998, kedy česká vláda zriadila inštitút rómskych poradcov, avšak táto pozícia sa ako „umelý výtvor“ (Kašparová, 2014, s. 154) na mnohých miestach stala nefunkčnou.

Záverečná kapitola monografie vychádza z konceptu enomickej histórie a mapuje skúsenosti rómskych politikov pôsobiacich v českom prostredí. Na príklade životných príbehov štyroch politikov: Štefana Daniela, Martina Oračka, Mariána Mirgu a Josefa Červeňáka, autorka dokumentuje variabilné prežívanie vlastnej rómskej identity, politickej identity, ako i samotného štátu. Cez rozpovedané príbehy autorka dekonštruje pozíciu „Róma z povolania“ (Kašparová, 2014, s. 213) ako i dualitu majoritnej a vlastnej rómskej kultúry, s ktorou sa mnohí diskurzívne vyrovnávajú.

Etnopolitická štúdia Ireny Kašparovej *Politika romství – romská politika* prináša na limitovanom priestore čitateľom a čitateľkám z rôznych sociálnych vedných disciplín farbistý náhľad do sveta rómskej politickej histórie na území Českej i Slovenskej republiky. Avšak poslednú kapitolu publikácie autorka uzatvára pomerne negatívnym hodnotením. Píše, že „sľubná situácia 90. rokov minulého storočia, kedy sa Rómovia začali aktívne podieľať na spoločenskom a politickom dianí na miestnej úrovni, je preč. Ich politickí vodcovia boli absorbovaní politickým polom majority na celonárodnej alebo nadnárodnej úrovni, kde vzhľadom k svojej početnej zanedbateľnosti plnia viac menej kozmetickú úlohu“ (Kašparová, 2014, s. 242). I touto publikáciou sa však v medziach politickej antropológie autorka snaží priblížiť sociálne i kultúrne faktory, ktoré na vývoj rómskej politiky vplývajú. Patrične prínosnou je i záverečná štvrtá kapitola, ktorá cez naratívne rozhovory skúma skúsenosť niekoľkých *Homo Politicus Romus* a navracia tak rómskej histórii jej vlastný hlas.

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MUKACHEVO BUSINESS FORUM

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Pri skúmaní regionálneho rozvoja pohraničia sú štátne hranice chápané spravidla ako mnohostranné sociálne inštitúcie, nie len ako formálne politické markery zvrchovanosti. Hranice rámcujú spoločenské a politické dianie a sú vytvárané prostredníctvom inštitucionálnych a diskurzívnych postupov rôznymi aktérmi na rôznych úrovniach. Detailná analýza rôznych prístupov k cezhraničnej spolupráci umožňuje vytvorenie know-how použiteľného pri vypracovávaní stratégií rozvoja prihraničných regiónov, ktoré vzhľadom na vyvíjajúci sa charakter hraníc môžu zdieľať podobné i diferencované problémy a príležitosti. Regionálna ekonomika vo svojej podstate funguje ako určitá špecifická časť celku národnej ekonomiky (prípadne ekonomiky integračného zoskupenia) a vykonáva v rámci tohto celku také funkcie, ktoré ju udržiavajú a rozvíjajú v kontexte vnútorných väzieb na národnú ekonomiku a špecifických vonkajších väzieb k medzinárodnému okoliu – predovšetkým ku geograficky najbližšiemu okoliu. Funkcionálne odlišnosti regionálnej ekonomiky v rámci národného hospodárstva spôsobujú, že rôznorodé regióny nemajú rovnaké potreby a priority a nereagujú na vonkajšie podnety rovnakým spôsobom. Analytické výstupy v rámci border studies, mapujúce predpoklady a bariéry cezhraničnej spolupráce, disponujú významným praktickým aspektom, nakoľko majú potenciál stať sa

nástrojom budovania vzájomnej dôvery, spolupráce a regionálneho rozvoja prihraničných regiónov.

V naznačenom kontexte sa v dňoch 18. – 20. mája 2016 v rámci grantového projektu CBC01014 Zdieľanie know-how z európskej integrácie a skúseností z cezhraničnej spolupráce medzi Nórskom, Ruskom a Ukrajinou (SUREC II) uskutočnila medzinárodná vedecko-praktická konferencia Mukachevo Business Forum. Podujatie bolo organizované Magistrátom mesta Mukačevo v spolupráci so Slovenskou spoločnosťou pre zahraničnú politiku a Slovenskou obchodnou a priemyselnou komorou. Organizátori si predsavzali vytvoriť priestor pre prezentácie, diskusie a otvorený dialóg na úrovni odbornej, decíznej a podnikateľskej sféry, ohľadom možností cezhraničnej spolupráce a vzájomne výhodného partnerstva prihraničných regiónov. Predmetom záujmu ukrajinských, slovenských, maďarských, poľských, českých a nemeckých účastníkov konferencie boli predovšetkým perspektívy a výzvy, týkajúce sa podmienok a rozvoja vzájomného obchodu, investícií a priemyselnej výroby v Zakarpatskej oblasti vo vzťahu k susedným prihraničným regiónom SR, Maďarska a Poľska. Zo sektorového hľadiska sa jednotlivé diskutované témy týkali predovšetkým ľahkého priemyslu, najmä elektrotechnického, potravinárskeho, drevospracujúceho priemyslu a staveb-

níctva, ale aj otázok energetickej efektívnosti, zahraničného obchodu, turizmu a cestovného ruchu. Praktickým aspektom konferencie bola účasť podnikateľov a prezentácia investičného a produkčného potenciálu mesta Mukačevo a Mukačevského rajónu, vrátane exkurzií do výrobných prevádzok firiem Fischer, Flextronics, AVE, Tochprilad, Zakarpatska budivelna keramika, a i.

Implementácia asociačnej dohody a DCFTA by podľa predpokladov odborníkov mala akcelerovať vzájomný obchod Ukrajiny a EÚ, diverzifikáciu ukrajinského exportu a modernizáciu ukrajinskej ekonomiky prostredníctvom redukcie ciel a kvantitatívnych obmedzení i prostredníctvom harmonizácie noriem a štandardov v rámci vybraných priemyselných a agropotravinárskych odvetví. Na regionálnej úrovni sa ako priamy efekt zavedenia zóny voľného obchodu očakáva revitalizácia podnikania a vzájomného obchodu v prihraničných regiónoch. Problematike nových podnikateľ-

ských a investičných príležitostí v takto vymedzenom kontexte bola venovaná panelová sekcia, v rámci ktorej diskutovali a so svojimi analytickými príspevkami vystúpili Uliana Nechitajlo z užhorodského Centra pre strategické partnerstvo (CSP), Martin Lačný z Inštitútu politológie FF PU v Prešove, Juraj Knopp zo Slovenskej obchodnej a priemyselnej komory, Oleh Dubish z Poľsko-ukrajinskej obchodnej komory, Vladimír Benč zo Slovenskej spoločnosti pre zahraničnú politiku (SFPA), Volodymyr Hoblyk z Mukačevskej štátnej univerzity a Andriy Baloha, primátor mesta Mukačevo. Parciálnymi témami rečníkov boli vývoj a súčasný stav vzájomného obchodu Zakarpatskej oblasti a samosprávnych krajov na východe Slovenska, charakteristiky podnikateľského prostredia v prihraničných regiónoch, príležitosti a prekážky cezhraničnej spolupráce a cezhraničného obchodu, proces implementácie DCFTA a jej dopad na slovensko-ukrajinské pohranicie.



INŠTITÚT POLITOLÓGIE NA NEFORMÁLNO M STRETNUTÍ S LIAMOM WASLEYM, CHARGÉ D' AFFAIRES VELVYSLANECTVA USA NA SLOVENSKU

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Dňa 25. 4. 2016 sa vo večerných hodinách v priestoroch Libresso Books & Coffee v Prešove uskutočnilo neformálne stretnutie študentov a členov Inštitútu politológie s pánom Liamom Wasley, chargé d'affaires Veľvyslanectva USA na Slovensku. V rámci svojej pracovnej cesty po východnom Slovensku absolvoval okrem iného aj návštevu rezidencie gréckokatolíckeho arcibiskupstva v Prešove, kde ho privítal arcibiskup a metropolita Ján Babjak, či historickú exkurziu po meste Prešov v sprievode pána Martina Razusa, regionálneho zástupcu Česko-Slovenskej medzinárodnej genealogickej spoločnosti (CGSI). Stretnutie so študentmi a členmi Inštitútu politológie bolo zamerané na spoločnú diskusiu o aktuálnych otázkach zahraničnej a medzinárodnej politiky, bezpečnosti, politickej situácii na Ukrajine, ďalšom smerovaní bilaterálnych vzťahov Slovenska a USA, ako aj o úlohe Slovenska v rámci štruktúr Severoatlantickej aliance (NATO).

Pán L. Wasley pôsobí od septembra 2015 na Veľvyslanectve USA na Slovensku v diplomatickej funkcii chargé d'affaires ad interim. Do svojej funkcie dočasného vedúceho

zastupiteľského úradu USA nastúpil po skončení funkčného obdobia vedúceho diplomatickej misie USA na Slovensku, veľvyslanca Theodora Sedgwicka, ktorý v Bratislave pôsobil približne päť rokov. Vo funkcii dočasného šéfa diplomatickej misie zotrva do momentu odovzdania poverovacích listín dezignovaného veľvyslanca USA Adama H. Sterlinga prezidentovi Slovenskej republiky Andrejovi Kiskovi. A. Sterling bol do uvedenej diplomatickej funkcie oficiálne nominovaný prezidentom B. Obamom dňa 18. 12. 2015 a tejto funkcie sa bude môcť ujať až po potvrdení resp. schvaľovanom procese v Senáte USA.

Chargé d'affaires L. Wasley pôsobil počas svojej doterajšej diplomatickej kariéry na viacerých významných postoch. Pred svojím príchodom na Slovensko zastával funkciu povereného riaditeľa sekcie Európskych záležitostí Ministerstva zahraničných vecí USA pre vzťahy medzi USA a inštitúciami EÚ. V rokoch 2008 – 2011 zastával funkciu povereného ministerského poradcu pre politiku na Veľvyslanectve USA v Ríme, kde sa zaoberal vzťahmi medzi USA a Talianskom v oblasti zahraničnej

politiky a obrany, taktiež talianskym predsedníctvom G8 a operáciami NATO v Líbyi. V rámci svojej diplomatickej kariéry pôsobil ako zástupca riaditeľa pre bojové operácie NATO, politický poradca Amerických ozbrojených síl v Afganistane či pozorovateľ prímeria v Kosove v roku 1998. Svoje skúsenosti získal aj ako praktikant Ministerstva zahraničných vecí USA v kancelárii senátora J. Rockefellera.

Neformálne stretnutie prebiehalo v priateľskej atmosfére. Ako uviedol, nielen Slovensko je naďalej konfrontované s takými javmi ako korupcia či otázkou dodržiavania menšinových práv [...]. USA majú veľký záujem byť súčasťou diskusie o týchto témach, plnohodnotným partnerom a spojencom Slovenska. Vyjadril svoje potešenie z úspechu Slovenska, ako jednej z krajín post-sovietskeho bloku, ktorá sa stala súčasťou NATO a EÚ, pričom na tomto úspechu participovali aj USA. Avšak nielen Slovensko, ale aj ostatné európske krajiny sa naďalej – obzvlášť dnes – nachádzajú v náročnom procese budovania demokracie (*unfinished democracy*), s ktorým majú USA svoje vlastné skúsenosti. Nejde pritom iba o otázku plnohodnotnej inklúzie menšín do spoločnosti, ale aj o také výzvy, akou je súčasná migračná kríza, ktorá dnes rezonuje v médiách a rozdeľuje spoločnosť naprieč všetkými európskymi krajinami. V súvislosti s demokraciou dnes namiesto participácie intenzívnejšie zaznieva volanie po rovnosti v príležitostiach a možnostiach. Súčasná Európska únia čelí

rôznym nástrahám, pričom tak ako jej vznik aj riešenie jej problémov sa ukázali v politickej rovine ako jednoduché, no v praktickej rovine veľmi náročné.

Prítomní účastníci položili hosťovi viaceré zaujímavé a podnetné otázky. Pán chargé d'affaires prezentoval svoje názory v súvislosti s otázkami prijatia Ukrajiny do štruktúr NATO a EÚ, vzájomných vzťahov EÚ, USA a Ruska, schopnosťou Ukrajiny prijať európsku menu či potenciálneho víťazstva D. Trumpa v prezidentských voľbách v USA. Zaujímal nás jeho názor, či je administratíva prezidenta B. Obamu vo Washingtone sklamaná zo súčasného procesu negociácií v otázke prijatia Zmluvy o transatlantickom partnerstve v oblasti obchodu a investícií (TTIP). Nielen na tomto mieste L. Wasley pripomenul jej výhody pre stredných a malých podnikateľov, ale aj stratený čas, ktorý bol dôsledkom zdĺhavých vyjednávaní na úrovni EÚ. Napriek tomu, jej prijatie do veľkej miery závisí aj na úlohe a moci amerického Senátu, vrátane názorového súhlasu s jej prijatím v jednotlivých agrikultúrnych federálnych štátoch USA.

Inštitút politológie vyjadruje svoje poďakovanie Veľvyslanectvu USA na Slovensku a chargé d'affaires L. Wasleymu za prejavovaný záujem o vzájomné stretnutie na neformálnej úrovni a vedenie spoločnej odbornej diskusie s členmi akademickej obce a študentmi denného štúdia politológie.

INŠTITÚT POLITOLÓGIE PARTICIPOVAL NA MEDZINÁRODNÝCH KONFERENCIÁCH O SLOVENSKO-UKRAJINSKEJ CEZHRANIČNEJ SPOLUPRÁCI

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Dňa 29. februára 2016 sa na Ukrajine v priestoroch rektorátu Užhorodskej národnej univerzity v Užhorode konala úvodná medzinárodná konferencia k projektu financovanému z Nórskeho finančného mechanizmu a štátneho rozpočtu Slovenskej republiky v rámci programu SK08 – Cezhraničná spolupráca: „Slovensko – Ukrajina: Spolupráca naprieč hranicou“. Tento projekt zainteresovaní poznajú pod skratkou CBC 01018 a oficiálny názov projektu znie: „Zdieľanie know-how pre lepší manažment Schengenskej hranice medzi Slovenskom/Ukrajinou a Nórskom/Ruskom“. Partnerom projektu je aj Inštitút politológie Filozofickej fakulty Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove, ktorý bol na konferencii zastúpený členom inštitútu Michalom Cirnerom. Ten v rámci plnárneho zasadnutia v pracovnej časti konferencie vystúpil s príspevkom „Úloha partnerov v projekte CBC 01018“. Samotné podujatie otvorili: dekan Fakulty spoločenských vied Užhorodskej národnej univerzity v Užhorode Jurij Ostapets, za Generálny konzulát Slovenskej republiky v Užhorode Jana Dvorecká, Vla-

dimír Benč zo Slovenskej spoločnosti pre zahraničnú politiku a Mykola Kushnir z Národného inštitútu strategických štúdií v Kyjeve. Počas vedeckej časti konferencie odzneli viaceré zaujímavé príspevky. Prorektorka Užhorodskej národnej univerzity v Užhorode Myroslava Lendel vystúpila s príspevkom „Vojna s Ruskom ako dôvod migrácie na Ukrajinu a z Ukrajiny“. Zástupca oddelenia Západnej regionálnej správy štátnych hraníc Ukrajiny Andrij Hitt prezentoval príspevok s názvom: „Hraničná štátna služba Ukrajiny: súčasný stav ochrany ukrajinsko-slovenskej štátnej hranice“. Za prešovskú pobočku Slovenskej spoločnosti pre zahraničnú politiku vystúpil Martin Angeľovič, ktorý prezentoval tému „Modely migrácie na slovensko-ukrajinskej hranici“.

Ďalším z radu podujatí v rámci programu SK08 – Cezhraničná spolupráca: „Slovensko – Ukrajina: Spolupráca naprieč hranicou“ bola medzinárodná vedecko-praktická konferencia s názvom „Regionálna politika na Ukrajine v kontexte integrácie a bezpečnosti európskeho priestoru: výmena reformných skúseností“,

ktorá sa uskutočnila dňa 11. mája 2016 v Užhorode na pôde Užhorodskej národnej univerzity. Celý projekt je podporovaný z Nórskeho finančného mechanizmu a štátneho rozpočtu Slovenskej republiky. Táto konferencia sa konala v rámci projektu CBC 01014: „Zdieľanie know-how z európskej integrácie a skúseností z cezhraničnej spolupráce medzi Nórskom, Ruskom a Ukrajinou“. Rozsiahly program podujatia pozostával z troch tematických blokov, v rámci ktorých účastníci prezentovali svoje príspevky a otvorili diskusiu k problematike regionálneho rozvoja v EÚ a na Ukrajine, taktiež k otázkam regionálnej politiky a reformy verejnej správy na Ukrajine. Medzinárodná konferencia poskytla zúčastneným akademikom, zástupcom regionálnych inštitúcií či expertom na regionálnu politiku a verejnú správu priestor pre podnetnú diskusiu o výzvach i problémoch regionálnej politiky na Ukrajine v kontexte jej administratívno-územnej reformy. Podujatie zároveň vytvorilo priestor pre vzájomnú výmenu praktických skúseností s reformou verejnej správy na Ukrajine a v krajinách EÚ (vrátane Slovenska).

Medzi pozvanými hosťami bola aj Janka Burianová, generálna konzulka Slovenskej republiky v Užhorode. Tá v príhovore vyjadrila svoje potešenie z realizovaného projektu a zdôraznila potrebu permanentného úsilia o napredovanie v rozvoji cezhraničnej spolupráce medzi Slovenskom a Ukrajinou nielen z hľadiska podpory cezhraničného obchodu a ekonomických stykov, ale aj s ohľadom na vzájomnú výmenu informácií a praktických skúseností medzi oboma krajinami v kontexte asociačnej dohody podpísanej zo strany Ukrajiny. Zo Slovenskej republiky mal na konferencii svoje zastúpenie Inštitút politológie Filozofickej fakulty Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove (ako jeden z riešiteľských partnerov projektu) v osobe Vladislava Dudinského, Michala Cirnera a Gabriela Székelyho. Vladislav Dudinský vystúpil s príspevkom „Metódy výskumu cezhraničnej spolupráce“. Michal Cirner hovoril o skúsenostiach s reformou verejnej správy na Slovensku a Gabriel Székely analyzoval vo svojom vystúpení skúsenosti Slovenska a iných štátov s tzv. participatívnym rozpočtom. S pre-

zentáciou piatich rámcových okruhov medzinárodného projektu vrátane analýzy regionálnej politiky EÚ a Slovenska vystúpil v úvodnom paneli Vladimír Benč zo Slovenskej spoločnosti pre zahraničnú politiku.

Slovenskí partneri projektu adresovali viaceré dôležité odporúčania, ako aj praktické skúsenosti s procesom reformy verejnej správy, jej decentralizáciou a nedostatkami, ktoré v tomto procese vyvstali. Ako podstatný odkaz naďalej ostáva nutnosť Ukrajiny v pokračovaní usilovnej a kontinuálnej práce na budovaní a implementácii politiky regionálneho rozvoja. Práve táto politika sa pre regionálny rozvoj Ukrajiny ukazuje ako kruciálna nielen s ohľadom na splnenie kritérií pre vstup do EÚ. Regionálna politika je dôležitá aj pre samotné vyrovnávanie veľkých regionálnych rozdielov, ktoré na Ukrajine existujú rovnako ako na malom území Slovenska. Možno pripomenúť, že cesta Slovenska do EÚ trvala od podpisu asociačnej dohody (1992) 12 rokov, počas ktorých sa regionálna politika ukázala ako jedna z najproblémovejších oblastí kvôli splneniu mnohých podmienok zo strany EÚ. Úspešnosť ekonomických reforiem v podstatnej miere závisí aj od procesu reformy verejnej správy. Aj na Slovensku existuje viacero problémov – malé obce či chudobné regióny vyžadujú špecifický prístup, neschopnosť malých obcí podniknúť ekonomický rozvoj na lokálnej úrovni, rezignácia komunálnych politických elít na vlastnú politiku, prílišná orientácia na štrukturálne fondy EÚ či nevybudovaná dopravná infraštruktúra. Zodpovednosť avšak neleží výlučne „na pleciach“ vlády a jej programových prioritách. Potrebná je aj vyššia miera participácie občanov na verejnom rozhodovaní, podpora vzájomného spájania malých obcí či spoločného partnerstva verejného a súkromného sektoru.

Spomenutými konferenciami projektové aktivity nekončia, práve naopak. V blízkej budúcnosti budú v rámci jednotlivých projektov realizované ešte ďalšie podujatia a výskumné aktivity, na ktorých bude Inštitút politológie participovať.