Introduction

In our modern world, Kant’s ideas are present and vivid, sometimes hidden or assimilated, so that their origin is not entirely evident. One reason for this may lie in the radicalism of Kant’s thought, in the original sense of the word: it goes to and around the “root” of our understanding, judging and acting as a sensual rational being. It is reason that proves to be the root of human nature – the faculty of the human being which can ensure his survival his specific natural setting; people, like no other species of living organisms, rely on the creation of conscious coexistence, as their instincts and urges do not have sufficient guiding force. What this “conscious form” is is given several explanations in Kant’s philosophy. It begins with the following injunction: think on your own, that is, give yourself laws, bind yourself to rules, or in Kantian terms: oblige yourself to what is required – i.e. lay down a duty for yourself.

Kant’s Enlightenment ideals encourage his contemporaries – and those of us who read his works today – to use their own reason: his lectures on logic and metaphysics instruct students to philosophise independently rather than engaging in a mere “learning of the philosophy”; the anthropology lectures guide the educated public towards self-comprehension as “world citizens”; the lectures on Physical Geography illustrate theoretical knowledge of the world with the passing of pre-and early scientific observations of the geographical, biological and cultural particularities of other continents… This knowledge entered the canon of 19th century in the ideal of a civic education and expresses the versatility and practical relevance of human reason.

Related to the topic of cosmopolitanism is the question of whether reason can be perceived as theoretical reflection or as having an ultimate practical goal, which allows us rational knowledge of what a “community” is and what can and must essentially obtain in order for humans to survive. The understanding of community

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1 I. KANT’s works are cited in accordance with Akademie-Ausgabe (AA), Berlin 1911ff.
is in turn a precondition and basis of social order, the state, a “community”, which has a binding legal system or carries the ideal of our hope for a better world, “The Kingdom of God on Earth”. When running through the clarification of a priori conditions of human life, the questions: “What can I know?” and “What should I do?” are recurrent themes of Kant’s Critiques, and in the end, in the ethical and religious philosophical writings (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Metaphysics of Morals and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone) the question “What can I hope?” is addressed. The answer is known to be rather disillusioning: empirically, hardly any “progress for the better” is evident; it seems as though we are even referred by Kant again to a “beyond”. With the fourth question: “What is man?” – posed, by the way, in the Introduction to the Logic – we are back to anthropology. There has been much discussed about a philosophical, a priori justified or rational-based anthropology according to Kant: What does the critical-rational transcendental philosophy reveal about the nature of man? Can it say anything, or should it be left to the empirically progressive Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View?

These debates will not be pursued further. The clarifications introduced above intend to illustrate the versatility of Kant’s thinking, which does not imply its heterogeneity: quite the contrary, they repeatedly and substantially suggest nothing else than the realisation of the rational-being in all its aspects – a realisation which must be completed over again, as it has not yet been concluded as a “project of social progress for the better”. It is the natural disposition of reason, which makes man capable of community, which does not reduce the person to her individuality but allows a self-understanding according to which her given isolated organism counts as a natural condition, but not as an end. According to Kant, every human being is an end in himself, since he represents humanity in his person, not because of any “self-realisation” with regards to his individual peculiarities. Acting with this in mind is the groundwork of morality. Kant’s cosmopolitanism, or the idea of establishing a cosmopolitan world as a whole, allows for the development of all existing capabilities of the human species; it has, therefore, an ethical basis that is worth focussing on also within the horizon of any political philosophy. This close and necessary relationship between ethics and social theory exists primarily with regard to contents; so, the moral-philosophical system of the Metaphysics of Morals includes both a theory of rights and a theory of virtue, but it is also constituted methodologically, because “considered objectively, there can be only one human reason, there cannot be many philosophies; in other words, there can be only one true system of philosophy from principles”2.

Only the self-understanding of man as a being capable of morality, which is

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2 Kant, I.: Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA 06: 207; in: Kant: Practical Philosophy, transl. by Mary Gregor, p. 366f
associated with this ability, and to which he commits his morality, i.e. he makes his own free will the basis for his action, can develop into a policy that regards the individual as part and representative of the whole, and does not consider individuals as a corrupt herd of mere voters.

Theory (ethics) and practice (politics) thus cannot be separated in philosophical reflection. Moral education in theory means "the formation" of a world citizen in practice. This is clearly presented by Kant in his *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*.

Kant clearly requests a systematic harmony of all aspects of theoretical and practical philosophy, rooted in reason, in the little paper *On the Common Saying: “That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice”* of 1793. Kant examines the relationship between theory and practice in the form of three replies, which he makes to the writings of Garve, Mendelssohn and Hobbes. It deals with the validity and the necessary agreement between theory and practice in relation to morality ("with a view to the well-being of every human being"), in terms of constitutional law ("with reference to the well-being of States"), and in concepts of international law ("with a view to the well-being of the human race as a whole")

Kant does so by succession to the position of private and business man, statesman and man of the world (world citizen). Crucial for our considerations here is the result of Kant’s assumptions in this debate about the theory, “which is based on the concept of duty”

A special task of philosophy is and remains the provision of “the access to the right of free movement in order to enable the realisation of the Republican idea within a state and society”, as describes Ernst R. Sandvoss very concisely in his characterisation of *The Conflict of the Faculties*, in which Kant puts into opposition the Faculty of Arts against the Theological Faculty, the Law Faculty against the Faculty of Medicine: “the supreme principle of philosophy is not utility, but truth,” says Sandvoss, and at the same time “philosophy draws its lessons neither from the Bible nor from the common law or medicine, but from the intellectual freedom that every society needs […] freedom of thought, freedom of speech,

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3 Kant, I.: Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis, AA 08: 277; transl. ibid., p. 281
4 Ibid., AA 08: 276f; transl. ibid., p. 280
5 Ibid, AA 08: 277; transl. p. 280. Kant explains further: “For here it is a matter of the canon of reason (in the practical), where the worth of practice rests entirely on its conformity with the theory underlying it, and all is lost if the empirical and hence contingent conditions of carrying out the law are made conditions of the law itself, so that a practice calculated with reference to an outcome probable in accordance with previous experience is given authority to control a self-sufficient theory.”
freedom of writing”6.

The intellectual freedom of a society can only be created and preserved by its “enlightened” members, whose self-understanding is that of rational and morally responsible people. Each real commonwealth, if it has the character of a community, and is as such truly effective, assumes an appropriate awareness of the related individuals – they are the guarantors of the “intellectual freedom” which, although it might be prevented from the outside, cannot be given.

The roots of human morality

Kant believes that man is a moral being, that it belongs to his nature to be moral. Therefore, it is no coincidence that man distinguishes good from evil, and that this distinction provides the criterion of judgment for his actions. According to Kant, these anthropological constants of “morality” cannot be sufficiently explained by a biologically anchored instinct triggered by external conditions, occurring in humans as compassion or moral “sense”. Any empirical reflection and justification of human morality, or virtue, comes up against its limits through the impossibility of finding the generally applicable principles, necessary regardless of whether they are meant as expressions of the principle of moral philosophy or as specific maxims for action. The theory of human morality, proceeding the empirical way, must therefore remain hypothetical and can strictly speaking provide nothing more than a historical description of customs, cultural traditions and social-regulatory functions; referring to contingent facts or past events interpreted as relations of cause and effect, such a theory does not allow any forward-looking perspective7.

For Kant, it is thus no question that a purely descriptive account of human morality is not adequate and therefore that the practical philosophy which deals with human behaviour, the pursuit of happiness and life in the community, proceeds a priori, i.e. moral principles must be justified a priori. A comprehensive argument against empirical moral philosophy can be found in the preface of to the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785). The fact that a “pure” moral philosophy (i.e. one “cleansed” of everything empirical) must exist does not require any argument, says Kant, because “it is evident from the common idea of duty and moral laws”; it is based “in itself”8. Does he appeal to common sense or reason when he says: “Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a

7 However, David Hume has shown clearly that this can only be a “weak” causal necessity without universal validity, depending on the external conditions to which we have no impact - (cf. David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding).
ground of obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the command, “thou shalt not lie” does not hold only for human beings, as if other rational beings did not have to heed it, and so with all other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the human being or in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in concepts of pure reason […]”.

Before searching for the moral principle (in the “pure” philosophical meaning) and the roots of morality (in the anthropological sense), Kant assumes that it is evident that each obligation based in law or in command must have its foundations in concepts of reason. What constitutes morality is “Verbindlichkeit”: the voluntary acceptance of orders / laws, considered by all humans as universally valid. According to Kant, the possibility of doing so must be anchored in the idea of “law” and “duty”, i.e. within clear concepts of reason, since their meaning is known and comprehensible to everyone, regardless of one’s own experience or reflection on that particular experience. To be able to oblige oneself to rules and laws, as well as to subjective principles (maxims), is to be able to determine one’s own will. The opposite would be a mere reaction to sensory stimuli and that alone. Whether this is done consciously or unconsciously, for the level of reflection is inconsequential, it is crucial that the human will is not only motivated by inclinations, desires and needs, but that it works as a conscious ability or characteristic feature of a person who can handle anything, is capable of moving anything, of giving himself laws and at the same time committing to them. This is called “autonomy” (self-legislation) or freedom of the will in the true sense of the word. While psychology examines the conditions, moral philosophy, according to Kant, has to deal with “the idea and the principles of a possible pure will”.

We can thus summarise that Kant sees the roots of morality in the comprehensibility of the concepts of law and duty to all rational beings, and in the will, which is nothing other than practical reason itself. Or, as Kant also states: “The will is a capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good.” In other words, the practically essential is what one is ordered to do – what is “ordered” or laid down by a “law”, “rule” or “principle”. Only a rational being has the ability to represent laws and to follow them, i.e. to act in accordance with principles. Reason “cognizes its highest practical vocation in the establishment of a good will,” where “good will” is meant to be a concept dwelling “in natural sound understanding,” which “needs

9 Kant, I.: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA 04: 389; transl.: Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge 1996.
10 Ibid, AA 04: 390f.
11 “Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason.” Ibid, AA 04: 412; engl. transl. p. 66
12 Ibid, AA 04: 412; transl. p. 66
not so much to be taught as only to be clarified”¹³. Moral philosophy ultimately serves to give “laws a priori, which no doubt still require a judgement sharpened by experience” to a rational being, to assess the circumstances and the manner in which the “rational commandments” are being used, so that the rational being not only comes to identify them, but also to implement them – as Kant says, to make “the idea of a practical pure reason […] effective in concreto in the conduct of his [the rational being’s] life”¹⁴. In practice, the insight into duty is always our own inclination, pleasant and unpleasant feeling – it is the faculty of judgement that can give to duty the emphasis it needs in order to determine the faculty of choice. Therefore every moral reflection can be directed towards philosophical reflection on the one hand, and on the other hand towards the “clarification” of concepts which have been “misunderstood” by everyone.

**The principle of human morality – the principle of pure moral philosophy**

Moral-philosophical reflection thus leads to the “discovery” of the principle of morality; Kant also speaks about the discovery of the moral law – Kant research leads almost cyclically towards discussions of the origin and validity of the categorical imperative.

From the time of the writing of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant performs a philosophical investigation of law, namely via the analysis of the concepts for the derivation of duty, with the goal of making them the basic or supreme principle of morality. Its establishment is to be connected to the “discovery” or “derivation.” This is precisely the program of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. With the aim of seeking and establishing “the supreme principle of morality”¹⁵, it provides the groundwork for a critique of (pure) practical reason, which must systematically precede a “metaphysics of morals” in the same way as the critique of pure (theoretical) reason precedes any general metaphysics. The systematic structure of Kant’s moral philosophy corresponds to the close connection between theory and practice – concepts, already known (and legitimated) by common sense, are commented on and explained, a process which leads to a new and deeper philosophical insight. This is how moral formation is considered methodologically.

The result of conceptual analysis (desire, duty and right), which Kant carries out in the “Groundwork,” is well known: “the supreme principle of morality,” which Kant calls the “categorical imperative,” “fact of reason” – reason’s own law, created

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¹⁴ Ibid, AA 04: 389; transl. p. 45
¹⁵ Ibid, AA 04: 392; transl. p. 47
by itself and included in itself. Let us follow Kant in his “search and establishment.”

After reflecting on the will which (insofar as determined by practical reason) becomes a good will, Kant asks about the concept of duty: What is it which is our duty, what should be, what is there an obligation to do? First, there is an obligation to survive. The background is clear: as a single specimen, I must stay alive in order to represent the human species, humanity as such. The “being alive” is more than mere survival: I must develop my physical appearance besides developing the related skills of reason and the associated consciousness. Kant further notes: “to be beneficent where one can is a duty” – and that directly applies to all other people, but also indirectly to myself, for the securing of one’s happiness fundamentally reduces the temptation to neglect one’s duty, which grows with worries and discontent. Importantly, this indicates a higher purpose in consciousness, moving from inclination and desire to seeking one’s own happiness and well-being, which is natural, and therefore not morally relevant; our own well-being can be considered a (indirect) duty and therefore morally relevant only when we regard it as facilitating the performance of duty. The fact that the promotion of well-being should be exercised towards others, and should be done out of duty sounds quite banal indeed. Kant however differentiates between the duty of charity and charity as a command as, for example, the Christian doctrine dictates, and points out that love or affection cannot be required – no feeling of affection can be enforced. Beneficence towards others, without affection, even in spite of aversion, purely from duty: this is, following Kant, practical love lying “in the will” and “in principles of action,” and not “in the propensity of feeling” or “in melting sympathy”.

It is clear that from the discussion about the content of the concept of duty, the moral value of an action lies in the maxim, the subjective principle, which it expresses; hence the moral value of actions depends only on the “principle of the will,” and is independent of the expected impact of the action and of any longed-for reality, i.e. it is independent of all material ends. The concept of obligation can be formally defined as “necessity of an action from respect for law.” Kant concludes: “Hence nothing other than the representation of the law in itself, which can of course occur only in a rational being, insofar as it and not the hoped-for effect is the determining ground of the will, can constitute the preeminent good we call moral, which is already present in the person itself who acts in accordance with this representation […]”.

Thus what remains as a “determining ground of the will,” as a motive for

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16 Kant distinguishes acts of duty from only (externally) dutiful action.
17 Kant, I.: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA 04: 398; transl. p. 53
19 Ibid, AA 04: 400, transl. p. 55
20 Ibid, AA 04: 401; transl. p. 56
moral action, is “the conformity of actions as such with universal law”\(^{21}\), a formal principle that I, an individual, want my individual (subjective) maxims to come into compliance with what is determined by reason (the law itself, the dictate of reason). In other words: If I do what must be done, then it is good, then I am ready to do what has to be done – what is required. Kant finds several formulations for the situations which are discussed in Kantian research as formulations of the categorical imperative. The most famous is: “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”\(^{22}\). Categorical – unrestricted, unconditional – validity is specific to the moral imperative, because it contains nothing besides the necessity of the maxim, nothing but the subjective principle of conformity to law and reason, no substantive provisions for particular acts and goals (as opposed to hypothetical imperatives, such as those of wisdom, the fall).

The supreme principle of morality is initially an instruction without any precise content\(^{23}\), which simply expresses that it is possible to determine one’s own will in such a way that its end will be humanity itself. Kant explains the formal imperative in detail, by speaking of the kingdom of ends, where everything has a price or a dignity: However, “that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity”\(^{24}\). We are talking about the dignity of humanity; for human beings (like any rational being) exist as ends in themselves, such that none of them is ever to be considered and treated merely as means to another end, but always at the same time as an end in himself. This view is based on the so-called “formula of humanity” of the categorical imperative: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”\(^{25}\).

Kant’s concern of moral philosophy is very clear here. Human reason, man’s “nature” itself, guarantees not only the necessary but also the universal validity of the moral law. Namely, it brings forth an ideal of the kingdom of ends, in terms of which the “systematic union of various rational beings through common laws”\(^{26}\) is to be understood, where rational beings are legislators and subjects to the all-applicable laws at the same time – therein lies their dignity, in the capacity for commitment, to associate freely with all that is in favour of the community of

\(^{21}\) Ibid, AA 04: 402; transl. p. 56
\(^{22}\) Ibid, AA 04: 421; transl. p. 73
\(^{23}\) There is a talk of the supreme good (summum bonum) in the „Critique of Practical Reason“, whereby the highest good presents itself as virtue and happiness together.
\(^{24}\) Kant, I.: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA 04: 435; transl. p. 84
\(^{25}\) Ibid, AA 04: 429; transl. p. 80
\(^{26}\) Ibid, AA 04: 433ff; transl. p. 83
mankind, regardless of one's own needs and inclinations, because there is a higher purpose: it is not about the individual, but about any person as part of humanity, the own one included. Kant's idea of community is his constant concern; it is further developed, or specified, by the civil commonwealth towards the ideals of an ethical society and the invisible church, which play an important role in his late work, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*.

**Kant’s cosmopolitanism**

Kant’s cosmopolitan idea and theory are of utmost relevance within the Kantian research. All the ideas presented below show that Kant’s remarks on cosmopolitanism relate directly to moral philosophy. In philosophy itself, cosmopolitanism on the one hand pertains to anthropology. On the other hand, it pertains to political philosophy or the philosophy of history. What unites both aspects is the enlightened intent, the conviction that the development of individual self-understanding and the growing awareness of the individual basis of progress is in the great horizon of the universe. The individual, from the cosmopolitan perspective, is a resident of earth, a world citizen, and a representative of humanity – the one who creates and is responsible for his own development as well as the destiny of every generation. Kant answers the question “What is man?” in a pragmatic way with “[…] what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can or should make of himself”\(^{28}\). This requires knowledge of “things in the world” provided by special sciences (geography, anthropology, biology, climatology, etc.), but which nevertheless must be “ordered and directed through philosophy”\(^{29}\). Kant intended to give this guidance – the injunction to think for oneself, in order to improve understanding of human consciousness, i.e. the capacity of reason for self-understanding as a citizen of the world – in his lecture on *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, which was published as his last published writing in printed form in 1798. With the second aspect of cosmopolitanism, in concepts of political philosophy or philosophy of history, Kant’s attempt to capture the cultural and civilizing development of

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\(^{27}\) Several publications have appeared in recent years, which are received and discussed intensively. To mention only some of the most important ones, I would like to highlight the following anthologies with contributions by numerous authors (Flikschuh, Kleingeld, Höffe, Gerhardt, Castillo, Bourgeois): Kant cosmopolitique. Hrsg. von Yves Charles Zarka und Caroline Guibet Lafaye. Paris 2008. Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’. A Critical Guide. Ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty und James Schmidt. Cambridge 2009; as well as Rendtorff, Jacob Dahl: Enlightened Cosmopolitanism – Kant as a Mediator in the Debate Between Communitarianism and Liberalism. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik (Berlin) 17, 2009, 171–181. XI. International Kant Congress in Pisa in 2010 dedicated to the topic: “Kant e la filosofia in senso politico”.

\(^{28}\) Kant, I.: *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, AA 07: 119; transl. and ed. by Robert B. Louden, Cambridge 2006, p.3

mankind\textsuperscript{30} is primarily documented in the \textit{Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose} (1784). The difficulty is obvious: the real tangled course of world history is not considered as if “rational beings” act in it according to plan; so how can a philosopher show that the history of apparently randomly acting creatures still meaningfully follows a progressive plan of nature? We are here not to decide whether Kant succeeded in arguing for the progress of human history toward a better condition. The results of his considerations are in short as follows: Reason is a natural ability in people to help them develop all their natural talents perfectly and completely, but as reason does not “work” instinctively, it must be taught and practiced – where a single human life is not sufficient to achieve significant progress. Therefore, this development is related to the species as a whole. To support this development, nature makes use of “antagonism\	extsuperscript{31}. Kant speaks in this context of the “unsocial sociability” of man: there is the inner contradiction between sensibility and reason; the individual is in conflict with others; peoples and states fight each other. The overcoming of contradictions and conflicts at different levels encourages the development of natural abilities, among which are also morality and social accord. According to Kant, state constitutions, even all the contractual regulation of relations between states to secure peace, are consequences of “antagonism” at this level. Kant concludes: “The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally – and for this purpose also externally – perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely”\textsuperscript{32}. Kant speaks of the desirable association of already “founded states” to “The League of Nations”. This shall, however, regulate only the mutual relations of states. On the inside, the states are free; internally, their task is to constitute a “civil commonwealth,” to allow for citizens’ inner moral development rather than hindering them:

“But as long as states apply all their resources to their vain and violent schemes of expansion, thus incessantly obstructing the slow and laborious efforts of their citizens to cultivate their minds, and even deprive them of all support in these efforts, no progress in this direction can be expected. For a long internal process of careful work on the part of each commonwealth is necessary for the education of its citizens. But all good enterprises which are not grafted on to a morally good attitude of mind are nothing but illusion and outwardly glittering misery. The hu-


\textsuperscript{31} Kant, I.: Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, AA 08: 19 ff

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, AA 08: 27; Political Writings, transl. by H. B. Nisbet, ed. H. Reiss, Cambridge 2nd ed. 1991, p. 50
man race will no doubt remain in this condition until it has worked itself out of the chaotic state of its political relations in the way I have described”33,34.

Conclusion

Kant’s concept of reason, which faces various tasks from the theoretical and practical points of view (though it remains one and the same), is very differentiated: The fact that we humans have reason means much more than the fact that we are “rational beings;” in fact, the coaction of thinking and sensibility, will and judgement, constitutes the complex natural disposition of “Vernunft,” which insofar as “enlightened,” trained and practiced, enables us to be moral. The human being is thus constantly called on to “think for oneself [Selbstdenken].” The Kantian imperative of enlightenment “Have the courage to use your mind!” (Sapere aude!) aims not only for further knowledge and training in the conventional sense, but primarily for the formation of moral identity. To see through one’s motives is the first step towards the “moralisation” of one’s own actions; a sober-minded attitude enables decisions against one’s own inclinations in the favour of community, and results from knowledge and experience of the competition of “rational” and egocentric principles in one’s own consciousness: the conviction that because of the generic character of reason people do not differ substantially, only in their form of appearance, must arise initially from reflection – not necessarily scientific and philosophical reflection, but primarily as a result of the “enlightened” self-understanding.

The independent insights requiring “veracity” of thought, speech and action, brought forth by reason’s “Selbstdenken,” cannot be ignored35. The potential of Kantian philosophy is far from exhausted; “enlightenment” in this sense is sorely needed throughout the world and will probably never be concluded.

Translation: Eva Zelizňaková

33 Ibid, AA 08: 26; Political Writings, p. 49
34 It is no coincidence that a philosophy of consciousness, tolerance and community arises with Kant in the late Enlightenment in Europe – the old continent with cultural and religious diversity, in which each individual battles for his own different traditions, where each enriches the other, and where each must, at least, live side by side (and also today can live relatively peacefully). The “Kantian way” towards an integrated post-national European identity is vigorously illustrated by Jean-Marc Ferry, a professor of philosophy and political science at the Free University of Brussels (Université Libre de Bruxelles) in public seminars, lectures and numerous publications, see especially Ferry, J.-M.: Europe, la voie kantienne. Paris: Cerf 2005.
Zhrnutie

Mravná výchova (Bildung) a svetoobčianstvo podľa Kanta

Kantovo učenie o právach osôb a národov, jeho teória ľudských práv a právnej štátnosti sú diskutované aj nad rámec odboru filozofie, aby sa našiel vchod do existujúcich právnych a štátnych ústav, a je nepochybné, že Kant sa spája s OSN. V tomto príspevku ide o poukázanie na ešte stále aktuálny význam, ktorý môže mať Kantova etika pre spoločný život ľudí v rozmanitých spoločnostiach a spoločenstvách. Z tohto dôvodu sú ďalej nastolované základné princípy Kantovej etiky, aby sa stali pochopiteľnými účinnosť a najmä široký horizont týchto morálno-filozofických reflexií. Morálne formovanie, zdokonalovanie, ako ho chápe Kant, je bezpodmienčný predpoklad pre svetoobčianske vedomie; Kantovo ponímanie môže byť plodným ešte i dnes, aby sa mohol úspešne rozvíjať spoločný život ľudí z heterogénnych kultúr a tradícií (napríklad v úzkom európskom priestore, ale tiež i s ohľadom na výzvy globalizácie). Bildung sa pritom v prvom pláne nechápe ako výchovná a indoktrinujúca aktivita, ale predovšetkým ako v ľudskej prirodzenosti založený vývoj osobnosti z pohnútok individuálneho rozumu až k sebapochopeniu ako rodovej rozumnej bytosti.

Zusammenfassung

Moralische Bildung und Kosmopolitismus bei Kant


Margit Ruffing